# threads

id: 019fde96-ce8c-7a03-bf66-390f3b4b2b45
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/credproof
title: Reply with exactly the token CREDPROOF-OK and nothing else
approval_mode: never
cli_version: 0.146.0
first_user_message: Reply with exactly the token CREDPROOF-OK and nothing else
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
thread_source: user
preview: Reply with exactly the token CREDPROOF-OK and nothing else
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/07/rollout-2026-08-07T23-37-33-019fde96-ce8c-7a03-bf66-390f3b4b2b45.jsonl

sandbox_policy:
  {"type":"managed","file_system":{"type":"restricted","entries":[{"path":{"type":"special","value":{"kind":"root"}},"access":"read"}]},"network":"restricted"}


id: 019fde9c-d8cf-76a3-9535-259e93a8927a
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/seat-bundle-portability-c96546fabcfb
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 1733b23aaa144542f80e026fcbccf823980fdc29
git_branch: wt/seat-bundle-portability
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/07/rollout-2026-08-07T23-44-08-019fde9c-d8cf-76a3-9535-259e93a8927a.jsonl

title:
  Re-review the complete uncommitted harness portability diff after fixes. Intent: released remote-seat works in target repos without modules/harness; prompt plaintext must never enter the target repository/mirror and must be cleaned from private remote job storage on all known start failures, preflight refusals, normal exits, and signals; unknown dispatch outcomes must not race-delete a live runner; runtime overlays must be cleaned after known terminal outcomes; credential and container containment and exit contracts remain intact. Report-only, do not edit. Report only verified P1/P2 correctness, security, or portability defects with file:line and concrete failure scenario. If none, output CLEAN.

first_user_message:
  Re-review the complete uncommitted harness portability diff after fixes. Intent: released remote-seat works in target repos without modules/harness; prompt plaintext must never enter the target repository/mirror and must be cleaned from private remote job storage on all known start failures, preflight refusals, normal exits, and signals; unknown dispatch outcomes must not race-delete a live runner; runtime overlays must be cleaned after known terminal outcomes; credential and container containment and exit contracts remain intact. Report-only, do not edit. Report only verified P1/P2 correctness, security, or portability defects with file:line and concrete failure scenario. If none, output CLEAN.

preview:
  Re-review the complete uncommitted harness portability diff after fixes. Intent: released remote-seat works in target repos without modules/harness; prompt plaintext must never enter the target repository/mirror and must be cleaned from private remote job storage on all known start failures, preflight refusals, normal exits, and signals; unknown dispatch outcomes must not race-delete a live runner; runtime overlays must be cleaned after known terminal outcomes; credential and container containment and exit contracts remain intact. Report-only, do not edit. Report only verified P1/P2 correctness, security, or portability defects with file:line and concrete failure scenario. If none, output CLEAN.


id: 019fdeb0-2192-7c23-89ed-e4a600d024e7
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/seat-bundle-portability-c96546fabcfb
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 1733b23aaa144542f80e026fcbccf823980fdc29
git_branch: wt/seat-bundle-portability
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/08/rollout-2026-08-08T00-05-12-019fdeb0-2192-7c23-89ed-e4a600d024e7.jsonl

title:
  Re-review the complete uncommitted harness portability diff after the remote-job-disappeared cleanup fix. Intent: released remote-seat works in target repos without modules/harness; prompt plaintext must never enter the target repository/mirror and must be cleaned from private remote job storage on all known start failures, preflight refusals, normal exits, and signals; unknown dispatch outcomes must not race-delete a live runner; runtime overlays must be cleaned after every known terminal outcome; credential and container containment and exit contracts remain intact. Report-only, do not edit. Report only verified P1/P2 correctness, security, or portability defects with file:line and concrete failure scenario. If none, output CLEAN.

first_user_message:
  Re-review the complete uncommitted harness portability diff after the remote-job-disappeared cleanup fix. Intent: released remote-seat works in target repos without modules/harness; prompt plaintext must never enter the target repository/mirror and must be cleaned from private remote job storage on all known start failures, preflight refusals, normal exits, and signals; unknown dispatch outcomes must not race-delete a live runner; runtime overlays must be cleaned after every known terminal outcome; credential and container containment and exit contracts remain intact. Report-only, do not edit. Report only verified P1/P2 correctness, security, or portability defects with file:line and concrete failure scenario. If none, output CLEAN.

preview:
  Re-review the complete uncommitted harness portability diff after the remote-job-disappeared cleanup fix. Intent: released remote-seat works in target repos without modules/harness; prompt plaintext must never enter the target repository/mirror and must be cleaned from private remote job storage on all known start failures, preflight refusals, normal exits, and signals; unknown dispatch outcomes must not race-delete a live runner; runtime overlays must be cleaned after every known terminal outcome; credential and container containment and exit contracts remain intact. Report-only, do not edit. Report only verified P1/P2 correctness, security, or portability defects with file:line and concrete failure scenario. If none, output CLEAN.


id: 019fdeb2-56c6-7931-919e-c52fae165b10
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/multideal-be233aea816b
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 84b06065e950e34df769794a9ab324447738addb
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/multideal.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-luna
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/08/rollout-2026-08-08T00-07-37-019fdeb2-56c6-7931-919e-c52fae165b10.jsonl

title:
  Audience: AI coding agents first.

  Perform repository launch-readiness JUDGEMENT sweep. READ-ONLY: NEVER modify, create, or commit files. Print stdout only.

  OWNED IDS: AC-12, AC-13, AC-14, AC-15, AC-16, AC-20, AC-21, AC-22, AC-23, AC-24, AC-26, AC-28, AC-29, AC-30, AC-31

  Checklist:
  1. Return each owned ID exactly once. NEVER evaluate any other criterion.
  2. Re-derive current-tree verdicts. NEVER inherit `GOLIVE.md` verdicts.
  3. For AC-12, AC-13, AC-16, AC-24: open covering tests. WORKS requires durable outcome assertion: persisted row, API truth, or confirmation surviving reload.
  4. For AC-14, AC-15, AC-20, AC-21, AC-22, AC-23, AC-26, AC-28, AC-29, AC-30: code/config existence is insufficient. Keep UNVERIFIED without dated recorded evidence of real-world behavior.
  5. For AC-31: inspect current implementation and evidence. WORKS requires observed behavior or durable-outcome test.
  6. Cite every evidence claim as `path/to/file.ext:LINE` using opened, resolvable lines.
  7. For non-WORKS, name exact evidence or change required in `whatWouldSettleIt`.

  Output one JSON array; print nothing after it:
  [{ "id": "AC-12", "verdict": "works|broken|missing|unverified", "evidence": "<one to three cited sentences>", "whatWouldSettleIt": "<required when not works>" }]

first_user_message:
  Audience: AI coding agents first.

  Perform repository launch-readiness JUDGEMENT sweep. READ-ONLY: NEVER modify, create, or commit files. Print stdout only.

  OWNED IDS: AC-12, AC-13, AC-14, AC-15, AC-16, AC-20, AC-21, AC-22, AC-23, AC-24, AC-26, AC-28, AC-29, AC-30, AC-31

  Checklist:
  1. Return each owned ID exactly once. NEVER evaluate any other criterion.
  2. Re-derive current-tree verdicts. NEVER inherit `GOLIVE.md` verdicts.
  3. For AC-12, AC-13, AC-16, AC-24: open covering tests. WORKS requires durable outcome assertion: persisted row, API truth, or confirmation surviving reload.
  4. For AC-14, AC-15, AC-20, AC-21, AC-22, AC-23, AC-26, AC-28, AC-29, AC-30: code/config existence is insufficient. Keep UNVERIFIED without dated recorded evidence of real-world behavior.
  5. For AC-31: inspect current implementation and evidence. WORKS requires observed behavior or durable-outcome test.
  6. Cite every evidence claim as `path/to/file.ext:LINE` using opened, resolvable lines.
  7. For non-WORKS, name exact evidence or change required in `whatWouldSettleIt`.

  Output one JSON array; print nothing after it:
  [{ "id": "AC-12", "verdict": "works|broken|missing|unverified", "evidence": "<one to three cited sentences>", "whatWouldSettleIt": "<required when not works>" }]

preview:
  Audience: AI coding agents first.

  Perform repository launch-readiness JUDGEMENT sweep. READ-ONLY: NEVER modify, create, or commit files. Print stdout only.

  OWNED IDS: AC-12, AC-13, AC-14, AC-15, AC-16, AC-20, AC-21, AC-22, AC-23, AC-24, AC-26, AC-28, AC-29, AC-30, AC-31

  Checklist:
  1. Return each owned ID exactly once. NEVER evaluate any other criterion.
  2. Re-derive current-tree verdicts. NEVER inherit `GOLIVE.md` verdicts.
  3. For AC-12, AC-13, AC-16, AC-24: open covering tests. WORKS requires durable outcome assertion: persisted row, API truth, or confirmation surviving reload.
  4. For AC-14, AC-15, AC-20, AC-21, AC-22, AC-23, AC-26, AC-28, AC-29, AC-30: code/config existence is insufficient. Keep UNVERIFIED without dated recorded evidence of real-world behavior.
  5. For AC-31: inspect current implementation and evidence. WORKS requires observed behavior or durable-outcome test.
  6. Cite every evidence claim as `path/to/file.ext:LINE` using opened, resolvable lines.
  7. For non-WORKS, name exact evidence or change required in `whatWouldSettleIt`.

  Output one JSON array; print nothing after it:
  [{ "id": "AC-12", "verdict": "works|broken|missing|unverified", "evidence": "<one to three cited sentences>", "whatWouldSettleIt": "<required when not works>" }]


id: 019fdeb5-337e-7ae1-8126-ed83a9bf4028
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/seathatch-2b31de2c9650
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: da41bab1a47d1d627e781db3ebb8185e60ae8d51
git_branch: wt/seathatch
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-luna
reasoning_effort: high
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/08/rollout-2026-08-08T00-10-44-019fdeb5-337e-7ae1-8126-ed83a9bf4028.jsonl

title:
  Work ONLY inside the git worktree /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/seathatch (never in /home/user/Projects/overdeck itself). Do not touch modules/sandbox/**, any Containerfile, or modules/workstation/claude/bin/local-dispatch-guard.

  GOAL: remove the env-var fail-open HARNESS_SEAT_REMOTE=0 from the harness remote-seat path, so that no environment variable can bring a headless agent seat back onto the workstation. The canonical denial mechanism already exists and stays authoritative: ~/.claude/bin/local-dispatch-guard (exit 97, "headless agent dispatch on this workstation is denied"), which every wrapper (claude.sh:75-83, codex.sh:163-171, ca.sh:136-144) calls before spawning the engine. Its rule: a TTY on fd 0/1/2 (a human is attached) allows local execution; headless does not. That IS the human escape hatch — do NOT invent another one, and do NOT add any new env var.

  EXACT CHANGES — implement all of them, nothing else:

  1. modules/harness/seat/remote-seat.mjs
     In adapterRemotable(), delete the line:
       if (process.env.HARNESS_SEAT_REMOTE === "0") return { ok: false, reason: "kill-switch HARNESS_SEAT_REMOTE=0" };
     Nothing else in this file changes. Leave the HARNESS_SEAT_CONTAINER branch at line ~342 alone.

  2. modules/harness/wrappers/lib/remote-seat.sh
     Delete the line:  [[ "${HARNESS_SEAT_REMOTE:-}" == "0" ]] && return 1
     Update the header comment so it states the truth: enable/disable is CONFIG (modules/harness/seat/seat-remote.json) only; there is no env kill switch; when the launcher says run-locally, local execution is still subject to local-dispatch-guard, which denies a headless dispatch with exit 97. Keep the comment SHORT (comments describe what the code does, never reasoning/history).

  3. modules/harness/seat/README.md
     Line ~34: delete the "HARNESS_SEAT_REMOTE=0 -> kill switch" bullet. Replace with one line stating that remoting is switched off only in seat-remote.json / build-remote.json and that a headless local dispatch is refused with exit 97 by local-dispatch-guard. Keep the HARNESS_SEAT_CONTAINER bullet.

  4. modules/harness/seat/test/seat-contract.test.sh
     Replace the two lines
       HARNESS_SEAT_REMOTE=0 node "$LAUNCHER" --check codex >/dev/null 2>&1
       check "HARNESS_SEAT_REMOTE=0 kill switch forces local" "$?" 1
     with a REGRESSION assertion that the hatch is gone: the same command must now exit 0 ("HARNESS_SEAT_REMOTE=0 no longer forces local"). Everything else in this file is unchanged.

  5. modules/harness/wrappers/claude-classification.test.sh
     This suite currently relies on HARNESS_SEAT_REMOTE=0 to stop the wrapper from dispatching a real remote seat. Replace that with a fixture that removes the seat shim instead of setting an env var:
     - after $tmp is created, do: cp -r "$root" "$tmp/wrappers" ; rm -f "$tmp/wrappers/lib/remote-seat.sh"
       ($root is the wrappers dir; claude.sh computes SKILL_DIR="$(dirname $0)/.." and only uses it for "$SKILL_DIR/wrappers/lib/remote-seat.sh", guarded by `if [[ -f ... ]]`, so the copied wrapper takes the local path with byte-identical code under test.)
     - run_case must invoke  bash "$tmp/wrappers/claude.sh"  instead of  bash "$root/claude.sh".
     - delete HARNESS_SEAT_REMOTE=0 from the env list. Keep everything else (HOME, PATH, CLAUDE_TEST_MODE, _CLAUDE_ENGINE_BIN, the stubbed local-dispatch-guard).
     The suite must still pass unchanged in its assertions.

  6. NEW FILE modules/harness/seat/test/seat-hatch.test.sh (executable, bash, same PASS/FAIL/check helper style as seat-contract.test.sh, exits nonzero if any check fails). It must prove the hatch is closed END TO END through the real wrapper — not by unit-testing a function. Build in $tmp:
     - $tmp/home/.claude/bin/local-dispatch-guard  = a COPY of the real modules/workstation/claude/bin/local-dispatch-guard from this repo (resolve its path relative to the test file). Not a stub.
     - $tmp/bin/claude = a stub that does `touch "$SENTINEL"` and prints {"is_error":false,"session_id":"s","result":"ok"} then exits 0, where SENTINEL is passed via env SEAT_HATCH_SENTINEL. It must also answer `auth status --json` with {"status":"ok"} exit 0 (claude.sh health-checks it).
     - $tmp/ws = a git repo (git init, one commit) used as --workspace.
     - a disabled seat config $tmp/seat-remote-off.json  = a copy of modules/harness/seat/seat-remote.json with "enabled": false.
     - a transport config $tmp/build-remote.json with hosts ["seat-hatch-unreachable.invalid"], port 2222, ssh_user "user", remote_root "/home/user/builds", identity_file "~/.ssh/id_ed25519_buildbox", local_fallback false, local_only [], max_remote_jobs 1.
     Run the REAL modules/harness/wrappers/claude.sh (so the seat shim IS present) with env -i, HOME=$tmp/home, PATH="$tmp/bin:/usr/bin:/bin", and assert three cases:
     A) HARNESS_SEAT_REMOTE=0 set, real (enabled) seat config, BUILD_REMOTE_CONFIG=$tmp/build-remote.json, headless (stdin/stdout/stderr are pipes/files):
        the sentinel file must NOT exist afterwards and rc must not be 0 — the seat was still routed remotely and failed on the unreachable host instead of running on this machine.
     B) HARNESS_SEAT_REMOTE=0 AND HARNESS_SEAT_CONFIG=$tmp/seat-remote-off.json, headless:
        rc must be 97 and the sentinel must NOT exist — with remoting switched off the local path is refused by local-dispatch-guard.
     C) same as B but with a real pty so a human-at-a-terminal is simulated: run it under `script -qec "<command>" /dev/null` (util-linux script; quote carefully, keep env via a small generated runner script in $tmp so nothing depends on shell quoting) — rc must be 0 and the sentinel MUST exist. This proves the human escape still works and that the deny in B is the TTY rule, not a blanket failure.
     Case C must be skipped with a printed SKIP (not a FAIL) only if `script` is not installed. Every case must clean the sentinel before running.

  7. Wire the new test into whatever runner already runs modules/harness/seat/test/seat-contract.test.sh (find it; e.g. a run-tests.sh / test list). If seat-contract.test.sh is discovered by glob, nothing to do — say so.

  CONSTRAINTS:
  - No new env var, no new flag, no fallback that could execute the engine on the workstation.
  - Do not weaken or delete any existing assertion to make a suite pass; if something fails, fix the code, not the test.
  - Do not run anything that forks heavily, no builds, no network beyond the intentional DNS miss to the .invalid host.
  - Run and report the ACTUAL output of: bash modules/harness/seat/test/seat-contract.test.sh ; bash modules/harness/seat/test/seat-hatch.test.sh ; bash modules/harness/wrappers/claude-classification.test.sh ; bash modules/harness/wrappers/ca-identity.test.sh
  - Report honestly: exact pass/fail counts per suite, and anything you could not verify. Do not claim a green you did not observe.
  - Commit nothing. Leave the changes in the worktree.

first_user_message:
  Work ONLY inside the git worktree /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/seathatch (never in /home/user/Projects/overdeck itself). Do not touch modules/sandbox/**, any Containerfile, or modules/workstation/claude/bin/local-dispatch-guard.

  GOAL: remove the env-var fail-open HARNESS_SEAT_REMOTE=0 from the harness remote-seat path, so that no environment variable can bring a headless agent seat back onto the workstation. The canonical denial mechanism already exists and stays authoritative: ~/.claude/bin/local-dispatch-guard (exit 97, "headless agent dispatch on this workstation is denied"), which every wrapper (claude.sh:75-83, codex.sh:163-171, ca.sh:136-144) calls before spawning the engine. Its rule: a TTY on fd 0/1/2 (a human is attached) allows local execution; headless does not. That IS the human escape hatch — do NOT invent another one, and do NOT add any new env var.

  EXACT CHANGES — implement all of them, nothing else:

  1. modules/harness/seat/remote-seat.mjs
     In adapterRemotable(), delete the line:
       if (process.env.HARNESS_SEAT_REMOTE === "0") return { ok: false, reason: "kill-switch HARNESS_SEAT_REMOTE=0" };
     Nothing else in this file changes. Leave the HARNESS_SEAT_CONTAINER branch at line ~342 alone.

  2. modules/harness/wrappers/lib/remote-seat.sh
     Delete the line:  [[ "${HARNESS_SEAT_REMOTE:-}" == "0" ]] && return 1
     Update the header comment so it states the truth: enable/disable is CONFIG (modules/harness/seat/seat-remote.json) only; there is no env kill switch; when the launcher says run-locally, local execution is still subject to local-dispatch-guard, which denies a headless dispatch with exit 97. Keep the comment SHORT (comments describe what the code does, never reasoning/history).

  3. modules/harness/seat/README.md
     Line ~34: delete the "HARNESS_SEAT_REMOTE=0 -> kill switch" bullet. Replace with one line stating that remoting is switched off only in seat-remote.json / build-remote.json and that a headless local dispatch is refused with exit 97 by local-dispatch-guard. Keep the HARNESS_SEAT_CONTAINER bullet.

  4. modules/harness/seat/test/seat-contract.test.sh
     Replace the two lines
       HARNESS_SEAT_REMOTE=0 node "$LAUNCHER" --check codex >/dev/null 2>&1
       check "HARNESS_SEAT_REMOTE=0 kill switch forces local" "$?" 1
     with a REGRESSION assertion that the hatch is gone: the same command must now exit 0 ("HARNESS_SEAT_REMOTE=0 no longer forces local"). Everything else in this file is unchanged.

  5. modules/harness/wrappers/claude-classification.test.sh
     This suite currently relies on HARNESS_SEAT_REMOTE=0 to stop the wrapper from dispatching a real remote seat. Replace that with a fixture that removes the seat shim instead of setting an env var:
     - after $tmp is created, do: cp -r "$root" "$tmp/wrappers" ; rm -f "$tmp/wrappers/lib/remote-seat.sh"
       ($root is the wrappers dir; claude.sh computes SKILL_DIR="$(dirname $0)/.." and only uses it for "$SKILL_DIR/wrappers/lib/remote-seat.sh", guarded by `if [[ -f ... ]]`, so the copied wrapper takes the local path with byte-identical code under test.)
     - run_case must invoke  bash "$tmp/wrappers/claude.sh"  instead of  bash "$root/claude.sh".
     - delete HARNESS_SEAT_REMOTE=0 from the env list. Keep everything else (HOME, PATH, CLAUDE_TEST_MODE, _CLAUDE_ENGINE_BIN, the stubbed local-dispatch-guard).
     The suite must still pass unchanged in its assertions.

  6. NEW FILE modules/harness/seat/test/seat-hatch.test.sh (executable, bash, same PASS/FAIL/check helper style as seat-contract.test.sh, exits nonzero if any check fails). It must prove the hatch is closed END TO END through the real wrapper — not by unit-testing a function. Build in $tmp:
     - $tmp/home/.claude/bin/local-dispatch-guard  = a COPY of the real modules/workstation/claude/bin/local-dispatch-guard from this repo (resolve its path relative to the test file). Not a stub.
     - $tmp/bin/claude = a stub that does `touch "$SENTINEL"` and prints {"is_error":false,"session_id":"s","result":"ok"} then exits 0, where SENTINEL is passed via env SEAT_HATCH_SENTINEL. It must also answer `auth status --json` with {"status":"ok"} exit 0 (claude.sh health-checks it).
     - $tmp/ws = a git repo (git init, one commit) used as --workspace.
     - a disabled seat config $tmp/seat-remote-off.json  = a copy of modules/harness/seat/seat-remote.json with "enabled": false.
     - a transport config $tmp/build-remote.json with hosts ["seat-hatch-unreachable.invalid"], port 2222, ssh_user "user", remote_root "/home/user/builds", identity_file "~/.ssh/id_ed25519_buildbox", local_fallback false, local_only [], max_remote_jobs 1.
     Run the REAL modules/harness/wrappers/claude.sh (so the seat shim IS present) with env -i, HOME=$tmp/home, PATH="$tmp/bin:/usr/bin:/bin", and assert three cases:
     A) HARNESS_SEAT_REMOTE=0 set, real (enabled) seat config, BUILD_REMOTE_CONFIG=$tmp/build-remote.json, headless (stdin/stdout/stderr are pipes/files):
        the sentinel file must NOT exist afterwards and rc must not be 0 — the seat was still routed remotely and failed on the unreachable host instead of running on this machine.
     B) HARNESS_SEAT_REMOTE=0 AND HARNESS_SEAT_CONFIG=$tmp/seat-remote-off.json, headless:
        rc must be 97 and the sentinel must NOT exist — with remoting switched off the local path is refused by local-dispatch-guard.
     C) same as B but with a real pty so a human-at-a-terminal is simulated: run it under `script -qec "<command>" /dev/null` (util-linux script; quote carefully, keep env via a small generated runner script in $tmp so nothing depends on shell quoting) — rc must be 0 and the sentinel MUST exist. This proves the human escape still works and that the deny in B is the TTY rule, not a blanket failure.
     Case C must be skipped with a printed SKIP (not a FAIL) only if `script` is not installed. Every case must clean the sentinel before running.

  7. Wire the new test into whatever runner already runs modules/harness/seat/test/seat-contract.test.sh (find it; e.g. a run-tests.sh / test list). If seat-contract.test.sh is discovered by glob, nothing to do — say so.

  CONSTRAINTS:
  - No new env var, no new flag, no fallback that could execute the engine on the workstation.
  - Do not weaken or delete any existing assertion to make a suite pass; if something fails, fix the code, not the test.
  - Do not run anything that forks heavily, no builds, no network beyond the intentional DNS miss to the .invalid host.
  - Run and report the ACTUAL output of: bash modules/harness/seat/test/seat-contract.test.sh ; bash modules/harness/seat/test/seat-hatch.test.sh ; bash modules/harness/wrappers/claude-classification.test.sh ; bash modules/harness/wrappers/ca-identity.test.sh
  - Report honestly: exact pass/fail counts per suite, and anything you could not verify. Do not claim a green you did not observe.
  - Commit nothing. Leave the changes in the worktree.

preview:
  Work ONLY inside the git worktree /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/seathatch (never in /home/user/Projects/overdeck itself). Do not touch modules/sandbox/**, any Containerfile, or modules/workstation/claude/bin/local-dispatch-guard.

  GOAL: remove the env-var fail-open HARNESS_SEAT_REMOTE=0 from the harness remote-seat path, so that no environment variable can bring a headless agent seat back onto the workstation. The canonical denial mechanism already exists and stays authoritative: ~/.claude/bin/local-dispatch-guard (exit 97, "headless agent dispatch on this workstation is denied"), which every wrapper (claude.sh:75-83, codex.sh:163-171, ca.sh:136-144) calls before spawning the engine. Its rule: a TTY on fd 0/1/2 (a human is attached) allows local execution; headless does not. That IS the human escape hatch — do NOT invent another one, and do NOT add any new env var.

  EXACT CHANGES — implement all of them, nothing else:

  1. modules/harness/seat/remote-seat.mjs
     In adapterRemotable(), delete the line:
       if (process.env.HARNESS_SEAT_REMOTE === "0") return { ok: false, reason: "kill-switch HARNESS_SEAT_REMOTE=0" };
     Nothing else in this file changes. Leave the HARNESS_SEAT_CONTAINER branch at line ~342 alone.

  2. modules/harness/wrappers/lib/remote-seat.sh
     Delete the line:  [[ "${HARNESS_SEAT_REMOTE:-}" == "0" ]] && return 1
     Update the header comment so it states the truth: enable/disable is CONFIG (modules/harness/seat/seat-remote.json) only; there is no env kill switch; when the launcher says run-locally, local execution is still subject to local-dispatch-guard, which denies a headless dispatch with exit 97. Keep the comment SHORT (comments describe what the code does, never reasoning/history).

  3. modules/harness/seat/README.md
     Line ~34: delete the "HARNESS_SEAT_REMOTE=0 -> kill switch" bullet. Replace with one line stating that remoting is switched off only in seat-remote.json / build-remote.json and that a headless local dispatch is refused with exit 97 by local-dispatch-guard. Keep the HARNESS_SEAT_CONTAINER bullet.

  4. modules/harness/seat/test/seat-contract.test.sh
     Replace the two lines
       HARNESS_SEAT_REMOTE=0 node "$LAUNCHER" --check codex >/dev/null 2>&1
       check "HARNESS_SEAT_REMOTE=0 kill switch forces local" "$?" 1
     with a REGRESSION assertion that the hatch is gone: the same command must now exit 0 ("HARNESS_SEAT_REMOTE=0 no longer forces local"). Everything else in this file is unchanged.

  5. modules/harness/wrappers/claude-classification.test.sh
     This suite currently relies on HARNESS_SEAT_REMOTE=0 to stop the wrapper from dispatching a real remote seat. Replace that with a fixture that removes the seat shim instead of setting an env var:
     - after $tmp is created, do: cp -r "$root" "$tmp/wrappers" ; rm -f "$tmp/wrappers/lib/remote-seat.sh"
       ($root is the wrappers dir; claude.sh computes SKILL_DIR="$(dirname $0)/.." and only uses it for "$SKILL_DIR/wrappers/lib/remote-seat.sh", guarded by `if [[ -f ... ]]`, so the copied wrapper takes the local path with byte-identical code under test.)
     - run_case must invoke  bash "$tmp/wrappers/claude.sh"  instead of  bash "$root/claude.sh".
     - delete HARNESS_SEAT_REMOTE=0 from the env list. Keep everything else (HOME, PATH, CLAUDE_TEST_MODE, _CLAUDE_ENGINE_BIN, the stubbed local-dispatch-guard).
     The suite must still pass unchanged in its assertions.

  6. NEW FILE modules/harness/seat/test/seat-hatch.test.sh (executable, bash, same PASS/FAIL/check helper style as seat-contract.test.sh, exits nonzero if any check fails). It must prove the hatch is closed END TO END through the real wrapper — not by unit-testing a function. Build in $tmp:
     - $tmp/home/.claude/bin/local-dispatch-guard  = a COPY of the real modules/workstation/claude/bin/local-dispatch-guard from this repo (resolve its path relative to the test file). Not a stub.
     - $tmp/bin/claude = a stub that does `touch "$SENTINEL"` and prints {"is_error":false,"session_id":"s","result":"ok"} then exits 0, where SENTINEL is passed via env SEAT_HATCH_SENTINEL. It must also answer `auth status --json` with {"status":"ok"} exit 0 (claude.sh health-checks it).
     - $tmp/ws = a git repo (git init, one commit) used as --workspace.
     - a disabled seat config $tmp/seat-remote-off.json  = a copy of modules/harness/seat/seat-remote.json with "enabled": false.
     - a transport config $tmp/build-remote.json with hosts ["seat-hatch-unreachable.invalid"], port 2222, ssh_user "user", remote_root "/home/user/builds", identity_file "~/.ssh/id_ed25519_buildbox", local_fallback false, local_only [], max_remote_jobs 1.
     Run the REAL modules/harness/wrappers/claude.sh (so the seat shim IS present) with env -i, HOME=$tmp/home, PATH="$tmp/bin:/usr/bin:/bin", and assert three cases:
     A) HARNESS_SEAT_REMOTE=0 set, real (enabled) seat config, BUILD_REMOTE_CONFIG=$tmp/build-remote.json, headless (stdin/stdout/stderr are pipes/files):
        the sentinel file must NOT exist afterwards and rc must not be 0 — the seat was still routed remotely and failed on the unreachable host instead of running on this machine.
     B) HARNESS_SEAT_REMOTE=0 AND HARNESS_SEAT_CONFIG=$tmp/seat-remote-off.json, headless:
        rc must be 97 and the sentinel must NOT exist — with remoting switched off the local path is refused by local-dispatch-guard.
     C) same as B but with a real pty so a human-at-a-terminal is simulated: run it under `script -qec "<command>" /dev/null` (util-linux script; quote carefully, keep env via a small generated runner script in $tmp so nothing depends on shell quoting) — rc must be 0 and the sentinel MUST exist. This proves the human escape still works and that the deny in B is the TTY rule, not a blanket failure.
     Case C must be skipped with a printed SKIP (not a FAIL) only if `script` is not installed. Every case must clean the sentinel before running.

  7. Wire the new test into whatever runner already runs modules/harness/seat/test/seat-contract.test.sh (find it; e.g. a run-tests.sh / test list). If seat-contract.test.sh is discovered by glob, nothing to do — say so.

  CONSTRAINTS:
  - No new env var, no new flag, no fallback that could execute the engine on the workstation.
  - Do not weaken or delete any existing assertion to make a suite pass; if something fails, fix the code, not the test.
  - Do not run anything that forks heavily, no builds, no network beyond the intentional DNS miss to the .invalid host.
  - Run and report the ACTUAL output of: bash modules/harness/seat/test/seat-contract.test.sh ; bash modules/harness/seat/test/seat-hatch.test.sh ; bash modules/harness/wrappers/claude-classification.test.sh ; bash modules/harness/wrappers/ca-identity.test.sh
  - Report honestly: exact pass/fail counts per suite, and anything you could not verify. Do not claim a green you did not observe.
  - Commit nothing. Leave the changes in the worktree.


id: 019fdeb5-432f-7101-baf8-654922f2b4d0
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/seat-bundle-portability-c96546fabcfb
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 1733b23aaa144542f80e026fcbccf823980fdc29
git_branch: wt/seat-bundle-portability
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/08/rollout-2026-08-08T00-10-49-019fdeb5-432f-7101-baf8-654922f2b4d0.jsonl

title:
  Final re-review of the complete uncommitted harness portability diff after watcher-state hardening. Intent: released remote-seat works in target repos without modules/harness; prompt plaintext must never enter the target repository/mirror and must be cleaned from private remote job storage on all known start failures, preflight refusals, normal exits, and signals; unknown or transitional dispatch outcomes must not race-delete a live runner; runtime overlays must be cleaned only after confirmed terminal outcomes; credential, containment, and exit contracts remain intact. Report-only, do not edit. Report only verified P1/P2 correctness, security, or portability defects with file:line and concrete failure scenario. If none, output CLEAN.

first_user_message:
  Final re-review of the complete uncommitted harness portability diff after watcher-state hardening. Intent: released remote-seat works in target repos without modules/harness; prompt plaintext must never enter the target repository/mirror and must be cleaned from private remote job storage on all known start failures, preflight refusals, normal exits, and signals; unknown or transitional dispatch outcomes must not race-delete a live runner; runtime overlays must be cleaned only after confirmed terminal outcomes; credential, containment, and exit contracts remain intact. Report-only, do not edit. Report only verified P1/P2 correctness, security, or portability defects with file:line and concrete failure scenario. If none, output CLEAN.

preview:
  Final re-review of the complete uncommitted harness portability diff after watcher-state hardening. Intent: released remote-seat works in target repos without modules/harness; prompt plaintext must never enter the target repository/mirror and must be cleaned from private remote job storage on all known start failures, preflight refusals, normal exits, and signals; unknown or transitional dispatch outcomes must not race-delete a live runner; runtime overlays must be cleaned only after confirmed terminal outcomes; credential, containment, and exit contracts remain intact. Report-only, do not edit. Report only verified P1/P2 correctness, security, or portability defects with file:line and concrete failure scenario. If none, output CLEAN.


id: 019fdeb9-f737-7371-9e5f-b06c5a6ed555
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/seat-bundle-portability-c96546fabcfb
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 1733b23aaa144542f80e026fcbccf823980fdc29
git_branch: wt/seat-bundle-portability
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/08/rollout-2026-08-08T00-15-57-019fdeb9-f737-7371-9e5f-b06c5a6ed555.jsonl

title:
  Final re-review of the complete uncommitted harness portability diff after simplifying watcher authority to final rc plus live systemd state. Intent: released remote-seat works in target repos without modules/harness; prompt plaintext must never enter the target repository/mirror and must be cleaned from private remote job storage on all known start failures, preflight refusals, normal exits, and signals; unknown, corrupt, stale, or transitional dispatch state must not race-delete a live runner or hang forever; runtime overlays must be cleaned only after confirmed terminal outcomes; credential, containment, and exit contracts remain intact. Report-only, do not edit. Report only verified P1/P2 correctness, security, or portability defects with file:line and concrete failure scenario. If none, output CLEAN.

first_user_message:
  Final re-review of the complete uncommitted harness portability diff after simplifying watcher authority to final rc plus live systemd state. Intent: released remote-seat works in target repos without modules/harness; prompt plaintext must never enter the target repository/mirror and must be cleaned from private remote job storage on all known start failures, preflight refusals, normal exits, and signals; unknown, corrupt, stale, or transitional dispatch state must not race-delete a live runner or hang forever; runtime overlays must be cleaned only after confirmed terminal outcomes; credential, containment, and exit contracts remain intact. Report-only, do not edit. Report only verified P1/P2 correctness, security, or portability defects with file:line and concrete failure scenario. If none, output CLEAN.

preview:
  Final re-review of the complete uncommitted harness portability diff after simplifying watcher authority to final rc plus live systemd state. Intent: released remote-seat works in target repos without modules/harness; prompt plaintext must never enter the target repository/mirror and must be cleaned from private remote job storage on all known start failures, preflight refusals, normal exits, and signals; unknown, corrupt, stale, or transitional dispatch state must not race-delete a live runner or hang forever; runtime overlays must be cleaned only after confirmed terminal outcomes; credential, containment, and exit contracts remain intact. Report-only, do not edit. Report only verified P1/P2 correctness, security, or portability defects with file:line and concrete failure scenario. If none, output CLEAN.


id: 019fdebd-49a2-7422-bdc7-082149e96826
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/seat-bundle-portability-c96546fabcfb
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 1733b23aaa144542f80e026fcbccf823980fdc29
git_branch: wt/seat-bundle-portability
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/08/rollout-2026-08-08T00-19-34-019fdebd-49a2-7422-bdc7-082149e96826.jsonl

title:
  Final re-review of the complete uncommitted harness portability diff after aligning reconnect and watcher service-state classification. Intent: released remote-seat works in target repos without modules/harness; prompt plaintext must never enter the target repository/mirror and must be cleaned from private remote job storage on all known start failures, preflight refusals, normal exits, and signals; unknown, corrupt, stale, or transitional dispatch state must not race-delete a live runner or hang forever; runtime overlays must be cleaned only after confirmed terminal outcomes; credential, containment, and exit contracts remain intact. Report-only, do not edit. Report only verified P1/P2 correctness, security, or portability defects with file:line and concrete failure scenario. If none, output CLEAN.

first_user_message:
  Final re-review of the complete uncommitted harness portability diff after aligning reconnect and watcher service-state classification. Intent: released remote-seat works in target repos without modules/harness; prompt plaintext must never enter the target repository/mirror and must be cleaned from private remote job storage on all known start failures, preflight refusals, normal exits, and signals; unknown, corrupt, stale, or transitional dispatch state must not race-delete a live runner or hang forever; runtime overlays must be cleaned only after confirmed terminal outcomes; credential, containment, and exit contracts remain intact. Report-only, do not edit. Report only verified P1/P2 correctness, security, or portability defects with file:line and concrete failure scenario. If none, output CLEAN.

preview:
  Final re-review of the complete uncommitted harness portability diff after aligning reconnect and watcher service-state classification. Intent: released remote-seat works in target repos without modules/harness; prompt plaintext must never enter the target repository/mirror and must be cleaned from private remote job storage on all known start failures, preflight refusals, normal exits, and signals; unknown, corrupt, stale, or transitional dispatch state must not race-delete a live runner or hang forever; runtime overlays must be cleaned only after confirmed terminal outcomes; credential, containment, and exit contracts remain intact. Report-only, do not edit. Report only verified P1/P2 correctness, security, or portability defects with file:line and concrete failure scenario. If none, output CLEAN.


id: 019fdec1-3b35-7083-8bfb-2f5f4cf7a1d8
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/seat-bundle-portability-c96546fabcfb
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 1733b23aaa144542f80e026fcbccf823980fdc29
git_branch: wt/seat-bundle-portability
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/08/rollout-2026-08-08T00-23-53-019fdec1-3b35-7083-8bfb-2f5f4cf7a1d8.jsonl

title:
  Final re-review of the complete uncommitted harness portability diff after making reconnect classification service-authoritative and validating receipts. Intent: released remote-seat works in target repos without modules/harness; prompt plaintext must never enter the target repository/mirror and must be cleaned from private remote job storage on all known start failures, preflight refusals, normal exits, and signals; unknown, corrupt, stale, or transitional dispatch state must not race-delete a live runner or hang forever; runtime overlays must be cleaned only after confirmed terminal outcomes; credential, containment, and exit contracts remain intact. Report-only, do not edit. Report only verified P1/P2 correctness, security, or portability defects with file:line and concrete failure scenario. If none, output CLEAN.

first_user_message:
  Final re-review of the complete uncommitted harness portability diff after making reconnect classification service-authoritative and validating receipts. Intent: released remote-seat works in target repos without modules/harness; prompt plaintext must never enter the target repository/mirror and must be cleaned from private remote job storage on all known start failures, preflight refusals, normal exits, and signals; unknown, corrupt, stale, or transitional dispatch state must not race-delete a live runner or hang forever; runtime overlays must be cleaned only after confirmed terminal outcomes; credential, containment, and exit contracts remain intact. Report-only, do not edit. Report only verified P1/P2 correctness, security, or portability defects with file:line and concrete failure scenario. If none, output CLEAN.

preview:
  Final re-review of the complete uncommitted harness portability diff after making reconnect classification service-authoritative and validating receipts. Intent: released remote-seat works in target repos without modules/harness; prompt plaintext must never enter the target repository/mirror and must be cleaned from private remote job storage on all known start failures, preflight refusals, normal exits, and signals; unknown, corrupt, stale, or transitional dispatch state must not race-delete a live runner or hang forever; runtime overlays must be cleaned only after confirmed terminal outcomes; credential, containment, and exit contracts remain intact. Report-only, do not edit. Report only verified P1/P2 correctness, security, or portability defects with file:line and concrete failure scenario. If none, output CLEAN.


id: 019fdf03-db80-7650-a8a8-1b9e5c26f454
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/scratchpad-81b14a103c05
title: reply with exactly: SOLOK
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
cli_version: 0.146.0
first_user_message: reply with exactly: SOLOK
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
preview: reply with exactly: SOLOK
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/08/rollout-2026-08-08T01-36-39-019fdf03-db80-7650-a8a8-1b9e5c26f454.jsonl


id: 019fdf09-9f91-7521-80f0-04ee290a9604
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/revfix-f75a34a90c55
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 536e4d024900e07cfdf4b098b8d80d5160650741
git_branch: wt/revfix
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/08/rollout-2026-08-08T01-42-57-019fdf09-9f91-7521-80f0-04ee290a9604.jsonl

title:
  Build a live trace reader for the overdeck v3 software factory.

  Repo root: the directory you are started in. Work only there. Do not touch /home/user/Projects/overdeck (the shared main checkout).

  ## The problem

  The factory (a vendored copy of super-simple-software-factory at modules/harness/factory/) records everything it does into a global SQLite trace db while a run is in progress. Nothing reads it. The owner's single biggest complaint across three versions is "I have no observability — why it failed? what failed? what did the agent do? anything? nothing." The data is already there; there is no viewer. That is the whole gap you are closing.

  Upstream SSSF shipped a web visualizer that polls `events.rowid` every 500ms. Overdeck deliberately did NOT ship it (see docs/plans/2026-08-05-sssf-v3-adoption.md — reference only). No replacement was ever built.

  ## What to build

  A `factory watch` subcommand that streams a live run to the terminal.

  Files:
    modules/harness/factory/adw_modules/watch.py   (create)
    modules/harness/factory/bin/factory            (modify — route the `watch` subcommand)
    modules/harness/factory/tests/test_watch.py    (create)

  Read these first, do not guess:
  - `modules/harness/factory/adw_modules/tracer.py` — the full schema (sessions, phases, events, envelopes, gate_results, processes, agent_sessions, decisions) and exactly what each event type carries. The schema is the contract; do not invent columns.
  - `modules/harness/factory/adw_modules/control.py` — how an existing control subcommand resolves the config, the db path and the repo. `watch` MUST reuse that exact resolution, not re-derive it.
  - `modules/harness/factory/bin/factory` — `run_control()` and the `stop|reconcile|decisions|answer` dispatch case. `watch` joins that set.
  - `modules/harness/reference/sssf/` — upstream's visualizer queries, for what is worth showing. Reference only; ship nothing from it.

  ## Contract

  `factory watch [ADW_ID] [--repo PATH] [--config PATH] [--follow/--no-follow] [--since-start] [--json] [--poll-ms N]`

  - No ADW_ID: attach to the most recent session that is still running. If none is running, attach to the most recent session and print its history (implies no-follow). Say plainly which session was chosen and why.
  - `--follow` (default true): poll `events.rowid` strictly greater than the last one printed, at `--poll-ms` (default 500). Never re-print an event. Exit cleanly when the session's `ended_at` is set and no new rows remain. Ctrl-C exits 0 without a traceback.
  - `--since-start`: print the session's whole history first, then follow. Default is to start from the current tail.
  - `--json`: one JSON object per line, for piping. Otherwise human-readable lines.

  Human output must answer, at a glance: which phase is running, what the agent is doing right now, what a gate checked and whether it passed, and — when something fails — the actual error text, not a classification. Show the artifact path for anything too large to inline (quality command logs, raw agent output). Include elapsed time per phase and mark a phase that is still open.

  ## Hard requirements

  - **Read-only.** Open the db with `mode=ro` via a URI. `watch` must never write to the trace db, never mutate a run, never kill anything.
  - **A missing artifact is a field, never an exception.** If a log path does not exist, print that it is absent. Never let a filesystem error terminate the stream. The engine this replaces died exactly this way: an unguarded read of a log that was never created threw ENOENT, and the exception became the failure reason, destroying the real one.
  - The db is in WAL mode and is being written by a live run. Concurrent reads must not block the writer or crash on a partial write.
  - A session with zero events is a valid state, not an error.
  - Never invent, estimate or fabricate a value. If usage/tokens/cost is NULL, show it as unknown.

  ## Acceptance — run it and report its REAL output. Never claim a pass you did not observe.

      cd modules/harness/factory && uv run pytest tests/test_watch.py -q

  The tests must build a temporary SQLite db against the real tracer schema and prove: follow mode emits each new event exactly once and never re-emits; a session with no events does not error; a missing artifact path renders as absent rather than raising; `--json` output is one valid JSON object per line; selection with no ADW_ID picks the running session over a newer finished one.

