# threads

id: 019ffa7f-a81c-75b0-8d7d-8aec278a2fe6
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/tmux-runtime-boundary-79d991acef71
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 7a2e478fc6472483758c5f970475d19bc6e95a8c
git_branch: wt/tmux-runtime-boundary
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/13/rollout-2026-08-13T09-41-37-019ffa7f-a81c-75b0-8d7d-8aec278a2fe6.jsonl

title:
  You are a senior application-security and correctness auditor running an independent adversarial pre-ship review. Treat prior safety claims as unverified. Assume trust-boundary inputs hostile and fail closed. For each candidate, state a concrete trigger, try once to refute it from current code/Linux contracts, and report only what survives. Review exactly these CURRENT latest files and their current diff: /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/tmux-runtime-boundary/modules/workstation/claude/lib/seat_scope_entry.py and /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/tmux-runtime-boundary/modules/workstation/claude/lib/seat_tmux_mediator.py. Read-only; do not edit; do not run tests. Verify this candidate only: read_process_identity and mediator verify_live_identity parse /proc/<pid>/stat with whitespace splitting and assume starttime index 21; the process comm field may contain spaces or parentheses, shifting fields and causing false identity mismatch or acceptance of the wrong value. Check actual current implementation, tmux comm realism, and the Linux proc stat contract. Latest state controls. Return exactly one verdict token CONFIRMED, PLAUSIBLE, or REFUTED, followed by current absolute file:line locations and a concise concrete scenario. No unrelated findings.

first_user_message:
  You are a senior application-security and correctness auditor running an independent adversarial pre-ship review. Treat prior safety claims as unverified. Assume trust-boundary inputs hostile and fail closed. For each candidate, state a concrete trigger, try once to refute it from current code/Linux contracts, and report only what survives. Review exactly these CURRENT latest files and their current diff: /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/tmux-runtime-boundary/modules/workstation/claude/lib/seat_scope_entry.py and /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/tmux-runtime-boundary/modules/workstation/claude/lib/seat_tmux_mediator.py. Read-only; do not edit; do not run tests. Verify this candidate only: read_process_identity and mediator verify_live_identity parse /proc/<pid>/stat with whitespace splitting and assume starttime index 21; the process comm field may contain spaces or parentheses, shifting fields and causing false identity mismatch or acceptance of the wrong value. Check actual current implementation, tmux comm realism, and the Linux proc stat contract. Latest state controls. Return exactly one verdict token CONFIRMED, PLAUSIBLE, or REFUTED, followed by current absolute file:line locations and a concise concrete scenario. No unrelated findings.

preview:
  You are a senior application-security and correctness auditor running an independent adversarial pre-ship review. Treat prior safety claims as unverified. Assume trust-boundary inputs hostile and fail closed. For each candidate, state a concrete trigger, try once to refute it from current code/Linux contracts, and report only what survives. Review exactly these CURRENT latest files and their current diff: /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/tmux-runtime-boundary/modules/workstation/claude/lib/seat_scope_entry.py and /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/tmux-runtime-boundary/modules/workstation/claude/lib/seat_tmux_mediator.py. Read-only; do not edit; do not run tests. Verify this candidate only: read_process_identity and mediator verify_live_identity parse /proc/<pid>/stat with whitespace splitting and assume starttime index 21; the process comm field may contain spaces or parentheses, shifting fields and causing false identity mismatch or acceptance of the wrong value. Check actual current implementation, tmux comm realism, and the Linux proc stat contract. Latest state controls. Return exactly one verdict token CONFIRMED, PLAUSIBLE, or REFUTED, followed by current absolute file:line locations and a concise concrete scenario. No unrelated findings.


id: 019ffa8d-0740-7283-9a73-6057081fa2db
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/immutable-release-bundle-07a25b741c08
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 1af000a229ad3830615209abae6ccef5df2c25ea
git_branch: wt/immutable-release-bundle
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/13/rollout-2026-08-13T09-56-14-019ffa8d-0740-7283-9a73-6057081fa2db.jsonl