  Also confirm the CLI parses and does not regress the existing control commands:

      ./modules/harness/factory/bin/factory --help
      ./modules/harness/factory/bin/factory watch --help

  ## Commit

      git add modules/harness/factory/adw_modules/watch.py modules/harness/factory/bin/factory modules/harness/factory/tests/test_watch.py && git commit -m 'stream a live factory run to the terminal'

  Report: what you built, the verbatim acceptance output, and your commit sha — the commit carrying YOUR files, never another task's. A repo-wide tooling or dependency warning outside your three files is the owner's to fix, not yours: report it and judge your task on its own files.

first_user_message:
  Build a live trace reader for the overdeck v3 software factory.

  Repo root: the directory you are started in. Work only there. Do not touch /home/user/Projects/overdeck (the shared main checkout).

  ## The problem

  The factory (a vendored copy of super-simple-software-factory at modules/harness/factory/) records everything it does into a global SQLite trace db while a run is in progress. Nothing reads it. The owner's single biggest complaint across three versions is "I have no observability — why it failed? what failed? what did the agent do? anything? nothing." The data is already there; there is no viewer. That is the whole gap you are closing.

  Upstream SSSF shipped a web visualizer that polls `events.rowid` every 500ms. Overdeck deliberately did NOT ship it (see docs/plans/2026-08-05-sssf-v3-adoption.md — reference only). No replacement was ever built.

  ## What to build

  A `factory watch` subcommand that streams a live run to the terminal.

  Files:
    modules/harness/factory/adw_modules/watch.py   (create)
    modules/harness/factory/bin/factory            (modify — route the `watch` subcommand)
    modules/harness/factory/tests/test_watch.py    (create)

  Read these first, do not guess:
  - `modules/harness/factory/adw_modules/tracer.py` — the full schema (sessions, phases, events, envelopes, gate_results, processes, agent_sessions, decisions) and exactly what each event type carries. The schema is the contract; do not invent columns.
  - `modules/harness/factory/adw_modules/control.py` — how an existing control subcommand resolves the config, the db path and the repo. `watch` MUST reuse that exact resolution, not re-derive it.
  - `modules/harness/factory/bin/factory` — `run_control()` and the `stop|reconcile|decisions|answer` dispatch case. `watch` joins that set.
  - `modules/harness/reference/sssf/` — upstream's visualizer queries, for what is worth showing. Reference only; ship nothing from it.

  ## Contract

  `factory watch [ADW_ID] [--repo PATH] [--config PATH] [--follow/--no-follow] [--since-start] [--json] [--poll-ms N]`

  - No ADW_ID: attach to the most recent session that is still running. If none is running, attach to the most recent session and print its history (implies no-follow). Say plainly which session was chosen and why.
  - `--follow` (default true): poll `events.rowid` strictly greater than the last one printed, at `--poll-ms` (default 500). Never re-print an event. Exit cleanly when the session's `ended_at` is set and no new rows remain. Ctrl-C exits 0 without a traceback.
  - `--since-start`: print the session's whole history first, then follow. Default is to start from the current tail.
  - `--json`: one JSON object per line, for piping. Otherwise human-readable lines.

  Human output must answer, at a glance: which phase is running, what the agent is doing right now, what a gate checked and whether it passed, and — when something fails — the actual error text, not a classification. Show the artifact path for anything too large to inline (quality command logs, raw agent output). Include elapsed time per phase and mark a phase that is still open.

  ## Hard requirements

  - **Read-only.** Open the db with `mode=ro` via a URI. `watch` must never write to the trace db, never mutate a run, never kill anything.
  - **A missing artifact is a field, never an exception.** If a log path does not exist, print that it is absent. Never let a filesystem error terminate the stream. The engine this replaces died exactly this way: an unguarded read of a log that was never created threw ENOENT, and the exception became the failure reason, destroying the real one.
  - The db is in WAL mode and is being written by a live run. Concurrent reads must not block the writer or crash on a partial write.
  - A session with zero events is a valid state, not an error.
  - Never invent, estimate or fabricate a value. If usage/tokens/cost is NULL, show it as unknown.

  ## Acceptance — run it and report its REAL output. Never claim a pass you did not observe.

      cd modules/harness/factory && uv run pytest tests/test_watch.py -q

  The tests must build a temporary SQLite db against the real tracer schema and prove: follow mode emits each new event exactly once and never re-emits; a session with no events does not error; a missing artifact path renders as absent rather than raising; `--json` output is one valid JSON object per line; selection with no ADW_ID picks the running session over a newer finished one.

  Also confirm the CLI parses and does not regress the existing control commands:

      ./modules/harness/factory/bin/factory --help
      ./modules/harness/factory/bin/factory watch --help

  ## Commit

      git add modules/harness/factory/adw_modules/watch.py modules/harness/factory/bin/factory modules/harness/factory/tests/test_watch.py && git commit -m 'stream a live factory run to the terminal'

  Report: what you built, the verbatim acceptance output, and your commit sha — the commit carrying YOUR files, never another task's. A repo-wide tooling or dependency warning outside your three files is the owner's to fix, not yours: report it and judge your task on its own files.

preview:
  Build a live trace reader for the overdeck v3 software factory.

  Repo root: the directory you are started in. Work only there. Do not touch /home/user/Projects/overdeck (the shared main checkout).

  ## The problem

  The factory (a vendored copy of super-simple-software-factory at modules/harness/factory/) records everything it does into a global SQLite trace db while a run is in progress. Nothing reads it. The owner's single biggest complaint across three versions is "I have no observability — why it failed? what failed? what did the agent do? anything? nothing." The data is already there; there is no viewer. That is the whole gap you are closing.

  Upstream SSSF shipped a web visualizer that polls `events.rowid` every 500ms. Overdeck deliberately did NOT ship it (see docs/plans/2026-08-05-sssf-v3-adoption.md — reference only). No replacement was ever built.

  ## What to build

  A `factory watch` subcommand that streams a live run to the terminal.

  Files:
    modules/harness/factory/adw_modules/watch.py   (create)
    modules/harness/factory/bin/factory            (modify — route the `watch` subcommand)
    modules/harness/factory/tests/test_watch.py    (create)

  Read these first, do not guess:
  - `modules/harness/factory/adw_modules/tracer.py` — the full schema (sessions, phases, events, envelopes, gate_results, processes, agent_sessions, decisions) and exactly what each event type carries. The schema is the contract; do not invent columns.
  - `modules/harness/factory/adw_modules/control.py` — how an existing control subcommand resolves the config, the db path and the repo. `watch` MUST reuse that exact resolution, not re-derive it.
  - `modules/harness/factory/bin/factory` — `run_control()` and the `stop|reconcile|decisions|answer` dispatch case. `watch` joins that set.
  - `modules/harness/reference/sssf/` — upstream's visualizer queries, for what is worth showing. Reference only; ship nothing from it.

  ## Contract

  `factory watch [ADW_ID] [--repo PATH] [--config PATH] [--follow/--no-follow] [--since-start] [--json] [--poll-ms N]`

  - No ADW_ID: attach to the most recent session that is still running. If none is running, attach to the most recent session and print its history (implies no-follow). Say plainly which session was chosen and why.
  - `--follow` (default true): poll `events.rowid` strictly greater than the last one printed, at `--poll-ms` (default 500). Never re-print an event. Exit cleanly when the session's `ended_at` is set and no new rows remain. Ctrl-C exits 0 without a traceback.
  - `--since-start`: print the session's whole history first, then follow. Default is to start from the current tail.
  - `--json`: one JSON object per line, for piping. Otherwise human-readable lines.

  Human output must answer, at a glance: which phase is running, what the agent is doing right now, what a gate checked and whether it passed, and — when something fails — the actual error text, not a classification. Show the artifact path for anything too large to inline (quality command logs, raw agent output). Include elapsed time per phase and mark a phase that is still open.

  ## Hard requirements

  - **Read-only.** Open the db with `mode=ro` via a URI. `watch` must never write to the trace db, never mutate a run, never kill anything.
  - **A missing artifact is a field, never an exception.** If a log path does not exist, print that it is absent. Never let a filesystem error terminate the stream. The engine this replaces died exactly this way: an unguarded read of a log that was never created threw ENOENT, and the exception became the failure reason, destroying the real one.
  - The db is in WAL mode and is being written by a live run. Concurrent reads must not block the writer or crash on a partial write.
  - A session with zero events is a valid state, not an error.
  - Never invent, estimate or fabricate a value. If usage/tokens/cost is NULL, show it as unknown.

  ## Acceptance — run it and report its REAL output. Never claim a pass you did not observe.

      cd modules/harness/factory && uv run pytest tests/test_watch.py -q

  The tests must build a temporary SQLite db against the real tracer schema and prove: follow mode emits each new event exactly once and never re-emits; a session with no events does not error; a missing artifact path renders as absent rather than raising; `--json` output is one valid JSON object per line; selection with no ADW_ID picks the running session over a newer finished one.

  Also confirm the CLI parses and does not regress the existing control commands:

      ./modules/harness/factory/bin/factory --help
      ./modules/harness/factory/bin/factory watch --help

  ## Commit

      git add modules/harness/factory/adw_modules/watch.py modules/harness/factory/bin/factory modules/harness/factory/tests/test_watch.py && git commit -m 'stream a live factory run to the terminal'

  Report: what you built, the verbatim acceptance output, and your commit sha — the commit carrying YOUR files, never another task's. A repo-wide tooling or dependency warning outside your three files is the owner's to fix, not yours: report it and judge your task on its own files.


id: 019fdf80-de71-7aa3-9cd7-4c37cab624b2
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/harnessbundle-b3c1c49f106f
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 151ef46aaf83766109810ca37b8058781c5c60d5
git_branch: wt/harnessbundle
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-terra
reasoning_effort: medium
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/08/rollout-2026-08-08T03-53-12-019fdf80-de71-7aa3-9cd7-4c37cab624b2.jsonl

title:
  Task: cut a harness engine bundle carrying commit ab1033da and unblock the harness-release bump. Read modules/harness/CLAUDE.md FIRST for engine-bundle resolution rules. Produce the bundle, verify the guard it carries is actually present in the built artifact, and report the version. Never ship a bundle you have not verified. Commit on your branch and report.

first_user_message:
  Task: cut a harness engine bundle carrying commit ab1033da and unblock the harness-release bump. Read modules/harness/CLAUDE.md FIRST for engine-bundle resolution rules. Produce the bundle, verify the guard it carries is actually present in the built artifact, and report the version. Never ship a bundle you have not verified. Commit on your branch and report.

preview:
  Task: cut a harness engine bundle carrying commit ab1033da and unblock the harness-release bump. Read modules/harness/CLAUDE.md FIRST for engine-bundle resolution rules. Produce the bundle, verify the guard it carries is actually present in the built artifact, and report the version. Never ship a bundle you have not verified. Commit on your branch and report.


id: 019fdf81-0b20-7950-91cf-edb24ced16f9
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/attachable-3a47313ed256
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 151ef46aaf83766109810ca37b8058781c5c60d5
git_branch: wt/attachable
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-terra
reasoning_effort: medium
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/08/rollout-2026-08-08T03-53-24-019fdf81-0b20-7950-91cf-edb24ced16f9.jsonl

title:
  Task: make running agent sessions actually attachable. Sessions are launched without a multiplexer so their screen cannot be attached. Launch agent sessions under tmux (or the established multiplexer in this repo - read the existing session-ledger and sessions-panel code first, never assume) so an existing session can be attached and its screen seen. Add tests. Commit on your branch and report how to attach.

first_user_message:
  Task: make running agent sessions actually attachable. Sessions are launched without a multiplexer so their screen cannot be attached. Launch agent sessions under tmux (or the established multiplexer in this repo - read the existing session-ledger and sessions-panel code first, never assume) so an existing session can be attached and its screen seen. Add tests. Commit on your branch and report how to attach.

preview:
  Task: make running agent sessions actually attachable. Sessions are launched without a multiplexer so their screen cannot be attached. Launch agent sessions under tmux (or the established multiplexer in this repo - read the existing session-ledger and sessions-panel code first, never assume) so an existing session can be attached and its screen seen. Add tests. Commit on your branch and report how to attach.


id: 019fdf81-0e18-7a11-a9f3-e727d0fe3433
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/factory-adw-df680f068432
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 151ef46aaf83766109810ca37b8058781c5c60d5
git_branch: wt/factory-adw
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/08/rollout-2026-08-08T03-53-24-019fdf81-0e18-7a11-a9f3-e727d0fe3433.jsonl

title:
  Make one canonical, complete ADW in the overdeck v3 software factory. Repo root: the directory you are started in. Work ONLY there; never touch /home/user/Projects/overdeck.

  ## Why

  The factory has several near-duplicate ADWs (adw_plan.py, adw_plan_build.py, adw_plan_build_test.py, adw_plan_build_test_quality.py, adw_simple_sdlc.py, adw_build*.py, adw_document.py, adw_prompt.py). None of them is the complete one. The owner wants ONE canonical end-to-end workflow that plans, builds, tests, runs the full configured quality set, repairs what it can, and lands in a trace the owner can watch live.

  Build it from adw_simple_sdlc.py — that is the closest starting point. Read every ADW listed above before you start so the canonical one is a superset of what they each already do well. Read adw_modules/runner.py, quality.py, hitl.py, gates.py, agents.py, git_helper.py, session.py, tracer.py and watch.py first. Do not guess at any of it.

  ## Required behavior of the canonical ADW

  1. Runs the FULL configured quality set from the config, not just quality.test. Every check runs; each records its own pass/fail and its command-log artifact. One failing check fails the phase with the real command output, never a summary.
  2. The terminal repair iteration is correct: every accepted fix is re-tested. A fix that is applied but never re-verified is the defect to eliminate. Bound the iterations from config with a sane default, and record each iteration as its own attempt in the trace.
  3. Has a HITL planner seam: when the plan reaches a genuine fork the run asks the human through the existing hitl.py mechanism and records the decision durably. It must not invent questions for things it can decide.
  4. Every phase is recorded through the existing tracer so `factory watch` renders the whole run live. Reuse the existing phase/event vocabulary. Do not invent a parallel logging path.
  5. Honours the git preflight already wired into session.ensure(mutates_repo=True), and commits only the paths the run is entitled to via run.commit_all.
  6. A failure anywhere preserves its own evidence — the real error text and artifact path — and never translates it into a classification.

  Name it modules/harness/factory/adw_sdlc.py. Do NOT delete the existing ADWs; adding the canonical one is the task.

  ## Tests

  modules/harness/factory/tests/test_adw_sdlc.py — real temporary git repo and real temporary trace db, no mocked git. Prove: every configured quality check runs and each is recorded; a failing check fails the phase carrying the real command output; a repair iteration re-tests after applying a fix and a fix that does not fix is not accepted; the iteration bound is honoured; the run's phases are all present in the trace in order.

  ## Acceptance — run these and report the REAL output. Never claim a pass you did not observe.

      cd modules/harness/factory && uv run pytest tests/test_adw_sdlc.py -q
      cd modules/harness/factory && uv run pytest -q

  The full suite passes 73 tests today. It must still pass.

  ## Commit

      git add modules/harness/factory/adw_sdlc.py modules/harness/factory/tests/test_adw_sdlc.py && git commit -m 'add the canonical end-to-end ADW'

  Report what you built, the verbatim acceptance output, and your commit sha.

first_user_message:
  Make one canonical, complete ADW in the overdeck v3 software factory. Repo root: the directory you are started in. Work ONLY there; never touch /home/user/Projects/overdeck.

  ## Why

  The factory has several near-duplicate ADWs (adw_plan.py, adw_plan_build.py, adw_plan_build_test.py, adw_plan_build_test_quality.py, adw_simple_sdlc.py, adw_build*.py, adw_document.py, adw_prompt.py). None of them is the complete one. The owner wants ONE canonical end-to-end workflow that plans, builds, tests, runs the full configured quality set, repairs what it can, and lands in a trace the owner can watch live.

  Build it from adw_simple_sdlc.py — that is the closest starting point. Read every ADW listed above before you start so the canonical one is a superset of what they each already do well. Read adw_modules/runner.py, quality.py, hitl.py, gates.py, agents.py, git_helper.py, session.py, tracer.py and watch.py first. Do not guess at any of it.

  ## Required behavior of the canonical ADW

  1. Runs the FULL configured quality set from the config, not just quality.test. Every check runs; each records its own pass/fail and its command-log artifact. One failing check fails the phase with the real command output, never a summary.
  2. The terminal repair iteration is correct: every accepted fix is re-tested. A fix that is applied but never re-verified is the defect to eliminate. Bound the iterations from config with a sane default, and record each iteration as its own attempt in the trace.
  3. Has a HITL planner seam: when the plan reaches a genuine fork the run asks the human through the existing hitl.py mechanism and records the decision durably. It must not invent questions for things it can decide.
  4. Every phase is recorded through the existing tracer so `factory watch` renders the whole run live. Reuse the existing phase/event vocabulary. Do not invent a parallel logging path.
  5. Honours the git preflight already wired into session.ensure(mutates_repo=True), and commits only the paths the run is entitled to via run.commit_all.
  6. A failure anywhere preserves its own evidence — the real error text and artifact path — and never translates it into a classification.

  Name it modules/harness/factory/adw_sdlc.py. Do NOT delete the existing ADWs; adding the canonical one is the task.

  ## Tests

  modules/harness/factory/tests/test_adw_sdlc.py — real temporary git repo and real temporary trace db, no mocked git. Prove: every configured quality check runs and each is recorded; a failing check fails the phase carrying the real command output; a repair iteration re-tests after applying a fix and a fix that does not fix is not accepted; the iteration bound is honoured; the run's phases are all present in the trace in order.

  ## Acceptance — run these and report the REAL output. Never claim a pass you did not observe.

      cd modules/harness/factory && uv run pytest tests/test_adw_sdlc.py -q
      cd modules/harness/factory && uv run pytest -q

  The full suite passes 73 tests today. It must still pass.

  ## Commit

      git add modules/harness/factory/adw_sdlc.py modules/harness/factory/tests/test_adw_sdlc.py && git commit -m 'add the canonical end-to-end ADW'

  Report what you built, the verbatim acceptance output, and your commit sha.

preview:
  Make one canonical, complete ADW in the overdeck v3 software factory. Repo root: the directory you are started in. Work ONLY there; never touch /home/user/Projects/overdeck.

  ## Why

  The factory has several near-duplicate ADWs (adw_plan.py, adw_plan_build.py, adw_plan_build_test.py, adw_plan_build_test_quality.py, adw_simple_sdlc.py, adw_build*.py, adw_document.py, adw_prompt.py). None of them is the complete one. The owner wants ONE canonical end-to-end workflow that plans, builds, tests, runs the full configured quality set, repairs what it can, and lands in a trace the owner can watch live.

  Build it from adw_simple_sdlc.py — that is the closest starting point. Read every ADW listed above before you start so the canonical one is a superset of what they each already do well. Read adw_modules/runner.py, quality.py, hitl.py, gates.py, agents.py, git_helper.py, session.py, tracer.py and watch.py first. Do not guess at any of it.

  ## Required behavior of the canonical ADW

  1. Runs the FULL configured quality set from the config, not just quality.test. Every check runs; each records its own pass/fail and its command-log artifact. One failing check fails the phase with the real command output, never a summary.
  2. The terminal repair iteration is correct: every accepted fix is re-tested. A fix that is applied but never re-verified is the defect to eliminate. Bound the iterations from config with a sane default, and record each iteration as its own attempt in the trace.
  3. Has a HITL planner seam: when the plan reaches a genuine fork the run asks the human through the existing hitl.py mechanism and records the decision durably. It must not invent questions for things it can decide.
  4. Every phase is recorded through the existing tracer so `factory watch` renders the whole run live. Reuse the existing phase/event vocabulary. Do not invent a parallel logging path.
  5. Honours the git preflight already wired into session.ensure(mutates_repo=True), and commits only the paths the run is entitled to via run.commit_all.
  6. A failure anywhere preserves its own evidence — the real error text and artifact path — and never translates it into a classification.

  Name it modules/harness/factory/adw_sdlc.py. Do NOT delete the existing ADWs; adding the canonical one is the task.

  ## Tests

  modules/harness/factory/tests/test_adw_sdlc.py — real temporary git repo and real temporary trace db, no mocked git. Prove: every configured quality check runs and each is recorded; a failing check fails the phase carrying the real command output; a repair iteration re-tests after applying a fix and a fix that does not fix is not accepted; the iteration bound is honoured; the run's phases are all present in the trace in order.

  ## Acceptance — run these and report the REAL output. Never claim a pass you did not observe.

      cd modules/harness/factory && uv run pytest tests/test_adw_sdlc.py -q
      cd modules/harness/factory && uv run pytest -q

  The full suite passes 73 tests today. It must still pass.

  ## Commit

      git add modules/harness/factory/adw_sdlc.py modules/harness/factory/tests/test_adw_sdlc.py && git commit -m 'add the canonical end-to-end ADW'

  Report what you built, the verbatim acceptance output, and your commit sha.


id: 019fdf84-5899-7461-8263-50949ad1fbd6
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/rev2-d5c6d864a97a
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: efcfeddb7e7a19ed840ce1907b4f78f99d94d0e4
git_branch: wt/rev2
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-terra
reasoning_effort: medium
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/08/rollout-2026-08-08T03-57-00-019fdf84-5899-7461-8263-50949ad1fbd6.jsonl

title:
  SHARED CONSTRAINTS (apply to every task below; violating any of these is worse than not finishing):

  - You are running inside a git worktree of /home/user/Projects/overdeck. Work ONLY here. NEVER touch /home/user/Projects/overdeck itself (the shared main checkout) — other agents have uncommitted work there and destructive git verbs against it are blocked.
  - Read /home/user/Projects/overdeck/CLAUDE.md first. It is binding.
  - NEVER run destructive, fork-bomb, resource-exhaustion, or otherwise dangerous tests on this workstation, for any reason, under any containment. This machine was fork-bombed twice in 24h. A timeout or ulimit does NOT make it acceptable. If a test needs that, it goes to the disposable danger-lab VM on debian1, or it does not run.
  - NEVER modify sshd, network, firewall, or boot configuration on debian1/debian2/debian3. Two of those boxes were bricked exactly that way yesterday. Read-only inspection over ssh is fine.
  - NEVER kill processes by name (pkill/killall). Kill by cgroup or literal PID only.
  - NEVER run a browser or Playwright locally. Route E2E through ~/.claude/bin/e2e-remote. Never set E2E_REMOTE_OK=1.
  - Never print, echo, or read credential values.
  - Buildbox registry is modules/workstation/claude/buildbox-hosts.json. It is the single source of host identity. Never hardcode a host; never contact a host the registry does not mark "reachable".
  - No stubs, no placeholders, no TODO-shaped code. Ship the real thing or report precisely why you could not.
  - Comments document WHAT is non-obvious about the code, never why you chose it. Default zero comments.
  - Surgical and minimal: touch only what the task requires. No drive-by refactors, no adjacent cleanups.

  TASK — CODE REVIEW ONLY. You will NOT edit, commit, or land ANY file. Your entire deliverable is a written findings report printed as your final answer.

  Overnight, ~101 commits were landed into this repo by an earlier codex run on a weaker model. Each was reviewed by an agent before landing, but the owner wants an independent second pass. That is you. Assume the code is wrong until you have read it.

  YOUR SLICE (six other reviewers cover the rest — stay strictly inside these paths):
  modules/harness/test modules/harness/spec modules/harness/seat modules/harness/bin modules/harness/wrappers modules/harness/systemd

  Diff range: 7a312eb3c7a38e0553d092291dad7bf7025427c1~1..origin/main
  Start with: git diff --stat 7a312eb3c7a38e0553d092291dad7bf7025427c1~1..origin/main -- modules/harness/test modules/harness/spec modules/harness/seat modules/harness/bin modules/harness/wrappers modules/harness/systemd
  Then read the diff in bounded chunks (per file or per subsystem). Do NOT try to hold all of it at once; you will exhaust context and produce nothing. Read the surrounding file, not just the hunk — a defect usually lives in the interaction between the new hunk and the code around it.

  HUNT FOR THESE, in priority order. Every one has already been found for real in this codebase in the last 24 hours:
  1. FAIL-OPEN — a failure path that falls back to doing the risky thing instead of refusing. Especially anything that ends up executing heavy work on the workstation instead of a buildbox, or skipping a safety gate when a probe errors.
  2. FABRICATED DATA — a value written before the thing it describes exists, or rendered as fact when it is unknown. Unknown must render as an em dash, never 0, never a stale snapshot.
  3. TESTS THAT CANNOT FAIL — assertions on presence rather than correctness; a test restating an argv it already asserted; a test weakened or deleted to match observed output; skipped tests reporting green; a fake that escapes into a real network or CLI call; a pipeline whose grep is intercepted by a shim so every assertion passes vacuously.
  4. SPECULATIVE MECHANISM — code handling keys, fields or states the real API or emitter never produces.
  5. RACE / CONCURRENCY — shared state without a claim, last-write-wins where it matters, a clock captured once at mount and reused as "now".
  6. ERROR SWALLOWING — rc captured from the wrong expression, 2>/dev/null hiding a real failure, a set -e pipeline killed by a grep that legitimately returns 1, blanket suppression of a nonzero exit.
  7. SECURITY — anything widening a permitted-root or allowlist, credentials on a writable mount, an env var that restores a dangerous behaviour.

  REPORT FORMAT, ranked most severe first:
  SEVERITY (blocker | real defect | smell) | file:line | what is wrong | concrete failure scenario (specific inputs -> specific wrong outcome) | one-sentence fix

  A finding you cannot state a concrete failure scenario for is not a finding. Drop it. Do NOT report style, naming, or refactor opinions — they will be discarded and they cost the owner reading time he does not have.

  End with two short sections:
  CLEAN: areas you reviewed and judged sound, so the owner knows your coverage and not only your hits.
  NOT REVIEWED: what you did not get to, by path.

first_user_message:
  SHARED CONSTRAINTS (apply to every task below; violating any of these is worse than not finishing):

  - You are running inside a git worktree of /home/user/Projects/overdeck. Work ONLY here. NEVER touch /home/user/Projects/overdeck itself (the shared main checkout) — other agents have uncommitted work there and destructive git verbs against it are blocked.
  - Read /home/user/Projects/overdeck/CLAUDE.md first. It is binding.
  - NEVER run destructive, fork-bomb, resource-exhaustion, or otherwise dangerous tests on this workstation, for any reason, under any containment. This machine was fork-bombed twice in 24h. A timeout or ulimit does NOT make it acceptable. If a test needs that, it goes to the disposable danger-lab VM on debian1, or it does not run.
  - NEVER modify sshd, network, firewall, or boot configuration on debian1/debian2/debian3. Two of those boxes were bricked exactly that way yesterday. Read-only inspection over ssh is fine.
  - NEVER kill processes by name (pkill/killall). Kill by cgroup or literal PID only.
  - NEVER run a browser or Playwright locally. Route E2E through ~/.claude/bin/e2e-remote. Never set E2E_REMOTE_OK=1.
  - Never print, echo, or read credential values.
  - Buildbox registry is modules/workstation/claude/buildbox-hosts.json. It is the single source of host identity. Never hardcode a host; never contact a host the registry does not mark "reachable".
  - No stubs, no placeholders, no TODO-shaped code. Ship the real thing or report precisely why you could not.
  - Comments document WHAT is non-obvious about the code, never why you chose it. Default zero comments.
  - Surgical and minimal: touch only what the task requires. No drive-by refactors, no adjacent cleanups.

  TASK — CODE REVIEW ONLY. You will NOT edit, commit, or land ANY file. Your entire deliverable is a written findings report printed as your final answer.

  Overnight, ~101 commits were landed into this repo by an earlier codex run on a weaker model. Each was reviewed by an agent before landing, but the owner wants an independent second pass. That is you. Assume the code is wrong until you have read it.

  YOUR SLICE (six other reviewers cover the rest — stay strictly inside these paths):
  modules/harness/test modules/harness/spec modules/harness/seat modules/harness/bin modules/harness/wrappers modules/harness/systemd

  Diff range: 7a312eb3c7a38e0553d092291dad7bf7025427c1~1..origin/main
  Start with: git diff --stat 7a312eb3c7a38e0553d092291dad7bf7025427c1~1..origin/main -- modules/harness/test modules/harness/spec modules/harness/seat modules/harness/bin modules/harness/wrappers modules/harness/systemd
  Then read the diff in bounded chunks (per file or per subsystem). Do NOT try to hold all of it at once; you will exhaust context and produce nothing. Read the surrounding file, not just the hunk — a defect usually lives in the interaction between the new hunk and the code around it.

  HUNT FOR THESE, in priority order. Every one has already been found for real in this codebase in the last 24 hours:
  1. FAIL-OPEN — a failure path that falls back to doing the risky thing instead of refusing. Especially anything that ends up executing heavy work on the workstation instead of a buildbox, or skipping a safety gate when a probe errors.
  2. FABRICATED DATA — a value written before the thing it describes exists, or rendered as fact when it is unknown. Unknown must render as an em dash, never 0, never a stale snapshot.
  3. TESTS THAT CANNOT FAIL — assertions on presence rather than correctness; a test restating an argv it already asserted; a test weakened or deleted to match observed output; skipped tests reporting green; a fake that escapes into a real network or CLI call; a pipeline whose grep is intercepted by a shim so every assertion passes vacuously.
  4. SPECULATIVE MECHANISM — code handling keys, fields or states the real API or emitter never produces.
  5. RACE / CONCURRENCY — shared state without a claim, last-write-wins where it matters, a clock captured once at mount and reused as "now".
  6. ERROR SWALLOWING — rc captured from the wrong expression, 2>/dev/null hiding a real failure, a set -e pipeline killed by a grep that legitimately returns 1, blanket suppression of a nonzero exit.
  7. SECURITY — anything widening a permitted-root or allowlist, credentials on a writable mount, an env var that restores a dangerous behaviour.

  REPORT FORMAT, ranked most severe first:
  SEVERITY (blocker | real defect | smell) | file:line | what is wrong | concrete failure scenario (specific inputs -> specific wrong outcome) | one-sentence fix

  A finding you cannot state a concrete failure scenario for is not a finding. Drop it. Do NOT report style, naming, or refactor opinions — they will be discarded and they cost the owner reading time he does not have.

  End with two short sections:
  CLEAN: areas you reviewed and judged sound, so the owner knows your coverage and not only your hits.
  NOT REVIEWED: what you did not get to, by path.

preview:
  SHARED CONSTRAINTS (apply to every task below; violating any of these is worse than not finishing):

  - You are running inside a git worktree of /home/user/Projects/overdeck. Work ONLY here. NEVER touch /home/user/Projects/overdeck itself (the shared main checkout) — other agents have uncommitted work there and destructive git verbs against it are blocked.
  - Read /home/user/Projects/overdeck/CLAUDE.md first. It is binding.
  - NEVER run destructive, fork-bomb, resource-exhaustion, or otherwise dangerous tests on this workstation, for any reason, under any containment. This machine was fork-bombed twice in 24h. A timeout or ulimit does NOT make it acceptable. If a test needs that, it goes to the disposable danger-lab VM on debian1, or it does not run.
  - NEVER modify sshd, network, firewall, or boot configuration on debian1/debian2/debian3. Two of those boxes were bricked exactly that way yesterday. Read-only inspection over ssh is fine.
  - NEVER kill processes by name (pkill/killall). Kill by cgroup or literal PID only.
  - NEVER run a browser or Playwright locally. Route E2E through ~/.claude/bin/e2e-remote. Never set E2E_REMOTE_OK=1.
  - Never print, echo, or read credential values.
  - Buildbox registry is modules/workstation/claude/buildbox-hosts.json. It is the single source of host identity. Never hardcode a host; never contact a host the registry does not mark "reachable".
  - No stubs, no placeholders, no TODO-shaped code. Ship the real thing or report precisely why you could not.
  - Comments document WHAT is non-obvious about the code, never why you chose it. Default zero comments.
  - Surgical and minimal: touch only what the task requires. No drive-by refactors, no adjacent cleanups.

  TASK — CODE REVIEW ONLY. You will NOT edit, commit, or land ANY file. Your entire deliverable is a written findings report printed as your final answer.

  Overnight, ~101 commits were landed into this repo by an earlier codex run on a weaker model. Each was reviewed by an agent before landing, but the owner wants an independent second pass. That is you. Assume the code is wrong until you have read it.

  YOUR SLICE (six other reviewers cover the rest — stay strictly inside these paths):
  modules/harness/test modules/harness/spec modules/harness/seat modules/harness/bin modules/harness/wrappers modules/harness/systemd

  Diff range: 7a312eb3c7a38e0553d092291dad7bf7025427c1~1..origin/main
  Start with: git diff --stat 7a312eb3c7a38e0553d092291dad7bf7025427c1~1..origin/main -- modules/harness/test modules/harness/spec modules/harness/seat modules/harness/bin modules/harness/wrappers modules/harness/systemd
  Then read the diff in bounded chunks (per file or per subsystem). Do NOT try to hold all of it at once; you will exhaust context and produce nothing. Read the surrounding file, not just the hunk — a defect usually lives in the interaction between the new hunk and the code around it.

  HUNT FOR THESE, in priority order. Every one has already been found for real in this codebase in the last 24 hours:
  1. FAIL-OPEN — a failure path that falls back to doing the risky thing instead of refusing. Especially anything that ends up executing heavy work on the workstation instead of a buildbox, or skipping a safety gate when a probe errors.
  2. FABRICATED DATA — a value written before the thing it describes exists, or rendered as fact when it is unknown. Unknown must render as an em dash, never 0, never a stale snapshot.
  3. TESTS THAT CANNOT FAIL — assertions on presence rather than correctness; a test restating an argv it already asserted; a test weakened or deleted to match observed output; skipped tests reporting green; a fake that escapes into a real network or CLI call; a pipeline whose grep is intercepted by a shim so every assertion passes vacuously.
  4. SPECULATIVE MECHANISM — code handling keys, fields or states the real API or emitter never produces.
  5. RACE / CONCURRENCY — shared state without a claim, last-write-wins where it matters, a clock captured once at mount and reused as "now".
  6. ERROR SWALLOWING — rc captured from the wrong expression, 2>/dev/null hiding a real failure, a set -e pipeline killed by a grep that legitimately returns 1, blanket suppression of a nonzero exit.
  7. SECURITY — anything widening a permitted-root or allowlist, credentials on a writable mount, an env var that restores a dangerous behaviour.

  REPORT FORMAT, ranked most severe first:
  SEVERITY (blocker | real defect | smell) | file:line | what is wrong | concrete failure scenario (specific inputs -> specific wrong outcome) | one-sentence fix

  A finding you cannot state a concrete failure scenario for is not a finding. Drop it. Do NOT report style, naming, or refactor opinions — they will be discarded and they cost the owner reading time he does not have.

  End with two short sections:
  CLEAN: areas you reviewed and judged sound, so the owner knows your coverage and not only your hits.
  NOT REVIEWED: what you did not get to, by path.


id: 019fdf84-98bc-7931-97ff-69267cde8bdf
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/rev5-b3313abfa367
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: efcfeddb7e7a19ed840ce1907b4f78f99d94d0e4
git_branch: wt/rev5
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-terra
reasoning_effort: medium
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/08/rollout-2026-08-08T03-57-16-019fdf84-98bc-7931-97ff-69267cde8bdf.jsonl

title:
  SHARED CONSTRAINTS (apply to every task below; violating any of these is worse than not finishing):

  - You are running inside a git worktree of /home/user/Projects/overdeck. Work ONLY here. NEVER touch /home/user/Projects/overdeck itself (the shared main checkout) — other agents have uncommitted work there and destructive git verbs against it are blocked.
  - Read /home/user/Projects/overdeck/CLAUDE.md first. It is binding.
  - NEVER run destructive, fork-bomb, resource-exhaustion, or otherwise dangerous tests on this workstation, for any reason, under any containment. This machine was fork-bombed twice in 24h. A timeout or ulimit does NOT make it acceptable. If a test needs that, it goes to the disposable danger-lab VM on debian1, or it does not run.
  - NEVER modify sshd, network, firewall, or boot configuration on debian1/debian2/debian3. Two of those boxes were bricked exactly that way yesterday. Read-only inspection over ssh is fine.
  - NEVER kill processes by name (pkill/killall). Kill by cgroup or literal PID only.
  - NEVER run a browser or Playwright locally. Route E2E through ~/.claude/bin/e2e-remote. Never set E2E_REMOTE_OK=1.
  - Never print, echo, or read credential values.
  - Buildbox registry is modules/workstation/claude/buildbox-hosts.json. It is the single source of host identity. Never hardcode a host; never contact a host the registry does not mark "reachable".
  - No stubs, no placeholders, no TODO-shaped code. Ship the real thing or report precisely why you could not.
  - Comments document WHAT is non-obvious about the code, never why you chose it. Default zero comments.
  - Surgical and minimal: touch only what the task requires. No drive-by refactors, no adjacent cleanups.

  TASK — CODE REVIEW ONLY. You will NOT edit, commit, or land ANY file. Your entire deliverable is a written findings report printed as your final answer.

  Overnight, ~101 commits were landed into this repo by an earlier codex run on a weaker model. Each was reviewed by an agent before landing, but the owner wants an independent second pass. That is you. Assume the code is wrong until you have read it.

  YOUR SLICE (six other reviewers cover the rest — stay strictly inside these paths):
  modules/systray

  Diff range: 7a312eb3c7a38e0553d092291dad7bf7025427c1~1..origin/main
  Start with: git diff --stat 7a312eb3c7a38e0553d092291dad7bf7025427c1~1..origin/main -- modules/systray
  Then read the diff in bounded chunks (per file or per subsystem). Do NOT try to hold all of it at once; you will exhaust context and produce nothing. Read the surrounding file, not just the hunk — a defect usually lives in the interaction between the new hunk and the code around it.

  HUNT FOR THESE, in priority order. Every one has already been found for real in this codebase in the last 24 hours:
  1. FAIL-OPEN — a failure path that falls back to doing the risky thing instead of refusing. Especially anything that ends up executing heavy work on the workstation instead of a buildbox, or skipping a safety gate when a probe errors.
  2. FABRICATED DATA — a value written before the thing it describes exists, or rendered as fact when it is unknown. Unknown must render as an em dash, never 0, never a stale snapshot.
  3. TESTS THAT CANNOT FAIL — assertions on presence rather than correctness; a test restating an argv it already asserted; a test weakened or deleted to match observed output; skipped tests reporting green; a fake that escapes into a real network or CLI call; a pipeline whose grep is intercepted by a shim so every assertion passes vacuously.
  4. SPECULATIVE MECHANISM — code handling keys, fields or states the real API or emitter never produces.
  5. RACE / CONCURRENCY — shared state without a claim, last-write-wins where it matters, a clock captured once at mount and reused as "now".
  6. ERROR SWALLOWING — rc captured from the wrong expression, 2>/dev/null hiding a real failure, a set -e pipeline killed by a grep that legitimately returns 1, blanket suppression of a nonzero exit.
  7. SECURITY — anything widening a permitted-root or allowlist, credentials on a writable mount, an env var that restores a dangerous behaviour.

  REPORT FORMAT, ranked most severe first:
  SEVERITY (blocker | real defect | smell) | file:line | what is wrong | concrete failure scenario (specific inputs -> specific wrong outcome) | one-sentence fix

  A finding you cannot state a concrete failure scenario for is not a finding. Drop it. Do NOT report style, naming, or refactor opinions — they will be discarded and they cost the owner reading time he does not have.

  End with two short sections:
  CLEAN: areas you reviewed and judged sound, so the owner knows your coverage and not only your hits.
  NOT REVIEWED: what you did not get to, by path.

first_user_message:
  SHARED CONSTRAINTS (apply to every task below; violating any of these is worse than not finishing):

  - You are running inside a git worktree of /home/user/Projects/overdeck. Work ONLY here. NEVER touch /home/user/Projects/overdeck itself (the shared main checkout) — other agents have uncommitted work there and destructive git verbs against it are blocked.
  - Read /home/user/Projects/overdeck/CLAUDE.md first. It is binding.
  - NEVER run destructive, fork-bomb, resource-exhaustion, or otherwise dangerous tests on this workstation, for any reason, under any containment. This machine was fork-bombed twice in 24h. A timeout or ulimit does NOT make it acceptable. If a test needs that, it goes to the disposable danger-lab VM on debian1, or it does not run.
  - NEVER modify sshd, network, firewall, or boot configuration on debian1/debian2/debian3. Two of those boxes were bricked exactly that way yesterday. Read-only inspection over ssh is fine.
  - NEVER kill processes by name (pkill/killall). Kill by cgroup or literal PID only.
  - NEVER run a browser or Playwright locally. Route E2E through ~/.claude/bin/e2e-remote. Never set E2E_REMOTE_OK=1.
  - Never print, echo, or read credential values.
  - Buildbox registry is modules/workstation/claude/buildbox-hosts.json. It is the single source of host identity. Never hardcode a host; never contact a host the registry does not mark "reachable".
  - No stubs, no placeholders, no TODO-shaped code. Ship the real thing or report precisely why you could not.
  - Comments document WHAT is non-obvious about the code, never why you chose it. Default zero comments.
  - Surgical and minimal: touch only what the task requires. No drive-by refactors, no adjacent cleanups.

  TASK — CODE REVIEW ONLY. You will NOT edit, commit, or land ANY file. Your entire deliverable is a written findings report printed as your final answer.

  Overnight, ~101 commits were landed into this repo by an earlier codex run on a weaker model. Each was reviewed by an agent before landing, but the owner wants an independent second pass. That is you. Assume the code is wrong until you have read it.

  YOUR SLICE (six other reviewers cover the rest — stay strictly inside these paths):
  modules/systray

  Diff range: 7a312eb3c7a38e0553d092291dad7bf7025427c1~1..origin/main
  Start with: git diff --stat 7a312eb3c7a38e0553d092291dad7bf7025427c1~1..origin/main -- modules/systray
  Then read the diff in bounded chunks (per file or per subsystem). Do NOT try to hold all of it at once; you will exhaust context and produce nothing. Read the surrounding file, not just the hunk — a defect usually lives in the interaction between the new hunk and the code around it.

  HUNT FOR THESE, in priority order. Every one has already been found for real in this codebase in the last 24 hours:
  1. FAIL-OPEN — a failure path that falls back to doing the risky thing instead of refusing. Especially anything that ends up executing heavy work on the workstation instead of a buildbox, or skipping a safety gate when a probe errors.
  2. FABRICATED DATA — a value written before the thing it describes exists, or rendered as fact when it is unknown. Unknown must render as an em dash, never 0, never a stale snapshot.
  3. TESTS THAT CANNOT FAIL — assertions on presence rather than correctness; a test restating an argv it already asserted; a test weakened or deleted to match observed output; skipped tests reporting green; a fake that escapes into a real network or CLI call; a pipeline whose grep is intercepted by a shim so every assertion passes vacuously.
  4. SPECULATIVE MECHANISM — code handling keys, fields or states the real API or emitter never produces.
  5. RACE / CONCURRENCY — shared state without a claim, last-write-wins where it matters, a clock captured once at mount and reused as "now".
  6. ERROR SWALLOWING — rc captured from the wrong expression, 2>/dev/null hiding a real failure, a set -e pipeline killed by a grep that legitimately returns 1, blanket suppression of a nonzero exit.
  7. SECURITY — anything widening a permitted-root or allowlist, credentials on a writable mount, an env var that restores a dangerous behaviour.

  REPORT FORMAT, ranked most severe first:
  SEVERITY (blocker | real defect | smell) | file:line | what is wrong | concrete failure scenario (specific inputs -> specific wrong outcome) | one-sentence fix

  A finding you cannot state a concrete failure scenario for is not a finding. Drop it. Do NOT report style, naming, or refactor opinions — they will be discarded and they cost the owner reading time he does not have.