title:
  Act as a senior application-security and correctness auditor doing an independent adversarial pre-ship review. Review commit 1af000a229ad3830615209abae6ccef5df2c25ea against its parent in /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/immutable-release-bundle. Review exactly the committed diff and only trace essential cited symbols. Treat all trust-boundary inputs, datastore reads, filesystem state, environment, and subprocess/service outputs as hostile. Fail closed: an unconfirmed guard is missing. Enumerate every branch and sibling behavior. Focus especially on descriptor authenticity and expected identity; path substitution and TOCTOU; symlink and hardlink attacks; sealed-source completeness; source-to-workspace-to-runtime separation; deckctl provenance; legacy behavior; lock and queue cleanup; fail-closed error handling. Also check authorization, injection, unsafe parsing, resource exhaustion, idempotency/atomicity, information disclosure, and validation where relevant. For each candidate, state a concrete trigger, then actively re-read and try to refute it; report only findings that survive. Inspect only: do not edit, write an attack-surface file, test, commit, land, or deploy. Ignore the foreign uncommitted create-release-bundle.mjs change and preserved .real-bundle-test directories unless the committed diff wrongly depends on them. Output only concrete reproducible blockers as a numbered severity-ordered list with title, file:line/function, severity, exact scenario, and specific fix. End with Headline and Residual/unverified. If none, output CLEAN plus only material assumptions.

first_user_message:
  Act as a senior application-security and correctness auditor doing an independent adversarial pre-ship review. Review commit 1af000a229ad3830615209abae6ccef5df2c25ea against its parent in /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/immutable-release-bundle. Review exactly the committed diff and only trace essential cited symbols. Treat all trust-boundary inputs, datastore reads, filesystem state, environment, and subprocess/service outputs as hostile. Fail closed: an unconfirmed guard is missing. Enumerate every branch and sibling behavior. Focus especially on descriptor authenticity and expected identity; path substitution and TOCTOU; symlink and hardlink attacks; sealed-source completeness; source-to-workspace-to-runtime separation; deckctl provenance; legacy behavior; lock and queue cleanup; fail-closed error handling. Also check authorization, injection, unsafe parsing, resource exhaustion, idempotency/atomicity, information disclosure, and validation where relevant. For each candidate, state a concrete trigger, then actively re-read and try to refute it; report only findings that survive. Inspect only: do not edit, write an attack-surface file, test, commit, land, or deploy. Ignore the foreign uncommitted create-release-bundle.mjs change and preserved .real-bundle-test directories unless the committed diff wrongly depends on them. Output only concrete reproducible blockers as a numbered severity-ordered list with title, file:line/function, severity, exact scenario, and specific fix. End with Headline and Residual/unverified. If none, output CLEAN plus only material assumptions.

preview:
  Act as a senior application-security and correctness auditor doing an independent adversarial pre-ship review. Review commit 1af000a229ad3830615209abae6ccef5df2c25ea against its parent in /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/immutable-release-bundle. Review exactly the committed diff and only trace essential cited symbols. Treat all trust-boundary inputs, datastore reads, filesystem state, environment, and subprocess/service outputs as hostile. Fail closed: an unconfirmed guard is missing. Enumerate every branch and sibling behavior. Focus especially on descriptor authenticity and expected identity; path substitution and TOCTOU; symlink and hardlink attacks; sealed-source completeness; source-to-workspace-to-runtime separation; deckctl provenance; legacy behavior; lock and queue cleanup; fail-closed error handling. Also check authorization, injection, unsafe parsing, resource exhaustion, idempotency/atomicity, information disclosure, and validation where relevant. For each candidate, state a concrete trigger, then actively re-read and try to refute it; report only findings that survive. Inspect only: do not edit, write an attack-surface file, test, commit, land, or deploy. Ignore the foreign uncommitted create-release-bundle.mjs change and preserved .real-bundle-test directories unless the committed diff wrongly depends on them. Output only concrete reproducible blockers as a numbered severity-ordered list with title, file:line/function, severity, exact scenario, and specific fix. End with Headline and Residual/unverified. If none, output CLEAN plus only material assumptions.


id: 019ffac0-5ce7-7b51-8407-cf2709400167
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/uj-020-cancellation-d8bc7588a5ef
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: e45d1ab7e42391259e23fa97a9490cbd5e9253c6
git_branch: wt/uj-020-cancellation
git_origin_url: git@github.com:avi-ezra/Press.Zone-Works.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/13/rollout-2026-08-13T10-52-18-019ffac0-5ce7-7b51-8407-cf2709400167.jsonl