  End with two short sections:
  CLEAN: areas you reviewed and judged sound, so the owner knows your coverage and not only your hits.
  NOT REVIEWED: what you did not get to, by path.

preview:
  SHARED CONSTRAINTS (apply to every task below; violating any of these is worse than not finishing):

  - You are running inside a git worktree of /home/user/Projects/overdeck. Work ONLY here. NEVER touch /home/user/Projects/overdeck itself (the shared main checkout) — other agents have uncommitted work there and destructive git verbs against it are blocked.
  - Read /home/user/Projects/overdeck/CLAUDE.md first. It is binding.
  - NEVER run destructive, fork-bomb, resource-exhaustion, or otherwise dangerous tests on this workstation, for any reason, under any containment. This machine was fork-bombed twice in 24h. A timeout or ulimit does NOT make it acceptable. If a test needs that, it goes to the disposable danger-lab VM on debian1, or it does not run.
  - NEVER modify sshd, network, firewall, or boot configuration on debian1/debian2/debian3. Two of those boxes were bricked exactly that way yesterday. Read-only inspection over ssh is fine.
  - NEVER kill processes by name (pkill/killall). Kill by cgroup or literal PID only.
  - NEVER run a browser or Playwright locally. Route E2E through ~/.claude/bin/e2e-remote. Never set E2E_REMOTE_OK=1.
  - Never print, echo, or read credential values.
  - Buildbox registry is modules/workstation/claude/buildbox-hosts.json. It is the single source of host identity. Never hardcode a host; never contact a host the registry does not mark "reachable".
  - No stubs, no placeholders, no TODO-shaped code. Ship the real thing or report precisely why you could not.
  - Comments document WHAT is non-obvious about the code, never why you chose it. Default zero comments.
  - Surgical and minimal: touch only what the task requires. No drive-by refactors, no adjacent cleanups.

  TASK — CODE REVIEW ONLY. You will NOT edit, commit, or land ANY file. Your entire deliverable is a written findings report printed as your final answer.

  Overnight, ~101 commits were landed into this repo by an earlier codex run on a weaker model. Each was reviewed by an agent before landing, but the owner wants an independent second pass. That is you. Assume the code is wrong until you have read it.

  YOUR SLICE (six other reviewers cover the rest — stay strictly inside these paths):
  modules/systray

  Diff range: 7a312eb3c7a38e0553d092291dad7bf7025427c1~1..origin/main
  Start with: git diff --stat 7a312eb3c7a38e0553d092291dad7bf7025427c1~1..origin/main -- modules/systray
  Then read the diff in bounded chunks (per file or per subsystem). Do NOT try to hold all of it at once; you will exhaust context and produce nothing. Read the surrounding file, not just the hunk — a defect usually lives in the interaction between the new hunk and the code around it.

  HUNT FOR THESE, in priority order. Every one has already been found for real in this codebase in the last 24 hours:
  1. FAIL-OPEN — a failure path that falls back to doing the risky thing instead of refusing. Especially anything that ends up executing heavy work on the workstation instead of a buildbox, or skipping a safety gate when a probe errors.
  2. FABRICATED DATA — a value written before the thing it describes exists, or rendered as fact when it is unknown. Unknown must render as an em dash, never 0, never a stale snapshot.
  3. TESTS THAT CANNOT FAIL — assertions on presence rather than correctness; a test restating an argv it already asserted; a test weakened or deleted to match observed output; skipped tests reporting green; a fake that escapes into a real network or CLI call; a pipeline whose grep is intercepted by a shim so every assertion passes vacuously.
  4. SPECULATIVE MECHANISM — code handling keys, fields or states the real API or emitter never produces.
  5. RACE / CONCURRENCY — shared state without a claim, last-write-wins where it matters, a clock captured once at mount and reused as "now".
  6. ERROR SWALLOWING — rc captured from the wrong expression, 2>/dev/null hiding a real failure, a set -e pipeline killed by a grep that legitimately returns 1, blanket suppression of a nonzero exit.
  7. SECURITY — anything widening a permitted-root or allowlist, credentials on a writable mount, an env var that restores a dangerous behaviour.

  REPORT FORMAT, ranked most severe first:
  SEVERITY (blocker | real defect | smell) | file:line | what is wrong | concrete failure scenario (specific inputs -> specific wrong outcome) | one-sentence fix

  A finding you cannot state a concrete failure scenario for is not a finding. Drop it. Do NOT report style, naming, or refactor opinions — they will be discarded and they cost the owner reading time he does not have.

  End with two short sections:
  CLEAN: areas you reviewed and judged sound, so the owner knows your coverage and not only your hits.
  NOT REVIEWED: what you did not get to, by path.


id: 019fdf84-99db-7582-9250-e79154da9d4f
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/rev7-ef704bec37dc
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: efcfeddb7e7a19ed840ce1907b4f78f99d94d0e4
git_branch: wt/rev7
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-terra
reasoning_effort: medium
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/08/rollout-2026-08-08T03-57-17-019fdf84-99db-7582-9250-e79154da9d4f.jsonl

title:
  SHARED CONSTRAINTS (apply to every task below; violating any of these is worse than not finishing):

  - You are running inside a git worktree of /home/user/Projects/overdeck. Work ONLY here. NEVER touch /home/user/Projects/overdeck itself (the shared main checkout) — other agents have uncommitted work there and destructive git verbs against it are blocked.
  - Read /home/user/Projects/overdeck/CLAUDE.md first. It is binding.
  - NEVER run destructive, fork-bomb, resource-exhaustion, or otherwise dangerous tests on this workstation, for any reason, under any containment. This machine was fork-bombed twice in 24h. A timeout or ulimit does NOT make it acceptable. If a test needs that, it goes to the disposable danger-lab VM on debian1, or it does not run.
  - NEVER modify sshd, network, firewall, or boot configuration on debian1/debian2/debian3. Two of those boxes were bricked exactly that way yesterday. Read-only inspection over ssh is fine.
  - NEVER kill processes by name (pkill/killall). Kill by cgroup or literal PID only.
  - NEVER run a browser or Playwright locally. Route E2E through ~/.claude/bin/e2e-remote. Never set E2E_REMOTE_OK=1.
  - Never print, echo, or read credential values.
  - Buildbox registry is modules/workstation/claude/buildbox-hosts.json. It is the single source of host identity. Never hardcode a host; never contact a host the registry does not mark "reachable".
  - No stubs, no placeholders, no TODO-shaped code. Ship the real thing or report precisely why you could not.
  - Comments document WHAT is non-obvious about the code, never why you chose it. Default zero comments.
  - Surgical and minimal: touch only what the task requires. No drive-by refactors, no adjacent cleanups.

  TASK — CODE REVIEW ONLY. You will NOT edit, commit, or land ANY file. Your entire deliverable is a written findings report printed as your final answer.

  Overnight, ~101 commits were landed into this repo by an earlier codex run on a weaker model. Each was reviewed by an agent before landing, but the owner wants an independent second pass. That is you. Assume the code is wrong until you have read it.

  YOUR SLICE (six other reviewers cover the rest — stay strictly inside these paths):
  modules/monitor modules/buildbox modules/gptbridge modules/sandbox tests/os

  Diff range: 7a312eb3c7a38e0553d092291dad7bf7025427c1~1..origin/main
  Start with: git diff --stat 7a312eb3c7a38e0553d092291dad7bf7025427c1~1..origin/main -- modules/monitor modules/buildbox modules/gptbridge modules/sandbox tests/os
  Then read the diff in bounded chunks (per file or per subsystem). Do NOT try to hold all of it at once; you will exhaust context and produce nothing. Read the surrounding file, not just the hunk — a defect usually lives in the interaction between the new hunk and the code around it.

  HUNT FOR THESE, in priority order. Every one has already been found for real in this codebase in the last 24 hours:
  1. FAIL-OPEN — a failure path that falls back to doing the risky thing instead of refusing. Especially anything that ends up executing heavy work on the workstation instead of a buildbox, or skipping a safety gate when a probe errors.
  2. FABRICATED DATA — a value written before the thing it describes exists, or rendered as fact when it is unknown. Unknown must render as an em dash, never 0, never a stale snapshot.
  3. TESTS THAT CANNOT FAIL — assertions on presence rather than correctness; a test restating an argv it already asserted; a test weakened or deleted to match observed output; skipped tests reporting green; a fake that escapes into a real network or CLI call; a pipeline whose grep is intercepted by a shim so every assertion passes vacuously.
  4. SPECULATIVE MECHANISM — code handling keys, fields or states the real API or emitter never produces.
  5. RACE / CONCURRENCY — shared state without a claim, last-write-wins where it matters, a clock captured once at mount and reused as "now".
  6. ERROR SWALLOWING — rc captured from the wrong expression, 2>/dev/null hiding a real failure, a set -e pipeline killed by a grep that legitimately returns 1, blanket suppression of a nonzero exit.
  7. SECURITY — anything widening a permitted-root or allowlist, credentials on a writable mount, an env var that restores a dangerous behaviour.

  REPORT FORMAT, ranked most severe first:
  SEVERITY (blocker | real defect | smell) | file:line | what is wrong | concrete failure scenario (specific inputs -> specific wrong outcome) | one-sentence fix

  A finding you cannot state a concrete failure scenario for is not a finding. Drop it. Do NOT report style, naming, or refactor opinions — they will be discarded and they cost the owner reading time he does not have.

  End with two short sections:
  CLEAN: areas you reviewed and judged sound, so the owner knows your coverage and not only your hits.
  NOT REVIEWED: what you did not get to, by path.

first_user_message:
  SHARED CONSTRAINTS (apply to every task below; violating any of these is worse than not finishing):

  - You are running inside a git worktree of /home/user/Projects/overdeck. Work ONLY here. NEVER touch /home/user/Projects/overdeck itself (the shared main checkout) — other agents have uncommitted work there and destructive git verbs against it are blocked.
  - Read /home/user/Projects/overdeck/CLAUDE.md first. It is binding.
  - NEVER run destructive, fork-bomb, resource-exhaustion, or otherwise dangerous tests on this workstation, for any reason, under any containment. This machine was fork-bombed twice in 24h. A timeout or ulimit does NOT make it acceptable. If a test needs that, it goes to the disposable danger-lab VM on debian1, or it does not run.
  - NEVER modify sshd, network, firewall, or boot configuration on debian1/debian2/debian3. Two of those boxes were bricked exactly that way yesterday. Read-only inspection over ssh is fine.
  - NEVER kill processes by name (pkill/killall). Kill by cgroup or literal PID only.
  - NEVER run a browser or Playwright locally. Route E2E through ~/.claude/bin/e2e-remote. Never set E2E_REMOTE_OK=1.
  - Never print, echo, or read credential values.
  - Buildbox registry is modules/workstation/claude/buildbox-hosts.json. It is the single source of host identity. Never hardcode a host; never contact a host the registry does not mark "reachable".
  - No stubs, no placeholders, no TODO-shaped code. Ship the real thing or report precisely why you could not.
  - Comments document WHAT is non-obvious about the code, never why you chose it. Default zero comments.
  - Surgical and minimal: touch only what the task requires. No drive-by refactors, no adjacent cleanups.

  TASK — CODE REVIEW ONLY. You will NOT edit, commit, or land ANY file. Your entire deliverable is a written findings report printed as your final answer.

  Overnight, ~101 commits were landed into this repo by an earlier codex run on a weaker model. Each was reviewed by an agent before landing, but the owner wants an independent second pass. That is you. Assume the code is wrong until you have read it.

  YOUR SLICE (six other reviewers cover the rest — stay strictly inside these paths):
  modules/monitor modules/buildbox modules/gptbridge modules/sandbox tests/os

  Diff range: 7a312eb3c7a38e0553d092291dad7bf7025427c1~1..origin/main
  Start with: git diff --stat 7a312eb3c7a38e0553d092291dad7bf7025427c1~1..origin/main -- modules/monitor modules/buildbox modules/gptbridge modules/sandbox tests/os
  Then read the diff in bounded chunks (per file or per subsystem). Do NOT try to hold all of it at once; you will exhaust context and produce nothing. Read the surrounding file, not just the hunk — a defect usually lives in the interaction between the new hunk and the code around it.

  HUNT FOR THESE, in priority order. Every one has already been found for real in this codebase in the last 24 hours:
  1. FAIL-OPEN — a failure path that falls back to doing the risky thing instead of refusing. Especially anything that ends up executing heavy work on the workstation instead of a buildbox, or skipping a safety gate when a probe errors.
  2. FABRICATED DATA — a value written before the thing it describes exists, or rendered as fact when it is unknown. Unknown must render as an em dash, never 0, never a stale snapshot.
  3. TESTS THAT CANNOT FAIL — assertions on presence rather than correctness; a test restating an argv it already asserted; a test weakened or deleted to match observed output; skipped tests reporting green; a fake that escapes into a real network or CLI call; a pipeline whose grep is intercepted by a shim so every assertion passes vacuously.
  4. SPECULATIVE MECHANISM — code handling keys, fields or states the real API or emitter never produces.
  5. RACE / CONCURRENCY — shared state without a claim, last-write-wins where it matters, a clock captured once at mount and reused as "now".
  6. ERROR SWALLOWING — rc captured from the wrong expression, 2>/dev/null hiding a real failure, a set -e pipeline killed by a grep that legitimately returns 1, blanket suppression of a nonzero exit.
  7. SECURITY — anything widening a permitted-root or allowlist, credentials on a writable mount, an env var that restores a dangerous behaviour.

  REPORT FORMAT, ranked most severe first:
  SEVERITY (blocker | real defect | smell) | file:line | what is wrong | concrete failure scenario (specific inputs -> specific wrong outcome) | one-sentence fix

  A finding you cannot state a concrete failure scenario for is not a finding. Drop it. Do NOT report style, naming, or refactor opinions — they will be discarded and they cost the owner reading time he does not have.

  End with two short sections:
  CLEAN: areas you reviewed and judged sound, so the owner knows your coverage and not only your hits.
  NOT REVIEWED: what you did not get to, by path.

preview:
  SHARED CONSTRAINTS (apply to every task below; violating any of these is worse than not finishing):

  - You are running inside a git worktree of /home/user/Projects/overdeck. Work ONLY here. NEVER touch /home/user/Projects/overdeck itself (the shared main checkout) — other agents have uncommitted work there and destructive git verbs against it are blocked.
  - Read /home/user/Projects/overdeck/CLAUDE.md first. It is binding.
  - NEVER run destructive, fork-bomb, resource-exhaustion, or otherwise dangerous tests on this workstation, for any reason, under any containment. This machine was fork-bombed twice in 24h. A timeout or ulimit does NOT make it acceptable. If a test needs that, it goes to the disposable danger-lab VM on debian1, or it does not run.
  - NEVER modify sshd, network, firewall, or boot configuration on debian1/debian2/debian3. Two of those boxes were bricked exactly that way yesterday. Read-only inspection over ssh is fine.
  - NEVER kill processes by name (pkill/killall). Kill by cgroup or literal PID only.
  - NEVER run a browser or Playwright locally. Route E2E through ~/.claude/bin/e2e-remote. Never set E2E_REMOTE_OK=1.
  - Never print, echo, or read credential values.
  - Buildbox registry is modules/workstation/claude/buildbox-hosts.json. It is the single source of host identity. Never hardcode a host; never contact a host the registry does not mark "reachable".
  - No stubs, no placeholders, no TODO-shaped code. Ship the real thing or report precisely why you could not.
  - Comments document WHAT is non-obvious about the code, never why you chose it. Default zero comments.
  - Surgical and minimal: touch only what the task requires. No drive-by refactors, no adjacent cleanups.

  TASK — CODE REVIEW ONLY. You will NOT edit, commit, or land ANY file. Your entire deliverable is a written findings report printed as your final answer.

  Overnight, ~101 commits were landed into this repo by an earlier codex run on a weaker model. Each was reviewed by an agent before landing, but the owner wants an independent second pass. That is you. Assume the code is wrong until you have read it.

  YOUR SLICE (six other reviewers cover the rest — stay strictly inside these paths):
  modules/monitor modules/buildbox modules/gptbridge modules/sandbox tests/os

  Diff range: 7a312eb3c7a38e0553d092291dad7bf7025427c1~1..origin/main
  Start with: git diff --stat 7a312eb3c7a38e0553d092291dad7bf7025427c1~1..origin/main -- modules/monitor modules/buildbox modules/gptbridge modules/sandbox tests/os
  Then read the diff in bounded chunks (per file or per subsystem). Do NOT try to hold all of it at once; you will exhaust context and produce nothing. Read the surrounding file, not just the hunk — a defect usually lives in the interaction between the new hunk and the code around it.

  HUNT FOR THESE, in priority order. Every one has already been found for real in this codebase in the last 24 hours:
  1. FAIL-OPEN — a failure path that falls back to doing the risky thing instead of refusing. Especially anything that ends up executing heavy work on the workstation instead of a buildbox, or skipping a safety gate when a probe errors.
  2. FABRICATED DATA — a value written before the thing it describes exists, or rendered as fact when it is unknown. Unknown must render as an em dash, never 0, never a stale snapshot.
  3. TESTS THAT CANNOT FAIL — assertions on presence rather than correctness; a test restating an argv it already asserted; a test weakened or deleted to match observed output; skipped tests reporting green; a fake that escapes into a real network or CLI call; a pipeline whose grep is intercepted by a shim so every assertion passes vacuously.
  4. SPECULATIVE MECHANISM — code handling keys, fields or states the real API or emitter never produces.
  5. RACE / CONCURRENCY — shared state without a claim, last-write-wins where it matters, a clock captured once at mount and reused as "now".
  6. ERROR SWALLOWING — rc captured from the wrong expression, 2>/dev/null hiding a real failure, a set -e pipeline killed by a grep that legitimately returns 1, blanket suppression of a nonzero exit.
  7. SECURITY — anything widening a permitted-root or allowlist, credentials on a writable mount, an env var that restores a dangerous behaviour.

  REPORT FORMAT, ranked most severe first:
  SEVERITY (blocker | real defect | smell) | file:line | what is wrong | concrete failure scenario (specific inputs -> specific wrong outcome) | one-sentence fix

  A finding you cannot state a concrete failure scenario for is not a finding. Drop it. Do NOT report style, naming, or refactor opinions — they will be discarded and they cost the owner reading time he does not have.

  End with two short sections:
  CLEAN: areas you reviewed and judged sound, so the owner knows your coverage and not only your hits.
  NOT REVIEWED: what you did not get to, by path.


id: 019fe15c-6e2d-7743-8bdf-596afa25049a
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/t144sidebar-d2f7333c9343
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 55d78d7e4c9d0bb45b48e9007b180096629aac5e
git_branch: wt/t144sidebar
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-terra
reasoning_effort: medium
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/08/rollout-2026-08-08T12-32-39-019fe15c-6e2d-7743-8bdf-596afa25049a.jsonl

title:
  Add the missing sidebar link to the Incidents page in the Overdeck web app. You are in an overdeck worktree. MANDATORY: read .claude/skills/od-ui-dev/SKILL.md first and obey it — compose existing @overdeck/deck-ui exports, tokens only, both themes, no new primitives. The Incidents page exists and renders but there is no link to it from the app sidebar/navigation. Find the sidebar/nav registry in apps/web, add Incidents with the same pattern (icon, ordering, active-state) as the existing entries (Logs, Sessions, CI, Machines). Run: pnpm --filter web typecheck and any nav-related tests. Commit to the current branch with a short imperative message. Do NOT push.

first_user_message:
  Add the missing sidebar link to the Incidents page in the Overdeck web app. You are in an overdeck worktree. MANDATORY: read .claude/skills/od-ui-dev/SKILL.md first and obey it — compose existing @overdeck/deck-ui exports, tokens only, both themes, no new primitives. The Incidents page exists and renders but there is no link to it from the app sidebar/navigation. Find the sidebar/nav registry in apps/web, add Incidents with the same pattern (icon, ordering, active-state) as the existing entries (Logs, Sessions, CI, Machines). Run: pnpm --filter web typecheck and any nav-related tests. Commit to the current branch with a short imperative message. Do NOT push.

preview:
  Add the missing sidebar link to the Incidents page in the Overdeck web app. You are in an overdeck worktree. MANDATORY: read .claude/skills/od-ui-dev/SKILL.md first and obey it — compose existing @overdeck/deck-ui exports, tokens only, both themes, no new primitives. The Incidents page exists and renders but there is no link to it from the app sidebar/navigation. Find the sidebar/nav registry in apps/web, add Incidents with the same pattern (icon, ordering, active-state) as the existing entries (Logs, Sessions, CI, Machines). Run: pnpm --filter web typecheck and any nav-related tests. Commit to the current branch with a short imperative message. Do NOT push.


id: 019fe15c-6dcc-7103-82dc-34a44b5ef554
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/t123hooks-b35341e6ef16
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 55d78d7e4c9d0bb45b48e9007b180096629aac5e
git_branch: wt/t123hooks
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/08/rollout-2026-08-08T12-32-39-019fe15c-6dcc-7103-82dc-34a44b5ef554.jsonl

title:
  Show every hook running on the laptop in Overdeck, with dead ones flagged. You are in an overdeck worktree. Goal: the owner cannot see which Claude Code hooks (PreToolUse/PostToolUse/UserPromptSubmit/Stop/SessionStart etc.) are installed and whether they are alive. Build: (1) a collector-side inventory that enumerates configured hooks from the live settings the runtime actually loads (~/.claude/settings.json and per-scope tools.json/hook registries) with, per hook: event type, matcher, command path, whether the file exists and is executable, and last-execution evidence where obtainable; flag DEAD any hook whose target is missing/non-executable. (2) Surface it in the Overdeck web app — MANDATORY first: read .claude/skills/od-ui-dev/SKILL.md and obey it (compose existing @overdeck/deck-ui exports, no new primitives — stop and report if one seems required, tokens only, both themes, honest data — never fabricate liveness). Follow the existing pattern the Sessions/Machines pages use for collector-fed panels. Add tests for the inventory logic (fixture settings files: healthy hook, missing file, non-executable). Run collector tests (FT_FROM_HOOK=1 FT_HINTS=1 ft bun test in collector/) and pnpm --filter web typecheck. Commit to the current branch with a short imperative message. Do NOT push.

first_user_message:
  Show every hook running on the laptop in Overdeck, with dead ones flagged. You are in an overdeck worktree. Goal: the owner cannot see which Claude Code hooks (PreToolUse/PostToolUse/UserPromptSubmit/Stop/SessionStart etc.) are installed and whether they are alive. Build: (1) a collector-side inventory that enumerates configured hooks from the live settings the runtime actually loads (~/.claude/settings.json and per-scope tools.json/hook registries) with, per hook: event type, matcher, command path, whether the file exists and is executable, and last-execution evidence where obtainable; flag DEAD any hook whose target is missing/non-executable. (2) Surface it in the Overdeck web app — MANDATORY first: read .claude/skills/od-ui-dev/SKILL.md and obey it (compose existing @overdeck/deck-ui exports, no new primitives — stop and report if one seems required, tokens only, both themes, honest data — never fabricate liveness). Follow the existing pattern the Sessions/Machines pages use for collector-fed panels. Add tests for the inventory logic (fixture settings files: healthy hook, missing file, non-executable). Run collector tests (FT_FROM_HOOK=1 FT_HINTS=1 ft bun test in collector/) and pnpm --filter web typecheck. Commit to the current branch with a short imperative message. Do NOT push.

preview:
  Show every hook running on the laptop in Overdeck, with dead ones flagged. You are in an overdeck worktree. Goal: the owner cannot see which Claude Code hooks (PreToolUse/PostToolUse/UserPromptSubmit/Stop/SessionStart etc.) are installed and whether they are alive. Build: (1) a collector-side inventory that enumerates configured hooks from the live settings the runtime actually loads (~/.claude/settings.json and per-scope tools.json/hook registries) with, per hook: event type, matcher, command path, whether the file exists and is executable, and last-execution evidence where obtainable; flag DEAD any hook whose target is missing/non-executable. (2) Surface it in the Overdeck web app — MANDATORY first: read .claude/skills/od-ui-dev/SKILL.md and obey it (compose existing @overdeck/deck-ui exports, no new primitives — stop and report if one seems required, tokens only, both themes, honest data — never fabricate liveness). Follow the existing pattern the Sessions/Machines pages use for collector-fed panels. Add tests for the inventory logic (fixture settings files: healthy hook, missing file, non-executable). Run collector tests (FT_FROM_HOOK=1 FT_HINTS=1 ft bun test in collector/) and pnpm --filter web typecheck. Commit to the current branch with a short imperative message. Do NOT push.


id: 019fe190-d1cd-7951-885c-3131cbd88f02
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/t120noop-32cd51ea733b
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 02d2d728181f4234ee840f6f548b31a654ea7a51
git_branch: wt/t120noop
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-terra
reasoning_effort: medium
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/08/rollout-2026-08-08T13-29-52-019fe190-d1cd-7951-885c-3131cbd88f02.jsonl

title:
  Fix dispatches silently no-oping when their target path is outside the mirrored repo. Repo: overdeck monorepo, you are in worktree .worktrees/t120noop (branch wt/t120noop). Read CLAUDE.md first. Context: the cdx dispatch path mirrors a repo to a buildbox — find the dispatch/mirror target resolution under modules/workstation (FT_FROM_HOOK=1 FT_HINTS=1 ft grep for mirror, remoteArgv, dispatch). Bug: when a dispatch's target path is outside the mirrored repo root, the run silently does nothing instead of failing loudly. Task: make an out-of-mirror target a HARD ERROR at dispatch time, message naming the target and the mirror root (fail-closed, never silent), and add a test in the module's tests directory following existing style. Run the affected test suite green. Commit locally with one terse imperative message. Do NOT push, do NOT merge main.

first_user_message:
  Fix dispatches silently no-oping when their target path is outside the mirrored repo. Repo: overdeck monorepo, you are in worktree .worktrees/t120noop (branch wt/t120noop). Read CLAUDE.md first. Context: the cdx dispatch path mirrors a repo to a buildbox — find the dispatch/mirror target resolution under modules/workstation (FT_FROM_HOOK=1 FT_HINTS=1 ft grep for mirror, remoteArgv, dispatch). Bug: when a dispatch's target path is outside the mirrored repo root, the run silently does nothing instead of failing loudly. Task: make an out-of-mirror target a HARD ERROR at dispatch time, message naming the target and the mirror root (fail-closed, never silent), and add a test in the module's tests directory following existing style. Run the affected test suite green. Commit locally with one terse imperative message. Do NOT push, do NOT merge main.

preview:
  Fix dispatches silently no-oping when their target path is outside the mirrored repo. Repo: overdeck monorepo, you are in worktree .worktrees/t120noop (branch wt/t120noop). Read CLAUDE.md first. Context: the cdx dispatch path mirrors a repo to a buildbox — find the dispatch/mirror target resolution under modules/workstation (FT_FROM_HOOK=1 FT_HINTS=1 ft grep for mirror, remoteArgv, dispatch). Bug: when a dispatch's target path is outside the mirrored repo root, the run silently does nothing instead of failing loudly. Task: make an out-of-mirror target a HARD ERROR at dispatch time, message naming the target and the mirror root (fail-closed, never silent), and add a test in the module's tests directory following existing style. Run the affected test suite green. Commit locally with one terse imperative message. Do NOT push, do NOT merge main.


id: 019fe1b9-8301-7d13-a3c8-e11203900089
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/factory-adw-df680f068432
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: f64068187784fd1eb09977a607a401b4b13bef97
git_branch: wt/factory-adw
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: medium
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/08/rollout-2026-08-08T14-14-19-019fe1b9-8301-7d13-a3c8-e11203900089.jsonl

title:
  Work in the repository checkout at your CURRENT WORKING DIRECTORY. Every path below is relative to that repo root. Absolute /home/user/... paths do not exist for you.

  GOAL — a failing factory run currently reports itself as all-green in the trace database.

  Proven with live data. ADW 05275167 ran adw_plan_build_test_quality against a repo containing a deliberately failing test. The run correctly FAILED overall ("not accepted: verify/test never came back clean after 3 fix attempt(s)"), and the console correctly printed:

      quality test: pnpm run test
      quality test: failed (exit 1, 40.2s)
      quality typecheck: passed (exit 0, 39.8s)
      quality build: passed (exit 0, 29.1s)
      passed: False, checks: 2/3

  But the trace db recorded this:

      phases:  05275167_05_verify_1  status=success   error=''
               05275167_07_verify_2  status=success   error=''
               05275167_09_verify_3  status=success   error=''
      gate_results for this adw: 5 rows, EVERY ONE passed=1
                                 (artifacts_exist, files_non_empty, diff_matches_claims ×3)

  So the trace db says 9/9 phases succeeded and 5/5 gates passed for a run that failed three times on a red test. The name of the failing check, its exit code, its duration and its command.log path exist ONLY in the terminal output and on disk — nothing in the db, therefore nothing in the web UI.

  The owner's acceptance bar, verbatim: "I need to also be able to see all the gates, status, logs, everything that YOU see I need to see as well." A UI showing 9/9 green for a failed run is worse than no observability — it is actively misleading.

  FILES YOU MAY TOUCH (nothing else):
    modules/harness/factory/adw_modules/quality.py
    modules/harness/factory/adw_modules/tracer.py
    modules/harness/factory/adw_modules/runner.py
    modules/harness/factory/adw_modules/agents.py
    any test file already under modules/harness/factory/tests/

  Do NOT touch collector/**, apps/web/**, or packages/** — the consumer half is a separate job. Do NOT change the CLI console output; it is already correct.

  READ FIRST (do not trust this brief blindly)
  - adw_modules/quality.py — the whole file. `run_quality(run)` at ~line 236 orchestrates the checks; the per-check runner around lines 65-140 already computes `passed`, the exact `command` string, the exit code, the duration, and writes an artifact directory `run.context_handoff_dir / "quality" / f"{seq:02d}_{name}"` containing command.log. Every value you need is ALREADY computed there — this is a recording gap, not a measurement gap.
  - adw_modules/tracer.py — the `gate_results` table (columns: id, adw_id, phase_id, attempt, gate, passed, violations_json, checks_json, created_at) and the existing writer that the artifacts_exist / files_non_empty / diff_matches_claims gates use. Follow that writer's shape exactly.
  - Also read how a phase's status is set (grep phase_end / phase status in tracer.py and runner.py) before changing anything about phase status.

  REQUIRED — 1. every quality check becomes a gate_result row
  `run_quality` must write ONE gate_result row per configured quality check, through the SAME tracer writer the existing gates use. Per row:
    gate      = f"quality:{check_name}"   (e.g. "quality:test") — matches the naming already used for the process/event records in this file
    passed    = the check's real boolean
    phase_id  = the verify phase this check ran under
    checks_json = a single-entry list in the same shape the existing gates emit, carrying: the exact command string, the exit code, the duration in ms, and the ABSOLUTE path to that check's command.log artifact.
    violations_json = [] when passed; when failed, carry a truncated tail of command.log (last 4000 chars, with an explicit truncation marker) so the failure is readable without opening a file.
  A check that is declared but NOT configured (the `not configured` path around line 161) is a FAILED row with the existing reason string — not a missing row.
  Rows must be written as each check completes, not batched at the end, so a run killed mid-quality still leaves the checks that already ran.

  REQUIRED — 2. a verify phase whose checks failed must not report success
  Find where the verify phase's status is written and make it reflect the quality outcome: a verify phase whose QualityResult is not passed ends with a failure status and an `error` naming which checks failed (e.g. "quality checks failed: test (exit 1)"). Do NOT invent a new status vocabulary — use the same failure status other phases already use; grep for it and match it.
  Be careful and surgical here: the verify phase currently returning success is what lets the fix/verify repair loop continue to the next attempt. Read that loop before you change anything, and make sure a failed verify still lets fix_N run and the ADW reach its own "not accepted after N fix attempts" conclusion. The repair loop's behavior MUST NOT change — only what gets recorded. If honouring that means the phase status is driven from the QualityResult at phase-end rather than by raising, do it that way.

  CONSTRAINTS — NON-NEGOTIABLE
  - Additive to the schema only. Do not add a column if the existing gate_results columns already carry the data — they do; this is a writer change, not a schema change. If you conclude a column is genuinely missing, add it via the MIGRATIONS list (never edit a shipped CREATE TABLE) and say why in your report.
  - No stubs, no placeholders, no TODOs. No fabricated values — an unknown stays null.
  - Comments describe WHAT is non-obvious, never your reasoning. Default to zero comments.
  - Surgical: touch only the listed files; do not reformat adjacent code.
  - Do not commit. Leave changes in the working tree.

  TESTS (modules/harness/factory/tests/)
  - A quality run with one failing and two passing checks writes three gate_result rows with the right gate names and passed values, and the failing row's violations_json carries a non-empty log tail.
  - The failing row's checks_json carries the command string, the exit code and the command.log path.
  - A verify phase whose quality result failed is recorded with a failure status and a non-empty error naming the failing check.
  - The existing repair-loop behavior is unchanged: a failed verify still permits the subsequent fix phase. Prove this with an assertion, not by inspection.
  Never weaken an existing assertion to make something pass.

  VERIFY
  Run `python3 -m pytest modules/harness/factory/tests/ -q` from the repo root and report the ACTUAL output. Do NOT attempt pnpm (ERR_PNPM_TARBALL_URL_MISMATCH in this sandbox). Re-read every file you touched end to end.

  REPORT
  - The exact gate names and row shape you now write, with file:line.
  - Where the verify phase status is decided, and exactly what you changed there.
  - What you did to guarantee the repair loop still runs after a failed verify, and the assertion that proves it.
  - The real pytest output. Never claim a pass you did not observe.

first_user_message:
  Work in the repository checkout at your CURRENT WORKING DIRECTORY. Every path below is relative to that repo root. Absolute /home/user/... paths do not exist for you.

  GOAL — a failing factory run currently reports itself as all-green in the trace database.

  Proven with live data. ADW 05275167 ran adw_plan_build_test_quality against a repo containing a deliberately failing test. The run correctly FAILED overall ("not accepted: verify/test never came back clean after 3 fix attempt(s)"), and the console correctly printed:

      quality test: pnpm run test
      quality test: failed (exit 1, 40.2s)
      quality typecheck: passed (exit 0, 39.8s)
      quality build: passed (exit 0, 29.1s)
      passed: False, checks: 2/3

  But the trace db recorded this:

      phases:  05275167_05_verify_1  status=success   error=''
               05275167_07_verify_2  status=success   error=''
               05275167_09_verify_3  status=success   error=''
      gate_results for this adw: 5 rows, EVERY ONE passed=1
                                 (artifacts_exist, files_non_empty, diff_matches_claims ×3)

  So the trace db says 9/9 phases succeeded and 5/5 gates passed for a run that failed three times on a red test. The name of the failing check, its exit code, its duration and its command.log path exist ONLY in the terminal output and on disk — nothing in the db, therefore nothing in the web UI.

  The owner's acceptance bar, verbatim: "I need to also be able to see all the gates, status, logs, everything that YOU see I need to see as well." A UI showing 9/9 green for a failed run is worse than no observability — it is actively misleading.

  FILES YOU MAY TOUCH (nothing else):
    modules/harness/factory/adw_modules/quality.py
    modules/harness/factory/adw_modules/tracer.py
    modules/harness/factory/adw_modules/runner.py
    modules/harness/factory/adw_modules/agents.py
    any test file already under modules/harness/factory/tests/

  Do NOT touch collector/**, apps/web/**, or packages/** — the consumer half is a separate job. Do NOT change the CLI console output; it is already correct.

  READ FIRST (do not trust this brief blindly)
  - adw_modules/quality.py — the whole file. `run_quality(run)` at ~line 236 orchestrates the checks; the per-check runner around lines 65-140 already computes `passed`, the exact `command` string, the exit code, the duration, and writes an artifact directory `run.context_handoff_dir / "quality" / f"{seq:02d}_{name}"` containing command.log. Every value you need is ALREADY computed there — this is a recording gap, not a measurement gap.
  - adw_modules/tracer.py — the `gate_results` table (columns: id, adw_id, phase_id, attempt, gate, passed, violations_json, checks_json, created_at) and the existing writer that the artifacts_exist / files_non_empty / diff_matches_claims gates use. Follow that writer's shape exactly.
  - Also read how a phase's status is set (grep phase_end / phase status in tracer.py and runner.py) before changing anything about phase status.

  REQUIRED — 1. every quality check becomes a gate_result row
  `run_quality` must write ONE gate_result row per configured quality check, through the SAME tracer writer the existing gates use. Per row:
    gate      = f"quality:{check_name}"   (e.g. "quality:test") — matches the naming already used for the process/event records in this file
    passed    = the check's real boolean
    phase_id  = the verify phase this check ran under
    checks_json = a single-entry list in the same shape the existing gates emit, carrying: the exact command string, the exit code, the duration in ms, and the ABSOLUTE path to that check's command.log artifact.
    violations_json = [] when passed; when failed, carry a truncated tail of command.log (last 4000 chars, with an explicit truncation marker) so the failure is readable without opening a file.
  A check that is declared but NOT configured (the `not configured` path around line 161) is a FAILED row with the existing reason string — not a missing row.
  Rows must be written as each check completes, not batched at the end, so a run killed mid-quality still leaves the checks that already ran.

  REQUIRED — 2. a verify phase whose checks failed must not report success
  Find where the verify phase's status is written and make it reflect the quality outcome: a verify phase whose QualityResult is not passed ends with a failure status and an `error` naming which checks failed (e.g. "quality checks failed: test (exit 1)"). Do NOT invent a new status vocabulary — use the same failure status other phases already use; grep for it and match it.
  Be careful and surgical here: the verify phase currently returning success is what lets the fix/verify repair loop continue to the next attempt. Read that loop before you change anything, and make sure a failed verify still lets fix_N run and the ADW reach its own "not accepted after N fix attempts" conclusion. The repair loop's behavior MUST NOT change — only what gets recorded. If honouring that means the phase status is driven from the QualityResult at phase-end rather than by raising, do it that way.

  CONSTRAINTS — NON-NEGOTIABLE
  - Additive to the schema only. Do not add a column if the existing gate_results columns already carry the data — they do; this is a writer change, not a schema change. If you conclude a column is genuinely missing, add it via the MIGRATIONS list (never edit a shipped CREATE TABLE) and say why in your report.
  - No stubs, no placeholders, no TODOs. No fabricated values — an unknown stays null.
  - Comments describe WHAT is non-obvious, never your reasoning. Default to zero comments.
  - Surgical: touch only the listed files; do not reformat adjacent code.
  - Do not commit. Leave changes in the working tree.

  TESTS (modules/harness/factory/tests/)
  - A quality run with one failing and two passing checks writes three gate_result rows with the right gate names and passed values, and the failing row's violations_json carries a non-empty log tail.
  - The failing row's checks_json carries the command string, the exit code and the command.log path.
  - A verify phase whose quality result failed is recorded with a failure status and a non-empty error naming the failing check.
  - The existing repair-loop behavior is unchanged: a failed verify still permits the subsequent fix phase. Prove this with an assertion, not by inspection.
  Never weaken an existing assertion to make something pass.

  VERIFY
  Run `python3 -m pytest modules/harness/factory/tests/ -q` from the repo root and report the ACTUAL output. Do NOT attempt pnpm (ERR_PNPM_TARBALL_URL_MISMATCH in this sandbox). Re-read every file you touched end to end.

  REPORT
  - The exact gate names and row shape you now write, with file:line.
  - Where the verify phase status is decided, and exactly what you changed there.
  - What you did to guarantee the repair loop still runs after a failed verify, and the assertion that proves it.
  - The real pytest output. Never claim a pass you did not observe.

preview:
  Work in the repository checkout at your CURRENT WORKING DIRECTORY. Every path below is relative to that repo root. Absolute /home/user/... paths do not exist for you.

  GOAL — a failing factory run currently reports itself as all-green in the trace database.

  Proven with live data. ADW 05275167 ran adw_plan_build_test_quality against a repo containing a deliberately failing test. The run correctly FAILED overall ("not accepted: verify/test never came back clean after 3 fix attempt(s)"), and the console correctly printed:

      quality test: pnpm run test
      quality test: failed (exit 1, 40.2s)
      quality typecheck: passed (exit 0, 39.8s)
      quality build: passed (exit 0, 29.1s)
      passed: False, checks: 2/3

  But the trace db recorded this:

      phases:  05275167_05_verify_1  status=success   error=''
               05275167_07_verify_2  status=success   error=''
               05275167_09_verify_3  status=success   error=''
      gate_results for this adw: 5 rows, EVERY ONE passed=1
                                 (artifacts_exist, files_non_empty, diff_matches_claims ×3)

  So the trace db says 9/9 phases succeeded and 5/5 gates passed for a run that failed three times on a red test. The name of the failing check, its exit code, its duration and its command.log path exist ONLY in the terminal output and on disk — nothing in the db, therefore nothing in the web UI.

  The owner's acceptance bar, verbatim: "I need to also be able to see all the gates, status, logs, everything that YOU see I need to see as well." A UI showing 9/9 green for a failed run is worse than no observability — it is actively misleading.

  FILES YOU MAY TOUCH (nothing else):
    modules/harness/factory/adw_modules/quality.py
    modules/harness/factory/adw_modules/tracer.py
    modules/harness/factory/adw_modules/runner.py
    modules/harness/factory/adw_modules/agents.py
    any test file already under modules/harness/factory/tests/

  Do NOT touch collector/**, apps/web/**, or packages/** — the consumer half is a separate job. Do NOT change the CLI console output; it is already correct.

  READ FIRST (do not trust this brief blindly)
  - adw_modules/quality.py — the whole file. `run_quality(run)` at ~line 236 orchestrates the checks; the per-check runner around lines 65-140 already computes `passed`, the exact `command` string, the exit code, the duration, and writes an artifact directory `run.context_handoff_dir / "quality" / f"{seq:02d}_{name}"` containing command.log. Every value you need is ALREADY computed there — this is a recording gap, not a measurement gap.
  - adw_modules/tracer.py — the `gate_results` table (columns: id, adw_id, phase_id, attempt, gate, passed, violations_json, checks_json, created_at) and the existing writer that the artifacts_exist / files_non_empty / diff_matches_claims gates use. Follow that writer's shape exactly.
  - Also read how a phase's status is set (grep phase_end / phase status in tracer.py and runner.py) before changing anything about phase status.

  REQUIRED — 1. every quality check becomes a gate_result row
  `run_quality` must write ONE gate_result row per configured quality check, through the SAME tracer writer the existing gates use. Per row:
    gate      = f"quality:{check_name}"   (e.g. "quality:test") — matches the naming already used for the process/event records in this file
    passed    = the check's real boolean
    phase_id  = the verify phase this check ran under
    checks_json = a single-entry list in the same shape the existing gates emit, carrying: the exact command string, the exit code, the duration in ms, and the ABSOLUTE path to that check's command.log artifact.
    violations_json = [] when passed; when failed, carry a truncated tail of command.log (last 4000 chars, with an explicit truncation marker) so the failure is readable without opening a file.
  A check that is declared but NOT configured (the `not configured` path around line 161) is a FAILED row with the existing reason string — not a missing row.
  Rows must be written as each check completes, not batched at the end, so a run killed mid-quality still leaves the checks that already ran.

  REQUIRED — 2. a verify phase whose checks failed must not report success
  Find where the verify phase's status is written and make it reflect the quality outcome: a verify phase whose QualityResult is not passed ends with a failure status and an `error` naming which checks failed (e.g. "quality checks failed: test (exit 1)"). Do NOT invent a new status vocabulary — use the same failure status other phases already use; grep for it and match it.
  Be careful and surgical here: the verify phase currently returning success is what lets the fix/verify repair loop continue to the next attempt. Read that loop before you change anything, and make sure a failed verify still lets fix_N run and the ADW reach its own "not accepted after N fix attempts" conclusion. The repair loop's behavior MUST NOT change — only what gets recorded. If honouring that means the phase status is driven from the QualityResult at phase-end rather than by raising, do it that way.

  CONSTRAINTS — NON-NEGOTIABLE
  - Additive to the schema only. Do not add a column if the existing gate_results columns already carry the data — they do; this is a writer change, not a schema change. If you conclude a column is genuinely missing, add it via the MIGRATIONS list (never edit a shipped CREATE TABLE) and say why in your report.
  - No stubs, no placeholders, no TODOs. No fabricated values — an unknown stays null.
  - Comments describe WHAT is non-obvious, never your reasoning. Default to zero comments.
  - Surgical: touch only the listed files; do not reformat adjacent code.
  - Do not commit. Leave changes in the working tree.

  TESTS (modules/harness/factory/tests/)
  - A quality run with one failing and two passing checks writes three gate_result rows with the right gate names and passed values, and the failing row's violations_json carries a non-empty log tail.
  - The failing row's checks_json carries the command string, the exit code and the command.log path.
  - A verify phase whose quality result failed is recorded with a failure status and a non-empty error naming the failing check.
  - The existing repair-loop behavior is unchanged: a failed verify still permits the subsequent fix phase. Prove this with an assertion, not by inspection.
  Never weaken an existing assertion to make something pass.

  VERIFY
  Run `python3 -m pytest modules/harness/factory/tests/ -q` from the repo root and report the ACTUAL output. Do NOT attempt pnpm (ERR_PNPM_TARBALL_URL_MISMATCH in this sandbox). Re-read every file you touched end to end.

  REPORT
  - The exact gate names and row shape you now write, with file:line.
  - Where the verify phase status is decided, and exactly what you changed there.
  - What you did to guarantee the repair loop still runs after a failed verify, and the assertion that proves it.
  - The real pytest output. Never claim a pass you did not observe.


id: 019fe228-3ac5-7900-89ee-1f0fb90e3db1
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/factory-adw-df680f068432
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 1dc775feb7febf8ac0c03fd2995cae6a7bd4843b
git_branch: wt/factory-adw
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/08/rollout-2026-08-08T16-15-15-019fe228-3ac5-7900-89ee-1f0fb90e3db1.jsonl

title:
  Work in the repository checkout at your CURRENT WORKING DIRECTORY. Every path below is relative to that repo root. Absolute /home/user/... paths do not exist for you.

  GOAL — two rendering defects proven by real screenshots of the deployed /factory page.

  DEFECT 1 — every detail drawer is 448px wide, and the data-dense tables inside it are unreadable.
  `packages/deck-ui/src/DetailDrawer.tsx` hardcodes `w-[min(28rem,100%)]` on the `<aside role="dialog">`. The factory attempt drawer renders a "Tool calls" table (columns: Seq, Tool name, Started, Duration, Result — Result itself contains a status chip plus two expandable text blocks) and the gate drawer renders a checks table (Check, Pass/fail, Command, Exit code, Duration, Command log, Note, Output artifact). At 448px the last columns are cut off the visible area; a full-screen screenshot confirms the command.log path — the single most useful value on a failed gate — is off-screen.

  REQUIRED: give DetailDrawer an OPTIONAL width affordance so a data-dense drawer can be wider, defaulting to today's width so every existing caller is unchanged.
  - Read DetailDrawer.tsx end to end first, including the draggable branch (it composes different position classes) and any test that asserts on its className.
  - The prop is PINNED (a second job calls it concurrently — do not rename it): `size?: 'default' | 'wide'`, defaulting to `'default'`. `'default'` must produce the EXACT class string that ships today. `'wide'` must stay responsive (`w-[min(<rem>,100%)]` shape — never wider than the viewport); pick a width that comfortably fits an 8-column table.
  - Both the modal and the draggable branch must honour it.
  - Do not change the drawer's overflow, focus trap, escape handling, or any other behavior.

  DEFECT 2 — sub-second durations render as "0s".
  `packages/deck-ui/src/format.ts` `formatDurationMs` returns `${Math.round(ms/1000)}s` for anything under a minute, so a 61ms tool call reads "0s" on the page. That is a real observability loss: the owner's bar is seeing how long each tool run actually took.
  REQUIRED: durations below 1000ms render in milliseconds (e.g. `61ms`); 1000ms and above keep today's output byte-for-byte. Do NOT change the minute/hour branches.
  - Then grep the whole repo for existing assertions that depend on the old sub-second output and update ONLY assertions that encoded the "0s" defect. Never weaken an assertion for any other reason.

  FILES YOU MAY TOUCH (nothing else):
    packages/deck-ui/src/DetailDrawer.tsx
    packages/deck-ui/src/format.ts
    any test file already under packages/deck-ui/ (and, ONLY for updating a "0s"/duration assertion, test files elsewhere in the repo)
    packages/deck-ui/src/gallery/** or the /design-system gallery entry for DetailDrawer, IF the project requires every variant to be registered there — read the gallery registration for DetailDrawer first and follow whatever pattern it already uses.

  Do NOT touch apps/web/src/components/factory/** — a separate job owns the calling side. Do NOT touch collector/** or modules/**.

  CONSTRAINTS — NON-NEGOTIABLE
  - NEVER create a new primitive. You are extending an existing one.
  - Design tokens only. No raw colors. Widths as Tailwind classes in the same idiom the file already uses.
  - No stubs, no placeholders, no TODOs.
  - Comments describe WHAT is non-obvious, never your reasoning. Default to zero comments.
  - Surgical: touch only the listed files; do not reformat adjacent code.
  - Do not commit. Leave changes in the working tree.

  TESTS (packages/deck-ui)
  - The default drawer renders with the same width class it has today.
  - The wide variant renders the wide class and is still capped at 100% of the viewport.
  - The draggable branch honours the width prop too.
  - formatDurationMs(61) → "61ms"; formatDurationMs(999) → milliseconds; formatDurationMs(1000) and formatDurationMs(45_000) unchanged from today.

  VERIFY
  You CANNOT run pnpm in this sandbox (ERR_PNPM_TARBALL_URL_MISMATCH) — do not attempt it and do not claim a test pass you did not observe. The main thread runs `pnpm --filter @overdeck/deck-ui test|typecheck` itself. Re-read every file you touched end to end and confirm every prop you pass exists on the component you pass it to.

  REPORT
  - The exact prop name, type and default you added, with file:line.
  - The exact class strings produced for each size, and proof the default is byte-identical to today's.
  - Every assertion you added or changed, and why any changed assertion was encoding the defect.

first_user_message:
  Work in the repository checkout at your CURRENT WORKING DIRECTORY. Every path below is relative to that repo root. Absolute /home/user/... paths do not exist for you.

  GOAL — two rendering defects proven by real screenshots of the deployed /factory page.

  DEFECT 1 — every detail drawer is 448px wide, and the data-dense tables inside it are unreadable.
  `packages/deck-ui/src/DetailDrawer.tsx` hardcodes `w-[min(28rem,100%)]` on the `<aside role="dialog">`. The factory attempt drawer renders a "Tool calls" table (columns: Seq, Tool name, Started, Duration, Result — Result itself contains a status chip plus two expandable text blocks) and the gate drawer renders a checks table (Check, Pass/fail, Command, Exit code, Duration, Command log, Note, Output artifact). At 448px the last columns are cut off the visible area; a full-screen screenshot confirms the command.log path — the single most useful value on a failed gate — is off-screen.

  REQUIRED: give DetailDrawer an OPTIONAL width affordance so a data-dense drawer can be wider, defaulting to today's width so every existing caller is unchanged.
  - Read DetailDrawer.tsx end to end first, including the draggable branch (it composes different position classes) and any test that asserts on its className.
  - The prop is PINNED (a second job calls it concurrently — do not rename it): `size?: 'default' | 'wide'`, defaulting to `'default'`. `'default'` must produce the EXACT class string that ships today. `'wide'` must stay responsive (`w-[min(<rem>,100%)]` shape — never wider than the viewport); pick a width that comfortably fits an 8-column table.
  - Both the modal and the draggable branch must honour it.
  - Do not change the drawer's overflow, focus trap, escape handling, or any other behavior.

  DEFECT 2 — sub-second durations render as "0s".
  `packages/deck-ui/src/format.ts` `formatDurationMs` returns `${Math.round(ms/1000)}s` for anything under a minute, so a 61ms tool call reads "0s" on the page. That is a real observability loss: the owner's bar is seeing how long each tool run actually took.
  REQUIRED: durations below 1000ms render in milliseconds (e.g. `61ms`); 1000ms and above keep today's output byte-for-byte. Do NOT change the minute/hour branches.
  - Then grep the whole repo for existing assertions that depend on the old sub-second output and update ONLY assertions that encoded the "0s" defect. Never weaken an assertion for any other reason.

  FILES YOU MAY TOUCH (nothing else):
    packages/deck-ui/src/DetailDrawer.tsx
    packages/deck-ui/src/format.ts
    any test file already under packages/deck-ui/ (and, ONLY for updating a "0s"/duration assertion, test files elsewhere in the repo)
    packages/deck-ui/src/gallery/** or the /design-system gallery entry for DetailDrawer, IF the project requires every variant to be registered there — read the gallery registration for DetailDrawer first and follow whatever pattern it already uses.

  Do NOT touch apps/web/src/components/factory/** — a separate job owns the calling side. Do NOT touch collector/** or modules/**.

  CONSTRAINTS — NON-NEGOTIABLE
  - NEVER create a new primitive. You are extending an existing one.
  - Design tokens only. No raw colors. Widths as Tailwind classes in the same idiom the file already uses.
  - No stubs, no placeholders, no TODOs.
  - Comments describe WHAT is non-obvious, never your reasoning. Default to zero comments.
  - Surgical: touch only the listed files; do not reformat adjacent code.
  - Do not commit. Leave changes in the working tree.

  TESTS (packages/deck-ui)
  - The default drawer renders with the same width class it has today.
  - The wide variant renders the wide class and is still capped at 100% of the viewport.
  - The draggable branch honours the width prop too.
  - formatDurationMs(61) → "61ms"; formatDurationMs(999) → milliseconds; formatDurationMs(1000) and formatDurationMs(45_000) unchanged from today.

  VERIFY
  You CANNOT run pnpm in this sandbox (ERR_PNPM_TARBALL_URL_MISMATCH) — do not attempt it and do not claim a test pass you did not observe. The main thread runs `pnpm --filter @overdeck/deck-ui test|typecheck` itself. Re-read every file you touched end to end and confirm every prop you pass exists on the component you pass it to.

  REPORT
  - The exact prop name, type and default you added, with file:line.
  - The exact class strings produced for each size, and proof the default is byte-identical to today's.
  - Every assertion you added or changed, and why any changed assertion was encoding the defect.

preview:
  Work in the repository checkout at your CURRENT WORKING DIRECTORY. Every path below is relative to that repo root. Absolute /home/user/... paths do not exist for you.

  GOAL — two rendering defects proven by real screenshots of the deployed /factory page.

  DEFECT 1 — every detail drawer is 448px wide, and the data-dense tables inside it are unreadable.
  `packages/deck-ui/src/DetailDrawer.tsx` hardcodes `w-[min(28rem,100%)]` on the `<aside role="dialog">`. The factory attempt drawer renders a "Tool calls" table (columns: Seq, Tool name, Started, Duration, Result — Result itself contains a status chip plus two expandable text blocks) and the gate drawer renders a checks table (Check, Pass/fail, Command, Exit code, Duration, Command log, Note, Output artifact). At 448px the last columns are cut off the visible area; a full-screen screenshot confirms the command.log path — the single most useful value on a failed gate — is off-screen.

  REQUIRED: give DetailDrawer an OPTIONAL width affordance so a data-dense drawer can be wider, defaulting to today's width so every existing caller is unchanged.
  - Read DetailDrawer.tsx end to end first, including the draggable branch (it composes different position classes) and any test that asserts on its className.
  - The prop is PINNED (a second job calls it concurrently — do not rename it): `size?: 'default' | 'wide'`, defaulting to `'default'`. `'default'` must produce the EXACT class string that ships today. `'wide'` must stay responsive (`w-[min(<rem>,100%)]` shape — never wider than the viewport); pick a width that comfortably fits an 8-column table.
  - Both the modal and the draggable branch must honour it.
  - Do not change the drawer's overflow, focus trap, escape handling, or any other behavior.

  DEFECT 2 — sub-second durations render as "0s".
  `packages/deck-ui/src/format.ts` `formatDurationMs` returns `${Math.round(ms/1000)}s` for anything under a minute, so a 61ms tool call reads "0s" on the page. That is a real observability loss: the owner's bar is seeing how long each tool run actually took.
  REQUIRED: durations below 1000ms render in milliseconds (e.g. `61ms`); 1000ms and above keep today's output byte-for-byte. Do NOT change the minute/hour branches.
  - Then grep the whole repo for existing assertions that depend on the old sub-second output and update ONLY assertions that encoded the "0s" defect. Never weaken an assertion for any other reason.

  FILES YOU MAY TOUCH (nothing else):
    packages/deck-ui/src/DetailDrawer.tsx
    packages/deck-ui/src/format.ts
    any test file already under packages/deck-ui/ (and, ONLY for updating a "0s"/duration assertion, test files elsewhere in the repo)
    packages/deck-ui/src/gallery/** or the /design-system gallery entry for DetailDrawer, IF the project requires every variant to be registered there — read the gallery registration for DetailDrawer first and follow whatever pattern it already uses.

  Do NOT touch apps/web/src/components/factory/** — a separate job owns the calling side. Do NOT touch collector/** or modules/**.

  CONSTRAINTS — NON-NEGOTIABLE
  - NEVER create a new primitive. You are extending an existing one.
  - Design tokens only. No raw colors. Widths as Tailwind classes in the same idiom the file already uses.
  - No stubs, no placeholders, no TODOs.
  - Comments describe WHAT is non-obvious, never your reasoning. Default to zero comments.
  - Surgical: touch only the listed files; do not reformat adjacent code.
  - Do not commit. Leave changes in the working tree.

  TESTS (packages/deck-ui)
  - The default drawer renders with the same width class it has today.
  - The wide variant renders the wide class and is still capped at 100% of the viewport.
  - The draggable branch honours the width prop too.
  - formatDurationMs(61) → "61ms"; formatDurationMs(999) → milliseconds; formatDurationMs(1000) and formatDurationMs(45_000) unchanged from today.

  VERIFY
  You CANNOT run pnpm in this sandbox (ERR_PNPM_TARBALL_URL_MISMATCH) — do not attempt it and do not claim a test pass you did not observe. The main thread runs `pnpm --filter @overdeck/deck-ui test|typecheck` itself. Re-read every file you touched end to end and confirm every prop you pass exists on the component you pass it to.

  REPORT
  - The exact prop name, type and default you added, with file:line.
  - The exact class strings produced for each size, and proof the default is byte-identical to today's.
  - Every assertion you added or changed, and why any changed assertion was encoding the defect.


id: 019fe22b-3c71-7762-a129-4532ca20fc5b
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/factory-adw-df680f068432
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 1dc775feb7febf8ac0c03fd2995cae6a7bd4843b
git_branch: wt/factory-adw
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/08/rollout-2026-08-08T16-18-32-019fe22b-3c71-7762-a129-4532ca20fc5b.jsonl

title:
  Work in the repository checkout at your CURRENT WORKING DIRECTORY. Every path below is relative to that repo root. Absolute /home/user/... paths do not exist for you.

  GOAL — two defects in the factory trace UI, both proven by real screenshots of the deployed /factory page.

  DEFECT 1 — the factory detail drawers are too narrow for the tables they contain.
  `packages/deck-ui/src/DetailDrawer.tsx` is being given a new OPTIONAL prop by a job running RIGHT NOW in this same tree:

      size?: 'default' | 'wide'      // defaults to 'default', which is today's 448px width

  You must NOT edit DetailDrawer.tsx or anything else under packages/** — that file is owned by the other job at this moment. Just pass the prop.

  REQUIRED: in `apps/web/src/components/factory/FactoryTraceTables.tsx`, pass `size="wide"` on the drawers that contain a DataTable — the agent-attempt drawer (it renders the "Tool calls" table) and the gate drawer (it renders the checks table). Leave the artifact-content drawer and the CollapsibleText drawer at the default width unless they too render a table — read each one before deciding, and say in your report which drawers you changed and which you deliberately left alone.

  DEFECT 2 — a failed gate check is labelled "BROKEN".
  `GateVerdict` (same file, ~line 382) renders `<VerdictBadge verdict={passed === null ? 'unverified' : passed ? 'works' : 'broken'} />`. On screen a failing quality check therefore reads **BROKEN** under a column headed "Pass / fail". The gate either passed or failed; "broken"/"works" is the wrong vocabulary for a pass/fail verdict and reads as a UI bug.

  REQUIRED: render gate and check verdicts with the pass/fail vocabulary already used elsewhere in this same file — read how `AttemptOutcome` and `ToolCallResult` render their outcomes (they use `StatusChip` with `status="completed"` / `status="failed"` / `status="unknown"`) and match that exactly. A passing gate reads as passed, a failing gate as failed, an unknown verdict stays honestly unknown. Do NOT invent a new chip, a new status value, or new wording beyond that vocabulary. Keep the column header and the sort behavior unchanged.

  FILES YOU MAY TOUCH (nothing else):
    apps/web/src/components/factory/FactoryTraceTables.tsx
    apps/web/src/components/factory/FactoryTraceTables.test.tsx
    apps/web/src/components/factory/FactoryContent.test.tsx

  Do NOT touch packages/** (another job owns it right now), collector/**, or modules/**.

  CONSTRAINTS — NON-NEGOTIABLE
  - Compose existing exports only. NEVER create a new primitive. If you believe one is missing, STOP and say so in your report instead of writing it.
  - The `@platform-modules/ui-primitives` DataTable has NO `ariaLabel` prop (accessible name comes from `caption`) and NO `align` prop, and no expandable rows. Its sort cycle is TRI-STATE (asc → desc → null).
  - Design tokens only. No raw colors, no raw px in inline styles.
  - No stubs, no placeholders, no TODOs. No fabricated data — a null renders honestly.
  - Comments describe WHAT is non-obvious, never your reasoning. Default to zero comments.
  - NEVER append a duplicate import line at the end of a file. Edit the existing import block in place.
  - Surgical: touch only the listed files. Do not commit — leave changes in the working tree.

  TESTS
  - The gate drawer and the attempt drawer are rendered with the wide size.
  - A failing gate row renders the failed pass/fail wording, and the string "broken" no longer appears for it.
  - A passing gate row renders the passed wording.
  - A gate whose verdict is unknown still renders honestly as unknown.
  - Existing assertions in these test files must keep passing. Never weaken one.
  Several sr-only live regions exist on the page — scope any role-based query with `within(...)`.

  VERIFY
  You CANNOT run pnpm in this sandbox (ERR_PNPM_TARBALL_URL_MISMATCH) — do not attempt it and do not claim a web test pass you did not observe. The main thread runs `pnpm --filter web typecheck|test` itself. Re-read every file you touched end to end and confirm every prop you pass exists on the component you pass it to.

  REPORT
  - Which drawers you gave the wide size and which you left at the default, with file:line and why.
  - The exact chip status + label you now render for passed / failed / unknown, with file:line and the existing usage you matched.
  - Every assertion you added or changed.

first_user_message:
  Work in the repository checkout at your CURRENT WORKING DIRECTORY. Every path below is relative to that repo root. Absolute /home/user/... paths do not exist for you.

  GOAL — two defects in the factory trace UI, both proven by real screenshots of the deployed /factory page.

  DEFECT 1 — the factory detail drawers are too narrow for the tables they contain.
  `packages/deck-ui/src/DetailDrawer.tsx` is being given a new OPTIONAL prop by a job running RIGHT NOW in this same tree:

      size?: 'default' | 'wide'      // defaults to 'default', which is today's 448px width

  You must NOT edit DetailDrawer.tsx or anything else under packages/** — that file is owned by the other job at this moment. Just pass the prop.

  REQUIRED: in `apps/web/src/components/factory/FactoryTraceTables.tsx`, pass `size="wide"` on the drawers that contain a DataTable — the agent-attempt drawer (it renders the "Tool calls" table) and the gate drawer (it renders the checks table). Leave the artifact-content drawer and the CollapsibleText drawer at the default width unless they too render a table — read each one before deciding, and say in your report which drawers you changed and which you deliberately left alone.

  DEFECT 2 — a failed gate check is labelled "BROKEN".
  `GateVerdict` (same file, ~line 382) renders `<VerdictBadge verdict={passed === null ? 'unverified' : passed ? 'works' : 'broken'} />`. On screen a failing quality check therefore reads **BROKEN** under a column headed "Pass / fail". The gate either passed or failed; "broken"/"works" is the wrong vocabulary for a pass/fail verdict and reads as a UI bug.

  REQUIRED: render gate and check verdicts with the pass/fail vocabulary already used elsewhere in this same file — read how `AttemptOutcome` and `ToolCallResult` render their outcomes (they use `StatusChip` with `status="completed"` / `status="failed"` / `status="unknown"`) and match that exactly. A passing gate reads as passed, a failing gate as failed, an unknown verdict stays honestly unknown. Do NOT invent a new chip, a new status value, or new wording beyond that vocabulary. Keep the column header and the sort behavior unchanged.

  FILES YOU MAY TOUCH (nothing else):
    apps/web/src/components/factory/FactoryTraceTables.tsx
    apps/web/src/components/factory/FactoryTraceTables.test.tsx
    apps/web/src/components/factory/FactoryContent.test.tsx

  Do NOT touch packages/** (another job owns it right now), collector/**, or modules/**.

  CONSTRAINTS — NON-NEGOTIABLE
  - Compose existing exports only. NEVER create a new primitive. If you believe one is missing, STOP and say so in your report instead of writing it.
  - The `@platform-modules/ui-primitives` DataTable has NO `ariaLabel` prop (accessible name comes from `caption`) and NO `align` prop, and no expandable rows. Its sort cycle is TRI-STATE (asc → desc → null).
  - Design tokens only. No raw colors, no raw px in inline styles.
  - No stubs, no placeholders, no TODOs. No fabricated data — a null renders honestly.
  - Comments describe WHAT is non-obvious, never your reasoning. Default to zero comments.
  - NEVER append a duplicate import line at the end of a file. Edit the existing import block in place.
  - Surgical: touch only the listed files. Do not commit — leave changes in the working tree.

  TESTS
  - The gate drawer and the attempt drawer are rendered with the wide size.
  - A failing gate row renders the failed pass/fail wording, and the string "broken" no longer appears for it.
  - A passing gate row renders the passed wording.
  - A gate whose verdict is unknown still renders honestly as unknown.
  - Existing assertions in these test files must keep passing. Never weaken one.
  Several sr-only live regions exist on the page — scope any role-based query with `within(...)`.

  VERIFY
  You CANNOT run pnpm in this sandbox (ERR_PNPM_TARBALL_URL_MISMATCH) — do not attempt it and do not claim a web test pass you did not observe. The main thread runs `pnpm --filter web typecheck|test` itself. Re-read every file you touched end to end and confirm every prop you pass exists on the component you pass it to.

  REPORT
  - Which drawers you gave the wide size and which you left at the default, with file:line and why.
  - The exact chip status + label you now render for passed / failed / unknown, with file:line and the existing usage you matched.
  - Every assertion you added or changed.

preview:
  Work in the repository checkout at your CURRENT WORKING DIRECTORY. Every path below is relative to that repo root. Absolute /home/user/... paths do not exist for you.

  GOAL — two defects in the factory trace UI, both proven by real screenshots of the deployed /factory page.

  DEFECT 1 — the factory detail drawers are too narrow for the tables they contain.
  `packages/deck-ui/src/DetailDrawer.tsx` is being given a new OPTIONAL prop by a job running RIGHT NOW in this same tree:

      size?: 'default' | 'wide'      // defaults to 'default', which is today's 448px width

  You must NOT edit DetailDrawer.tsx or anything else under packages/** — that file is owned by the other job at this moment. Just pass the prop.

  REQUIRED: in `apps/web/src/components/factory/FactoryTraceTables.tsx`, pass `size="wide"` on the drawers that contain a DataTable — the agent-attempt drawer (it renders the "Tool calls" table) and the gate drawer (it renders the checks table). Leave the artifact-content drawer and the CollapsibleText drawer at the default width unless they too render a table — read each one before deciding, and say in your report which drawers you changed and which you deliberately left alone.

  DEFECT 2 — a failed gate check is labelled "BROKEN".
  `GateVerdict` (same file, ~line 382) renders `<VerdictBadge verdict={passed === null ? 'unverified' : passed ? 'works' : 'broken'} />`. On screen a failing quality check therefore reads **BROKEN** under a column headed "Pass / fail". The gate either passed or failed; "broken"/"works" is the wrong vocabulary for a pass/fail verdict and reads as a UI bug.

  REQUIRED: render gate and check verdicts with the pass/fail vocabulary already used elsewhere in this same file — read how `AttemptOutcome` and `ToolCallResult` render their outcomes (they use `StatusChip` with `status="completed"` / `status="failed"` / `status="unknown"`) and match that exactly. A passing gate reads as passed, a failing gate as failed, an unknown verdict stays honestly unknown. Do NOT invent a new chip, a new status value, or new wording beyond that vocabulary. Keep the column header and the sort behavior unchanged.

  FILES YOU MAY TOUCH (nothing else):
    apps/web/src/components/factory/FactoryTraceTables.tsx
    apps/web/src/components/factory/FactoryTraceTables.test.tsx
    apps/web/src/components/factory/FactoryContent.test.tsx

  Do NOT touch packages/** (another job owns it right now), collector/**, or modules/**.

  CONSTRAINTS — NON-NEGOTIABLE
  - Compose existing exports only. NEVER create a new primitive. If you believe one is missing, STOP and say so in your report instead of writing it.
  - The `@platform-modules/ui-primitives` DataTable has NO `ariaLabel` prop (accessible name comes from `caption`) and NO `align` prop, and no expandable rows. Its sort cycle is TRI-STATE (asc → desc → null).
  - Design tokens only. No raw colors, no raw px in inline styles.
  - No stubs, no placeholders, no TODOs. No fabricated data — a null renders honestly.
  - Comments describe WHAT is non-obvious, never your reasoning. Default to zero comments.
  - NEVER append a duplicate import line at the end of a file. Edit the existing import block in place.
  - Surgical: touch only the listed files. Do not commit — leave changes in the working tree.

  TESTS
  - The gate drawer and the attempt drawer are rendered with the wide size.
  - A failing gate row renders the failed pass/fail wording, and the string "broken" no longer appears for it.
  - A passing gate row renders the passed wording.
  - A gate whose verdict is unknown still renders honestly as unknown.
  - Existing assertions in these test files must keep passing. Never weaken one.
  Several sr-only live regions exist on the page — scope any role-based query with `within(...)`.

  VERIFY
  You CANNOT run pnpm in this sandbox (ERR_PNPM_TARBALL_URL_MISMATCH) — do not attempt it and do not claim a web test pass you did not observe. The main thread runs `pnpm --filter web typecheck|test` itself. Re-read every file you touched end to end and confirm every prop you pass exists on the component you pass it to.

  REPORT
  - Which drawers you gave the wide size and which you left at the default, with file:line and why.
  - The exact chip status + label you now render for passed / failed / unknown, with file:line and the existing usage you matched.
  - Every assertion you added or changed.


id: 019fe244-91fb-7bd2-8b20-07b9eb850ccc
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/overdeck-f7f63179e1c7
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: f3cd358572a8d48c329a44d254c1001f5049b89c
git_branch: main
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/08/rollout-2026-08-08T16-46-12-019fe244-91fb-7bd2-8b20-07b9eb850ccc.jsonl

title:
  Task #110: prove the pids-cap breach kill in the danger lab. Context: /home/user/Projects/overdeck task #36 made a pids-cap breach kill the runaway process instead of paralyzing the machine; the kill behavior landed but was never proven under a real breach. The danger lab exists for exactly this: a frozen VM template with disposable per-agent clones on debian1 (read the danger-lab overview doc — search /home/user/Projects/overdeck/docs and '/home/user/Projects/0 DOCS' for danger-lab, plus the lab tooling in modules/). HARD RULES: the breach test runs ONLY inside a disposable danger-lab VM clone on debian1. NEVER run any fork bomb, pids exhaustion, or resource exhaustion on the workstation, on debian1 itself (the host), or on any other buildbox — the host is read-only for you except lab VM lifecycle commands. ssh with: ssh -F /dev/null debian1 (if ssh is unreachable from your environment, STOP and report that instead of testing anywhere else). Steps: clone a fresh lab VM, install the pids-cap kill mechanism inside it exactly as deployed (copy the relevant landed files from origin/main into the VM), trigger a controlled pids breach inside the VM, capture evidence the runaway got killed while the VM stayed responsive, destroy the clone. Output: evidence log (commands + outputs), verdict PROVEN or FAILED with failure detail. Touch no repo files; push nothing.

first_user_message:
  Task #110: prove the pids-cap breach kill in the danger lab. Context: /home/user/Projects/overdeck task #36 made a pids-cap breach kill the runaway process instead of paralyzing the machine; the kill behavior landed but was never proven under a real breach. The danger lab exists for exactly this: a frozen VM template with disposable per-agent clones on debian1 (read the danger-lab overview doc — search /home/user/Projects/overdeck/docs and '/home/user/Projects/0 DOCS' for danger-lab, plus the lab tooling in modules/). HARD RULES: the breach test runs ONLY inside a disposable danger-lab VM clone on debian1. NEVER run any fork bomb, pids exhaustion, or resource exhaustion on the workstation, on debian1 itself (the host), or on any other buildbox — the host is read-only for you except lab VM lifecycle commands. ssh with: ssh -F /dev/null debian1 (if ssh is unreachable from your environment, STOP and report that instead of testing anywhere else). Steps: clone a fresh lab VM, install the pids-cap kill mechanism inside it exactly as deployed (copy the relevant landed files from origin/main into the VM), trigger a controlled pids breach inside the VM, capture evidence the runaway got killed while the VM stayed responsive, destroy the clone. Output: evidence log (commands + outputs), verdict PROVEN or FAILED with failure detail. Touch no repo files; push nothing.

preview:
  Task #110: prove the pids-cap breach kill in the danger lab. Context: /home/user/Projects/overdeck task #36 made a pids-cap breach kill the runaway process instead of paralyzing the machine; the kill behavior landed but was never proven under a real breach. The danger lab exists for exactly this: a frozen VM template with disposable per-agent clones on debian1 (read the danger-lab overview doc — search /home/user/Projects/overdeck/docs and '/home/user/Projects/0 DOCS' for danger-lab, plus the lab tooling in modules/). HARD RULES: the breach test runs ONLY inside a disposable danger-lab VM clone on debian1. NEVER run any fork bomb, pids exhaustion, or resource exhaustion on the workstation, on debian1 itself (the host), or on any other buildbox — the host is read-only for you except lab VM lifecycle commands. ssh with: ssh -F /dev/null debian1 (if ssh is unreachable from your environment, STOP and report that instead of testing anywhere else). Steps: clone a fresh lab VM, install the pids-cap kill mechanism inside it exactly as deployed (copy the relevant landed files from origin/main into the VM), trigger a controlled pids breach inside the VM, capture evidence the runaway got killed while the VM stayed responsive, destroy the clone. Output: evidence log (commands + outputs), verdict PROVEN or FAILED with failure detail. Touch no repo files; push nothing.


id: 019fe24f-1f19-7f51-966f-3ccb84bbd676
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/factory-live-feaf66aa5dfe
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: b1f5e1d31f891515e0f4711ee4de85317bb4ffcf
git_branch: wt/factory-live
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-terra
reasoning_effort: medium
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/08/rollout-2026-08-08T16-57-43-019fe24f-1f19-7f51-966f-3ccb84bbd676.jsonl

title:
  Work in the repository checkout at your CURRENT WORKING DIRECTORY. Every path below is relative to that repo root.

  THE OWNER'S INSTRUCTION, VERBATIM:
  "i need a complete cutover to the factory. erase all mentions of the old ways, and make /plan create factory plans, and /brainstorm route to that. /run-plan needs to just run a factory plan. make sure that agents will never get the v2 old harness to their context — just like you dont even really know what was the v1 or any details about it, i want v2 to be forgotten"

  You are rewriting agent-facing documentation so that a future agent reading these files has NO IDEA a previous engine ever existed.

  === THE FACTORY — the only engine, the only truth ===

  CLI: `factory` (installed on PATH).
    factory [--repo PATH] [--config PATH] <ADW> [args...]

  ADW entrypoints (each takes ONE prompt argument):
    adw_prompt  adw_scout  adw_plan  adw_build  adw_build_test  adw_build_review
    adw_document  adw_quality  adw_plan_build  adw_plan_build_test
    adw_plan_build_test_quality  adw_sdlc  adw_simple_sdlc

  Control commands: `factory stop`, `factory reconcile`, `factory decisions`,
  `factory answer`, `factory watch [ADW_ID] [--follow] [--since-start]`.

  **A path argument resolves to that file's CONTENTS** (`adw_modules/utils.py`
  `resolve_prompt`). So `factory adw_plan_build_test_quality docs/plans/foo.md`
  feeds the authored document to the factory AS THE REQUEST TEXT.

  **THE FACT THAT GOVERNS THE /plan REWRITE — verified in the source, do not
  contradict it:** the factory's OWN planner agent does the task decomposition.
  The plan phase writes `<context_handoff_dir>/plan.md` and copies it to
  `specs/<adw_id>_<slug>.md`; the builder receives that plan through the
  `previous_envelope` and reads those artifacts. The authored doc you hand to
  `factory` is therefore the REQUEST, not a task graph.

  Consequence, binding on every file you touch: an authored plan doc MUST be a
  precise REQUEST SPEC — goal, constraints, the files/seams it must touch, the
  behavior required, and executable acceptance commands. It MUST NOT contain a
  wave table, a task dependency graph, per-task numbered checkbox steps, seat or
  tier assignments, or decision records. Those are the factory planner's job and
  duplicating them wastes tokens and invites drift.

  Phase chain: git_preflight -> request -> plan -> build -> (verify_N -> fix_N,
  bounded at 3 attempts) -> commit. Verify runs the project's configured quality
  checks AS CODE, not as an agent judgement.

  Config resolution, in order: `--config`, else `<repo>/.factory/sssf.config.yaml`,
  else the shipped default `modules/harness/factory/sssf.config.yaml`.

  Observability: every run streams to the `/factory` page in the overdeck web UI —
  timeline, per-phase agent attempts, prompts, gates, logs and diffs. That page is
  where a user watches a run. Trace database:
  `/home/user/.local/state/overdeck/factory/sssf.db`.

  NO RESUME. Re-launching starts a NEW adw_id. NEVER document a resume procedure,
  a `--retry` path, or a crash-recovery ladder. There is none.

  `modules/harness/factory/**` is off-limits to every factory agent by design — an
  agent must not edit the machinery that judges its own work.

  === WHAT MUST DISAPPEAR — every mention, in every file you touch ===

  Names and concepts: `runplan`, `run-plan` as an executor, "v1", "v2", "harness
  engine", "engine bundle", "the engine", `~/.harness/`, `HARNESS_ENGINE_DEV`,
  `ENGINE_ROOT`, `harness-release`, `runstate/`, engine journals, "waves" as an
  ENGINE concept, seats, tiers, presets, adapters registry, `REPLY_MARKERS`,
  `gate0`, canary stub, "quarantine" as an engine state.

  Flags: `--preset`, `--account`, `--concurrency`, `--retry-blocked`, `--budget-ms`,
  `--run-id`, `--isolate`, `--supervised`, `--daemonize`.

  Session-file fields: `meta.preset`, `meta.gate0_mode`, `meta.land_mode`,
  `meta.base_branch`, `task.seat`, `task.tier`, `task.wave`, `gated` records,
  `requires_decision`, the `["proceed","abort"]` sentinel.

  Scripts and paths: `ship-init.sh`, `rp-isolate.sh`, `run-plan-scan.mjs`, task
  branches shaped `plan/<slug>--<id>`.

  **Do NOT leave a migration note, a "formerly known as" line, a deprecation
  banner, a changelog entry, or a comment explaining what was removed.** A future
  agent reading the file must have no idea any of it ever existed. Deleting a
  section is correct; annotating its absence is not.

  === HOUSE RULES ===

  - Register: agent-facing, BLUF, imperative. Keep the "audience: AI coding agents
    first" line. Compress connective prose; NEVER compress normative keywords
    (MUST, MUST NOT, NEVER, ALWAYS), identifiers, paths, or code blocks.
  - No stubs, no placeholders, no TODOs.
  - NEVER invent a flag, a path, an ADW name or a behavior that is not listed
    above. If you need a fact that is not here, read the factory source under
    `modules/harness/factory/` and cite what you found.
  - Do NOT reformat or rewrite sections that have nothing to do with the cutover.
    Surgical edits only.
  - Do NOT commit. Leave every change in the working tree.
  - Touch ONLY the files your own task names. Other jobs are editing other files
    in this same checkout RIGHT NOW.

  REPORT: for each file, what you removed and what replaced it, with file:line.

  YOUR FILES (rewrite both; touch nothing else):
    modules/workstation/claude/skills/plan/SKILL.md
    modules/workstation/claude/skills/run-plan/SKILL.md

  These two are rewritten TOGETHER so the authored-doc format and the launch
  command stay consistent. Read both end to end before writing either.

  --- plan/SKILL.md ---

  It must now teach an agent to author a REQUEST SPEC for the factory. Re-read the
  governing fact in the brief above: the factory's own planner does the
  decomposition, so this doc is the request, not a task graph.

  DELETE ENTIRELY: the Wave Plan table and all wave/dependency-analysis prose, the
  Decision-Enumeration Pass and everything about `gated` records / options
  sentinels / `requires_decision` / `binds_meta`, the per-task
  Wave/Blocks/Blocked-by structure, the numbered checkbox task steps, the
  per-task commit steps, the "Execution Handoff" section and its handoff to any
  other skill, and the wave-plan item in Self-Review.

  KEEP AND ADAPT: the contract-level default (pin the seam, never the
  implementation body; collapse to literal code only when the code is shorter than
  the prose describing it), the vagueness bans ("TBD", "add appropriate error
  handling", "similar to Task N", references to symbols no contract defines), the
  body-bloat bans, the exact-file-paths rule, the exact-commands-with-expected-
  output rule, the required-literal-formats-pasted-verbatim rule, and a self-review
  pass covering spec coverage / vagueness / seam consistency.

  THE NEW DOCUMENT SHAPE it must instruct the author to produce:
    # <Feature> — request
    **Goal:** one sentence.
    **Context:** what exists now that this changes, with real paths.
    **Files:** exact paths, each with a one-line responsibility (Create/Modify).
    **Contract:** the seams — signatures, types, IO/route/schema shapes, any
      spec-mandated literal string verbatim.
    **Behavior:** what it must do; the named edge cases; the named error
      conditions. Never "handle edge cases" without naming them.
    **Out of scope:** what the factory must NOT touch.
    **Acceptance:** executable commands with their expected output.

  Save path stays `docs/plans/YYYY-MM-DD-<PLAN_SLUG>.md`. `PLAN_SLUG` is a
  kebab key; if brainstorm passed one, reuse it verbatim.

  The doc ends by stating the launch command and nothing else:
    cd <repoRoot> && factory adw_plan_build_test_quality docs/plans/YYYY-MM-DD-<PLAN_SLUG>.md

  Also delete the "## Learned Rules" entries that are about waves, dispatch
  economics, or the old executor. Learned rules that are still true about
  authoring (the i18n mirror-pages rule, the design-tokens-in-snippets rule, the
  sweep-must-be-exhaustive rule, the probe-must-not-filter-enabled rule, the
  fixture-violations-blocked-by-hooks rule) STAY — but strip any wording that
  names waves or the old executor.

  --- run-plan/SKILL.md ---

  This becomes a THIN launcher for a factory run against an authored plan doc.
  Nearly the whole current file is about the old engine and must be deleted: the
  inline fallback, `/run-plan status` and its scan script, the flag table, the
  decision gate, the ship-method freeze ladder, the resume/crash section, the
  isolated-run section, the safety floor, and the "Do NOT" list.

  The new file, short:
  - audience line; BLUF.
  - What it does: runs an authored plan document through the factory.
  - Resolve the plan doc: the first token is the slug; find
    `docs/plans/*-<SLUG>.md` under the repo. Ambiguous or missing → STOP, list the
    available slugs, do not launch.
  - Launch, from inside the repo root:
      cd <repoRoot> && factory adw_plan_build_test_quality docs/plans/<file>.md
    It is autonomous and runs in the foreground until it finishes.
  - Pick a shorter ADW only when the user explicitly asks for less: `adw_plan_build`
    (no verify), `adw_build` (the doc is already a plan and needs no re-planning).
  - Watching it: the run streams to the `/factory` page in the overdeck web UI —
    tell the user that is where they watch it. `factory watch --follow` is the
    terminal equivalent.
  - If it needs a human decision it surfaces one; answer with `factory decisions`
    and `factory answer`.
  - Non-zero exit → HALT and surface the factory's own stderr verbatim. Never
    reinterpret it, never relaunch blindly.
  - NEVER re-implement the loop in the conversation. The factory owns it.

first_user_message:
  Work in the repository checkout at your CURRENT WORKING DIRECTORY. Every path below is relative to that repo root.

  THE OWNER'S INSTRUCTION, VERBATIM:
  "i need a complete cutover to the factory. erase all mentions of the old ways, and make /plan create factory plans, and /brainstorm route to that. /run-plan needs to just run a factory plan. make sure that agents will never get the v2 old harness to their context — just like you dont even really know what was the v1 or any details about it, i want v2 to be forgotten"

  You are rewriting agent-facing documentation so that a future agent reading these files has NO IDEA a previous engine ever existed.

  === THE FACTORY — the only engine, the only truth ===

  CLI: `factory` (installed on PATH).
    factory [--repo PATH] [--config PATH] <ADW> [args...]

  ADW entrypoints (each takes ONE prompt argument):
    adw_prompt  adw_scout  adw_plan  adw_build  adw_build_test  adw_build_review
    adw_document  adw_quality  adw_plan_build  adw_plan_build_test
    adw_plan_build_test_quality  adw_sdlc  adw_simple_sdlc

  Control commands: `factory stop`, `factory reconcile`, `factory decisions`,
  `factory answer`, `factory watch [ADW_ID] [--follow] [--since-start]`.

  **A path argument resolves to that file's CONTENTS** (`adw_modules/utils.py`
  `resolve_prompt`). So `factory adw_plan_build_test_quality docs/plans/foo.md`
  feeds the authored document to the factory AS THE REQUEST TEXT.

  **THE FACT THAT GOVERNS THE /plan REWRITE — verified in the source, do not
  contradict it:** the factory's OWN planner agent does the task decomposition.
  The plan phase writes `<context_handoff_dir>/plan.md` and copies it to
  `specs/<adw_id>_<slug>.md`; the builder receives that plan through the
  `previous_envelope` and reads those artifacts. The authored doc you hand to
  `factory` is therefore the REQUEST, not a task graph.

  Consequence, binding on every file you touch: an authored plan doc MUST be a
  precise REQUEST SPEC — goal, constraints, the files/seams it must touch, the
  behavior required, and executable acceptance commands. It MUST NOT contain a
  wave table, a task dependency graph, per-task numbered checkbox steps, seat or
  tier assignments, or decision records. Those are the factory planner's job and
  duplicating them wastes tokens and invites drift.

  Phase chain: git_preflight -> request -> plan -> build -> (verify_N -> fix_N,
  bounded at 3 attempts) -> commit. Verify runs the project's configured quality
  checks AS CODE, not as an agent judgement.

  Config resolution, in order: `--config`, else `<repo>/.factory/sssf.config.yaml`,
  else the shipped default `modules/harness/factory/sssf.config.yaml`.

  Observability: every run streams to the `/factory` page in the overdeck web UI —
  timeline, per-phase agent attempts, prompts, gates, logs and diffs. That page is
  where a user watches a run. Trace database:
  `/home/user/.local/state/overdeck/factory/sssf.db`.

  NO RESUME. Re-launching starts a NEW adw_id. NEVER document a resume procedure,
  a `--retry` path, or a crash-recovery ladder. There is none.

  `modules/harness/factory/**` is off-limits to every factory agent by design — an
  agent must not edit the machinery that judges its own work.

  === WHAT MUST DISAPPEAR — every mention, in every file you touch ===

  Names and concepts: `runplan`, `run-plan` as an executor, "v1", "v2", "harness
  engine", "engine bundle", "the engine", `~/.harness/`, `HARNESS_ENGINE_DEV`,
  `ENGINE_ROOT`, `harness-release`, `runstate/`, engine journals, "waves" as an
  ENGINE concept, seats, tiers, presets, adapters registry, `REPLY_MARKERS`,
  `gate0`, canary stub, "quarantine" as an engine state.

  Flags: `--preset`, `--account`, `--concurrency`, `--retry-blocked`, `--budget-ms`,
  `--run-id`, `--isolate`, `--supervised`, `--daemonize`.

  Session-file fields: `meta.preset`, `meta.gate0_mode`, `meta.land_mode`,
  `meta.base_branch`, `task.seat`, `task.tier`, `task.wave`, `gated` records,
  `requires_decision`, the `["proceed","abort"]` sentinel.

  Scripts and paths: `ship-init.sh`, `rp-isolate.sh`, `run-plan-scan.mjs`, task
  branches shaped `plan/<slug>--<id>`.

  **Do NOT leave a migration note, a "formerly known as" line, a deprecation
  banner, a changelog entry, or a comment explaining what was removed.** A future
  agent reading the file must have no idea any of it ever existed. Deleting a
  section is correct; annotating its absence is not.