title:
  Act as a fresh, independent senior application-security and correctness auditor. Review exactly the UJ-020 cancellation diff in this worktree and only trace cited symbols essential to judge trust boundaries. Read git diff and the relevant route, service, schema, and tests. Do not edit any files. Treat request inputs, datastore reads, service returns, and prior safety claims as hostile or unverified. Focus especially on: broken object-level authorization (IDOR); site and plugin ownership binding on every identifier and branch; terminal-state immutability; cancellation races, atomicity, and idempotent retries; collateral mutation of unrelated jobs/resources; and fail-closed, non-disclosing error behavior. Enumerate sibling branches and state transitions rather than assuming guards are shared. For every candidate, state a concrete trigger, then refute it once by checking code/callers; report only findings that survive. Severity must reflect real impact. Also inspect or maintain the repository attack-surface map at .security/attack-surface.md according to this protocol: if absent, enumerate the review scope, record schema_version 1, HEAD SHA, ISO build time, scope, per-file content hashes, trust boundaries, entry points, untrusted inputs, AuthN/Z ownership model, invariants, and sinks; if present, prove freshness using schema, HEAD/diff intersection, and hashes, patching only stale entries. The map records surfaces, never findings. Do not create any report file. Output only a numbered list ordered by severity. Each item must include title, absolute file:line or function, severity, concrete trigger/exploit, and specific fix. End with Headline naming the 1-2 ship blockers and Residual / unverified stating genuine scope uncertainty. If no actionable exploit survives, say so directly and list only the top assumptions a deeper review should test.

first_user_message:
  Act as a fresh, independent senior application-security and correctness auditor. Review exactly the UJ-020 cancellation diff in this worktree and only trace cited symbols essential to judge trust boundaries. Read git diff and the relevant route, service, schema, and tests. Do not edit any files. Treat request inputs, datastore reads, service returns, and prior safety claims as hostile or unverified. Focus especially on: broken object-level authorization (IDOR); site and plugin ownership binding on every identifier and branch; terminal-state immutability; cancellation races, atomicity, and idempotent retries; collateral mutation of unrelated jobs/resources; and fail-closed, non-disclosing error behavior. Enumerate sibling branches and state transitions rather than assuming guards are shared. For every candidate, state a concrete trigger, then refute it once by checking code/callers; report only findings that survive. Severity must reflect real impact. Also inspect or maintain the repository attack-surface map at .security/attack-surface.md according to this protocol: if absent, enumerate the review scope, record schema_version 1, HEAD SHA, ISO build time, scope, per-file content hashes, trust boundaries, entry points, untrusted inputs, AuthN/Z ownership model, invariants, and sinks; if present, prove freshness using schema, HEAD/diff intersection, and hashes, patching only stale entries. The map records surfaces, never findings. Do not create any report file. Output only a numbered list ordered by severity. Each item must include title, absolute file:line or function, severity, concrete trigger/exploit, and specific fix. End with Headline naming the 1-2 ship blockers and Residual / unverified stating genuine scope uncertainty. If no actionable exploit survives, say so directly and list only the top assumptions a deeper review should test.

preview:
  Act as a fresh, independent senior application-security and correctness auditor. Review exactly the UJ-020 cancellation diff in this worktree and only trace cited symbols essential to judge trust boundaries. Read git diff and the relevant route, service, schema, and tests. Do not edit any files. Treat request inputs, datastore reads, service returns, and prior safety claims as hostile or unverified. Focus especially on: broken object-level authorization (IDOR); site and plugin ownership binding on every identifier and branch; terminal-state immutability; cancellation races, atomicity, and idempotent retries; collateral mutation of unrelated jobs/resources; and fail-closed, non-disclosing error behavior. Enumerate sibling branches and state transitions rather than assuming guards are shared. For every candidate, state a concrete trigger, then refute it once by checking code/callers; report only findings that survive. Severity must reflect real impact. Also inspect or maintain the repository attack-surface map at .security/attack-surface.md according to this protocol: if absent, enumerate the review scope, record schema_version 1, HEAD SHA, ISO build time, scope, per-file content hashes, trust boundaries, entry points, untrusted inputs, AuthN/Z ownership model, invariants, and sinks; if present, prove freshness using schema, HEAD/diff intersection, and hashes, patching only stale entries. The map records surfaces, never findings. Do not create any report file. Output only a numbered list ordered by severity. Each item must include title, absolute file:line or function, severity, concrete trigger/exploit, and specific fix. End with Headline naming the 1-2 ship blockers and Residual / unverified stating genuine scope uncertainty. If no actionable exploit survives, say so directly and list only the top assumptions a deeper review should test.