  === HOUSE RULES ===

  - Register: agent-facing, BLUF, imperative. Keep the "audience: AI coding agents
    first" line. Compress connective prose; NEVER compress normative keywords
    (MUST, MUST NOT, NEVER, ALWAYS), identifiers, paths, or code blocks.
  - No stubs, no placeholders, no TODOs.
  - NEVER invent a flag, a path, an ADW name or a behavior that is not listed
    above. If you need a fact that is not here, read the factory source under
    `modules/harness/factory/` and cite what you found.
  - Do NOT reformat or rewrite sections that have nothing to do with the cutover.
    Surgical edits only.
  - Do NOT commit. Leave every change in the working tree.
  - Touch ONLY the files your own task names. Other jobs are editing other files
    in this same checkout RIGHT NOW.

  REPORT: for each file, what you removed and what replaced it, with file:line.

  YOUR FILES (rewrite both; touch nothing else):
    modules/workstation/claude/skills/plan/SKILL.md
    modules/workstation/claude/skills/run-plan/SKILL.md

  These two are rewritten TOGETHER so the authored-doc format and the launch
  command stay consistent. Read both end to end before writing either.

  --- plan/SKILL.md ---

  It must now teach an agent to author a REQUEST SPEC for the factory. Re-read the
  governing fact in the brief above: the factory's own planner does the
  decomposition, so this doc is the request, not a task graph.

  DELETE ENTIRELY: the Wave Plan table and all wave/dependency-analysis prose, the
  Decision-Enumeration Pass and everything about `gated` records / options
  sentinels / `requires_decision` / `binds_meta`, the per-task
  Wave/Blocks/Blocked-by structure, the numbered checkbox task steps, the
  per-task commit steps, the "Execution Handoff" section and its handoff to any
  other skill, and the wave-plan item in Self-Review.

  KEEP AND ADAPT: the contract-level default (pin the seam, never the
  implementation body; collapse to literal code only when the code is shorter than
  the prose describing it), the vagueness bans ("TBD", "add appropriate error
  handling", "similar to Task N", references to symbols no contract defines), the
  body-bloat bans, the exact-file-paths rule, the exact-commands-with-expected-
  output rule, the required-literal-formats-pasted-verbatim rule, and a self-review
  pass covering spec coverage / vagueness / seam consistency.

  THE NEW DOCUMENT SHAPE it must instruct the author to produce:
    # <Feature> — request
    **Goal:** one sentence.
    **Context:** what exists now that this changes, with real paths.
    **Files:** exact paths, each with a one-line responsibility (Create/Modify).
    **Contract:** the seams — signatures, types, IO/route/schema shapes, any
      spec-mandated literal string verbatim.
    **Behavior:** what it must do; the named edge cases; the named error
      conditions. Never "handle edge cases" without naming them.
    **Out of scope:** what the factory must NOT touch.
    **Acceptance:** executable commands with their expected output.

  Save path stays `docs/plans/YYYY-MM-DD-<PLAN_SLUG>.md`. `PLAN_SLUG` is a
  kebab key; if brainstorm passed one, reuse it verbatim.

  The doc ends by stating the launch command and nothing else:
    cd <repoRoot> && factory adw_plan_build_test_quality docs/plans/YYYY-MM-DD-<PLAN_SLUG>.md

  Also delete the "## Learned Rules" entries that are about waves, dispatch
  economics, or the old executor. Learned rules that are still true about
  authoring (the i18n mirror-pages rule, the design-tokens-in-snippets rule, the
  sweep-must-be-exhaustive rule, the probe-must-not-filter-enabled rule, the
  fixture-violations-blocked-by-hooks rule) STAY — but strip any wording that
  names waves or the old executor.

  --- run-plan/SKILL.md ---

  This becomes a THIN launcher for a factory run against an authored plan doc.
  Nearly the whole current file is about the old engine and must be deleted: the
  inline fallback, `/run-plan status` and its scan script, the flag table, the
  decision gate, the ship-method freeze ladder, the resume/crash section, the
  isolated-run section, the safety floor, and the "Do NOT" list.

  The new file, short:
  - audience line; BLUF.
  - What it does: runs an authored plan document through the factory.
  - Resolve the plan doc: the first token is the slug; find
    `docs/plans/*-<SLUG>.md` under the repo. Ambiguous or missing → STOP, list the
    available slugs, do not launch.
  - Launch, from inside the repo root:
      cd <repoRoot> && factory adw_plan_build_test_quality docs/plans/<file>.md
    It is autonomous and runs in the foreground until it finishes.
  - Pick a shorter ADW only when the user explicitly asks for less: `adw_plan_build`
    (no verify), `adw_build` (the doc is already a plan and needs no re-planning).
  - Watching it: the run streams to the `/factory` page in the overdeck web UI —
    tell the user that is where they watch it. `factory watch --follow` is the
    terminal equivalent.
  - If it needs a human decision it surfaces one; answer with `factory decisions`
    and `factory answer`.
  - Non-zero exit → HALT and surface the factory's own stderr verbatim. Never
    reinterpret it, never relaunch blindly.
  - NEVER re-implement the loop in the conversation. The factory owns it.

preview:
  Work in the repository checkout at your CURRENT WORKING DIRECTORY. Every path below is relative to that repo root.

  THE OWNER'S INSTRUCTION, VERBATIM:
  "i need a complete cutover to the factory. erase all mentions of the old ways, and make /plan create factory plans, and /brainstorm route to that. /run-plan needs to just run a factory plan. make sure that agents will never get the v2 old harness to their context — just like you dont even really know what was the v1 or any details about it, i want v2 to be forgotten"

  You are rewriting agent-facing documentation so that a future agent reading these files has NO IDEA a previous engine ever existed.

  === THE FACTORY — the only engine, the only truth ===

  CLI: `factory` (installed on PATH).
    factory [--repo PATH] [--config PATH] <ADW> [args...]

  ADW entrypoints (each takes ONE prompt argument):
    adw_prompt  adw_scout  adw_plan  adw_build  adw_build_test  adw_build_review
    adw_document  adw_quality  adw_plan_build  adw_plan_build_test
    adw_plan_build_test_quality  adw_sdlc  adw_simple_sdlc

  Control commands: `factory stop`, `factory reconcile`, `factory decisions`,
  `factory answer`, `factory watch [ADW_ID] [--follow] [--since-start]`.

  **A path argument resolves to that file's CONTENTS** (`adw_modules/utils.py`
  `resolve_prompt`). So `factory adw_plan_build_test_quality docs/plans/foo.md`
  feeds the authored document to the factory AS THE REQUEST TEXT.

  **THE FACT THAT GOVERNS THE /plan REWRITE — verified in the source, do not
  contradict it:** the factory's OWN planner agent does the task decomposition.
  The plan phase writes `<context_handoff_dir>/plan.md` and copies it to
  `specs/<adw_id>_<slug>.md`; the builder receives that plan through the
  `previous_envelope` and reads those artifacts. The authored doc you hand to
  `factory` is therefore the REQUEST, not a task graph.

  Consequence, binding on every file you touch: an authored plan doc MUST be a
  precise REQUEST SPEC — goal, constraints, the files/seams it must touch, the
  behavior required, and executable acceptance commands. It MUST NOT contain a
  wave table, a task dependency graph, per-task numbered checkbox steps, seat or
  tier assignments, or decision records. Those are the factory planner's job and
  duplicating them wastes tokens and invites drift.

  Phase chain: git_preflight -> request -> plan -> build -> (verify_N -> fix_N,
  bounded at 3 attempts) -> commit. Verify runs the project's configured quality
  checks AS CODE, not as an agent judgement.

  Config resolution, in order: `--config`, else `<repo>/.factory/sssf.config.yaml`,
  else the shipped default `modules/harness/factory/sssf.config.yaml`.

  Observability: every run streams to the `/factory` page in the overdeck web UI —
  timeline, per-phase agent attempts, prompts, gates, logs and diffs. That page is
  where a user watches a run. Trace database:
  `/home/user/.local/state/overdeck/factory/sssf.db`.

  NO RESUME. Re-launching starts a NEW adw_id. NEVER document a resume procedure,
  a `--retry` path, or a crash-recovery ladder. There is none.

  `modules/harness/factory/**` is off-limits to every factory agent by design — an
  agent must not edit the machinery that judges its own work.

  === WHAT MUST DISAPPEAR — every mention, in every file you touch ===

  Names and concepts: `runplan`, `run-plan` as an executor, "v1", "v2", "harness
  engine", "engine bundle", "the engine", `~/.harness/`, `HARNESS_ENGINE_DEV`,
  `ENGINE_ROOT`, `harness-release`, `runstate/`, engine journals, "waves" as an
  ENGINE concept, seats, tiers, presets, adapters registry, `REPLY_MARKERS`,
  `gate0`, canary stub, "quarantine" as an engine state.

  Flags: `--preset`, `--account`, `--concurrency`, `--retry-blocked`, `--budget-ms`,
  `--run-id`, `--isolate`, `--supervised`, `--daemonize`.

  Session-file fields: `meta.preset`, `meta.gate0_mode`, `meta.land_mode`,
  `meta.base_branch`, `task.seat`, `task.tier`, `task.wave`, `gated` records,
  `requires_decision`, the `["proceed","abort"]` sentinel.

  Scripts and paths: `ship-init.sh`, `rp-isolate.sh`, `run-plan-scan.mjs`, task
  branches shaped `plan/<slug>--<id>`.

  **Do NOT leave a migration note, a "formerly known as" line, a deprecation
  banner, a changelog entry, or a comment explaining what was removed.** A future
  agent reading the file must have no idea any of it ever existed. Deleting a
  section is correct; annotating its absence is not.

  === HOUSE RULES ===

  - Register: agent-facing, BLUF, imperative. Keep the "audience: AI coding agents
    first" line. Compress connective prose; NEVER compress normative keywords
    (MUST, MUST NOT, NEVER, ALWAYS), identifiers, paths, or code blocks.
  - No stubs, no placeholders, no TODOs.
  - NEVER invent a flag, a path, an ADW name or a behavior that is not listed
    above. If you need a fact that is not here, read the factory source under
    `modules/harness/factory/` and cite what you found.
  - Do NOT reformat or rewrite sections that have nothing to do with the cutover.
    Surgical edits only.
  - Do NOT commit. Leave every change in the working tree.
  - Touch ONLY the files your own task names. Other jobs are editing other files
    in this same checkout RIGHT NOW.

  REPORT: for each file, what you removed and what replaced it, with file:line.

  YOUR FILES (rewrite both; touch nothing else):
    modules/workstation/claude/skills/plan/SKILL.md
    modules/workstation/claude/skills/run-plan/SKILL.md

  These two are rewritten TOGETHER so the authored-doc format and the launch
  command stay consistent. Read both end to end before writing either.

  --- plan/SKILL.md ---

  It must now teach an agent to author a REQUEST SPEC for the factory. Re-read the
  governing fact in the brief above: the factory's own planner does the
  decomposition, so this doc is the request, not a task graph.

  DELETE ENTIRELY: the Wave Plan table and all wave/dependency-analysis prose, the
  Decision-Enumeration Pass and everything about `gated` records / options
  sentinels / `requires_decision` / `binds_meta`, the per-task
  Wave/Blocks/Blocked-by structure, the numbered checkbox task steps, the
  per-task commit steps, the "Execution Handoff" section and its handoff to any
  other skill, and the wave-plan item in Self-Review.

  KEEP AND ADAPT: the contract-level default (pin the seam, never the
  implementation body; collapse to literal code only when the code is shorter than
  the prose describing it), the vagueness bans ("TBD", "add appropriate error
  handling", "similar to Task N", references to symbols no contract defines), the
  body-bloat bans, the exact-file-paths rule, the exact-commands-with-expected-
  output rule, the required-literal-formats-pasted-verbatim rule, and a self-review
  pass covering spec coverage / vagueness / seam consistency.

  THE NEW DOCUMENT SHAPE it must instruct the author to produce:
    # <Feature> — request
    **Goal:** one sentence.
    **Context:** what exists now that this changes, with real paths.
    **Files:** exact paths, each with a one-line responsibility (Create/Modify).
    **Contract:** the seams — signatures, types, IO/route/schema shapes, any
      spec-mandated literal string verbatim.
    **Behavior:** what it must do; the named edge cases; the named error
      conditions. Never "handle edge cases" without naming them.
    **Out of scope:** what the factory must NOT touch.
    **Acceptance:** executable commands with their expected output.

  Save path stays `docs/plans/YYYY-MM-DD-<PLAN_SLUG>.md`. `PLAN_SLUG` is a
  kebab key; if brainstorm passed one, reuse it verbatim.

  The doc ends by stating the launch command and nothing else:
    cd <repoRoot> && factory adw_plan_build_test_quality docs/plans/YYYY-MM-DD-<PLAN_SLUG>.md

  Also delete the "## Learned Rules" entries that are about waves, dispatch
  economics, or the old executor. Learned rules that are still true about
  authoring (the i18n mirror-pages rule, the design-tokens-in-snippets rule, the
  sweep-must-be-exhaustive rule, the probe-must-not-filter-enabled rule, the
  fixture-violations-blocked-by-hooks rule) STAY — but strip any wording that
  names waves or the old executor.

  --- run-plan/SKILL.md ---

  This becomes a THIN launcher for a factory run against an authored plan doc.
  Nearly the whole current file is about the old engine and must be deleted: the
  inline fallback, `/run-plan status` and its scan script, the flag table, the
  decision gate, the ship-method freeze ladder, the resume/crash section, the
  isolated-run section, the safety floor, and the "Do NOT" list.

  The new file, short:
  - audience line; BLUF.
  - What it does: runs an authored plan document through the factory.
  - Resolve the plan doc: the first token is the slug; find
    `docs/plans/*-<SLUG>.md` under the repo. Ambiguous or missing → STOP, list the
    available slugs, do not launch.
  - Launch, from inside the repo root:
      cd <repoRoot> && factory adw_plan_build_test_quality docs/plans/<file>.md
    It is autonomous and runs in the foreground until it finishes.
  - Pick a shorter ADW only when the user explicitly asks for less: `adw_plan_build`
    (no verify), `adw_build` (the doc is already a plan and needs no re-planning).
  - Watching it: the run streams to the `/factory` page in the overdeck web UI —
    tell the user that is where they watch it. `factory watch --follow` is the
    terminal equivalent.
  - If it needs a human decision it surfaces one; answer with `factory decisions`
    and `factory answer`.
  - Non-zero exit → HALT and surface the factory's own stderr verbatim. Never
    reinterpret it, never relaunch blindly.
  - NEVER re-implement the loop in the conversation. The factory owns it.


id: 019fe24f-5461-75b0-b3d0-c5dfbefa21af
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/factory-live-feaf66aa5dfe
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: b1f5e1d31f891515e0f4711ee4de85317bb4ffcf
git_branch: wt/factory-live
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-terra
reasoning_effort: medium
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/08/rollout-2026-08-08T16-57-57-019fe24f-5461-75b0-b3d0-c5dfbefa21af.jsonl

title:
  Work in the repository checkout at your CURRENT WORKING DIRECTORY. Every path below is relative to that repo root.

  THE OWNER'S INSTRUCTION, VERBATIM:
  "i need a complete cutover to the factory. erase all mentions of the old ways, and make /plan create factory plans, and /brainstorm route to that. /run-plan needs to just run a factory plan. make sure that agents will never get the v2 old harness to their context — just like you dont even really know what was the v1 or any details about it, i want v2 to be forgotten"

  You are rewriting agent-facing documentation so that a future agent reading these files has NO IDEA a previous engine ever existed.

  === THE FACTORY — the only engine, the only truth ===

  CLI: `factory` (installed on PATH).
    factory [--repo PATH] [--config PATH] <ADW> [args...]

  ADW entrypoints (each takes ONE prompt argument):
    adw_prompt  adw_scout  adw_plan  adw_build  adw_build_test  adw_build_review
    adw_document  adw_quality  adw_plan_build  adw_plan_build_test
    adw_plan_build_test_quality  adw_sdlc  adw_simple_sdlc

  Control commands: `factory stop`, `factory reconcile`, `factory decisions`,
  `factory answer`, `factory watch [ADW_ID] [--follow] [--since-start]`.

  **A path argument resolves to that file's CONTENTS** (`adw_modules/utils.py`
  `resolve_prompt`). So `factory adw_plan_build_test_quality docs/plans/foo.md`
  feeds the authored document to the factory AS THE REQUEST TEXT.

  **THE FACT THAT GOVERNS THE /plan REWRITE — verified in the source, do not
  contradict it:** the factory's OWN planner agent does the task decomposition.
  The plan phase writes `<context_handoff_dir>/plan.md` and copies it to
  `specs/<adw_id>_<slug>.md`; the builder receives that plan through the
  `previous_envelope` and reads those artifacts. The authored doc you hand to
  `factory` is therefore the REQUEST, not a task graph.

  Consequence, binding on every file you touch: an authored plan doc MUST be a
  precise REQUEST SPEC — goal, constraints, the files/seams it must touch, the
  behavior required, and executable acceptance commands. It MUST NOT contain a
  wave table, a task dependency graph, per-task numbered checkbox steps, seat or
  tier assignments, or decision records. Those are the factory planner's job and
  duplicating them wastes tokens and invites drift.

  Phase chain: git_preflight -> request -> plan -> build -> (verify_N -> fix_N,
  bounded at 3 attempts) -> commit. Verify runs the project's configured quality
  checks AS CODE, not as an agent judgement.

  Config resolution, in order: `--config`, else `<repo>/.factory/sssf.config.yaml`,
  else the shipped default `modules/harness/factory/sssf.config.yaml`.

  Observability: every run streams to the `/factory` page in the overdeck web UI —
  timeline, per-phase agent attempts, prompts, gates, logs and diffs. That page is
  where a user watches a run. Trace database:
  `/home/user/.local/state/overdeck/factory/sssf.db`.

  NO RESUME. Re-launching starts a NEW adw_id. NEVER document a resume procedure,
  a `--retry` path, or a crash-recovery ladder. There is none.

  `modules/harness/factory/**` is off-limits to every factory agent by design — an
  agent must not edit the machinery that judges its own work.

  === WHAT MUST DISAPPEAR — every mention, in every file you touch ===

  Names and concepts: `runplan`, `run-plan` as an executor, "v1", "v2", "harness
  engine", "engine bundle", "the engine", `~/.harness/`, `HARNESS_ENGINE_DEV`,
  `ENGINE_ROOT`, `harness-release`, `runstate/`, engine journals, "waves" as an
  ENGINE concept, seats, tiers, presets, adapters registry, `REPLY_MARKERS`,
  `gate0`, canary stub, "quarantine" as an engine state.

  Flags: `--preset`, `--account`, `--concurrency`, `--retry-blocked`, `--budget-ms`,
  `--run-id`, `--isolate`, `--supervised`, `--daemonize`.

  Session-file fields: `meta.preset`, `meta.gate0_mode`, `meta.land_mode`,
  `meta.base_branch`, `task.seat`, `task.tier`, `task.wave`, `gated` records,
  `requires_decision`, the `["proceed","abort"]` sentinel.

  Scripts and paths: `ship-init.sh`, `rp-isolate.sh`, `run-plan-scan.mjs`, task
  branches shaped `plan/<slug>--<id>`.

  **Do NOT leave a migration note, a "formerly known as" line, a deprecation
  banner, a changelog entry, or a comment explaining what was removed.** A future
  agent reading the file must have no idea any of it ever existed. Deleting a
  section is correct; annotating its absence is not.

  === HOUSE RULES ===

  - Register: agent-facing, BLUF, imperative. Keep the "audience: AI coding agents
    first" line. Compress connective prose; NEVER compress normative keywords
    (MUST, MUST NOT, NEVER, ALWAYS), identifiers, paths, or code blocks.
  - No stubs, no placeholders, no TODOs.
  - NEVER invent a flag, a path, an ADW name or a behavior that is not listed
    above. If you need a fact that is not here, read the factory source under
    `modules/harness/factory/` and cite what you found.
  - Do NOT reformat or rewrite sections that have nothing to do with the cutover.
    Surgical edits only.
  - Do NOT commit. Leave every change in the working tree.
  - Touch ONLY the files your own task names. Other jobs are editing other files
    in this same checkout RIGHT NOW.

  REPORT: for each file, what you removed and what replaced it, with file:line.

  YOUR FILES (touch nothing else):
    modules/workstation/claude/skills/brainstorm/SKILL.md
    modules/workstation/claude/skills/factory/SKILL.md
    modules/workstation/claude/skills/workflow-router/SKILL.md

  Read all three end to end first.

  --- brainstorm/SKILL.md ---

  Its dialogue-to-spec process (explore, clarify, approaches with trade-off tables,
  write spec, two-phase self-review, advisor gate) is CORRECT and stays. What must
  change is everything downstream of the spec.

  DELETE ENTIRELY: the whole "## Session File" section — the JSONL format, the
  `meta` line with `gate0_mode` / `preset` / `base_branch` / `land_mode`, every
  `task` record field (`seat`, `tier`, `wave`, `desc` shape, `requires_decision`),
  the `gated` record schema and its lifecycle fields, the "unified needs-a-human
  model", and the gate that decides when to write the file. There is no session
  file. Delete every reference to it in the checklist, the process flow digraph,
  and the terminal-state paragraph.

  The checklist becomes: explore context -> clarify -> propose approaches -> write
  spec -> spec self-review -> advisor review -> invoke plan -> launch the factory.

  Terminal state: after `plan` saves its document, launch it:
    cd <repoRoot> && factory adw_plan_build_test_quality docs/plans/YYYY-MM-DD-<PLAN_SLUG>.md
  Then tell the user the run is autonomous and streams to the `/factory` page in
  the overdeck web UI. No wave-count branch, no single-vs-multi-wave routing, no
  "tell the user to type a command" fallback.

  Update the digraph to match the new checklist — same style, fewer nodes.

  The route check at the top stays but must read: a one-line request with no
  authored spec goes straight to the `factory` skill; brainstorm is the route that
  authors a document first and then hands that document to the same factory.

  --- factory/SKILL.md ---

  Read it and make it the single canonical reference for the factory CLI, correct
  and complete against the contract in the brief above. Fix anything that
  contradicts it. It must cover: the CLI shape, the full ADW list with one line
  each on when to pick which, that a path argument resolves to file contents, the
  phase chain, config resolution order, the control commands, `/factory` as the
  observability surface, and that there is no resume. Remove any comparison to,
  or mention of, a previous engine — including any "not the factory:" style
  disambiguation that only makes sense if something else existed.

  --- workflow-router/SKILL.md ---

  Rewrite its routing table so every execution route lands on the factory. Delete
  any row, branch or note naming the old engine, its launcher, its flags, or the
  old plan-doc format. If a row exists only to disambiguate the factory from the
  old engine, delete the row.

first_user_message:
  Work in the repository checkout at your CURRENT WORKING DIRECTORY. Every path below is relative to that repo root.

  THE OWNER'S INSTRUCTION, VERBATIM:
  "i need a complete cutover to the factory. erase all mentions of the old ways, and make /plan create factory plans, and /brainstorm route to that. /run-plan needs to just run a factory plan. make sure that agents will never get the v2 old harness to their context — just like you dont even really know what was the v1 or any details about it, i want v2 to be forgotten"

  You are rewriting agent-facing documentation so that a future agent reading these files has NO IDEA a previous engine ever existed.

  === THE FACTORY — the only engine, the only truth ===

  CLI: `factory` (installed on PATH).
    factory [--repo PATH] [--config PATH] <ADW> [args...]

  ADW entrypoints (each takes ONE prompt argument):
    adw_prompt  adw_scout  adw_plan  adw_build  adw_build_test  adw_build_review
    adw_document  adw_quality  adw_plan_build  adw_plan_build_test
    adw_plan_build_test_quality  adw_sdlc  adw_simple_sdlc

  Control commands: `factory stop`, `factory reconcile`, `factory decisions`,
  `factory answer`, `factory watch [ADW_ID] [--follow] [--since-start]`.

  **A path argument resolves to that file's CONTENTS** (`adw_modules/utils.py`
  `resolve_prompt`). So `factory adw_plan_build_test_quality docs/plans/foo.md`
  feeds the authored document to the factory AS THE REQUEST TEXT.

  **THE FACT THAT GOVERNS THE /plan REWRITE — verified in the source, do not
  contradict it:** the factory's OWN planner agent does the task decomposition.
  The plan phase writes `<context_handoff_dir>/plan.md` and copies it to
  `specs/<adw_id>_<slug>.md`; the builder receives that plan through the
  `previous_envelope` and reads those artifacts. The authored doc you hand to
  `factory` is therefore the REQUEST, not a task graph.

  Consequence, binding on every file you touch: an authored plan doc MUST be a
  precise REQUEST SPEC — goal, constraints, the files/seams it must touch, the
  behavior required, and executable acceptance commands. It MUST NOT contain a
  wave table, a task dependency graph, per-task numbered checkbox steps, seat or
  tier assignments, or decision records. Those are the factory planner's job and
  duplicating them wastes tokens and invites drift.

  Phase chain: git_preflight -> request -> plan -> build -> (verify_N -> fix_N,
  bounded at 3 attempts) -> commit. Verify runs the project's configured quality
  checks AS CODE, not as an agent judgement.

  Config resolution, in order: `--config`, else `<repo>/.factory/sssf.config.yaml`,
  else the shipped default `modules/harness/factory/sssf.config.yaml`.

  Observability: every run streams to the `/factory` page in the overdeck web UI —
  timeline, per-phase agent attempts, prompts, gates, logs and diffs. That page is
  where a user watches a run. Trace database:
  `/home/user/.local/state/overdeck/factory/sssf.db`.

  NO RESUME. Re-launching starts a NEW adw_id. NEVER document a resume procedure,
  a `--retry` path, or a crash-recovery ladder. There is none.

  `modules/harness/factory/**` is off-limits to every factory agent by design — an
  agent must not edit the machinery that judges its own work.

  === WHAT MUST DISAPPEAR — every mention, in every file you touch ===

  Names and concepts: `runplan`, `run-plan` as an executor, "v1", "v2", "harness
  engine", "engine bundle", "the engine", `~/.harness/`, `HARNESS_ENGINE_DEV`,
  `ENGINE_ROOT`, `harness-release`, `runstate/`, engine journals, "waves" as an
  ENGINE concept, seats, tiers, presets, adapters registry, `REPLY_MARKERS`,
  `gate0`, canary stub, "quarantine" as an engine state.

  Flags: `--preset`, `--account`, `--concurrency`, `--retry-blocked`, `--budget-ms`,
  `--run-id`, `--isolate`, `--supervised`, `--daemonize`.

  Session-file fields: `meta.preset`, `meta.gate0_mode`, `meta.land_mode`,
  `meta.base_branch`, `task.seat`, `task.tier`, `task.wave`, `gated` records,
  `requires_decision`, the `["proceed","abort"]` sentinel.

  Scripts and paths: `ship-init.sh`, `rp-isolate.sh`, `run-plan-scan.mjs`, task
  branches shaped `plan/<slug>--<id>`.

  **Do NOT leave a migration note, a "formerly known as" line, a deprecation
  banner, a changelog entry, or a comment explaining what was removed.** A future
  agent reading the file must have no idea any of it ever existed. Deleting a
  section is correct; annotating its absence is not.

  === HOUSE RULES ===

  - Register: agent-facing, BLUF, imperative. Keep the "audience: AI coding agents
    first" line. Compress connective prose; NEVER compress normative keywords
    (MUST, MUST NOT, NEVER, ALWAYS), identifiers, paths, or code blocks.
  - No stubs, no placeholders, no TODOs.
  - NEVER invent a flag, a path, an ADW name or a behavior that is not listed
    above. If you need a fact that is not here, read the factory source under
    `modules/harness/factory/` and cite what you found.
  - Do NOT reformat or rewrite sections that have nothing to do with the cutover.
    Surgical edits only.
  - Do NOT commit. Leave every change in the working tree.
  - Touch ONLY the files your own task names. Other jobs are editing other files
    in this same checkout RIGHT NOW.

  REPORT: for each file, what you removed and what replaced it, with file:line.

  YOUR FILES (touch nothing else):
    modules/workstation/claude/skills/brainstorm/SKILL.md
    modules/workstation/claude/skills/factory/SKILL.md
    modules/workstation/claude/skills/workflow-router/SKILL.md

  Read all three end to end first.

  --- brainstorm/SKILL.md ---

  Its dialogue-to-spec process (explore, clarify, approaches with trade-off tables,
  write spec, two-phase self-review, advisor gate) is CORRECT and stays. What must
  change is everything downstream of the spec.

  DELETE ENTIRELY: the whole "## Session File" section — the JSONL format, the
  `meta` line with `gate0_mode` / `preset` / `base_branch` / `land_mode`, every
  `task` record field (`seat`, `tier`, `wave`, `desc` shape, `requires_decision`),
  the `gated` record schema and its lifecycle fields, the "unified needs-a-human
  model", and the gate that decides when to write the file. There is no session
  file. Delete every reference to it in the checklist, the process flow digraph,
  and the terminal-state paragraph.

  The checklist becomes: explore context -> clarify -> propose approaches -> write
  spec -> spec self-review -> advisor review -> invoke plan -> launch the factory.

  Terminal state: after `plan` saves its document, launch it:
    cd <repoRoot> && factory adw_plan_build_test_quality docs/plans/YYYY-MM-DD-<PLAN_SLUG>.md
  Then tell the user the run is autonomous and streams to the `/factory` page in
  the overdeck web UI. No wave-count branch, no single-vs-multi-wave routing, no
  "tell the user to type a command" fallback.

  Update the digraph to match the new checklist — same style, fewer nodes.

  The route check at the top stays but must read: a one-line request with no
  authored spec goes straight to the `factory` skill; brainstorm is the route that
  authors a document first and then hands that document to the same factory.

  --- factory/SKILL.md ---

  Read it and make it the single canonical reference for the factory CLI, correct
  and complete against the contract in the brief above. Fix anything that
  contradicts it. It must cover: the CLI shape, the full ADW list with one line
  each on when to pick which, that a path argument resolves to file contents, the
  phase chain, config resolution order, the control commands, `/factory` as the
  observability surface, and that there is no resume. Remove any comparison to,
  or mention of, a previous engine — including any "not the factory:" style
  disambiguation that only makes sense if something else existed.

  --- workflow-router/SKILL.md ---

  Rewrite its routing table so every execution route lands on the factory. Delete
  any row, branch or note naming the old engine, its launcher, its flags, or the
  old plan-doc format. If a row exists only to disambiguate the factory from the
  old engine, delete the row.

preview:
  Work in the repository checkout at your CURRENT WORKING DIRECTORY. Every path below is relative to that repo root.

  THE OWNER'S INSTRUCTION, VERBATIM:
  "i need a complete cutover to the factory. erase all mentions of the old ways, and make /plan create factory plans, and /brainstorm route to that. /run-plan needs to just run a factory plan. make sure that agents will never get the v2 old harness to their context — just like you dont even really know what was the v1 or any details about it, i want v2 to be forgotten"

  You are rewriting agent-facing documentation so that a future agent reading these files has NO IDEA a previous engine ever existed.

  === THE FACTORY — the only engine, the only truth ===

  CLI: `factory` (installed on PATH).
    factory [--repo PATH] [--config PATH] <ADW> [args...]

  ADW entrypoints (each takes ONE prompt argument):
    adw_prompt  adw_scout  adw_plan  adw_build  adw_build_test  adw_build_review
    adw_document  adw_quality  adw_plan_build  adw_plan_build_test
    adw_plan_build_test_quality  adw_sdlc  adw_simple_sdlc

  Control commands: `factory stop`, `factory reconcile`, `factory decisions`,
  `factory answer`, `factory watch [ADW_ID] [--follow] [--since-start]`.

  **A path argument resolves to that file's CONTENTS** (`adw_modules/utils.py`
  `resolve_prompt`). So `factory adw_plan_build_test_quality docs/plans/foo.md`
  feeds the authored document to the factory AS THE REQUEST TEXT.

  **THE FACT THAT GOVERNS THE /plan REWRITE — verified in the source, do not
  contradict it:** the factory's OWN planner agent does the task decomposition.
  The plan phase writes `<context_handoff_dir>/plan.md` and copies it to
  `specs/<adw_id>_<slug>.md`; the builder receives that plan through the
  `previous_envelope` and reads those artifacts. The authored doc you hand to
  `factory` is therefore the REQUEST, not a task graph.

  Consequence, binding on every file you touch: an authored plan doc MUST be a
  precise REQUEST SPEC — goal, constraints, the files/seams it must touch, the
  behavior required, and executable acceptance commands. It MUST NOT contain a
  wave table, a task dependency graph, per-task numbered checkbox steps, seat or
  tier assignments, or decision records. Those are the factory planner's job and
  duplicating them wastes tokens and invites drift.

  Phase chain: git_preflight -> request -> plan -> build -> (verify_N -> fix_N,
  bounded at 3 attempts) -> commit. Verify runs the project's configured quality
  checks AS CODE, not as an agent judgement.

  Config resolution, in order: `--config`, else `<repo>/.factory/sssf.config.yaml`,
  else the shipped default `modules/harness/factory/sssf.config.yaml`.

  Observability: every run streams to the `/factory` page in the overdeck web UI —
  timeline, per-phase agent attempts, prompts, gates, logs and diffs. That page is
  where a user watches a run. Trace database:
  `/home/user/.local/state/overdeck/factory/sssf.db`.

  NO RESUME. Re-launching starts a NEW adw_id. NEVER document a resume procedure,
  a `--retry` path, or a crash-recovery ladder. There is none.

  `modules/harness/factory/**` is off-limits to every factory agent by design — an
  agent must not edit the machinery that judges its own work.

  === WHAT MUST DISAPPEAR — every mention, in every file you touch ===

  Names and concepts: `runplan`, `run-plan` as an executor, "v1", "v2", "harness
  engine", "engine bundle", "the engine", `~/.harness/`, `HARNESS_ENGINE_DEV`,
  `ENGINE_ROOT`, `harness-release`, `runstate/`, engine journals, "waves" as an
  ENGINE concept, seats, tiers, presets, adapters registry, `REPLY_MARKERS`,
  `gate0`, canary stub, "quarantine" as an engine state.

  Flags: `--preset`, `--account`, `--concurrency`, `--retry-blocked`, `--budget-ms`,
  `--run-id`, `--isolate`, `--supervised`, `--daemonize`.

  Session-file fields: `meta.preset`, `meta.gate0_mode`, `meta.land_mode`,
  `meta.base_branch`, `task.seat`, `task.tier`, `task.wave`, `gated` records,
  `requires_decision`, the `["proceed","abort"]` sentinel.

  Scripts and paths: `ship-init.sh`, `rp-isolate.sh`, `run-plan-scan.mjs`, task
  branches shaped `plan/<slug>--<id>`.

  **Do NOT leave a migration note, a "formerly known as" line, a deprecation
  banner, a changelog entry, or a comment explaining what was removed.** A future
  agent reading the file must have no idea any of it ever existed. Deleting a
  section is correct; annotating its absence is not.

  === HOUSE RULES ===

  - Register: agent-facing, BLUF, imperative. Keep the "audience: AI coding agents
    first" line. Compress connective prose; NEVER compress normative keywords
    (MUST, MUST NOT, NEVER, ALWAYS), identifiers, paths, or code blocks.
  - No stubs, no placeholders, no TODOs.
  - NEVER invent a flag, a path, an ADW name or a behavior that is not listed
    above. If you need a fact that is not here, read the factory source under
    `modules/harness/factory/` and cite what you found.
  - Do NOT reformat or rewrite sections that have nothing to do with the cutover.
    Surgical edits only.
  - Do NOT commit. Leave every change in the working tree.
  - Touch ONLY the files your own task names. Other jobs are editing other files
    in this same checkout RIGHT NOW.

  REPORT: for each file, what you removed and what replaced it, with file:line.

  YOUR FILES (touch nothing else):
    modules/workstation/claude/skills/brainstorm/SKILL.md
    modules/workstation/claude/skills/factory/SKILL.md
    modules/workstation/claude/skills/workflow-router/SKILL.md

  Read all three end to end first.

  --- brainstorm/SKILL.md ---

  Its dialogue-to-spec process (explore, clarify, approaches with trade-off tables,
  write spec, two-phase self-review, advisor gate) is CORRECT and stays. What must
  change is everything downstream of the spec.

  DELETE ENTIRELY: the whole "## Session File" section — the JSONL format, the
  `meta` line with `gate0_mode` / `preset` / `base_branch` / `land_mode`, every
  `task` record field (`seat`, `tier`, `wave`, `desc` shape, `requires_decision`),
  the `gated` record schema and its lifecycle fields, the "unified needs-a-human
  model", and the gate that decides when to write the file. There is no session
  file. Delete every reference to it in the checklist, the process flow digraph,
  and the terminal-state paragraph.

  The checklist becomes: explore context -> clarify -> propose approaches -> write
  spec -> spec self-review -> advisor review -> invoke plan -> launch the factory.

  Terminal state: after `plan` saves its document, launch it:
    cd <repoRoot> && factory adw_plan_build_test_quality docs/plans/YYYY-MM-DD-<PLAN_SLUG>.md
  Then tell the user the run is autonomous and streams to the `/factory` page in
  the overdeck web UI. No wave-count branch, no single-vs-multi-wave routing, no
  "tell the user to type a command" fallback.

  Update the digraph to match the new checklist — same style, fewer nodes.

  The route check at the top stays but must read: a one-line request with no
  authored spec goes straight to the `factory` skill; brainstorm is the route that
  authors a document first and then hands that document to the same factory.

  --- factory/SKILL.md ---

  Read it and make it the single canonical reference for the factory CLI, correct
  and complete against the contract in the brief above. Fix anything that
  contradicts it. It must cover: the CLI shape, the full ADW list with one line
  each on when to pick which, that a path argument resolves to file contents, the
  phase chain, config resolution order, the control commands, `/factory` as the
  observability surface, and that there is no resume. Remove any comparison to,
  or mention of, a previous engine — including any "not the factory:" style
  disambiguation that only makes sense if something else existed.

  --- workflow-router/SKILL.md ---

  Rewrite its routing table so every execution route lands on the factory. Delete
  any row, branch or note naming the old engine, its launcher, its flags, or the
  old plan-doc format. If a row exists only to disambiguate the factory from the
  old engine, delete the row.


id: 019fe254-ebc3-7ba0-98e9-ce7be526c70e
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/factory-live-feaf66aa5dfe
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: ffea420cdf5276184ee3575629eedf04272cf66d
git_branch: wt/factory-live
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-terra
reasoning_effort: medium
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/08/rollout-2026-08-08T17-04-04-019fe254-ebc3-7ba0-98e9-ce7be526c70e.jsonl

title:
[cell repeats an earlier one in this file: 9517 characters]

first_user_message:
[cell repeats an earlier one in this file: 9517 characters]

preview:
[cell repeats an earlier one in this file: 9517 characters]


id: 019fe26c-bc86-75f2-8593-ccfef2aa90eb
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/obs-p01-93961e8ae592
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 639de03db79dfc57d856748245b68b2db0d877df
git_branch: wt/obs-p01
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/08/rollout-2026-08-08T17-30-04-019fe26c-bc86-75f2-8593-ccfef2aa90eb.jsonl

title:
  Implement Phase 0 and Phase 1 of docs/specs/2026-08-08-observability-design.md (READ IT FIRST — it is the contract; 428 lines, contract-level seams).

  Scope, exactly the two phases:
  Phase 0 — pin the contracts: Kubernetes RBAC (read-only), loopback bindings, source identities, Prometheus query ids, coverage semantics. Author the kube-state-metrics + cAdvisor scrape configuration as files in the repo (the collector cannot reach the cluster from your sandbox — emit config + an idempotent apply script; a human-run step will apply it). Add fixtures for exact, host-only, missing, conflicting, expired-Job, and partial-source cases.
  Phase 1 — the distinct 'kubernetes' adapter in the collector: normalized snapshot, coverage reporting, collector read routes; join Pod → Job → overdeck.dev/build-key annotation → build/session ledger; expose evidence and unplaced lists. Contract-test annotation handling against the REAL manifest shape in the repo's k3s-remote-build.mjs, including the Pod-template annotation. Exit criterion: an API consumer can name every node and show exact / host-only / unplaced status for every relevant session/build with no fuzzy inference.

  Follow the spec's Failure and freshness behavior section: absent sources are reported absent, never fabricated zeros. Reuse the existing activity-store and Logs contracts — do not restart them. Do NOT touch apps/web UI (that is Phase 2, out of scope).

  Verification you must run: bun test in collector/ (all existing + your new tests green), and any suite covering files you touch.

  CRITICAL WORKSPACE RULES: work directly in the repository root you are launched in ($PWD). Do NOT create any git worktree. Do NOT run git commit. Leave all changes as dirty/untracked files — your working tree syncs back to the caller; a commit would be lost. At the very end print: git status --short, then git diff, then the full contents of every NEW file you created.

first_user_message:
  Implement Phase 0 and Phase 1 of docs/specs/2026-08-08-observability-design.md (READ IT FIRST — it is the contract; 428 lines, contract-level seams).

  Scope, exactly the two phases:
  Phase 0 — pin the contracts: Kubernetes RBAC (read-only), loopback bindings, source identities, Prometheus query ids, coverage semantics. Author the kube-state-metrics + cAdvisor scrape configuration as files in the repo (the collector cannot reach the cluster from your sandbox — emit config + an idempotent apply script; a human-run step will apply it). Add fixtures for exact, host-only, missing, conflicting, expired-Job, and partial-source cases.
  Phase 1 — the distinct 'kubernetes' adapter in the collector: normalized snapshot, coverage reporting, collector read routes; join Pod → Job → overdeck.dev/build-key annotation → build/session ledger; expose evidence and unplaced lists. Contract-test annotation handling against the REAL manifest shape in the repo's k3s-remote-build.mjs, including the Pod-template annotation. Exit criterion: an API consumer can name every node and show exact / host-only / unplaced status for every relevant session/build with no fuzzy inference.

  Follow the spec's Failure and freshness behavior section: absent sources are reported absent, never fabricated zeros. Reuse the existing activity-store and Logs contracts — do not restart them. Do NOT touch apps/web UI (that is Phase 2, out of scope).

  Verification you must run: bun test in collector/ (all existing + your new tests green), and any suite covering files you touch.

  CRITICAL WORKSPACE RULES: work directly in the repository root you are launched in ($PWD). Do NOT create any git worktree. Do NOT run git commit. Leave all changes as dirty/untracked files — your working tree syncs back to the caller; a commit would be lost. At the very end print: git status --short, then git diff, then the full contents of every NEW file you created.

preview:
  Implement Phase 0 and Phase 1 of docs/specs/2026-08-08-observability-design.md (READ IT FIRST — it is the contract; 428 lines, contract-level seams).

  Scope, exactly the two phases:
  Phase 0 — pin the contracts: Kubernetes RBAC (read-only), loopback bindings, source identities, Prometheus query ids, coverage semantics. Author the kube-state-metrics + cAdvisor scrape configuration as files in the repo (the collector cannot reach the cluster from your sandbox — emit config + an idempotent apply script; a human-run step will apply it). Add fixtures for exact, host-only, missing, conflicting, expired-Job, and partial-source cases.
  Phase 1 — the distinct 'kubernetes' adapter in the collector: normalized snapshot, coverage reporting, collector read routes; join Pod → Job → overdeck.dev/build-key annotation → build/session ledger; expose evidence and unplaced lists. Contract-test annotation handling against the REAL manifest shape in the repo's k3s-remote-build.mjs, including the Pod-template annotation. Exit criterion: an API consumer can name every node and show exact / host-only / unplaced status for every relevant session/build with no fuzzy inference.

  Follow the spec's Failure and freshness behavior section: absent sources are reported absent, never fabricated zeros. Reuse the existing activity-store and Logs contracts — do not restart them. Do NOT touch apps/web UI (that is Phase 2, out of scope).

  Verification you must run: bun test in collector/ (all existing + your new tests green), and any suite covering files you touch.

  CRITICAL WORKSPACE RULES: work directly in the repository root you are launched in ($PWD). Do NOT create any git worktree. Do NOT run git commit. Leave all changes as dirty/untracked files — your working tree syncs back to the caller; a commit would be lost. At the very end print: git status --short, then git diff, then the full contents of every NEW file you created.


id: 019fe2d8-1216-7680-b0ef-0b863a42132e
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/themefactory-build-12f7414247b4
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 9593c58dc39fd21b3a37bce37b361cb58341e2be
git_branch: wt/themefactory-build
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/ThemeFactory
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/08/rollout-2026-08-08T19-27-19-019fe2d8-1216-7680-b0ef-0b863a42132e.jsonl

title:
  You are a senior application-security and correctness auditor running an INDEPENDENT adversarial pre-ship review. Treat prior safety claims as unverified. Review exactly the current uncommitted diff and only trace essential cited symbols. Every boundary-crossing input is hostile. Fail closed when a guard cannot be confirmed.

  USER TASK (verbatim): Review the current uncommitted diff in /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/ThemeFactory/.worktrees/themefactory-build. Focus on security/correctness of tools/gptbridge/browser.py cryptographic random Marionette port + state permissions, and build-themes.sh sequential coordinator redesign. User requires exactly one ThemeFactory headless browser at a time. Identify only concrete exploitable/correctness defects. Do not modify files.

  Scope: /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/ThemeFactory/.worktrees/themefactory-build/tools/gptbridge/browser.py and /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/ThemeFactory/.worktrees/themefactory-build/build-themes.sh current uncommitted diff. Inspect the diff and enough callers/references to verify concrete behavior, but do not wander.

  ATTACK-SURFACE PROTOCOL: Reuse a demonstrably fresh .security/attack-surface.md if present. Check schema_version, built_at_commit against HEAD, changed-file intersection, and content hashes as applicable. The user forbids modifications, so do not create or update the map; if absent/stale, enumerate the relevant surface in-memory and state map freshness under residual uncertainty. The map indexes entry points, trust boundaries, hostile inputs, authorization, invariants, and sinks; it never replaces the defect hunt.

  HUNT EVERY BRANCH AND PATH: object-level authorization; fail-open crypto/verification and malformed decoding; token binding; timing oracles; SQL/shell/code/template/log/header/path injection; SSRF; traversal; unsafe parsing/deserialization; secrets exposure; resource exhaustion; client metadata confusion; idempotency and atomicity; raw error disclosure; strict input validation. For this scope specifically verify cryptographic randomness and complete port range/format, bind/listen races, port ownership, stale/corrupt/symlinked state, directory/file modes under hostile umask and preexisting files, TOCTOU, cleanup ownership, process identity, signals/traps, lock exclusivity, inherited descriptors, crash paths, and whether any execution path can start or retain more than one ThemeFactory headless browser. For build-themes.sh enumerate every sequential coordinator branch: empty/invalid theme lists, command failure, interruption, orphaning, cleanup, exit propagation, concurrent invocations, existing browser state, and shell quoting/word splitting.

  MANDATORY VERIFICATION FOR EACH CANDIDATE: (1) give an exact concrete request/state/command/schedule that triggers the wrong behavior; drop candidates without one; (2) refute once by rereading code/callers for a guard that makes it safe; report only survivors; (3) severity is real impact: critical/high/medium/low. Do not invent low-value findings.

  OUTPUT ONLY a numbered list ordered by severity. Each finding must contain Title, Location as absolute file:line or function, Severity, Trigger/exploit, and specific Fix. End with Headline naming the 1-2 ship blockers, and Residual/unverified stating what cannot be confirmed from this scope. If none survive, say so directly and list only the top assumptions a deeper review should test. Do not modify any file and do not write a report file.

first_user_message:
  You are a senior application-security and correctness auditor running an INDEPENDENT adversarial pre-ship review. Treat prior safety claims as unverified. Review exactly the current uncommitted diff and only trace essential cited symbols. Every boundary-crossing input is hostile. Fail closed when a guard cannot be confirmed.

  USER TASK (verbatim): Review the current uncommitted diff in /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/ThemeFactory/.worktrees/themefactory-build. Focus on security/correctness of tools/gptbridge/browser.py cryptographic random Marionette port + state permissions, and build-themes.sh sequential coordinator redesign. User requires exactly one ThemeFactory headless browser at a time. Identify only concrete exploitable/correctness defects. Do not modify files.

  Scope: /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/ThemeFactory/.worktrees/themefactory-build/tools/gptbridge/browser.py and /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/ThemeFactory/.worktrees/themefactory-build/build-themes.sh current uncommitted diff. Inspect the diff and enough callers/references to verify concrete behavior, but do not wander.

  ATTACK-SURFACE PROTOCOL: Reuse a demonstrably fresh .security/attack-surface.md if present. Check schema_version, built_at_commit against HEAD, changed-file intersection, and content hashes as applicable. The user forbids modifications, so do not create or update the map; if absent/stale, enumerate the relevant surface in-memory and state map freshness under residual uncertainty. The map indexes entry points, trust boundaries, hostile inputs, authorization, invariants, and sinks; it never replaces the defect hunt.

  HUNT EVERY BRANCH AND PATH: object-level authorization; fail-open crypto/verification and malformed decoding; token binding; timing oracles; SQL/shell/code/template/log/header/path injection; SSRF; traversal; unsafe parsing/deserialization; secrets exposure; resource exhaustion; client metadata confusion; idempotency and atomicity; raw error disclosure; strict input validation. For this scope specifically verify cryptographic randomness and complete port range/format, bind/listen races, port ownership, stale/corrupt/symlinked state, directory/file modes under hostile umask and preexisting files, TOCTOU, cleanup ownership, process identity, signals/traps, lock exclusivity, inherited descriptors, crash paths, and whether any execution path can start or retain more than one ThemeFactory headless browser. For build-themes.sh enumerate every sequential coordinator branch: empty/invalid theme lists, command failure, interruption, orphaning, cleanup, exit propagation, concurrent invocations, existing browser state, and shell quoting/word splitting.

  MANDATORY VERIFICATION FOR EACH CANDIDATE: (1) give an exact concrete request/state/command/schedule that triggers the wrong behavior; drop candidates without one; (2) refute once by rereading code/callers for a guard that makes it safe; report only survivors; (3) severity is real impact: critical/high/medium/low. Do not invent low-value findings.

  OUTPUT ONLY a numbered list ordered by severity. Each finding must contain Title, Location as absolute file:line or function, Severity, Trigger/exploit, and specific Fix. End with Headline naming the 1-2 ship blockers, and Residual/unverified stating what cannot be confirmed from this scope. If none survive, say so directly and list only the top assumptions a deeper review should test. Do not modify any file and do not write a report file.

preview:
  You are a senior application-security and correctness auditor running an INDEPENDENT adversarial pre-ship review. Treat prior safety claims as unverified. Review exactly the current uncommitted diff and only trace essential cited symbols. Every boundary-crossing input is hostile. Fail closed when a guard cannot be confirmed.

  USER TASK (verbatim): Review the current uncommitted diff in /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/ThemeFactory/.worktrees/themefactory-build. Focus on security/correctness of tools/gptbridge/browser.py cryptographic random Marionette port + state permissions, and build-themes.sh sequential coordinator redesign. User requires exactly one ThemeFactory headless browser at a time. Identify only concrete exploitable/correctness defects. Do not modify files.

  Scope: /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/ThemeFactory/.worktrees/themefactory-build/tools/gptbridge/browser.py and /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/ThemeFactory/.worktrees/themefactory-build/build-themes.sh current uncommitted diff. Inspect the diff and enough callers/references to verify concrete behavior, but do not wander.

  ATTACK-SURFACE PROTOCOL: Reuse a demonstrably fresh .security/attack-surface.md if present. Check schema_version, built_at_commit against HEAD, changed-file intersection, and content hashes as applicable. The user forbids modifications, so do not create or update the map; if absent/stale, enumerate the relevant surface in-memory and state map freshness under residual uncertainty. The map indexes entry points, trust boundaries, hostile inputs, authorization, invariants, and sinks; it never replaces the defect hunt.

  HUNT EVERY BRANCH AND PATH: object-level authorization; fail-open crypto/verification and malformed decoding; token binding; timing oracles; SQL/shell/code/template/log/header/path injection; SSRF; traversal; unsafe parsing/deserialization; secrets exposure; resource exhaustion; client metadata confusion; idempotency and atomicity; raw error disclosure; strict input validation. For this scope specifically verify cryptographic randomness and complete port range/format, bind/listen races, port ownership, stale/corrupt/symlinked state, directory/file modes under hostile umask and preexisting files, TOCTOU, cleanup ownership, process identity, signals/traps, lock exclusivity, inherited descriptors, crash paths, and whether any execution path can start or retain more than one ThemeFactory headless browser. For build-themes.sh enumerate every sequential coordinator branch: empty/invalid theme lists, command failure, interruption, orphaning, cleanup, exit propagation, concurrent invocations, existing browser state, and shell quoting/word splitting.

  MANDATORY VERIFICATION FOR EACH CANDIDATE: (1) give an exact concrete request/state/command/schedule that triggers the wrong behavior; drop candidates without one; (2) refute once by rereading code/callers for a guard that makes it safe; report only survivors; (3) severity is real impact: critical/high/medium/low. Do not invent low-value findings.

  OUTPUT ONLY a numbered list ordered by severity. Each finding must contain Title, Location as absolute file:line or function, Severity, Trigger/exploit, and specific Fix. End with Headline naming the 1-2 ship blockers, and Residual/unverified stating what cannot be confirmed from this scope. If none survive, say so directly and list only the top assumptions a deeper review should test. Do not modify any file and do not write a report file.


id: 019fe33f-2ff2-7232-909b-ff578c61ad1b
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/hook-control-toggle-aab889141ff9
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 23a06c4807b56423195c4c2341a6baccf102a1ff
git_branch: wt/hook-control-toggle
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/08/rollout-2026-08-08T21-19-56-019fe33f-2ff2-7232-909b-ff578c61ad1b.jsonl

title:
  You are a senior application-security and correctness auditor running an INDEPENDENT adversarial pre-ship review. Treat all prior safety claims as unverified. Review exactly the current uncommitted hook-controls diff in /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/hook-control-toggle against /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/hook-control-toggle/docs/specs/2026-08-09-hook-controls-design.md. Trace only essential cited symbols. Do not edit. Do not run claude, claudex, or cld. Focus only on concrete, reproducible defects across shell fail-closed semantics, config locking/durability/repair, collector API/proxy trust boundaries, query races, UI state, and tests. Ignore style, refactoring, and performance unless they cause correctness failure.

  Assume all boundary-crossing inputs are hostile and fail closed when a guard cannot be confirmed. Build or refresh /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/hook-control-toggle/.security/attack-surface.md only if required by the protocol below, but because the user forbids edits, do not modify it; instead perform an in-memory fresh enumeration if no provably fresh map exists. Freshness protocol: schema v1; if map absent/malformed/stale, enumerate affected scope; if built_at_commit equals HEAD use it; otherwise intersect git changes since built_at_commit with scope/mapped files and refresh changed entries in memory; without proof, treat stale. Map entry fields: trust boundary, entry points, untrusted inputs, auth model, invariants, sinks. The map indexes the hunt and never replaces it.

  Walk every branch and sibling branch. Hunt: object authorization; fail-open parse/verify paths; token binding; timing differences; injection; SSRF; path traversal; unsafe parsing; secret exposure; resource exhaustion; client-declared metadata confusion; idempotency/atomicity; information disclosure; malformed input acceptance. For shell/config/API/UI specifically verify: every shell error path fails closed; locks cover full read-modify-durable-write and repair operations; writes use safe permissions, fsync/rename semantics where promised, and malformed state cannot be silently reset in a way that loses controls; proxy/client identity cannot forge trust headers or bypass loopback assumptions; GET/mutation queries cannot race into stale overwrite or UI rollback; optimistic/pending UI state cannot show success after server failure or revert newer mutations; tests actually exercise the promised failure modes.

  For each candidate: state exact trigger/state, try once to refute it from code/callers, and report only if it survives. Severity by real impact. Do not run tests; this is a diff-only review. Output a numbered severity-ordered list. Each finding must include title, absolute file:line, severity, concrete trigger/exploit, and specific fix. End with Headline (1-2 ship blockers) and Residual/unverified. If genuinely no exploitable/correctness defect survives, output CLEAN and the top assumptions a deeper review should test. Return verified findings only.

first_user_message:
  You are a senior application-security and correctness auditor running an INDEPENDENT adversarial pre-ship review. Treat all prior safety claims as unverified. Review exactly the current uncommitted hook-controls diff in /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/hook-control-toggle against /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/hook-control-toggle/docs/specs/2026-08-09-hook-controls-design.md. Trace only essential cited symbols. Do not edit. Do not run claude, claudex, or cld. Focus only on concrete, reproducible defects across shell fail-closed semantics, config locking/durability/repair, collector API/proxy trust boundaries, query races, UI state, and tests. Ignore style, refactoring, and performance unless they cause correctness failure.

  Assume all boundary-crossing inputs are hostile and fail closed when a guard cannot be confirmed. Build or refresh /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/hook-control-toggle/.security/attack-surface.md only if required by the protocol below, but because the user forbids edits, do not modify it; instead perform an in-memory fresh enumeration if no provably fresh map exists. Freshness protocol: schema v1; if map absent/malformed/stale, enumerate affected scope; if built_at_commit equals HEAD use it; otherwise intersect git changes since built_at_commit with scope/mapped files and refresh changed entries in memory; without proof, treat stale. Map entry fields: trust boundary, entry points, untrusted inputs, auth model, invariants, sinks. The map indexes the hunt and never replaces it.

  Walk every branch and sibling branch. Hunt: object authorization; fail-open parse/verify paths; token binding; timing differences; injection; SSRF; path traversal; unsafe parsing; secret exposure; resource exhaustion; client-declared metadata confusion; idempotency/atomicity; information disclosure; malformed input acceptance. For shell/config/API/UI specifically verify: every shell error path fails closed; locks cover full read-modify-durable-write and repair operations; writes use safe permissions, fsync/rename semantics where promised, and malformed state cannot be silently reset in a way that loses controls; proxy/client identity cannot forge trust headers or bypass loopback assumptions; GET/mutation queries cannot race into stale overwrite or UI rollback; optimistic/pending UI state cannot show success after server failure or revert newer mutations; tests actually exercise the promised failure modes.

  For each candidate: state exact trigger/state, try once to refute it from code/callers, and report only if it survives. Severity by real impact. Do not run tests; this is a diff-only review. Output a numbered severity-ordered list. Each finding must include title, absolute file:line, severity, concrete trigger/exploit, and specific fix. End with Headline (1-2 ship blockers) and Residual/unverified. If genuinely no exploitable/correctness defect survives, output CLEAN and the top assumptions a deeper review should test. Return verified findings only.

preview:
  You are a senior application-security and correctness auditor running an INDEPENDENT adversarial pre-ship review. Treat all prior safety claims as unverified. Review exactly the current uncommitted hook-controls diff in /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/hook-control-toggle against /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/hook-control-toggle/docs/specs/2026-08-09-hook-controls-design.md. Trace only essential cited symbols. Do not edit. Do not run claude, claudex, or cld. Focus only on concrete, reproducible defects across shell fail-closed semantics, config locking/durability/repair, collector API/proxy trust boundaries, query races, UI state, and tests. Ignore style, refactoring, and performance unless they cause correctness failure.

  Assume all boundary-crossing inputs are hostile and fail closed when a guard cannot be confirmed. Build or refresh /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/hook-control-toggle/.security/attack-surface.md only if required by the protocol below, but because the user forbids edits, do not modify it; instead perform an in-memory fresh enumeration if no provably fresh map exists. Freshness protocol: schema v1; if map absent/malformed/stale, enumerate affected scope; if built_at_commit equals HEAD use it; otherwise intersect git changes since built_at_commit with scope/mapped files and refresh changed entries in memory; without proof, treat stale. Map entry fields: trust boundary, entry points, untrusted inputs, auth model, invariants, sinks. The map indexes the hunt and never replaces it.

  Walk every branch and sibling branch. Hunt: object authorization; fail-open parse/verify paths; token binding; timing differences; injection; SSRF; path traversal; unsafe parsing; secret exposure; resource exhaustion; client-declared metadata confusion; idempotency/atomicity; information disclosure; malformed input acceptance. For shell/config/API/UI specifically verify: every shell error path fails closed; locks cover full read-modify-durable-write and repair operations; writes use safe permissions, fsync/rename semantics where promised, and malformed state cannot be silently reset in a way that loses controls; proxy/client identity cannot forge trust headers or bypass loopback assumptions; GET/mutation queries cannot race into stale overwrite or UI rollback; optimistic/pending UI state cannot show success after server failure or revert newer mutations; tests actually exercise the promised failure modes.

  For each candidate: state exact trigger/state, try once to refute it from code/callers, and report only if it survives. Severity by real impact. Do not run tests; this is a diff-only review. Output a numbered severity-ordered list. Each finding must include title, absolute file:line, severity, concrete trigger/exploit, and specific fix. End with Headline (1-2 ship blockers) and Residual/unverified. If genuinely no exploitable/correctness defect survives, output CLEAN and the top assumptions a deeper review should test. Return verified findings only.


id: 019fe35d-c721-7350-b439-15ba4de55e1c
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/hook-control-toggle-aab889141ff9
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 23a06c4807b56423195c4c2341a6baccf102a1ff
git_branch: wt/hook-control-toggle
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/08/rollout-2026-08-08T21-53-21-019fe35d-c721-7350-b439-15ba4de55e1c.jsonl

title:
  You are a senior application-security and correctness auditor running an independent adversarial pre-ship review. Treat all prior reviewed/safe claims as unverified. Review exactly the current uncommitted diff and essential cited symbols in /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/hook-control-toggle against /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/hook-control-toggle/docs/specs/2026-08-09-hook-controls-design.md. User request: 'Final read-only ship review of current uncommitted hook-controls feature in /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/hook-control-toggle against docs/specs/2026-08-09-hook-controls-design.md. Prioritize only high-confidence correctness/security defects with concrete failure scenarios. Verify prior classes: shell fail-closed entire map/malformed input; candidate-isolated tests; lock close and shared/exclusive semantics; rename commit-point 2xx; exact-byte repair/cleanup; API/proxy validation; malformed successful response rejection; stale GET vs mutation cache races; repairable UI/action/error behavior. Ignore style, dedup, speculative architecture and micro-performance. Do not edit or run claude/claudex/cld. Return CLEAN or concise verified findings.' Constraints: read-only; do not create or update .security/attack-surface.md despite the general map protocol. Build an in-memory attack-surface map from the diff/spec and run the full defect hunt. Treat every boundary input as hostile and fail closed when a required guard cannot be confirmed. Enumerate every branch and sibling path. Check injection/path handling/parsing/DoS/idempotency/atomicity/information disclosure/input validation where relevant. For each candidate: state a concrete trigger, re-read and attempt to refute it once, and report only survivors. Do not run tests; this is diff-only review. Output either CLEAN or a numbered severity-ordered list. Each finding must include title, absolute file:line, severity, concrete trigger/failure, and specific fix. End with Headline and Residual / unverified. Keep concise and include only high-confidence correctness/security defects.

first_user_message:
  You are a senior application-security and correctness auditor running an independent adversarial pre-ship review. Treat all prior reviewed/safe claims as unverified. Review exactly the current uncommitted diff and essential cited symbols in /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/hook-control-toggle against /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/hook-control-toggle/docs/specs/2026-08-09-hook-controls-design.md. User request: 'Final read-only ship review of current uncommitted hook-controls feature in /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/hook-control-toggle against docs/specs/2026-08-09-hook-controls-design.md. Prioritize only high-confidence correctness/security defects with concrete failure scenarios. Verify prior classes: shell fail-closed entire map/malformed input; candidate-isolated tests; lock close and shared/exclusive semantics; rename commit-point 2xx; exact-byte repair/cleanup; API/proxy validation; malformed successful response rejection; stale GET vs mutation cache races; repairable UI/action/error behavior. Ignore style, dedup, speculative architecture and micro-performance. Do not edit or run claude/claudex/cld. Return CLEAN or concise verified findings.' Constraints: read-only; do not create or update .security/attack-surface.md despite the general map protocol. Build an in-memory attack-surface map from the diff/spec and run the full defect hunt. Treat every boundary input as hostile and fail closed when a required guard cannot be confirmed. Enumerate every branch and sibling path. Check injection/path handling/parsing/DoS/idempotency/atomicity/information disclosure/input validation where relevant. For each candidate: state a concrete trigger, re-read and attempt to refute it once, and report only survivors. Do not run tests; this is diff-only review. Output either CLEAN or a numbered severity-ordered list. Each finding must include title, absolute file:line, severity, concrete trigger/failure, and specific fix. End with Headline and Residual / unverified. Keep concise and include only high-confidence correctness/security defects.

preview:
  You are a senior application-security and correctness auditor running an independent adversarial pre-ship review. Treat all prior reviewed/safe claims as unverified. Review exactly the current uncommitted diff and essential cited symbols in /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/hook-control-toggle against /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/hook-control-toggle/docs/specs/2026-08-09-hook-controls-design.md. User request: 'Final read-only ship review of current uncommitted hook-controls feature in /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/hook-control-toggle against docs/specs/2026-08-09-hook-controls-design.md. Prioritize only high-confidence correctness/security defects with concrete failure scenarios. Verify prior classes: shell fail-closed entire map/malformed input; candidate-isolated tests; lock close and shared/exclusive semantics; rename commit-point 2xx; exact-byte repair/cleanup; API/proxy validation; malformed successful response rejection; stale GET vs mutation cache races; repairable UI/action/error behavior. Ignore style, dedup, speculative architecture and micro-performance. Do not edit or run claude/claudex/cld. Return CLEAN or concise verified findings.' Constraints: read-only; do not create or update .security/attack-surface.md despite the general map protocol. Build an in-memory attack-surface map from the diff/spec and run the full defect hunt. Treat every boundary input as hostile and fail closed when a required guard cannot be confirmed. Enumerate every branch and sibling path. Check injection/path handling/parsing/DoS/idempotency/atomicity/information disclosure/input validation where relevant. For each candidate: state a concrete trigger, re-read and attempt to refute it once, and report only survivors. Do not run tests; this is diff-only review. Output either CLEAN or a numbered severity-ordered list. Each finding must include title, absolute file:line, severity, concrete trigger/failure, and specific fix. End with Headline and Residual / unverified. Keep concise and include only high-confidence correctness/security defects.


id: 019fe36f-4b5c-75a1-8131-806b1afc4a84
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/hook-control-toggle-aab889141ff9
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 23a06c4807b56423195c4c2341a6baccf102a1ff
git_branch: wt/hook-control-toggle
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/08/rollout-2026-08-08T22-12-29-019fe36f-4b5c-75a1-8131-806b1afc4a84.jsonl

title:
  Recheck only the prior residual finding in the CURRENT uncommitted worktree: collector/src/hook-controls.ts repair backup creation previously called writeFile before entering cleanup coverage, so a post-create write/close failure could leave a partial .corrupt file. The coordinator states the implementation now exclusively opens first, immediately enters cleanup coverage, writes/fsyncs/closes through the handle, and removes plus directory-fsyncs on every precommit failure. Inspect that narrow path and any direct regression against docs/specs/2026-08-09-hook-controls-design.md. Verify exact commit-point behavior and descriptor cleanup. Treat failures as hostile and attempt to refute any candidate once. Read-only: do not edit, create files, run tests, or invoke claude/claudex/cld. Return exactly CLEAN if fixed with no verified residual defect, otherwise one concise finding with absolute file:line, severity, concrete trigger, and exact fix.

first_user_message:
  Recheck only the prior residual finding in the CURRENT uncommitted worktree: collector/src/hook-controls.ts repair backup creation previously called writeFile before entering cleanup coverage, so a post-create write/close failure could leave a partial .corrupt file. The coordinator states the implementation now exclusively opens first, immediately enters cleanup coverage, writes/fsyncs/closes through the handle, and removes plus directory-fsyncs on every precommit failure. Inspect that narrow path and any direct regression against docs/specs/2026-08-09-hook-controls-design.md. Verify exact commit-point behavior and descriptor cleanup. Treat failures as hostile and attempt to refute any candidate once. Read-only: do not edit, create files, run tests, or invoke claude/claudex/cld. Return exactly CLEAN if fixed with no verified residual defect, otherwise one concise finding with absolute file:line, severity, concrete trigger, and exact fix.

preview:
  Recheck only the prior residual finding in the CURRENT uncommitted worktree: collector/src/hook-controls.ts repair backup creation previously called writeFile before entering cleanup coverage, so a post-create write/close failure could leave a partial .corrupt file. The coordinator states the implementation now exclusively opens first, immediately enters cleanup coverage, writes/fsyncs/closes through the handle, and removes plus directory-fsyncs on every precommit failure. Inspect that narrow path and any direct regression against docs/specs/2026-08-09-hook-controls-design.md. Verify exact commit-point behavior and descriptor cleanup. Treat failures as hostile and attempt to refute any candidate once. Read-only: do not edit, create files, run tests, or invoke claude/claudex/cld. Return exactly CLEAN if fixed with no verified residual defect, otherwise one concise finding with absolute file:line, severity, concrete trigger, and exact fix.


id: 019fe3f4-6955-7a32-991c-3263ec0cff56
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/k3s-p4-86833b4317d8
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: d593ef07155e248eda2b5fc32df930881ea39890
git_branch: wt/k3s-p4
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/09/rollout-2026-08-09T00-37-53-019fe3f4-6955-7a32-991c-3263ec0cff56.jsonl

title:
  Implement Phase 4 (workspace materialization) of docs/specs/2026-08-08-k3s-scheduler-design.md — READ IT FIRST; it carries the implementation status. Phases 1-3 are landed: tryK3sBuild submits flag-gated k8s Jobs (k3s_enabled off), the watcher reports results/logs back. Phase 4 = a submitted Job runs with a POPULATED build workspace instead of an empty container, so k3s builds become real.

  Requirements: preserve exact overdeck.dev/build-key annotations on both Job and Pod template (the observability joins depend on them, contract-tested in collector); fail-closed — a workspace that cannot be materialized fails the Job submission with the reason, never runs an empty build; do NOT flip k3s_enabled on (phase 5 owns cutover after parallel validation). Follow the spec's chosen materialization mechanism exactly; if the spec leaves a choice open, pick the most robust and state it in your final report. Add unit tests + extend the existing k3s contract/integration tests. Run every controller/spine suite covering files you touch and leave them green.

  CRITICAL WORKSPACE RULES: work in the repository root you are launched in ($PWD). No git worktree. No git commit — leave changes dirty/untracked; your tree syncs back. At the end print: git status --short, git diff, and full contents of every NEW file.

first_user_message:
  Implement Phase 4 (workspace materialization) of docs/specs/2026-08-08-k3s-scheduler-design.md — READ IT FIRST; it carries the implementation status. Phases 1-3 are landed: tryK3sBuild submits flag-gated k8s Jobs (k3s_enabled off), the watcher reports results/logs back. Phase 4 = a submitted Job runs with a POPULATED build workspace instead of an empty container, so k3s builds become real.

  Requirements: preserve exact overdeck.dev/build-key annotations on both Job and Pod template (the observability joins depend on them, contract-tested in collector); fail-closed — a workspace that cannot be materialized fails the Job submission with the reason, never runs an empty build; do NOT flip k3s_enabled on (phase 5 owns cutover after parallel validation). Follow the spec's chosen materialization mechanism exactly; if the spec leaves a choice open, pick the most robust and state it in your final report. Add unit tests + extend the existing k3s contract/integration tests. Run every controller/spine suite covering files you touch and leave them green.

  CRITICAL WORKSPACE RULES: work in the repository root you are launched in ($PWD). No git worktree. No git commit — leave changes dirty/untracked; your tree syncs back. At the end print: git status --short, git diff, and full contents of every NEW file.

preview:
  Implement Phase 4 (workspace materialization) of docs/specs/2026-08-08-k3s-scheduler-design.md — READ IT FIRST; it carries the implementation status. Phases 1-3 are landed: tryK3sBuild submits flag-gated k8s Jobs (k3s_enabled off), the watcher reports results/logs back. Phase 4 = a submitted Job runs with a POPULATED build workspace instead of an empty container, so k3s builds become real.

  Requirements: preserve exact overdeck.dev/build-key annotations on both Job and Pod template (the observability joins depend on them, contract-tested in collector); fail-closed — a workspace that cannot be materialized fails the Job submission with the reason, never runs an empty build; do NOT flip k3s_enabled on (phase 5 owns cutover after parallel validation). Follow the spec's chosen materialization mechanism exactly; if the spec leaves a choice open, pick the most robust and state it in your final report. Add unit tests + extend the existing k3s contract/integration tests. Run every controller/spine suite covering files you touch and leave them green.

  CRITICAL WORKSPACE RULES: work in the repository root you are launched in ($PWD). No git worktree. No git commit — leave changes dirty/untracked; your tree syncs back. At the end print: git status --short, git diff, and full contents of every NEW file.


id: 019fe40b-169f-7641-83fc-ac20a6de9266
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/muxhost-c761d6349c97
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 4f8af85f20f977b502b48fc840a67e4dd6067587
git_branch: muxhost
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/09/rollout-2026-08-09T01-02-39-019fe40b-169f-7641-83fc-ac20a6de9266.jsonl

title:
  Finish task #41/#148: make agent sessions tmux-hosted so their screens are viewable in Overdeck — no interactive-TTY requirement.

  THIS WORKTREE ($PWD) already contains prior real work on two commits (HEAD 'wip snapshot before lane resume' + '4f8af85f'/'0c0773a6') touching modules/workstation/claude/lib/agent-session-ledger.sh, bin/_tmpjail-shim.sh, bin/_agent-session-capture, collector/src/sessions/attach.ts + screen.ts. READ that first: git log -3 -p --stat. CONTINUE it.

  ABSOLUTE WORKSPACE RULE — READ TWICE: work ONLY in $PWD. Do NOT run 'od-worktree', 'git worktree add', or create any nested/sandbox worktree under any circumstances. A previous run of this exact task created /sandbox/workspaces/muxhost-resume and its entire output was LOST because it never synced back. If you make a worktree, your work is destroyed. Edit files in place in $PWD only.

  Root cause: a session only gets a tmux host when AGENT_LEDGER_MUX_WANT=1, which requires interactive TTY on stdin+stdout, a drivable TERM, not inside TMUX, not inside tmpjail — agent/jailed sessions fail all of these, so mux sockets are null for nearly every live session. Goal: dispatched/agent/non-TTY/jailed sessions get hosted under a DETACHED tmux server (tmux new-session -d needs no TTY); interactive human launches keep attaching normally; hosting failure refuses the unhosted launch (fail-closed); no regression to human launches.

  FIRST STEP: git fetch origin main && git merge --no-edit origin/main, resolve conflicts keeping BOTH sides (origin/main landed remote-screen-over-ssh in attach.ts/screen.ts; you keep that AND your tmux-hosting changes) per judgment — never drop either side. Committing the merge is fine.

  Verification (run all, leave green): bash modules/workstation/claude/tests/agent-session-ledger.test.sh and any tmux/nontty test you add; FT_FROM_HOOK=1 FT_HINTS=1 ft bun test in collector/.

  CRITICAL DELIVERY: do NOT leave work only as a commit. At the very end, in $PWD, run: git add -A && git commit -m wip-muxhost && git format-patch origin/main --stdout AND ALSO print git status --short + git diff origin/main. The format-patch output in the log is your delivery channel — it must contain every change vs origin/main.

first_user_message:
  Finish task #41/#148: make agent sessions tmux-hosted so their screens are viewable in Overdeck — no interactive-TTY requirement.

  THIS WORKTREE ($PWD) already contains prior real work on two commits (HEAD 'wip snapshot before lane resume' + '4f8af85f'/'0c0773a6') touching modules/workstation/claude/lib/agent-session-ledger.sh, bin/_tmpjail-shim.sh, bin/_agent-session-capture, collector/src/sessions/attach.ts + screen.ts. READ that first: git log -3 -p --stat. CONTINUE it.

  ABSOLUTE WORKSPACE RULE — READ TWICE: work ONLY in $PWD. Do NOT run 'od-worktree', 'git worktree add', or create any nested/sandbox worktree under any circumstances. A previous run of this exact task created /sandbox/workspaces/muxhost-resume and its entire output was LOST because it never synced back. If you make a worktree, your work is destroyed. Edit files in place in $PWD only.

  Root cause: a session only gets a tmux host when AGENT_LEDGER_MUX_WANT=1, which requires interactive TTY on stdin+stdout, a drivable TERM, not inside TMUX, not inside tmpjail — agent/jailed sessions fail all of these, so mux sockets are null for nearly every live session. Goal: dispatched/agent/non-TTY/jailed sessions get hosted under a DETACHED tmux server (tmux new-session -d needs no TTY); interactive human launches keep attaching normally; hosting failure refuses the unhosted launch (fail-closed); no regression to human launches.

  FIRST STEP: git fetch origin main && git merge --no-edit origin/main, resolve conflicts keeping BOTH sides (origin/main landed remote-screen-over-ssh in attach.ts/screen.ts; you keep that AND your tmux-hosting changes) per judgment — never drop either side. Committing the merge is fine.

  Verification (run all, leave green): bash modules/workstation/claude/tests/agent-session-ledger.test.sh and any tmux/nontty test you add; FT_FROM_HOOK=1 FT_HINTS=1 ft bun test in collector/.

  CRITICAL DELIVERY: do NOT leave work only as a commit. At the very end, in $PWD, run: git add -A && git commit -m wip-muxhost && git format-patch origin/main --stdout AND ALSO print git status --short + git diff origin/main. The format-patch output in the log is your delivery channel — it must contain every change vs origin/main.

preview:
  Finish task #41/#148: make agent sessions tmux-hosted so their screens are viewable in Overdeck — no interactive-TTY requirement.

  THIS WORKTREE ($PWD) already contains prior real work on two commits (HEAD 'wip snapshot before lane resume' + '4f8af85f'/'0c0773a6') touching modules/workstation/claude/lib/agent-session-ledger.sh, bin/_tmpjail-shim.sh, bin/_agent-session-capture, collector/src/sessions/attach.ts + screen.ts. READ that first: git log -3 -p --stat. CONTINUE it.

  ABSOLUTE WORKSPACE RULE — READ TWICE: work ONLY in $PWD. Do NOT run 'od-worktree', 'git worktree add', or create any nested/sandbox worktree under any circumstances. A previous run of this exact task created /sandbox/workspaces/muxhost-resume and its entire output was LOST because it never synced back. If you make a worktree, your work is destroyed. Edit files in place in $PWD only.

  Root cause: a session only gets a tmux host when AGENT_LEDGER_MUX_WANT=1, which requires interactive TTY on stdin+stdout, a drivable TERM, not inside TMUX, not inside tmpjail — agent/jailed sessions fail all of these, so mux sockets are null for nearly every live session. Goal: dispatched/agent/non-TTY/jailed sessions get hosted under a DETACHED tmux server (tmux new-session -d needs no TTY); interactive human launches keep attaching normally; hosting failure refuses the unhosted launch (fail-closed); no regression to human launches.

  FIRST STEP: git fetch origin main && git merge --no-edit origin/main, resolve conflicts keeping BOTH sides (origin/main landed remote-screen-over-ssh in attach.ts/screen.ts; you keep that AND your tmux-hosting changes) per judgment — never drop either side. Committing the merge is fine.

  Verification (run all, leave green): bash modules/workstation/claude/tests/agent-session-ledger.test.sh and any tmux/nontty test you add; FT_FROM_HOOK=1 FT_HINTS=1 ft bun test in collector/.

  CRITICAL DELIVERY: do NOT leave work only as a commit. At the very end, in $PWD, run: git add -A && git commit -m wip-muxhost && git format-patch origin/main --stdout AND ALSO print git status --short + git diff origin/main. The format-patch output in the log is your delivery channel — it must contain every change vs origin/main.


id: 019fe43c-3e9d-72a0-bf96-8e651f812596
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/humandot-779497d8a4d7
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 9dcacd2780a069bee1cf98666d0ab1ce0cd84983
git_branch: wt/humandot
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/09/rollout-2026-08-09T01-56-21-019fe43c-3e9d-72a0-bf96-8e651f812596.jsonl

title:
  Your previous edit to modules/systray/command_router.py (hardening ClaudeAdapter.verify_env_support) REGRESSED a test: modules/systray/tests/test_command_router.py::test_every_agent_start_path_is_contained_or_aborts[cld_any] now FAILS but PASSES on clean origin/main. Your verify_env_support change altered behavior that this containment test depends on. The current dirty tree has your change. Diagnose why cld_any now fails (run: python3 -m pytest 'modules/systray/tests/test_command_router.py::test_every_agent_start_path_is_contained_or_aborts[cld_any]' -q -x to see the assertion), and fix so BOTH your new probe tests AND that containment test pass. Do NOT weaken or edit the containment test to make it pass — fix the code. Likely cause: your probe now runs a real 'claude' subprocess during a code path the containment test drives with a fake, or changed a return the containment path relies on. Keep the probe hardening (timeout caught, var-read check, same-identity not a failure). Run the FULL file green: python3 -m pytest modules/systray/tests/test_command_router.py -q (all pass). WORKSPACE: work ONLY in $PWD, keep existing dirty changes, NO worktree, NO commit until the very end: git add -A && git commit -m wip && git format-patch origin/main --stdout ; then git status --short.

first_user_message:
  Your previous edit to modules/systray/command_router.py (hardening ClaudeAdapter.verify_env_support) REGRESSED a test: modules/systray/tests/test_command_router.py::test_every_agent_start_path_is_contained_or_aborts[cld_any] now FAILS but PASSES on clean origin/main. Your verify_env_support change altered behavior that this containment test depends on. The current dirty tree has your change. Diagnose why cld_any now fails (run: python3 -m pytest 'modules/systray/tests/test_command_router.py::test_every_agent_start_path_is_contained_or_aborts[cld_any]' -q -x to see the assertion), and fix so BOTH your new probe tests AND that containment test pass. Do NOT weaken or edit the containment test to make it pass — fix the code. Likely cause: your probe now runs a real 'claude' subprocess during a code path the containment test drives with a fake, or changed a return the containment path relies on. Keep the probe hardening (timeout caught, var-read check, same-identity not a failure). Run the FULL file green: python3 -m pytest modules/systray/tests/test_command_router.py -q (all pass). WORKSPACE: work ONLY in $PWD, keep existing dirty changes, NO worktree, NO commit until the very end: git add -A && git commit -m wip && git format-patch origin/main --stdout ; then git status --short.

preview:
  Your previous edit to modules/systray/command_router.py (hardening ClaudeAdapter.verify_env_support) REGRESSED a test: modules/systray/tests/test_command_router.py::test_every_agent_start_path_is_contained_or_aborts[cld_any] now FAILS but PASSES on clean origin/main. Your verify_env_support change altered behavior that this containment test depends on. The current dirty tree has your change. Diagnose why cld_any now fails (run: python3 -m pytest 'modules/systray/tests/test_command_router.py::test_every_agent_start_path_is_contained_or_aborts[cld_any]' -q -x to see the assertion), and fix so BOTH your new probe tests AND that containment test pass. Do NOT weaken or edit the containment test to make it pass — fix the code. Likely cause: your probe now runs a real 'claude' subprocess during a code path the containment test drives with a fake, or changed a return the containment path relies on. Keep the probe hardening (timeout caught, var-read check, same-identity not a failure). Run the FULL file green: python3 -m pytest modules/systray/tests/test_command_router.py -q (all pass). WORKSPACE: work ONLY in $PWD, keep existing dirty changes, NO worktree, NO commit until the very end: git add -A && git commit -m wip && git format-patch origin/main --stdout ; then git status --short.


id: 019fe44b-22d8-7fc0-944d-477c61c26fa0
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/muxrecover-90d0daac172b
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: e4feb9d242c3a06615eebfcb6d45481c8a91b1ec
git_branch: wt/muxrecover
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.3-codex-spark
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/09/rollout-2026-08-09T02-12-37-019fe44b-22d8-7fc0-944d-477c61c26fa0.jsonl

title:
  Read the Claude Code session transcript at /home/user/.claude/projects/-home-user/f5f6f15f-b816-485f-b134-63385afdc36e.jsonl (JSONL; skip tool_result noise). Author a continuation handoff in markdown for a fresh coding agent: goal, methodology, completed work, current state, precise next actions, blockers gated on the user, standing user instructions (verbatim), key file paths. Be complete but terse. Output ONLY the handoff markdown.

first_user_message:
  Read the Claude Code session transcript at /home/user/.claude/projects/-home-user/f5f6f15f-b816-485f-b134-63385afdc36e.jsonl (JSONL; skip tool_result noise). Author a continuation handoff in markdown for a fresh coding agent: goal, methodology, completed work, current state, precise next actions, blockers gated on the user, standing user instructions (verbatim), key file paths. Be complete but terse. Output ONLY the handoff markdown.

preview:
  Read the Claude Code session transcript at /home/user/.claude/projects/-home-user/f5f6f15f-b816-485f-b134-63385afdc36e.jsonl (JSONL; skip tool_result noise). Author a continuation handoff in markdown for a fresh coding agent: goal, methodology, completed work, current state, precise next actions, blockers gated on the user, standing user instructions (verbatim), key file paths. Be complete but terse. Output ONLY the handoff markdown.


id: 019fe467-42ec-7780-a951-863fefcb3667
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/mod-cms-content-model-run-bcfe5836759d
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: d132d81d6839b47bb72168189d902918fb01cbc0
git_branch: wt/mod-cms-content-model-run
git_origin_url: https://github.com/platform-modules/mod
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/09/rollout-2026-08-09T02-43-20-019fe467-42ec-7780-a951-863fefcb3667.jsonl

title:
  Review only; do not edit files or commit. Use /caveman ultra before your first response. Review the uncommitted content-model Task 1 diff. Scope: packages/db/src/index.ts, packages/db/src/transaction.ts, packages/db/src/index.test-d.ts, packages/db/src/types.test.ts, packages/db/src/postgres/neon-serverless.ts, packages/db/src/postgres/pglite.ts, packages/db/src/postgres/postgres-js.ts, packages/db/src/postgres/pglite.test.ts, packages/db/src/sqlite/d1.ts, packages/db/src/sqlite/types.ts, packages/db/src/sqlite/d1.test.ts, and apps/consumer/tests/db-transaction.test.ts. Ignore docs/plans/2026-08-08-mod-cms-content-model-completion.jsonl; it is session state, not Task 1 code. Judge against docs/plans/2026-08-08-mod-cms-content-model-completion.md Task 1, docs/specs/2026-08-08-fields-complete-design.md transaction capability contract around section 8.1, docs/specs/2026-08-08-mod-cms-content-model-completion-design.md combined transaction requirements, and docs/standards/coding-standard.md sections 2 and 4 plus R1-R3. Verify correctness, type soundness, callback-only minting, exact identity invariants, independently minted transaction rejection, nested transaction behavior, duplicate package-copy behavior, D1/Postgres adapter coverage, combined-to-narrow schema assignability without casts or wrappers, typed structural errors, and whether tests discriminate violations. Acceptance passed under Node 22: db tests 19/19, db typecheck, db build. Return only verified findings ranked P1/P2/P3, each with file:line, failure scenario, and minimal fix direction. If no P1/P2, state exactly 'P1/P2: none'. Do not suggest unrelated refactors.

first_user_message:
  Review only; do not edit files or commit. Use /caveman ultra before your first response. Review the uncommitted content-model Task 1 diff. Scope: packages/db/src/index.ts, packages/db/src/transaction.ts, packages/db/src/index.test-d.ts, packages/db/src/types.test.ts, packages/db/src/postgres/neon-serverless.ts, packages/db/src/postgres/pglite.ts, packages/db/src/postgres/postgres-js.ts, packages/db/src/postgres/pglite.test.ts, packages/db/src/sqlite/d1.ts, packages/db/src/sqlite/types.ts, packages/db/src/sqlite/d1.test.ts, and apps/consumer/tests/db-transaction.test.ts. Ignore docs/plans/2026-08-08-mod-cms-content-model-completion.jsonl; it is session state, not Task 1 code. Judge against docs/plans/2026-08-08-mod-cms-content-model-completion.md Task 1, docs/specs/2026-08-08-fields-complete-design.md transaction capability contract around section 8.1, docs/specs/2026-08-08-mod-cms-content-model-completion-design.md combined transaction requirements, and docs/standards/coding-standard.md sections 2 and 4 plus R1-R3. Verify correctness, type soundness, callback-only minting, exact identity invariants, independently minted transaction rejection, nested transaction behavior, duplicate package-copy behavior, D1/Postgres adapter coverage, combined-to-narrow schema assignability without casts or wrappers, typed structural errors, and whether tests discriminate violations. Acceptance passed under Node 22: db tests 19/19, db typecheck, db build. Return only verified findings ranked P1/P2/P3, each with file:line, failure scenario, and minimal fix direction. If no P1/P2, state exactly 'P1/P2: none'. Do not suggest unrelated refactors.