id: 019ffac7-4966-7501-8207-634f57c721f4
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/uj-020-cancellation-d8bc7588a5ef
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: e45d1ab7e42391259e23fa97a9490cbd5e9253c6
git_branch: wt/uj-020-cancellation
git_origin_url: git@github.com:avi-ezra/Press.Zone-Works.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/13/rollout-2026-08-13T10-59-52-019ffac7-4966-7501-8207-634f57c721f4.jsonl

title:
  Act as a senior application-security and correctness auditor performing an independent adversarial pre-ship review. User request: Re-review the current UJ-020 diff after fixes. Review exactly the current git diff and only essential cited references. Confirm: (1) ordinary API keys fail closed when site scope is absent; (2) license-auth site and plugin scope is exact in both lookup and compare-and-swap update; (3) unauthorized versus missing responses expose no existence oracle; (4) terminal-state, race, and idempotency behavior is correct. Report blockers only and do not edit any files. Treat every boundary input, datastore value, and auth claim as hostile. Enumerate every branch and check object-level authorization, fail-open validation, exact token/resource binding, timing/response oracles, injection, atomicity, single-winner CAS semantics, retry/redelivery idempotency, and information disclosure. For each candidate, state a concrete trigger, try once to refute it from code/callers, and report only findings that survive. Maintain/check the repository attack-surface map at .security/attack-surface.md only if this can be done without modifying files; because the user explicitly forbids edits, do not create or update it. Use any existing fresh map read-only, otherwise enumerate the changed scope in-memory. Output a numbered severity-ordered blocker list. Each finding must include title, absolute file:line, severity, concrete trigger/exploit, and specific fix. End with Headline and Residual/unverified. If no blocker is exploitable, say so directly and list only the top assumptions that remain unverified. Do not include non-blocking improvements.

first_user_message:
  Act as a senior application-security and correctness auditor performing an independent adversarial pre-ship review. User request: Re-review the current UJ-020 diff after fixes. Review exactly the current git diff and only essential cited references. Confirm: (1) ordinary API keys fail closed when site scope is absent; (2) license-auth site and plugin scope is exact in both lookup and compare-and-swap update; (3) unauthorized versus missing responses expose no existence oracle; (4) terminal-state, race, and idempotency behavior is correct. Report blockers only and do not edit any files. Treat every boundary input, datastore value, and auth claim as hostile. Enumerate every branch and check object-level authorization, fail-open validation, exact token/resource binding, timing/response oracles, injection, atomicity, single-winner CAS semantics, retry/redelivery idempotency, and information disclosure. For each candidate, state a concrete trigger, try once to refute it from code/callers, and report only findings that survive. Maintain/check the repository attack-surface map at .security/attack-surface.md only if this can be done without modifying files; because the user explicitly forbids edits, do not create or update it. Use any existing fresh map read-only, otherwise enumerate the changed scope in-memory. Output a numbered severity-ordered blocker list. Each finding must include title, absolute file:line, severity, concrete trigger/exploit, and specific fix. End with Headline and Residual/unverified. If no blocker is exploitable, say so directly and list only the top assumptions that remain unverified. Do not include non-blocking improvements.

preview:
  Act as a senior application-security and correctness auditor performing an independent adversarial pre-ship review. User request: Re-review the current UJ-020 diff after fixes. Review exactly the current git diff and only essential cited references. Confirm: (1) ordinary API keys fail closed when site scope is absent; (2) license-auth site and plugin scope is exact in both lookup and compare-and-swap update; (3) unauthorized versus missing responses expose no existence oracle; (4) terminal-state, race, and idempotency behavior is correct. Report blockers only and do not edit any files. Treat every boundary input, datastore value, and auth claim as hostile. Enumerate every branch and check object-level authorization, fail-open validation, exact token/resource binding, timing/response oracles, injection, atomicity, single-winner CAS semantics, retry/redelivery idempotency, and information disclosure. For each candidate, state a concrete trigger, try once to refute it from code/callers, and report only findings that survive. Maintain/check the repository attack-surface map at .security/attack-surface.md only if this can be done without modifying files; because the user explicitly forbids edits, do not create or update it. Use any existing fresh map read-only, otherwise enumerate the changed scope in-memory. Output a numbered severity-ordered blocker list. Each finding must include title, absolute file:line, severity, concrete trigger/exploit, and specific fix. End with Headline and Residual/unverified. If no blocker is exploitable, say so directly and list only the top assumptions that remain unverified. Do not include non-blocking improvements.


id: 019ffb35-a40b-7681-8d1f-8137451b2bd0
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/immutable-release-bundle-07a25b741c08
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: ba6a871eb2c52bc9e4add8bf40a7f64eaf85d3dd
git_branch: wt/immutable-release-bundle
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/13/rollout-2026-08-13T13-00-24-019ffb35-a40b-7681-8d1f-8137451b2bd0.jsonl

title:
  Perform a fresh independent READ-ONLY security/correctness review of the current uncommitted diff in /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/immutable-release-bundle. Do not edit, test, commit, land, or deploy.