preview:
  Review only; do not edit files or commit. Use /caveman ultra before your first response. Review the uncommitted content-model Task 1 diff. Scope: packages/db/src/index.ts, packages/db/src/transaction.ts, packages/db/src/index.test-d.ts, packages/db/src/types.test.ts, packages/db/src/postgres/neon-serverless.ts, packages/db/src/postgres/pglite.ts, packages/db/src/postgres/postgres-js.ts, packages/db/src/postgres/pglite.test.ts, packages/db/src/sqlite/d1.ts, packages/db/src/sqlite/types.ts, packages/db/src/sqlite/d1.test.ts, and apps/consumer/tests/db-transaction.test.ts. Ignore docs/plans/2026-08-08-mod-cms-content-model-completion.jsonl; it is session state, not Task 1 code. Judge against docs/plans/2026-08-08-mod-cms-content-model-completion.md Task 1, docs/specs/2026-08-08-fields-complete-design.md transaction capability contract around section 8.1, docs/specs/2026-08-08-mod-cms-content-model-completion-design.md combined transaction requirements, and docs/standards/coding-standard.md sections 2 and 4 plus R1-R3. Verify correctness, type soundness, callback-only minting, exact identity invariants, independently minted transaction rejection, nested transaction behavior, duplicate package-copy behavior, D1/Postgres adapter coverage, combined-to-narrow schema assignability without casts or wrappers, typed structural errors, and whether tests discriminate violations. Acceptance passed under Node 22: db tests 19/19, db typecheck, db build. Return only verified findings ranked P1/P2/P3, each with file:line, failure scenario, and minimal fix direction. If no P1/P2, state exactly 'P1/P2: none'. Do not suggest unrelated refactors.


id: 019fe473-1efd-7d92-985e-074ecaa6171c
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/mod-cms-content-model-run-bcfe5836759d
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: d132d81d6839b47bb72168189d902918fb01cbc0
git_branch: wt/mod-cms-content-model-run
git_origin_url: https://github.com/platform-modules/mod
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/09/rollout-2026-08-09T02-56-17-019fe473-1efd-7d92-985e-074ecaa6171c.jsonl

title:
  Review only; do not edit or commit. Use /caveman ultra before your first response. Re-review the uncommitted content-model Task 1 diff after fixes. The prior review found four mandatory issues: D1 did not satisfy public Transaction<S>; duplicate physical package copies were type-incompatible; capabilities remained valid after callbacks; and negative/nested tests did not exercise typed strict identity before effects. Verify each is fully fixed, and hunt regressions introduced by the fixes. Scope packages/db/src/** transaction-related changes plus apps/consumer/tests/db-transaction.test.ts; ignore docs/plans/2026-08-08-mod-cms-content-model-completion.jsonl. Judge against docs/plans/2026-08-08-mod-cms-content-model-completion.md Task 1, docs/specs/2026-08-08-fields-complete-design.md section 8.1 transaction contract, docs/specs/2026-08-08-mod-cms-content-model-completion-design.md combined transaction requirements, and coding-standard sections 2 and 4 plus R1-R3. Acceptance now passes under Node 22: db 7 files/21 tests, db typecheck, db build, consumer transaction test. Return only verified P1/P2/P3 findings with file:line and failure scenario. State exactly 'P1/P2: none' if no P1/P2. No unrelated refactors.

first_user_message:
  Review only; do not edit or commit. Use /caveman ultra before your first response. Re-review the uncommitted content-model Task 1 diff after fixes. The prior review found four mandatory issues: D1 did not satisfy public Transaction<S>; duplicate physical package copies were type-incompatible; capabilities remained valid after callbacks; and negative/nested tests did not exercise typed strict identity before effects. Verify each is fully fixed, and hunt regressions introduced by the fixes. Scope packages/db/src/** transaction-related changes plus apps/consumer/tests/db-transaction.test.ts; ignore docs/plans/2026-08-08-mod-cms-content-model-completion.jsonl. Judge against docs/plans/2026-08-08-mod-cms-content-model-completion.md Task 1, docs/specs/2026-08-08-fields-complete-design.md section 8.1 transaction contract, docs/specs/2026-08-08-mod-cms-content-model-completion-design.md combined transaction requirements, and coding-standard sections 2 and 4 plus R1-R3. Acceptance now passes under Node 22: db 7 files/21 tests, db typecheck, db build, consumer transaction test. Return only verified P1/P2/P3 findings with file:line and failure scenario. State exactly 'P1/P2: none' if no P1/P2. No unrelated refactors.

preview:
  Review only; do not edit or commit. Use /caveman ultra before your first response. Re-review the uncommitted content-model Task 1 diff after fixes. The prior review found four mandatory issues: D1 did not satisfy public Transaction<S>; duplicate physical package copies were type-incompatible; capabilities remained valid after callbacks; and negative/nested tests did not exercise typed strict identity before effects. Verify each is fully fixed, and hunt regressions introduced by the fixes. Scope packages/db/src/** transaction-related changes plus apps/consumer/tests/db-transaction.test.ts; ignore docs/plans/2026-08-08-mod-cms-content-model-completion.jsonl. Judge against docs/plans/2026-08-08-mod-cms-content-model-completion.md Task 1, docs/specs/2026-08-08-fields-complete-design.md section 8.1 transaction contract, docs/specs/2026-08-08-mod-cms-content-model-completion-design.md combined transaction requirements, and coding-standard sections 2 and 4 plus R1-R3. Acceptance now passes under Node 22: db 7 files/21 tests, db typecheck, db build, consumer transaction test. Return only verified P1/P2/P3 findings with file:line and failure scenario. State exactly 'P1/P2: none' if no P1/P2. No unrelated refactors.


id: 019fe47f-0260-7832-b2e2-edbb211c0f5f
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/mod-cms-content-model-run-bcfe5836759d
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: d132d81d6839b47bb72168189d902918fb01cbc0
git_branch: wt/mod-cms-content-model-run
git_origin_url: https://github.com/platform-modules/mod
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/09/rollout-2026-08-09T03-09-17-019fe47f-0260-7832-b2e2-edbb211c0f5f.jsonl

title:
  Review only; do not edit. Review the uncommitted content-model Task 1 diff. Scope packages/db transaction capability files, apps/consumer/tests/db-transaction.test.ts, docs/plans/2026-08-08-mod-cms-content-model-completion.md, and docs/specs/2026-08-08-mod-cms-content-model-completion-design.md. Ignore docs/plans/2026-08-08-mod-cms-content-model-completion.jsonl and the untracked %h directory. Judge against Task 1, fields spec section 8.1, content-model combined-transaction contract, and coding-standard sections 2/4/R1-R3. Verify callback-only minting, active callback lifetime, strict and nested identity invariants, physical duplicate-package runtime and compile-time compatibility, typed structural errors, D1/Postgres normalized query-capable execute<Row>(SQLWrapper), combined-to-narrow schema assignability without casts in package consumers, plain querier rejection, and discriminating tests. The authoritative Node 22 acceptance is currently clean: db 21/21 tests, typecheck, build, and consumer transaction test. Return only verified P1/P2/P3 findings with file:line and concrete failure scenario; state P1/P2: none if none.

first_user_message:
  Review only; do not edit. Review the uncommitted content-model Task 1 diff. Scope packages/db transaction capability files, apps/consumer/tests/db-transaction.test.ts, docs/plans/2026-08-08-mod-cms-content-model-completion.md, and docs/specs/2026-08-08-mod-cms-content-model-completion-design.md. Ignore docs/plans/2026-08-08-mod-cms-content-model-completion.jsonl and the untracked %h directory. Judge against Task 1, fields spec section 8.1, content-model combined-transaction contract, and coding-standard sections 2/4/R1-R3. Verify callback-only minting, active callback lifetime, strict and nested identity invariants, physical duplicate-package runtime and compile-time compatibility, typed structural errors, D1/Postgres normalized query-capable execute<Row>(SQLWrapper), combined-to-narrow schema assignability without casts in package consumers, plain querier rejection, and discriminating tests. The authoritative Node 22 acceptance is currently clean: db 21/21 tests, typecheck, build, and consumer transaction test. Return only verified P1/P2/P3 findings with file:line and concrete failure scenario; state P1/P2: none if none.

preview:
  Review only; do not edit. Review the uncommitted content-model Task 1 diff. Scope packages/db transaction capability files, apps/consumer/tests/db-transaction.test.ts, docs/plans/2026-08-08-mod-cms-content-model-completion.md, and docs/specs/2026-08-08-mod-cms-content-model-completion-design.md. Ignore docs/plans/2026-08-08-mod-cms-content-model-completion.jsonl and the untracked %h directory. Judge against Task 1, fields spec section 8.1, content-model combined-transaction contract, and coding-standard sections 2/4/R1-R3. Verify callback-only minting, active callback lifetime, strict and nested identity invariants, physical duplicate-package runtime and compile-time compatibility, typed structural errors, D1/Postgres normalized query-capable execute<Row>(SQLWrapper), combined-to-narrow schema assignability without casts in package consumers, plain querier rejection, and discriminating tests. The authoritative Node 22 acceptance is currently clean: db 21/21 tests, typecheck, build, and consumer transaction test. Return only verified P1/P2/P3 findings with file:line and concrete failure scenario; state P1/P2: none if none.


id: 019fe494-c5f6-7321-b138-0321ef09c5d6
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/incident-dispatch-selector-options-7ff8af8bd7d1
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: a1b65959b601a1d74c9b3d47996c43acabb65e52
git_branch: wt/incident-dispatch-selector-options
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/09/rollout-2026-08-09T03-33-03-019fe494-c5f6-7321-b138-0321ef09c5d6.jsonl

title:
  You are a senior application-security and correctness auditor running an independent adversarial pre-ship review. Treat all prior safe/reviewed claims as unverified. Review exactly commits a9a1e627..HEAD and only these scoped files plus collector dispatch-option validation files changed in that range: modules/harness/wrappers/codex.sh, modules/harness/wrappers/lib/remote-seat.sh, modules/harness/seat/remote-seat.mjs, modules/harness/seat/seat-run.sh, modules/harness/seat/seat-entrypoint.sh. Trace a cited symbol only when essential to judge a trust boundary. Assume CLI args, env, config, files, network/IPC, datastore and remote responses are hostile. Fail closed when a guard cannot be confirmed. Enumerate every mode/branch and explicitly check missing, duplicate, unknown modes; unsafe downgrade or escalation; shell/argument injection; authority freshness; side effects before validation; local versus remote semantic parity. For every candidate: state exact trigger/state, then try once to refute it by rereading guards/callers; report only defects surviving refutation. Severity must reflect concrete impact. Do not run wrappers or tests. Do not modify any file, including security-map files. Use read-only inspection commands only. Output a severity-ordered numbered list. Each item must contain title, absolute file:line, severity, concrete exploit/failure scenario, and specific fix. End with Headline naming ship blockers and Residual/unverified. If no concrete defect survives, state clean and list only top assumptions needing deeper review.

first_user_message:
  You are a senior application-security and correctness auditor running an independent adversarial pre-ship review. Treat all prior safe/reviewed claims as unverified. Review exactly commits a9a1e627..HEAD and only these scoped files plus collector dispatch-option validation files changed in that range: modules/harness/wrappers/codex.sh, modules/harness/wrappers/lib/remote-seat.sh, modules/harness/seat/remote-seat.mjs, modules/harness/seat/seat-run.sh, modules/harness/seat/seat-entrypoint.sh. Trace a cited symbol only when essential to judge a trust boundary. Assume CLI args, env, config, files, network/IPC, datastore and remote responses are hostile. Fail closed when a guard cannot be confirmed. Enumerate every mode/branch and explicitly check missing, duplicate, unknown modes; unsafe downgrade or escalation; shell/argument injection; authority freshness; side effects before validation; local versus remote semantic parity. For every candidate: state exact trigger/state, then try once to refute it by rereading guards/callers; report only defects surviving refutation. Severity must reflect concrete impact. Do not run wrappers or tests. Do not modify any file, including security-map files. Use read-only inspection commands only. Output a severity-ordered numbered list. Each item must contain title, absolute file:line, severity, concrete exploit/failure scenario, and specific fix. End with Headline naming ship blockers and Residual/unverified. If no concrete defect survives, state clean and list only top assumptions needing deeper review.

preview:
  You are a senior application-security and correctness auditor running an independent adversarial pre-ship review. Treat all prior safe/reviewed claims as unverified. Review exactly commits a9a1e627..HEAD and only these scoped files plus collector dispatch-option validation files changed in that range: modules/harness/wrappers/codex.sh, modules/harness/wrappers/lib/remote-seat.sh, modules/harness/seat/remote-seat.mjs, modules/harness/seat/seat-run.sh, modules/harness/seat/seat-entrypoint.sh. Trace a cited symbol only when essential to judge a trust boundary. Assume CLI args, env, config, files, network/IPC, datastore and remote responses are hostile. Fail closed when a guard cannot be confirmed. Enumerate every mode/branch and explicitly check missing, duplicate, unknown modes; unsafe downgrade or escalation; shell/argument injection; authority freshness; side effects before validation; local versus remote semantic parity. For every candidate: state exact trigger/state, then try once to refute it by rereading guards/callers; report only defects surviving refutation. Severity must reflect concrete impact. Do not run wrappers or tests. Do not modify any file, including security-map files. Use read-only inspection commands only. Output a severity-ordered numbered list. Each item must contain title, absolute file:line, severity, concrete exploit/failure scenario, and specific fix. End with Headline naming ship blockers and Residual/unverified. If no concrete defect survives, state clean and list only top assumptions needing deeper review.


id: 019fe4a4-cf74-7513-bbb8-a80a35f6c06b
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/mod-cms-content-model-run-bcfe5836759d
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: d132d81d6839b47bb72168189d902918fb01cbc0
git_branch: wt/mod-cms-content-model-run
git_origin_url: https://github.com/platform-modules/mod
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/09/rollout-2026-08-09T03-50-34-019fe4a4-cf74-7513-bbb8-a80a35f6c06b.jsonl

title:
  Review only; do not edit. Review the uncommitted content-model Task 1 diff, excluding docs/plans/2026-08-08-mod-cms-content-model-completion.jsonl and accidental %h/. Scope packages/db transaction capability files, apps/consumer/tests/db-transaction.test.ts, and the Task 1 spec/plan amendments. Judge against Task 1 in docs/plans/2026-08-08-mod-cms-content-model-completion.md, docs/specs/2026-08-08-fields-complete-design.md section 8.1, docs/specs/2026-08-08-mod-cms-content-model-completion-design.md, and docs/standards/coding-standard.md sections 2 and 4 plus R1-R3. Verify callback-only authenticity, active lifetime, strict identity invariants, nested transactions, duplicate physical package copies, D1/Postgres adapter coverage, combined-to-narrow schema assignability, typed structural errors, query execution, escaped operation/reflection safety, and discriminating tests. Pay particular attention to the replacement of a predictable global activation service with callback-closure authenticators and identity validators, and the added proxy mutation/extensibility traps. Return only verified P1/P2/P3 findings with file:line and concrete failure scenario. State 'P1/P2/P3: none' if clean.

first_user_message:
  Review only; do not edit. Review the uncommitted content-model Task 1 diff, excluding docs/plans/2026-08-08-mod-cms-content-model-completion.jsonl and accidental %h/. Scope packages/db transaction capability files, apps/consumer/tests/db-transaction.test.ts, and the Task 1 spec/plan amendments. Judge against Task 1 in docs/plans/2026-08-08-mod-cms-content-model-completion.md, docs/specs/2026-08-08-fields-complete-design.md section 8.1, docs/specs/2026-08-08-mod-cms-content-model-completion-design.md, and docs/standards/coding-standard.md sections 2 and 4 plus R1-R3. Verify callback-only authenticity, active lifetime, strict identity invariants, nested transactions, duplicate physical package copies, D1/Postgres adapter coverage, combined-to-narrow schema assignability, typed structural errors, query execution, escaped operation/reflection safety, and discriminating tests. Pay particular attention to the replacement of a predictable global activation service with callback-closure authenticators and identity validators, and the added proxy mutation/extensibility traps. Return only verified P1/P2/P3 findings with file:line and concrete failure scenario. State 'P1/P2/P3: none' if clean.

preview:
  Review only; do not edit. Review the uncommitted content-model Task 1 diff, excluding docs/plans/2026-08-08-mod-cms-content-model-completion.jsonl and accidental %h/. Scope packages/db transaction capability files, apps/consumer/tests/db-transaction.test.ts, and the Task 1 spec/plan amendments. Judge against Task 1 in docs/plans/2026-08-08-mod-cms-content-model-completion.md, docs/specs/2026-08-08-fields-complete-design.md section 8.1, docs/specs/2026-08-08-mod-cms-content-model-completion-design.md, and docs/standards/coding-standard.md sections 2 and 4 plus R1-R3. Verify callback-only authenticity, active lifetime, strict identity invariants, nested transactions, duplicate physical package copies, D1/Postgres adapter coverage, combined-to-narrow schema assignability, typed structural errors, query execution, escaped operation/reflection safety, and discriminating tests. Pay particular attention to the replacement of a predictable global activation service with callback-closure authenticators and identity validators, and the added proxy mutation/extensibility traps. Return only verified P1/P2/P3 findings with file:line and concrete failure scenario. State 'P1/P2/P3: none' if clean.


id: 019fe4b7-c5f7-71e1-b87a-c90ff9b567f3
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/mod-cms-content-model-run-bcfe5836759d
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: d132d81d6839b47bb72168189d902918fb01cbc0
git_branch: wt/mod-cms-content-model-run
git_origin_url: https://github.com/platform-modules/mod
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/09/rollout-2026-08-09T04-11-16-019fe4b7-c5f7-71e1-b87a-c90ff9b567f3.jsonl

title:
  Review only; do not edit. Final convergence review of uncommitted content-model Task 1 after PromiseLike terminal tracking and synthesized D1 execute reflection fixes. Exclude docs/plans/2026-08-08-mod-cms-content-model-completion.jsonl and accidental %h/. Scope packages/db transaction capability files, apps/consumer/tests/db-transaction.test.ts, and Task 1 spec/plan amendments. Judge against Task 1 in docs/plans/2026-08-08-mod-cms-content-model-completion.md, docs/specs/2026-08-08-fields-complete-design.md section 8.1, docs/specs/2026-08-08-mod-cms-content-model-completion-design.md, and docs/standards/coding-standard.md sections 2 and 4 plus R1-R3. Verify callback-only authenticity, exact identity, lifetime, nested/duplicate-copy behavior, every adapter, schema assignability, errors, all fire-and-forget paths without eager builder execution, reflection/proxy invariants, and tests. Return only verified P1/P2/P3 findings with file:line and concrete failure scenario. State 'P1/P2/P3: none' if clean.

first_user_message:
  Review only; do not edit. Final convergence review of uncommitted content-model Task 1 after PromiseLike terminal tracking and synthesized D1 execute reflection fixes. Exclude docs/plans/2026-08-08-mod-cms-content-model-completion.jsonl and accidental %h/. Scope packages/db transaction capability files, apps/consumer/tests/db-transaction.test.ts, and Task 1 spec/plan amendments. Judge against Task 1 in docs/plans/2026-08-08-mod-cms-content-model-completion.md, docs/specs/2026-08-08-fields-complete-design.md section 8.1, docs/specs/2026-08-08-mod-cms-content-model-completion-design.md, and docs/standards/coding-standard.md sections 2 and 4 plus R1-R3. Verify callback-only authenticity, exact identity, lifetime, nested/duplicate-copy behavior, every adapter, schema assignability, errors, all fire-and-forget paths without eager builder execution, reflection/proxy invariants, and tests. Return only verified P1/P2/P3 findings with file:line and concrete failure scenario. State 'P1/P2/P3: none' if clean.

preview:
  Review only; do not edit. Final convergence review of uncommitted content-model Task 1 after PromiseLike terminal tracking and synthesized D1 execute reflection fixes. Exclude docs/plans/2026-08-08-mod-cms-content-model-completion.jsonl and accidental %h/. Scope packages/db transaction capability files, apps/consumer/tests/db-transaction.test.ts, and Task 1 spec/plan amendments. Judge against Task 1 in docs/plans/2026-08-08-mod-cms-content-model-completion.md, docs/specs/2026-08-08-fields-complete-design.md section 8.1, docs/specs/2026-08-08-mod-cms-content-model-completion-design.md, and docs/standards/coding-standard.md sections 2 and 4 plus R1-R3. Verify callback-only authenticity, exact identity, lifetime, nested/duplicate-copy behavior, every adapter, schema assignability, errors, all fire-and-forget paths without eager builder execution, reflection/proxy invariants, and tests. Return only verified P1/P2/P3 findings with file:line and concrete failure scenario. State 'P1/P2/P3: none' if clean.


id: 019fe4bd-d42c-7041-b06d-3bdc7fc6a4c4
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/mod-cms-content-model-run-bcfe5836759d
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: d132d81d6839b47bb72168189d902918fb01cbc0
git_branch: wt/mod-cms-content-model-run
git_origin_url: https://github.com/platform-modules/mod
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/09/rollout-2026-08-09T04-17-53-019fe4bd-d42c-7041-b06d-3bdc7fc6a4c4.jsonl

title:
  Adversarially verify only the prior P1 at packages/db/src/transaction.ts line 305; do not edit. Trace the two distinct proxy handlers carefully. The line-305 property-equals-values branch is on the top-level transaction facade whose source is the raw Drizzle transaction. In contrast, the values method in an insert-values chain resolves through guardValue's separate handler, whose terminalOperationProperties excludes values. Inspect packages/db/src/postgres/pglite.test.ts lines 60 through 88, where an escaped insert-values builder is intentionally discarded and the table is asserted empty. Determine whether an ordinary insert-values-returning chain is actually eagerly executed or loses builder methods. Return CONFIRMED with a concrete trace if reproducible, otherwise REFUTED. Then state whether any P1/P2/P3 remains from the full prior review.

first_user_message:
  Adversarially verify only the prior P1 at packages/db/src/transaction.ts line 305; do not edit. Trace the two distinct proxy handlers carefully. The line-305 property-equals-values branch is on the top-level transaction facade whose source is the raw Drizzle transaction. In contrast, the values method in an insert-values chain resolves through guardValue's separate handler, whose terminalOperationProperties excludes values. Inspect packages/db/src/postgres/pglite.test.ts lines 60 through 88, where an escaped insert-values builder is intentionally discarded and the table is asserted empty. Determine whether an ordinary insert-values-returning chain is actually eagerly executed or loses builder methods. Return CONFIRMED with a concrete trace if reproducible, otherwise REFUTED. Then state whether any P1/P2/P3 remains from the full prior review.

preview:
  Adversarially verify only the prior P1 at packages/db/src/transaction.ts line 305; do not edit. Trace the two distinct proxy handlers carefully. The line-305 property-equals-values branch is on the top-level transaction facade whose source is the raw Drizzle transaction. In contrast, the values method in an insert-values chain resolves through guardValue's separate handler, whose terminalOperationProperties excludes values. Inspect packages/db/src/postgres/pglite.test.ts lines 60 through 88, where an escaped insert-values builder is intentionally discarded and the table is asserted empty. Determine whether an ordinary insert-values-returning chain is actually eagerly executed or loses builder methods. Return CONFIRMED with a concrete trace if reproducible, otherwise REFUTED. Then state whether any P1/P2/P3 remains from the full prior review.


id: 019fe4d5-b988-7652-89e4-5cf5001aeb0d
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/mod-cms-content-model-run-bcfe5836759d
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 33e7a1ba799274626a3e8cf3e2f16daf5ad7a3ff
git_branch: wt/mod-cms-content-model-run
git_origin_url: https://github.com/platform-modules/mod
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-terra
reasoning_effort: high
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/09/rollout-2026-08-09T04-43-59-019fe4d5-b988-7652-89e4-5cf5001aeb0d.jsonl

title:
  Fix all three verified Task 17 P2 findings; do not commit. The plan Files line has already been amended spec-first to include packages/content/src/index.ts and packages/fields/src/index.ts. First, replace mocked D1 conformance fixtures in packages/content/src/conformance.test.ts and packages/fields/src/conformance.test.ts with fixtures that genuinely execute the emitted SQL against D1-compatible SQLite storage; malformed table names, columns, or SQL syntax must fail. Keep the identified embedded real-Postgres fixture and fail-closed no-skip assertions. Reuse an existing repository fixture/dependency where available; do not add a fake query parser or stub. Second, export every new final-store schema/store/error/identity contract through each package's supported root barrel, preserving existing exports. Third, conform the fields immutable-definition seam exactly to docs/specs/2026-08-08-fields-complete-design.md: export the required FieldDefinitionVersion shape with definition: FieldGroup, not an arbitrary FieldStorageValue; keep storage parsing/validation strict and future Task 7 compatible. Add discriminating tests. Stay within the now-authorized Task 17 files. Preserve the unrelated plan JSONL and percent-h. Run exact Task 17 acceptance plus content/fields typechecks under Node 22 if available. Report files, receipts, warnings, and blockers.

first_user_message:
  Fix all three verified Task 17 P2 findings; do not commit. The plan Files line has already been amended spec-first to include packages/content/src/index.ts and packages/fields/src/index.ts. First, replace mocked D1 conformance fixtures in packages/content/src/conformance.test.ts and packages/fields/src/conformance.test.ts with fixtures that genuinely execute the emitted SQL against D1-compatible SQLite storage; malformed table names, columns, or SQL syntax must fail. Keep the identified embedded real-Postgres fixture and fail-closed no-skip assertions. Reuse an existing repository fixture/dependency where available; do not add a fake query parser or stub. Second, export every new final-store schema/store/error/identity contract through each package's supported root barrel, preserving existing exports. Third, conform the fields immutable-definition seam exactly to docs/specs/2026-08-08-fields-complete-design.md: export the required FieldDefinitionVersion shape with definition: FieldGroup, not an arbitrary FieldStorageValue; keep storage parsing/validation strict and future Task 7 compatible. Add discriminating tests. Stay within the now-authorized Task 17 files. Preserve the unrelated plan JSONL and percent-h. Run exact Task 17 acceptance plus content/fields typechecks under Node 22 if available. Report files, receipts, warnings, and blockers.

preview:
  Fix all three verified Task 17 P2 findings; do not commit. The plan Files line has already been amended spec-first to include packages/content/src/index.ts and packages/fields/src/index.ts. First, replace mocked D1 conformance fixtures in packages/content/src/conformance.test.ts and packages/fields/src/conformance.test.ts with fixtures that genuinely execute the emitted SQL against D1-compatible SQLite storage; malformed table names, columns, or SQL syntax must fail. Keep the identified embedded real-Postgres fixture and fail-closed no-skip assertions. Reuse an existing repository fixture/dependency where available; do not add a fake query parser or stub. Second, export every new final-store schema/store/error/identity contract through each package's supported root barrel, preserving existing exports. Third, conform the fields immutable-definition seam exactly to docs/specs/2026-08-08-fields-complete-design.md: export the required FieldDefinitionVersion shape with definition: FieldGroup, not an arbitrary FieldStorageValue; keep storage parsing/validation strict and future Task 7 compatible. Add discriminating tests. Stay within the now-authorized Task 17 files. Preserve the unrelated plan JSONL and percent-h. Run exact Task 17 acceptance plus content/fields typechecks under Node 22 if available. Report files, receipts, warnings, and blockers.


id: 019fe506-c974-7d92-927a-f3838c9a08e4
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/muxhost-final-11155b6dba21
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: fc14216404fdf5d142b3d223851fb84bfb4be9a5
git_branch: wt/muxhost-final
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/09/rollout-2026-08-09T05-37-35-019fe506-c974-7d92-927a-f3838c9a08e4.jsonl

title:
  Act as a senior application-security and correctness auditor performing an independent adversarial pre-ship review. Treat every prior fixed/clean claim as unverified. Assume all boundary-crossing input hostile. Fail closed. Review only current resulting contents and working-tree diff for the exact files below; trace cited helpers only when essential. Do not mutate any file.

  Repository: /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/muxhost-final
  Exact scope:
  - modules/workstation/claude/bin/_agent-build-scope
  - modules/workstation/claude/bin/_agent-session-admission
  - modules/workstation/claude/bin/_agent-session-tmux
  - modules/workstation/claude/bin/_tmpjail-shim.sh
  - modules/workstation/claude/bin/tmpjail
  - modules/workstation/claude/lib/confine.sh
  - modules/workstation/claude/tests/agent-session-ledger.test.sh
  - modules/workstation/claude/tests/agent-session-mux-routing.test.sh
  - modules/workstation/claude/tests/tmpjail-readonly-cwd.test.sh
  - modules/workstation/claude/tests/tmpjail-security.test.sh

  Prior sole residual: hostile checkout creates ./tmp -> /tmp; try_base followed it; non-overlay bind fallback rebound host /tmp onto /tmp, exposing writable host /tmp. Coordinator claims final delta canonicalizes candidate dirs, rejects symlinked/noncanonical upper/work paths, removes unsafe non-overlay bind fallback and refuses, and adds a host-namespace regression proving tmp->/tmp cannot expose host /tmp. Re-derive independently.

  Map the chain internally: PATH shim -> ledger -> tmux/direct admission -> buildslot -> confinement -> tmpjail/bwrap -> runtime. Walk every branch. Hunt concrete path/symlink/TOCTOU bypasses, PATH/env command substitution, unsafe canonicalization, jail spoofing, fallback continuation, argument loss, confinement escape, and tests that prove weaker properties. Check candidate base and created child paths, parents, races, overlay capability detection, bwrap failure behavior, and whether hostile checkout content can redirect any security-critical path. Distinguish preexisting shell-launch assumptions such as BASH_ENV from regressions. Do not report style, speculative hardening, low/medium issues, preexisting assumptions outside the changed security property, or test coverage alone.

  For each candidate state an exact attacker-controlled filesystem/env/argv state and wrong behavior; refute it once by rereading code/callers; report only surviving critical/high exploit paths. Output only numbered ship-blocking findings with absolute file:line, severity, trigger/exploit, fix, then Headline and Residual/unverified. If none survive, output CLEAN directly and only the top real assumptions left unverified. Do not mutate files.

first_user_message:
  Act as a senior application-security and correctness auditor performing an independent adversarial pre-ship review. Treat every prior fixed/clean claim as unverified. Assume all boundary-crossing input hostile. Fail closed. Review only current resulting contents and working-tree diff for the exact files below; trace cited helpers only when essential. Do not mutate any file.

  Repository: /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/muxhost-final
  Exact scope:
  - modules/workstation/claude/bin/_agent-build-scope
  - modules/workstation/claude/bin/_agent-session-admission
  - modules/workstation/claude/bin/_agent-session-tmux
  - modules/workstation/claude/bin/_tmpjail-shim.sh
  - modules/workstation/claude/bin/tmpjail
  - modules/workstation/claude/lib/confine.sh
  - modules/workstation/claude/tests/agent-session-ledger.test.sh
  - modules/workstation/claude/tests/agent-session-mux-routing.test.sh
  - modules/workstation/claude/tests/tmpjail-readonly-cwd.test.sh
  - modules/workstation/claude/tests/tmpjail-security.test.sh

  Prior sole residual: hostile checkout creates ./tmp -> /tmp; try_base followed it; non-overlay bind fallback rebound host /tmp onto /tmp, exposing writable host /tmp. Coordinator claims final delta canonicalizes candidate dirs, rejects symlinked/noncanonical upper/work paths, removes unsafe non-overlay bind fallback and refuses, and adds a host-namespace regression proving tmp->/tmp cannot expose host /tmp. Re-derive independently.

  Map the chain internally: PATH shim -> ledger -> tmux/direct admission -> buildslot -> confinement -> tmpjail/bwrap -> runtime. Walk every branch. Hunt concrete path/symlink/TOCTOU bypasses, PATH/env command substitution, unsafe canonicalization, jail spoofing, fallback continuation, argument loss, confinement escape, and tests that prove weaker properties. Check candidate base and created child paths, parents, races, overlay capability detection, bwrap failure behavior, and whether hostile checkout content can redirect any security-critical path. Distinguish preexisting shell-launch assumptions such as BASH_ENV from regressions. Do not report style, speculative hardening, low/medium issues, preexisting assumptions outside the changed security property, or test coverage alone.

  For each candidate state an exact attacker-controlled filesystem/env/argv state and wrong behavior; refute it once by rereading code/callers; report only surviving critical/high exploit paths. Output only numbered ship-blocking findings with absolute file:line, severity, trigger/exploit, fix, then Headline and Residual/unverified. If none survive, output CLEAN directly and only the top real assumptions left unverified. Do not mutate files.

preview:
  Act as a senior application-security and correctness auditor performing an independent adversarial pre-ship review. Treat every prior fixed/clean claim as unverified. Assume all boundary-crossing input hostile. Fail closed. Review only current resulting contents and working-tree diff for the exact files below; trace cited helpers only when essential. Do not mutate any file.

  Repository: /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/muxhost-final
  Exact scope:
  - modules/workstation/claude/bin/_agent-build-scope
  - modules/workstation/claude/bin/_agent-session-admission
  - modules/workstation/claude/bin/_agent-session-tmux
  - modules/workstation/claude/bin/_tmpjail-shim.sh
  - modules/workstation/claude/bin/tmpjail
  - modules/workstation/claude/lib/confine.sh
  - modules/workstation/claude/tests/agent-session-ledger.test.sh
  - modules/workstation/claude/tests/agent-session-mux-routing.test.sh
  - modules/workstation/claude/tests/tmpjail-readonly-cwd.test.sh
  - modules/workstation/claude/tests/tmpjail-security.test.sh

  Prior sole residual: hostile checkout creates ./tmp -> /tmp; try_base followed it; non-overlay bind fallback rebound host /tmp onto /tmp, exposing writable host /tmp. Coordinator claims final delta canonicalizes candidate dirs, rejects symlinked/noncanonical upper/work paths, removes unsafe non-overlay bind fallback and refuses, and adds a host-namespace regression proving tmp->/tmp cannot expose host /tmp. Re-derive independently.

  Map the chain internally: PATH shim -> ledger -> tmux/direct admission -> buildslot -> confinement -> tmpjail/bwrap -> runtime. Walk every branch. Hunt concrete path/symlink/TOCTOU bypasses, PATH/env command substitution, unsafe canonicalization, jail spoofing, fallback continuation, argument loss, confinement escape, and tests that prove weaker properties. Check candidate base and created child paths, parents, races, overlay capability detection, bwrap failure behavior, and whether hostile checkout content can redirect any security-critical path. Distinguish preexisting shell-launch assumptions such as BASH_ENV from regressions. Do not report style, speculative hardening, low/medium issues, preexisting assumptions outside the changed security property, or test coverage alone.

  For each candidate state an exact attacker-controlled filesystem/env/argv state and wrong behavior; refute it once by rereading code/callers; report only surviving critical/high exploit paths. Output only numbered ship-blocking findings with absolute file:line, severity, trigger/exploit, fix, then Headline and Residual/unverified. If none survive, output CLEAN directly and only the top real assumptions left unverified. Do not mutate files.


id: 019fe513-e639-7fe3-a875-d3c2e073e4b7
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/muxhost-final-11155b6dba21
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 28bbb41b21cfd112675beb650f37dcdb7d22c1f5
git_branch: wt/muxhost-final
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/09/rollout-2026-08-09T05-51-54-019fe513-e639-7fe3-a875-d3c2e073e4b7.jsonl

title:
  Perform a fresh adversarial pre-ship security and correctness review of the current uncommitted diff only. Target repository: /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/muxhost-final. Scope exactly modules/workstation/claude/bin/tmpjail and modules/workstation/claude/tests/tmpjail-security.test.sh. Threat model: hostile same-UID agent command must not reach host /tmp through procfs or spoof/reuse isolation. Prior direct-exec reuse was replaced with nested bwrap that should always create private PID namespace and procfs while retaining an overlay. Examine exact current diff and necessary nearby code. Attack every branch: bwrap ordering, namespace semantics, procfs, overlay reuse validation, environment spoofing, shell expansion, races, fallback/error handling, and test coverage. Report only concrete triggerable exploitable or correctness findings, after refuting each once. Do not modify files. Output severity and absolute file:line; output CLEAN if none.

first_user_message:
  Perform a fresh adversarial pre-ship security and correctness review of the current uncommitted diff only. Target repository: /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/muxhost-final. Scope exactly modules/workstation/claude/bin/tmpjail and modules/workstation/claude/tests/tmpjail-security.test.sh. Threat model: hostile same-UID agent command must not reach host /tmp through procfs or spoof/reuse isolation. Prior direct-exec reuse was replaced with nested bwrap that should always create private PID namespace and procfs while retaining an overlay. Examine exact current diff and necessary nearby code. Attack every branch: bwrap ordering, namespace semantics, procfs, overlay reuse validation, environment spoofing, shell expansion, races, fallback/error handling, and test coverage. Report only concrete triggerable exploitable or correctness findings, after refuting each once. Do not modify files. Output severity and absolute file:line; output CLEAN if none.

preview:
  Perform a fresh adversarial pre-ship security and correctness review of the current uncommitted diff only. Target repository: /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/muxhost-final. Scope exactly modules/workstation/claude/bin/tmpjail and modules/workstation/claude/tests/tmpjail-security.test.sh. Threat model: hostile same-UID agent command must not reach host /tmp through procfs or spoof/reuse isolation. Prior direct-exec reuse was replaced with nested bwrap that should always create private PID namespace and procfs while retaining an overlay. Examine exact current diff and necessary nearby code. Attack every branch: bwrap ordering, namespace semantics, procfs, overlay reuse validation, environment spoofing, shell expansion, races, fallback/error handling, and test coverage. Report only concrete triggerable exploitable or correctness findings, after refuting each once. Do not modify files. Output severity and absolute file:line; output CLEAN if none.


id: 019fe519-4d0c-72f2-b5ad-5e98f03d3f02
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/editor-widget-69f4b59cd86b
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 64c19a6cfcfe208bbc499852efae18b0e2be0c44
git_branch: wt/editor-widget
git_origin_url: https://github.com/platform-modules/mod
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/09/rollout-2026-08-09T05-57-48-019fe519-4d0c-72f2-b5ad-5e98f03d3f02.jsonl

title:
  Execute this targeted review directly; do not dispatch, edit, push, merge, or deploy. Recheck the current uncommitted fixes for the last P2: EditorWidget token-only contract in docs/specs/2026-06-18-mod-cms-v0.0.2-design.md section 2.4. Prior failure cited invented preview tokens with raw values and TabsList raw 2px fallback. Also confirm the module-scoped TextEncoder/TextDecoder R3 fix remains correct. Inspect current diff against HEAD 64c19a6c. Return only Result PASS or FAIL and concise cited findings.

first_user_message:
  Execute this targeted review directly; do not dispatch, edit, push, merge, or deploy. Recheck the current uncommitted fixes for the last P2: EditorWidget token-only contract in docs/specs/2026-06-18-mod-cms-v0.0.2-design.md section 2.4. Prior failure cited invented preview tokens with raw values and TabsList raw 2px fallback. Also confirm the module-scoped TextEncoder/TextDecoder R3 fix remains correct. Inspect current diff against HEAD 64c19a6c. Return only Result PASS or FAIL and concise cited findings.

preview:
  Execute this targeted review directly; do not dispatch, edit, push, merge, or deploy. Recheck the current uncommitted fixes for the last P2: EditorWidget token-only contract in docs/specs/2026-06-18-mod-cms-v0.0.2-design.md section 2.4. Prior failure cited invented preview tokens with raw values and TabsList raw 2px fallback. Also confirm the module-scoped TextEncoder/TextDecoder R3 fix remains correct. Inspect current diff against HEAD 64c19a6c. Return only Result PASS or FAIL and concise cited findings.


id: 019fe538-60c1-7211-830b-e3d62da5594f
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/factory-auth-jti-7b929400aeff
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 3e33076eb60cbf4d44264f8579f950e90ede5b8f
git_branch: wt/factory-auth-jti
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/zync.is.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/09/rollout-2026-08-09T06-31-45-019fe538-60c1-7211-830b-e3d62da5594f.jsonl

title:
  Perform an independent, read-only adversarial security review of the current uncommitted diff. Prior finding was fixed: configured AuthWriteDO signup failures now reportedly fall back inline only under explicit development, with tests. Do not edit. Focus only on high-confidence, triggerable remaining auth fail-open paths. Examine the exact diff and only essential direct references. Attack production/preview versus development gating; absent/malformed AuthWriteDO binding or secret; configured durable-object transport and non-OK branches; auth token/session binding, parser failures, and generic error behavior. Enumerate sibling branches. Treat all trust-boundary inputs and datastore reads as hostile. For each candidate give exact trigger, refute it once against the code/callers, then report only defects that survive with severity, file:line, and specific fix. If no actionable defects remain, say so and list only material unverified assumptions. Repository: /home/user/Projects/zync.is/.worktrees/factory-auth-jti.

first_user_message:
  Perform an independent, read-only adversarial security review of the current uncommitted diff. Prior finding was fixed: configured AuthWriteDO signup failures now reportedly fall back inline only under explicit development, with tests. Do not edit. Focus only on high-confidence, triggerable remaining auth fail-open paths. Examine the exact diff and only essential direct references. Attack production/preview versus development gating; absent/malformed AuthWriteDO binding or secret; configured durable-object transport and non-OK branches; auth token/session binding, parser failures, and generic error behavior. Enumerate sibling branches. Treat all trust-boundary inputs and datastore reads as hostile. For each candidate give exact trigger, refute it once against the code/callers, then report only defects that survive with severity, file:line, and specific fix. If no actionable defects remain, say so and list only material unverified assumptions. Repository: /home/user/Projects/zync.is/.worktrees/factory-auth-jti.

preview:
  Perform an independent, read-only adversarial security review of the current uncommitted diff. Prior finding was fixed: configured AuthWriteDO signup failures now reportedly fall back inline only under explicit development, with tests. Do not edit. Focus only on high-confidence, triggerable remaining auth fail-open paths. Examine the exact diff and only essential direct references. Attack production/preview versus development gating; absent/malformed AuthWriteDO binding or secret; configured durable-object transport and non-OK branches; auth token/session binding, parser failures, and generic error behavior. Enumerate sibling branches. Treat all trust-boundary inputs and datastore reads as hostile. For each candidate give exact trigger, refute it once against the code/callers, then report only defects that survive with severity, file:line, and specific fix. If no actionable defects remain, say so and list only material unverified assumptions. Repository: /home/user/Projects/zync.is/.worktrees/factory-auth-jti.


id: 019fe555-d7c3-7990-aab7-3be5be493492
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/factory-k3s-bbd2340bd183
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 9e090a4a7828c92e9012583fe16d54dd378da715
git_branch: wt/factory-k3s
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/09/rollout-2026-08-09T07-03-56-019fe555-d7c3-7990-aab7-3be5be493492.jsonl

title:
  Independently review commits ecd8e80d and 9e090a4a against docs/specs/2026-08-08-k3s-scheduler-design.md and repository instructions. Do not modify files. Focus on rollout safety, disabled-default/allowlist correctness, tested SSH/controller fallback, rollback, command matching bypasses, Kubernetes Job semantics, security boundaries, and whether any claim exceeds executed evidence. Inspect tests and relevant call sites. Return only concrete actionable findings with severity and file:line, or CLEAN. Also list exact validation still required before opt-in live canary and before sole-scheduler cutover.

first_user_message:
  Independently review commits ecd8e80d and 9e090a4a against docs/specs/2026-08-08-k3s-scheduler-design.md and repository instructions. Do not modify files. Focus on rollout safety, disabled-default/allowlist correctness, tested SSH/controller fallback, rollback, command matching bypasses, Kubernetes Job semantics, security boundaries, and whether any claim exceeds executed evidence. Inspect tests and relevant call sites. Return only concrete actionable findings with severity and file:line, or CLEAN. Also list exact validation still required before opt-in live canary and before sole-scheduler cutover.

preview:
  Independently review commits ecd8e80d and 9e090a4a against docs/specs/2026-08-08-k3s-scheduler-design.md and repository instructions. Do not modify files. Focus on rollout safety, disabled-default/allowlist correctness, tested SSH/controller fallback, rollback, command matching bypasses, Kubernetes Job semantics, security boundaries, and whether any claim exceeds executed evidence. Inspect tests and relevant call sites. Return only concrete actionable findings with severity and file:line, or CLEAN. Also list exact validation still required before opt-in live canary and before sole-scheduler cutover.


id: 019fe581-0fda-7302-9705-10dfe20dc1ec
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/factory-auth-jti-7b929400aeff
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 3e33076eb60cbf4d44264f8579f950e90ede5b8f
git_branch: wt/factory-auth-jti
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/zync.is.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/09/rollout-2026-08-09T07-51-08-019fe581-0fda-7302-9705-10dfe20dc1ec.jsonl

title:
  You are a senior application-security and correctness auditor conducting an independent adversarial pre-ship review. Work read-only and only in /home/user/Projects/zync.is/.worktrees/factory-auth-jti. Review the complete origin/main...HEAD delta plus all current unstaged and untracked changes. Exclude the protected untracked specs/ebcb8431_auth-jti-dispatcher.md from findings; never modify any file. Review exactly this delta/current change scope, tracing only essential referenced symbols/call paths. Treat all boundary inputs and datastore/service reads as hostile. Focus on concrete high/medium-confidence auth vulnerabilities newly introduced or insufficiently fixed: AuthWriteDO fail-closed behavior and JTI serialization; signed JWT type validation; session-row user/tenant/expiry binding; malformed user-version fail-closed behavior. Trace actual call paths and compare established secure patterns. Explicitly examine each branch/sibling branch. Exclude DoS, rate limits, docs-only issues, tests-only issues, dependency age, and speculative hardening. Also flag correctness defects that undermine those named security invariants even when exploitability is conditional.

  For every candidate, state a concrete trigger/exploit then refute it once from actual code; report only survivors. Severity by real impact. Output numbered findings ordered by severity. Each: title; absolute file path and line/function; severity; concrete trigger/exploit; confidence 1-10; exact remediation. End with Headline (ship blockers) and Residual/unverified. If no qualifying defects, state CLEAN explicitly and list only specific assumptions a deeper review should test. Do not make changes, commit, push, deploy, or invoke other agents.

first_user_message:
  You are a senior application-security and correctness auditor conducting an independent adversarial pre-ship review. Work read-only and only in /home/user/Projects/zync.is/.worktrees/factory-auth-jti. Review the complete origin/main...HEAD delta plus all current unstaged and untracked changes. Exclude the protected untracked specs/ebcb8431_auth-jti-dispatcher.md from findings; never modify any file. Review exactly this delta/current change scope, tracing only essential referenced symbols/call paths. Treat all boundary inputs and datastore/service reads as hostile. Focus on concrete high/medium-confidence auth vulnerabilities newly introduced or insufficiently fixed: AuthWriteDO fail-closed behavior and JTI serialization; signed JWT type validation; session-row user/tenant/expiry binding; malformed user-version fail-closed behavior. Trace actual call paths and compare established secure patterns. Explicitly examine each branch/sibling branch. Exclude DoS, rate limits, docs-only issues, tests-only issues, dependency age, and speculative hardening. Also flag correctness defects that undermine those named security invariants even when exploitability is conditional.

  For every candidate, state a concrete trigger/exploit then refute it once from actual code; report only survivors. Severity by real impact. Output numbered findings ordered by severity. Each: title; absolute file path and line/function; severity; concrete trigger/exploit; confidence 1-10; exact remediation. End with Headline (ship blockers) and Residual/unverified. If no qualifying defects, state CLEAN explicitly and list only specific assumptions a deeper review should test. Do not make changes, commit, push, deploy, or invoke other agents.

preview:
  You are a senior application-security and correctness auditor conducting an independent adversarial pre-ship review. Work read-only and only in /home/user/Projects/zync.is/.worktrees/factory-auth-jti. Review the complete origin/main...HEAD delta plus all current unstaged and untracked changes. Exclude the protected untracked specs/ebcb8431_auth-jti-dispatcher.md from findings; never modify any file. Review exactly this delta/current change scope, tracing only essential referenced symbols/call paths. Treat all boundary inputs and datastore/service reads as hostile. Focus on concrete high/medium-confidence auth vulnerabilities newly introduced or insufficiently fixed: AuthWriteDO fail-closed behavior and JTI serialization; signed JWT type validation; session-row user/tenant/expiry binding; malformed user-version fail-closed behavior. Trace actual call paths and compare established secure patterns. Explicitly examine each branch/sibling branch. Exclude DoS, rate limits, docs-only issues, tests-only issues, dependency age, and speculative hardening. Also flag correctness defects that undermine those named security invariants even when exploitability is conditional.

  For every candidate, state a concrete trigger/exploit then refute it once from actual code; report only survivors. Severity by real impact. Output numbered findings ordered by severity. Each: title; absolute file path and line/function; severity; concrete trigger/exploit; confidence 1-10; exact remediation. End with Headline (ship blockers) and Residual/unverified. If no qualifying defects, state CLEAN explicitly and list only specific assumptions a deeper review should test. Do not make changes, commit, push, deploy, or invoke other agents.


id: 019fe584-fda6-74c0-9e5d-be5dbcf2777f
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/factory-auth-jti-7b929400aeff
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 3e33076eb60cbf4d44264f8579f950e90ede5b8f
git_branch: wt/factory-auth-jti
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/zync.is.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/09/rollout-2026-08-09T07-55-25-019fe584-fda6-74c0-9e5d-be5dbcf2777f.jsonl

title:
  You are a senior application-security and correctness auditor conducting an independent adversarial pre-ship review. The execution environment mounts a read-only staged copy of the requested worktree at your current directory, /sandbox/workspaces/factory-auth-jti-7b929400aeff. Work only in that current directory; it is the exact review target. Do not modify any file. Review the complete origin/main...HEAD delta plus all current unstaged and untracked changes. Exclude the protected untracked specs/ebcb8431_auth-jti-dispatcher.md from findings. Review exactly this delta/current change scope, tracing only essential referenced symbols/call paths. Treat boundary inputs and datastore/service reads as hostile. Focus on concrete high/medium-confidence auth vulnerabilities newly introduced or insufficiently fixed: AuthWriteDO fail-closed behavior and JTI serialization; signed JWT type validation; session-row user/tenant/expiry binding; malformed user-version fail-closed behavior. Trace actual call paths and compare established secure patterns. Explicitly examine each branch/sibling branch. Exclude DoS, rate limits, docs-only issues, tests-only issues, dependency age, and speculative hardening. Also flag correctness defects that undermine those named security invariants even when exploitability is conditional.

  For every candidate, state a concrete trigger/exploit then refute it once from actual code; report only survivors. Severity by real impact. Output numbered findings ordered by severity. Each: title; absolute (sandbox) file path and line/function; severity; concrete trigger/exploit; confidence 1-10; exact remediation. End with Headline (ship blockers) and Residual/unverified. If no qualifying defects, state CLEAN explicitly and list only specific assumptions a deeper review should test. Do not make changes, commit, push, deploy, or invoke other agents.

first_user_message:
  You are a senior application-security and correctness auditor conducting an independent adversarial pre-ship review. The execution environment mounts a read-only staged copy of the requested worktree at your current directory, /sandbox/workspaces/factory-auth-jti-7b929400aeff. Work only in that current directory; it is the exact review target. Do not modify any file. Review the complete origin/main...HEAD delta plus all current unstaged and untracked changes. Exclude the protected untracked specs/ebcb8431_auth-jti-dispatcher.md from findings. Review exactly this delta/current change scope, tracing only essential referenced symbols/call paths. Treat boundary inputs and datastore/service reads as hostile. Focus on concrete high/medium-confidence auth vulnerabilities newly introduced or insufficiently fixed: AuthWriteDO fail-closed behavior and JTI serialization; signed JWT type validation; session-row user/tenant/expiry binding; malformed user-version fail-closed behavior. Trace actual call paths and compare established secure patterns. Explicitly examine each branch/sibling branch. Exclude DoS, rate limits, docs-only issues, tests-only issues, dependency age, and speculative hardening. Also flag correctness defects that undermine those named security invariants even when exploitability is conditional.

  For every candidate, state a concrete trigger/exploit then refute it once from actual code; report only survivors. Severity by real impact. Output numbered findings ordered by severity. Each: title; absolute (sandbox) file path and line/function; severity; concrete trigger/exploit; confidence 1-10; exact remediation. End with Headline (ship blockers) and Residual/unverified. If no qualifying defects, state CLEAN explicitly and list only specific assumptions a deeper review should test. Do not make changes, commit, push, deploy, or invoke other agents.

preview:
  You are a senior application-security and correctness auditor conducting an independent adversarial pre-ship review. The execution environment mounts a read-only staged copy of the requested worktree at your current directory, /sandbox/workspaces/factory-auth-jti-7b929400aeff. Work only in that current directory; it is the exact review target. Do not modify any file. Review the complete origin/main...HEAD delta plus all current unstaged and untracked changes. Exclude the protected untracked specs/ebcb8431_auth-jti-dispatcher.md from findings. Review exactly this delta/current change scope, tracing only essential referenced symbols/call paths. Treat boundary inputs and datastore/service reads as hostile. Focus on concrete high/medium-confidence auth vulnerabilities newly introduced or insufficiently fixed: AuthWriteDO fail-closed behavior and JTI serialization; signed JWT type validation; session-row user/tenant/expiry binding; malformed user-version fail-closed behavior. Trace actual call paths and compare established secure patterns. Explicitly examine each branch/sibling branch. Exclude DoS, rate limits, docs-only issues, tests-only issues, dependency age, and speculative hardening. Also flag correctness defects that undermine those named security invariants even when exploitability is conditional.

  For every candidate, state a concrete trigger/exploit then refute it once from actual code; report only survivors. Severity by real impact. Output numbered findings ordered by severity. Each: title; absolute (sandbox) file path and line/function; severity; concrete trigger/exploit; confidence 1-10; exact remediation. End with Headline (ship blockers) and Residual/unverified. If no qualifying defects, state CLEAN explicitly and list only specific assumptions a deeper review should test. Do not make changes, commit, push, deploy, or invoke other agents.


id: 019fe5d6-de45-75a0-9958-9067051aebfe
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/factory-ui-38cfa45ef4b8
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 2fcb53e9f9a71f8ac2b4e5432a42dc6f81795783
git_branch: wt/factory-ui
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-terra
reasoning_effort: medium
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/09/rollout-2026-08-09T09-24-52-019fe5d6-de45-75a0-9958-9067051aebfe.jsonl

title:
  Implement task #55 corrections in this worktree only. Read docs/specs/2026-08-09-factory-run-view-design.md and .claude/skills/od-ui-dev/SKILL.md first. Current files: apps/web/src/components/factory/FactoryRunContent.tsx, FactoryStepDrawer.tsx, factory-run-view-helpers.ts, FactoryRawTrace.tsx, apps/web/src/lib/factory-types.ts, packages/deck-ui/src/DiffView.tsx. Preserve existing uncommitted work; do not touch factory producer machinery. Fix these verified gaps: every phase and attempt step must open a drawer, including phase-only artifacts; drawer identity must show started/ended; prompts independently collapse; read/ls/grep/find must be collapsed one-line path/pattern with expandable CodeBlock excerpt; gates must show real argv, return code, pass/fail and output via Astryx terminal LogStream rather than JSON dump; terminal failure reasons include string arrays from gate violations; render all relevant phase diffs, not only first. Add/adjust focused tests for transcript/drawer requirements. Also diagnose actual project typecheck editor diagnostics in apps/web/src/components/LogsContent.tsx (implicit any row/tile/data cluster) and repair the shared generic/inference seam only if this checkout's web typecheck confirms it. Run focused tests/typecheck if practical. No raw colors, no new primitive, no invented data, no hand-written terminal/chat viewer. Return changed files/tests/results.

first_user_message:
  Implement task #55 corrections in this worktree only. Read docs/specs/2026-08-09-factory-run-view-design.md and .claude/skills/od-ui-dev/SKILL.md first. Current files: apps/web/src/components/factory/FactoryRunContent.tsx, FactoryStepDrawer.tsx, factory-run-view-helpers.ts, FactoryRawTrace.tsx, apps/web/src/lib/factory-types.ts, packages/deck-ui/src/DiffView.tsx. Preserve existing uncommitted work; do not touch factory producer machinery. Fix these verified gaps: every phase and attempt step must open a drawer, including phase-only artifacts; drawer identity must show started/ended; prompts independently collapse; read/ls/grep/find must be collapsed one-line path/pattern with expandable CodeBlock excerpt; gates must show real argv, return code, pass/fail and output via Astryx terminal LogStream rather than JSON dump; terminal failure reasons include string arrays from gate violations; render all relevant phase diffs, not only first. Add/adjust focused tests for transcript/drawer requirements. Also diagnose actual project typecheck editor diagnostics in apps/web/src/components/LogsContent.tsx (implicit any row/tile/data cluster) and repair the shared generic/inference seam only if this checkout's web typecheck confirms it. Run focused tests/typecheck if practical. No raw colors, no new primitive, no invented data, no hand-written terminal/chat viewer. Return changed files/tests/results.

preview:
  Implement task #55 corrections in this worktree only. Read docs/specs/2026-08-09-factory-run-view-design.md and .claude/skills/od-ui-dev/SKILL.md first. Current files: apps/web/src/components/factory/FactoryRunContent.tsx, FactoryStepDrawer.tsx, factory-run-view-helpers.ts, FactoryRawTrace.tsx, apps/web/src/lib/factory-types.ts, packages/deck-ui/src/DiffView.tsx. Preserve existing uncommitted work; do not touch factory producer machinery. Fix these verified gaps: every phase and attempt step must open a drawer, including phase-only artifacts; drawer identity must show started/ended; prompts independently collapse; read/ls/grep/find must be collapsed one-line path/pattern with expandable CodeBlock excerpt; gates must show real argv, return code, pass/fail and output via Astryx terminal LogStream rather than JSON dump; terminal failure reasons include string arrays from gate violations; render all relevant phase diffs, not only first. Add/adjust focused tests for transcript/drawer requirements. Also diagnose actual project typecheck editor diagnostics in apps/web/src/components/LogsContent.tsx (implicit any row/tile/data cluster) and repair the shared generic/inference seam only if this checkout's web typecheck confirms it. Run focused tests/typecheck if practical. No raw colors, no new primitive, no invented data, no hand-written terminal/chat viewer. Return changed files/tests/results.


id: 019fe5e2-ebb8-7b51-8fd5-d07a0ce50a85
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/factory-ui-38cfa45ef4b8
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 2fcb53e9f9a71f8ac2b4e5432a42dc6f81795783
git_branch: wt/factory-ui
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-terra
reasoning_effort: medium
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/09/rollout-2026-08-09T09-38-01-019fe5e2-ebb8-7b51-8fd5-d07a0ce50a85.jsonl

title:
  Repair only the current syntax/type error in apps/web/src/components/factory/FactoryStepDrawer.tsx introduced by the prior task #55 correction. web typecheck/build report line 39 parse errors around optional field output_tail. Use valid bracket access or equivalent. Do not alter unrelated behavior. Run pnpm --filter web typecheck and report result.

first_user_message:
  Repair only the current syntax/type error in apps/web/src/components/factory/FactoryStepDrawer.tsx introduced by the prior task #55 correction. web typecheck/build report line 39 parse errors around optional field output_tail. Use valid bracket access or equivalent. Do not alter unrelated behavior. Run pnpm --filter web typecheck and report result.

preview:
  Repair only the current syntax/type error in apps/web/src/components/factory/FactoryStepDrawer.tsx introduced by the prior task #55 correction. web typecheck/build report line 39 parse errors around optional field output_tail. Use valid bracket access or equivalent. Do not alter unrelated behavior. Run pnpm --filter web typecheck and report result.


id: 019fe5f2-8938-7ce3-85f8-5c2b28226e86
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/agent-aa139e1e770bf2b7b-f6429a0d984a
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 4b1946d06dfd62485494d082c768e673b8c13bb4
git_branch: worktree-agent-aa139e1e770bf2b7b
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/multideal.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: medium
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/09/rollout-2026-08-09T09-55-05-019fe5f2-8938-7ce3-85f8-5c2b28226e86.jsonl

title:
  Implement assigned review cards completely in current worktree. Do not commit, push, deploy, mutate Trello, apply migrations, or touch unrelated edits. Read repo rules and relevant skill files. Change deal-detail loading so public deal pages display only standard reviews for exact deal, not vendor-wide; desktop and mobile render shared DealReviews. Change DealReviews to initially show four newest reviews and include accessible show-all/show-fewer only when more exist, with Hebrew and English translations. Make active ReviewCard stars solid filled and inactive stars hollow. Add independent business-review functionality, never inline in deal pages. Only a purchaser owning a completed, review-eligible purchase for target vendor can create one business review. Verify user, purchase, vendor server-side; enforce duplicates in database. Keep existing deal-review constraints unchanged. Add business_reviews schema table plus raw SQL migration, query layer, workflow, Zod API explicit business review mode, public list endpoint behavior, business-page UI/data, JSON-LD aggregate and reviews from business review data. Preserve standard and technical reviews; never expose PII. Reuse existing UI components and i18n; no raw UI. Add focused regression tests covering deal loader scoping, mobile placement, expand UI, star fill, business authorization and duplicate protection, and business page loading where patterns support it. Do not apply migration. Run focused tests plus pnpm --filter web typecheck. Work directly, then report changed files and exact tests.

first_user_message:
  Implement assigned review cards completely in current worktree. Do not commit, push, deploy, mutate Trello, apply migrations, or touch unrelated edits. Read repo rules and relevant skill files. Change deal-detail loading so public deal pages display only standard reviews for exact deal, not vendor-wide; desktop and mobile render shared DealReviews. Change DealReviews to initially show four newest reviews and include accessible show-all/show-fewer only when more exist, with Hebrew and English translations. Make active ReviewCard stars solid filled and inactive stars hollow. Add independent business-review functionality, never inline in deal pages. Only a purchaser owning a completed, review-eligible purchase for target vendor can create one business review. Verify user, purchase, vendor server-side; enforce duplicates in database. Keep existing deal-review constraints unchanged. Add business_reviews schema table plus raw SQL migration, query layer, workflow, Zod API explicit business review mode, public list endpoint behavior, business-page UI/data, JSON-LD aggregate and reviews from business review data. Preserve standard and technical reviews; never expose PII. Reuse existing UI components and i18n; no raw UI. Add focused regression tests covering deal loader scoping, mobile placement, expand UI, star fill, business authorization and duplicate protection, and business page loading where patterns support it. Do not apply migration. Run focused tests plus pnpm --filter web typecheck. Work directly, then report changed files and exact tests.

preview:
  Implement assigned review cards completely in current worktree. Do not commit, push, deploy, mutate Trello, apply migrations, or touch unrelated edits. Read repo rules and relevant skill files. Change deal-detail loading so public deal pages display only standard reviews for exact deal, not vendor-wide; desktop and mobile render shared DealReviews. Change DealReviews to initially show four newest reviews and include accessible show-all/show-fewer only when more exist, with Hebrew and English translations. Make active ReviewCard stars solid filled and inactive stars hollow. Add independent business-review functionality, never inline in deal pages. Only a purchaser owning a completed, review-eligible purchase for target vendor can create one business review. Verify user, purchase, vendor server-side; enforce duplicates in database. Keep existing deal-review constraints unchanged. Add business_reviews schema table plus raw SQL migration, query layer, workflow, Zod API explicit business review mode, public list endpoint behavior, business-page UI/data, JSON-LD aggregate and reviews from business review data. Preserve standard and technical reviews; never expose PII. Reuse existing UI components and i18n; no raw UI. Add focused regression tests covering deal loader scoping, mobile placement, expand UI, star fill, business authorization and duplicate protection, and business page loading where patterns support it. Do not apply migration. Run focused tests plus pnpm --filter web typecheck. Work directly, then report changed files and exact tests.


id: 019fe620-40a1-7d60-bbd7-ca024220fa74
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/factory-jpr06-74aad88e56dc
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 2a39ed7b7df69ce5545471aa5eaada47eeac64c3
git_branch: wt/factory-jpr06
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/zync.is.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/09/rollout-2026-08-09T10-45-01-019fe620-40a1-7d60-bbd7-ca024220fa74.jsonl

title:
  You are a senior application-security and correctness auditor running an INDEPENDENT, adversarial, pre-ship review. You are deliberately a fresh pair of eyes. Treat every prior "reviewed / handled / safe / not possible / out of scope" claim as unverified and re-derive it.

  TASK (verbatim): Independently and adversarially review the current working-tree delta in /home/user/Projects/zync.is/.worktrees/factory-jpr06 against origin/main, including commit 2a39ed7b7 and uncommitted follow-up. Focus only on concrete high-confidence correctness/security defects in: atomic public accept/reject, deterministic duplicates, strict malformed/conflicting retry validation, canonical authenticated resend, tenant-safe recipients, allowed states, real email delivery, authorization, durable idempotency, concurrency, quotas/DoS, disclosure, HTML injection. Read relevant implementation and tests. Do not modify files, do not run heavy tests, do not push/deploy. Report exact file/line and exploit/failure sequence; say clean if none.

  OPERATING RULES:
  1. Review exactly the diff and essential cited references. Trace references only when essential to judge a trust boundary.
  2. Assume every trust-boundary input is hostile: request data, headers/cookies, environment/config, datastore/service reads, network/queue data.
  3. Fail closed: if a required guard cannot be confirmed, flag it, but only report after establishing a concrete trigger and refuting the finding once.
  4. Do not modify any file, including .security/attack-surface.md. You may inspect an existing map, but the user's no-modification constraint overrides map creation/update.

  ATTACK-SURFACE METHOD:
  Build an internal map of changed files, entry points, untrusted inputs, authentication/authorization and object ownership, invariants, and sinks. Reuse an existing demonstrably fresh .security/attack-surface.md if present; otherwise enumerate internally without writing. Always run the defect hunt.

  HUNT EVERY BRANCH (switch/case, role/status/kind/parentType; sibling asymmetry is a prime target):
  - Broken object-level authorization/IDOR: trace every supplied identifier to object-specific authorization on every path.
  - Fail-open auth/crypto/verify; malformed parsing/decoding; tokens bound to actor and target.
  - Timing/state oracles from asymmetric awaited work.
  - SQL/NoSQL, shell, code, HTML/template, log, header, and path injection; SSRF; traversal; unsafe parsing/deserialization.
  - Secrets and internal errors in logs/responses.
  - Resource exhaustion: body buffering, unbounded work, missing quotas/rate limits on state changes.
  - Client-trusted content type/metadata.
  - Idempotency and atomicity: consume/write then throw; retries/redelivery; durable uniqueness and concurrency races.
  - Information disclosure and over-permissive validation.

  AUTH-PATH CHECKS WHEN APPLICABLE:
  Enumerate credential classes and revocation events; verify no surviving class re-mints a killed class. Compare same-intent functions for asymmetric revocation. For every verify/refresh/resolve path require signature, expiry, version, active user/session, row expiry, and owner binding as applicable. Fail closed on absent key/config. Check timing drift, charge attempt counters before compare, raw secret bytes reaching sinks, security-verb no-ops, modulo bias, nondeterministic pagination, silently dropped authz input, and host-side compensation revealing module gaps.

  TASK-SPECIFIC REQUIRED LENSES:
  - Atomic public accept/reject and concurrency: identify exact state transition predicates, single-winner semantics, rollback behavior, and conflicting replays.
  - Deterministic duplicates and durable idempotency: identical replay must return canonical prior result; malformed or payload-conflicting retry must be rejected rather than silently treated as duplicate; uniqueness must survive restarts and concurrent requests.
  - Canonical authenticated resend: authentication, authorization, tenant/object binding, recipient selection, allowed source states, canonical persisted content/recipient rather than attacker-modified retry input.
  - Tenant-safe recipients: every recipient must be resolved within the correct tenant/object authorization boundary; check datastore values as hostile too.
  - Real email delivery: ensure success is not recorded/returned before provider delivery acceptance; failures and retries cannot lose or duplicate effects.
  - Quotas/DoS: all public and resend routes have enforceable bounded work and durable/concurrency-safe quotas where promised.
  - Disclosure and HTML injection: client-visible errors and rendered email/body data are escaped/sanitized at the correct context.

  VERIFY EACH CANDIDATE BEFORE REPORTING:
  1. State the exact request/state/concurrency schedule that triggers it. If no concrete trigger, drop it.
  2. Refute it once: re-read relevant implementation/tests/callers and identify anything that makes it safe. Report only survivors.
  3. Severity by real impact: critical/high/medium/low. A short list of confirmed defects beats speculative coverage.

  OUTPUT ONLY A NUMBERED LIST ORDERED BY SEVERITY. EACH FINDING:
  - Title
  - Location: absolute file path and exact line/function
  - Severity
  - Trigger / exploit: concrete attacker/failure sequence
  - Fix: specific change
  Then:
  - Headline: 1-2 ship blockers, named
  - Residual / unverified: only genuine uncertainty from scope
  If nothing exploitable survives, say clean directly and list only the top assumptions a deeper review should test. Do not modify files or run heavy tests.

first_user_message:
  You are a senior application-security and correctness auditor running an INDEPENDENT, adversarial, pre-ship review. You are deliberately a fresh pair of eyes. Treat every prior "reviewed / handled / safe / not possible / out of scope" claim as unverified and re-derive it.

  TASK (verbatim): Independently and adversarially review the current working-tree delta in /home/user/Projects/zync.is/.worktrees/factory-jpr06 against origin/main, including commit 2a39ed7b7 and uncommitted follow-up. Focus only on concrete high-confidence correctness/security defects in: atomic public accept/reject, deterministic duplicates, strict malformed/conflicting retry validation, canonical authenticated resend, tenant-safe recipients, allowed states, real email delivery, authorization, durable idempotency, concurrency, quotas/DoS, disclosure, HTML injection. Read relevant implementation and tests. Do not modify files, do not run heavy tests, do not push/deploy. Report exact file/line and exploit/failure sequence; say clean if none.

  OPERATING RULES:
  1. Review exactly the diff and essential cited references. Trace references only when essential to judge a trust boundary.
  2. Assume every trust-boundary input is hostile: request data, headers/cookies, environment/config, datastore/service reads, network/queue data.
  3. Fail closed: if a required guard cannot be confirmed, flag it, but only report after establishing a concrete trigger and refuting the finding once.
  4. Do not modify any file, including .security/attack-surface.md. You may inspect an existing map, but the user's no-modification constraint overrides map creation/update.

  ATTACK-SURFACE METHOD:
  Build an internal map of changed files, entry points, untrusted inputs, authentication/authorization and object ownership, invariants, and sinks. Reuse an existing demonstrably fresh .security/attack-surface.md if present; otherwise enumerate internally without writing. Always run the defect hunt.

  HUNT EVERY BRANCH (switch/case, role/status/kind/parentType; sibling asymmetry is a prime target):
  - Broken object-level authorization/IDOR: trace every supplied identifier to object-specific authorization on every path.
  - Fail-open auth/crypto/verify; malformed parsing/decoding; tokens bound to actor and target.
  - Timing/state oracles from asymmetric awaited work.
  - SQL/NoSQL, shell, code, HTML/template, log, header, and path injection; SSRF; traversal; unsafe parsing/deserialization.
  - Secrets and internal errors in logs/responses.
  - Resource exhaustion: body buffering, unbounded work, missing quotas/rate limits on state changes.
  - Client-trusted content type/metadata.
  - Idempotency and atomicity: consume/write then throw; retries/redelivery; durable uniqueness and concurrency races.
  - Information disclosure and over-permissive validation.

  AUTH-PATH CHECKS WHEN APPLICABLE:
  Enumerate credential classes and revocation events; verify no surviving class re-mints a killed class. Compare same-intent functions for asymmetric revocation. For every verify/refresh/resolve path require signature, expiry, version, active user/session, row expiry, and owner binding as applicable. Fail closed on absent key/config. Check timing drift, charge attempt counters before compare, raw secret bytes reaching sinks, security-verb no-ops, modulo bias, nondeterministic pagination, silently dropped authz input, and host-side compensation revealing module gaps.

  TASK-SPECIFIC REQUIRED LENSES:
  - Atomic public accept/reject and concurrency: identify exact state transition predicates, single-winner semantics, rollback behavior, and conflicting replays.
  - Deterministic duplicates and durable idempotency: identical replay must return canonical prior result; malformed or payload-conflicting retry must be rejected rather than silently treated as duplicate; uniqueness must survive restarts and concurrent requests.
  - Canonical authenticated resend: authentication, authorization, tenant/object binding, recipient selection, allowed source states, canonical persisted content/recipient rather than attacker-modified retry input.
  - Tenant-safe recipients: every recipient must be resolved within the correct tenant/object authorization boundary; check datastore values as hostile too.
  - Real email delivery: ensure success is not recorded/returned before provider delivery acceptance; failures and retries cannot lose or duplicate effects.
  - Quotas/DoS: all public and resend routes have enforceable bounded work and durable/concurrency-safe quotas where promised.
  - Disclosure and HTML injection: client-visible errors and rendered email/body data are escaped/sanitized at the correct context.

  VERIFY EACH CANDIDATE BEFORE REPORTING:
  1. State the exact request/state/concurrency schedule that triggers it. If no concrete trigger, drop it.
  2. Refute it once: re-read relevant implementation/tests/callers and identify anything that makes it safe. Report only survivors.
  3. Severity by real impact: critical/high/medium/low. A short list of confirmed defects beats speculative coverage.

  OUTPUT ONLY A NUMBERED LIST ORDERED BY SEVERITY. EACH FINDING:
  - Title
  - Location: absolute file path and exact line/function
  - Severity
  - Trigger / exploit: concrete attacker/failure sequence
  - Fix: specific change
  Then:
  - Headline: 1-2 ship blockers, named
  - Residual / unverified: only genuine uncertainty from scope
  If nothing exploitable survives, say clean directly and list only the top assumptions a deeper review should test. Do not modify files or run heavy tests.

preview:
  You are a senior application-security and correctness auditor running an INDEPENDENT, adversarial, pre-ship review. You are deliberately a fresh pair of eyes. Treat every prior "reviewed / handled / safe / not possible / out of scope" claim as unverified and re-derive it.

  TASK (verbatim): Independently and adversarially review the current working-tree delta in /home/user/Projects/zync.is/.worktrees/factory-jpr06 against origin/main, including commit 2a39ed7b7 and uncommitted follow-up. Focus only on concrete high-confidence correctness/security defects in: atomic public accept/reject, deterministic duplicates, strict malformed/conflicting retry validation, canonical authenticated resend, tenant-safe recipients, allowed states, real email delivery, authorization, durable idempotency, concurrency, quotas/DoS, disclosure, HTML injection. Read relevant implementation and tests. Do not modify files, do not run heavy tests, do not push/deploy. Report exact file/line and exploit/failure sequence; say clean if none.

  OPERATING RULES:
  1. Review exactly the diff and essential cited references. Trace references only when essential to judge a trust boundary.
  2. Assume every trust-boundary input is hostile: request data, headers/cookies, environment/config, datastore/service reads, network/queue data.
  3. Fail closed: if a required guard cannot be confirmed, flag it, but only report after establishing a concrete trigger and refuting the finding once.
  4. Do not modify any file, including .security/attack-surface.md. You may inspect an existing map, but the user's no-modification constraint overrides map creation/update.

  ATTACK-SURFACE METHOD:
  Build an internal map of changed files, entry points, untrusted inputs, authentication/authorization and object ownership, invariants, and sinks. Reuse an existing demonstrably fresh .security/attack-surface.md if present; otherwise enumerate internally without writing. Always run the defect hunt.

  HUNT EVERY BRANCH (switch/case, role/status/kind/parentType; sibling asymmetry is a prime target):
  - Broken object-level authorization/IDOR: trace every supplied identifier to object-specific authorization on every path.
  - Fail-open auth/crypto/verify; malformed parsing/decoding; tokens bound to actor and target.
  - Timing/state oracles from asymmetric awaited work.
  - SQL/NoSQL, shell, code, HTML/template, log, header, and path injection; SSRF; traversal; unsafe parsing/deserialization.
  - Secrets and internal errors in logs/responses.
  - Resource exhaustion: body buffering, unbounded work, missing quotas/rate limits on state changes.
  - Client-trusted content type/metadata.
  - Idempotency and atomicity: consume/write then throw; retries/redelivery; durable uniqueness and concurrency races.
  - Information disclosure and over-permissive validation.

  AUTH-PATH CHECKS WHEN APPLICABLE:
  Enumerate credential classes and revocation events; verify no surviving class re-mints a killed class. Compare same-intent functions for asymmetric revocation. For every verify/refresh/resolve path require signature, expiry, version, active user/session, row expiry, and owner binding as applicable. Fail closed on absent key/config. Check timing drift, charge attempt counters before compare, raw secret bytes reaching sinks, security-verb no-ops, modulo bias, nondeterministic pagination, silently dropped authz input, and host-side compensation revealing module gaps.

  TASK-SPECIFIC REQUIRED LENSES:
  - Atomic public accept/reject and concurrency: identify exact state transition predicates, single-winner semantics, rollback behavior, and conflicting replays.
  - Deterministic duplicates and durable idempotency: identical replay must return canonical prior result; malformed or payload-conflicting retry must be rejected rather than silently treated as duplicate; uniqueness must survive restarts and concurrent requests.
  - Canonical authenticated resend: authentication, authorization, tenant/object binding, recipient selection, allowed source states, canonical persisted content/recipient rather than attacker-modified retry input.
  - Tenant-safe recipients: every recipient must be resolved within the correct tenant/object authorization boundary; check datastore values as hostile too.
  - Real email delivery: ensure success is not recorded/returned before provider delivery acceptance; failures and retries cannot lose or duplicate effects.
  - Quotas/DoS: all public and resend routes have enforceable bounded work and durable/concurrency-safe quotas where promised.
  - Disclosure and HTML injection: client-visible errors and rendered email/body data are escaped/sanitized at the correct context.

  VERIFY EACH CANDIDATE BEFORE REPORTING:
  1. State the exact request/state/concurrency schedule that triggers it. If no concrete trigger, drop it.
  2. Refute it once: re-read relevant implementation/tests/callers and identify anything that makes it safe. Report only survivors.
  3. Severity by real impact: critical/high/medium/low. A short list of confirmed defects beats speculative coverage.

  OUTPUT ONLY A NUMBERED LIST ORDERED BY SEVERITY. EACH FINDING:
  - Title
  - Location: absolute file path and exact line/function
  - Severity
  - Trigger / exploit: concrete attacker/failure sequence
  - Fix: specific change
  Then:
  - Headline: 1-2 ship blockers, named
  - Residual / unverified: only genuine uncertainty from scope
  If nothing exploitable survives, say clean directly and list only the top assumptions a deeper review should test. Do not modify files or run heavy tests.


id: 019fe65a-f5eb-74a0-88d0-8cb7e7b4fc5a
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/overdeck-f7f63179e1c7
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 9f814d0a2f1327744eb97b21df9e25cc10b3e798
git_branch: main
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.3-codex-spark
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/09/rollout-2026-08-09T11-49-08-019fe65a-f5eb-74a0-88d0-8cb7e7b4fc5a.jsonl

title:
  Read the Claude Code session transcript at /home/user/.claude/projects/-home-user-Projects-overdeck/939ddb63-2b81-45e1-bb4b-71c6e8b48533.jsonl (JSONL; skip tool_result noise). Author a continuation handoff in markdown for a fresh coding agent: goal, methodology, completed work, current state, precise next actions, blockers gated on the user, standing user instructions (verbatim), key file paths. Be complete but terse. Output ONLY the handoff markdown.

first_user_message:
  Read the Claude Code session transcript at /home/user/.claude/projects/-home-user-Projects-overdeck/939ddb63-2b81-45e1-bb4b-71c6e8b48533.jsonl (JSONL; skip tool_result noise). Author a continuation handoff in markdown for a fresh coding agent: goal, methodology, completed work, current state, precise next actions, blockers gated on the user, standing user instructions (verbatim), key file paths. Be complete but terse. Output ONLY the handoff markdown.

preview:
  Read the Claude Code session transcript at /home/user/.claude/projects/-home-user-Projects-overdeck/939ddb63-2b81-45e1-bb4b-71c6e8b48533.jsonl (JSONL; skip tool_result noise). Author a continuation handoff in markdown for a fresh coding agent: goal, methodology, completed work, current state, precise next actions, blockers gated on the user, standing user instructions (verbatim), key file paths. Be complete but terse. Output ONLY the handoff markdown.


id: 019fe6a3-c25e-7cc3-9e9e-77abd997a042
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/acf-never-translate-c04240a8bf8b/plugins/international-press-zone
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 6d366cff34a5a110a53740b5b4ec662dc541f0d8
git_branch: feature/acf-never-translate
git_origin_url: git@github.com:avi-ezra/Press.Zone-Works.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/09/rollout-2026-08-09T13-08-39-019fe6a3-c25e-7cc3-9e9e-77abd997a042.jsonl

title:
  You are a senior application-security and correctness auditor running an INDEPENDENT, adversarial, pre-ship review. Treat every prior reviewed/handled/safe claim as unverified. Review exactly the supplied diff and trace only essential cited symbols. Assume every trust-boundary input and datastore/service value is hostile. Fail closed: inability to confirm a guard means it is missing.

  Build/reuse the repository attack-surface map per repository policy if possible, but the user forbids modifying reviewed repository files; therefore do not write or alter any repository file. Never modify source, tests, plan, or generated files.

  Walk every branch, switch case, role/status/kind/parent type, every lock lifecycle, and every try/finally path. Hunt especially: broken object-level authorization; fail-open parse/verify; unbound tokens; timing side channels; injection; SSRF; path traversal; unsafe parsing; secret exposure; DoS; metadata confusion; atomicity/idempotency; information disclosure; weak validation. For auth paths, enumerate complete authorization/validity predicates and compare sibling paths. For each candidate, state exact trigger, refute it once by re-reading the relevant code/callers, and report only findings that survive. Severity must reflect real impact. Near-zero false positives.

  TASK
  Review only the uncommitted diff in:
  /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/wordpress/wp-content/.worktrees/acf-never-translate/plugins/international-press-zone
  against:
  /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/wordpress/wp-content/.worktrees/acf-never-translate/plugins/international-press-zone/docs/plans/2026-08-09-acf-never-translate.md

  Exclude task #12 two-phase policy transitions.

  Verify all six accepted defects are fully fixed:
  1. Native ACF mutation-lock lifecycle.
  2. Manual source/target authorization and lock-before-snapshot.
  3. Pending/applied revisions, including locked Auto.
  4. Exact raw rollback, including Mirror backups.
  5. Force-validation TOCTOU.
  6. Real WordPress+ACF race/auth/finalizer coverage.

  Focus on exploitable authorization, stale writes, lock leaks/deadlocks, rollback corruption, revision-state defects, and test false positives. Inspect every lock lifecycle and try/finally path. Review only uncommitted changes and essential references needed to evaluate them. Do not modify files. Do not include task #12 findings.

  OUTPUT
  Return only a numbered list of actionable findings ordered by severity. Each finding must include:
  - Title
  - Severity: critical/high/medium/low
  - Absolute file:line
  - Concrete failure/exploit scenario
  - Robust specific fix

  End with Headline naming the 1-2 ship blockers and Residual/unverified stating only real scope uncertainty. If no exploitable/correctness defects survive adversarial refutation, state CLEAN directly and list only the top assumptions a deeper review should test.

first_user_message:
  You are a senior application-security and correctness auditor running an INDEPENDENT, adversarial, pre-ship review. Treat every prior reviewed/handled/safe claim as unverified. Review exactly the supplied diff and trace only essential cited symbols. Assume every trust-boundary input and datastore/service value is hostile. Fail closed: inability to confirm a guard means it is missing.

  Build/reuse the repository attack-surface map per repository policy if possible, but the user forbids modifying reviewed repository files; therefore do not write or alter any repository file. Never modify source, tests, plan, or generated files.

  Walk every branch, switch case, role/status/kind/parent type, every lock lifecycle, and every try/finally path. Hunt especially: broken object-level authorization; fail-open parse/verify; unbound tokens; timing side channels; injection; SSRF; path traversal; unsafe parsing; secret exposure; DoS; metadata confusion; atomicity/idempotency; information disclosure; weak validation. For auth paths, enumerate complete authorization/validity predicates and compare sibling paths. For each candidate, state exact trigger, refute it once by re-reading the relevant code/callers, and report only findings that survive. Severity must reflect real impact. Near-zero false positives.

  TASK
  Review only the uncommitted diff in:
  /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/wordpress/wp-content/.worktrees/acf-never-translate/plugins/international-press-zone
  against:
  /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/wordpress/wp-content/.worktrees/acf-never-translate/plugins/international-press-zone/docs/plans/2026-08-09-acf-never-translate.md

  Exclude task #12 two-phase policy transitions.

  Verify all six accepted defects are fully fixed:
  1. Native ACF mutation-lock lifecycle.
  2. Manual source/target authorization and lock-before-snapshot.
  3. Pending/applied revisions, including locked Auto.
  4. Exact raw rollback, including Mirror backups.
  5. Force-validation TOCTOU.
  6. Real WordPress+ACF race/auth/finalizer coverage.

  Focus on exploitable authorization, stale writes, lock leaks/deadlocks, rollback corruption, revision-state defects, and test false positives. Inspect every lock lifecycle and try/finally path. Review only uncommitted changes and essential references needed to evaluate them. Do not modify files. Do not include task #12 findings.

  OUTPUT
  Return only a numbered list of actionable findings ordered by severity. Each finding must include:
  - Title
  - Severity: critical/high/medium/low
  - Absolute file:line
  - Concrete failure/exploit scenario
  - Robust specific fix

  End with Headline naming the 1-2 ship blockers and Residual/unverified stating only real scope uncertainty. If no exploitable/correctness defects survive adversarial refutation, state CLEAN directly and list only the top assumptions a deeper review should test.

preview:
  You are a senior application-security and correctness auditor running an INDEPENDENT, adversarial, pre-ship review. Treat every prior reviewed/handled/safe claim as unverified. Review exactly the supplied diff and trace only essential cited symbols. Assume every trust-boundary input and datastore/service value is hostile. Fail closed: inability to confirm a guard means it is missing.

  Build/reuse the repository attack-surface map per repository policy if possible, but the user forbids modifying reviewed repository files; therefore do not write or alter any repository file. Never modify source, tests, plan, or generated files.

  Walk every branch, switch case, role/status/kind/parent type, every lock lifecycle, and every try/finally path. Hunt especially: broken object-level authorization; fail-open parse/verify; unbound tokens; timing side channels; injection; SSRF; path traversal; unsafe parsing; secret exposure; DoS; metadata confusion; atomicity/idempotency; information disclosure; weak validation. For auth paths, enumerate complete authorization/validity predicates and compare sibling paths. For each candidate, state exact trigger, refute it once by re-reading the relevant code/callers, and report only findings that survive. Severity must reflect real impact. Near-zero false positives.

  TASK
  Review only the uncommitted diff in:
  /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/wordpress/wp-content/.worktrees/acf-never-translate/plugins/international-press-zone
  against:
  /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/wordpress/wp-content/.worktrees/acf-never-translate/plugins/international-press-zone/docs/plans/2026-08-09-acf-never-translate.md

  Exclude task #12 two-phase policy transitions.

  Verify all six accepted defects are fully fixed:
  1. Native ACF mutation-lock lifecycle.
  2. Manual source/target authorization and lock-before-snapshot.
  3. Pending/applied revisions, including locked Auto.
  4. Exact raw rollback, including Mirror backups.
  5. Force-validation TOCTOU.
  6. Real WordPress+ACF race/auth/finalizer coverage.

  Focus on exploitable authorization, stale writes, lock leaks/deadlocks, rollback corruption, revision-state defects, and test false positives. Inspect every lock lifecycle and try/finally path. Review only uncommitted changes and essential references needed to evaluate them. Do not modify files. Do not include task #12 findings.

  OUTPUT
  Return only a numbered list of actionable findings ordered by severity. Each finding must include:
  - Title
  - Severity: critical/high/medium/low
  - Absolute file:line
  - Concrete failure/exploit scenario
  - Robust specific fix

  End with Headline naming the 1-2 ship blockers and Residual/unverified stating only real scope uncertainty. If no exploitable/correctness defects survive adversarial refutation, state CLEAN directly and list only the top assumptions a deeper review should test.