  Review exactly these files plus referenced materializer/authority code essential to judge boundaries:
  - packaging/deploy-queue-launcher.sh
  - overdeck-deploy.service
  - deploy-local.sh
  - test-deploy-local.sh
  - release-bundle.mjs
  - validate-release-bundle.mjs
  - release-bundle.test.mjs

  Review specifically against all five frozen blockers:
  1. auth-before-parse and same-opened-object package validation
  2. post-receipt executable/config substitution and zero mutable workspace/DEPLOY install reads
  3. watchdog rollback identity retention
  4. authenticated queue envelope with descriptor-less immutable refusal and unchanged legacy mode
  5. receipt-gated preserve/bootstrap/rollback

  Verify five dedicated adversarial regressions truly exist and exercise each blocker rather than merely two queue cases. Treat protected creator modification and .real dirs as foreign, not review scope, but flag any dependency on them.

  Act as a senior application-security and correctness auditor doing an independent adversarial pre-ship pass. Treat prior safety claims as unverified. Every trust-boundary input is hostile. Fail closed where guards cannot be confirmed. Enumerate every relevant branch and sibling path. Check object identity, TOCTOU, auth-before-parse, immutable descriptor enforcement, authenticated envelopes, legacy-mode invariance, rollback identity, receipt gating, idempotency/atomicity, path/file substitution, unsafe parsing, information leaks, resource exhaustion, and malformed-input validation. For every candidate: state exact trigger, try to refute from code/callers, report only if it survives. Severity by real impact.

  Use /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/immutable-release-bundle/.security/attack-surface.md only if present and provably fresh. Because this is strictly read-only, do not create or update it; if absent/stale, enumerate in memory and note residual only if this prevents confirmation.

  Output only concrete reproducible blockers with absolute file:line and failure scenario, or CLEAN. Explicitly state whether all five blocker-specific adversarial tests exist and genuinely exercise their blocker. End with headline and residual/unverified. Do not run tests or modify files.

first_user_message:
  Perform a fresh independent READ-ONLY security/correctness review of the current uncommitted diff in /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/immutable-release-bundle. Do not edit, test, commit, land, or deploy.

  Review exactly these files plus referenced materializer/authority code essential to judge boundaries:
  - packaging/deploy-queue-launcher.sh
  - overdeck-deploy.service
  - deploy-local.sh
  - test-deploy-local.sh
  - release-bundle.mjs
  - validate-release-bundle.mjs
  - release-bundle.test.mjs

  Review specifically against all five frozen blockers:
  1. auth-before-parse and same-opened-object package validation
  2. post-receipt executable/config substitution and zero mutable workspace/DEPLOY install reads
  3. watchdog rollback identity retention
  4. authenticated queue envelope with descriptor-less immutable refusal and unchanged legacy mode
  5. receipt-gated preserve/bootstrap/rollback

  Verify five dedicated adversarial regressions truly exist and exercise each blocker rather than merely two queue cases. Treat protected creator modification and .real dirs as foreign, not review scope, but flag any dependency on them.

  Act as a senior application-security and correctness auditor doing an independent adversarial pre-ship pass. Treat prior safety claims as unverified. Every trust-boundary input is hostile. Fail closed where guards cannot be confirmed. Enumerate every relevant branch and sibling path. Check object identity, TOCTOU, auth-before-parse, immutable descriptor enforcement, authenticated envelopes, legacy-mode invariance, rollback identity, receipt gating, idempotency/atomicity, path/file substitution, unsafe parsing, information leaks, resource exhaustion, and malformed-input validation. For every candidate: state exact trigger, try to refute from code/callers, report only if it survives. Severity by real impact.

  Use /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/immutable-release-bundle/.security/attack-surface.md only if present and provably fresh. Because this is strictly read-only, do not create or update it; if absent/stale, enumerate in memory and note residual only if this prevents confirmation.

  Output only concrete reproducible blockers with absolute file:line and failure scenario, or CLEAN. Explicitly state whether all five blocker-specific adversarial tests exist and genuinely exercise their blocker. End with headline and residual/unverified. Do not run tests or modify files.

preview:
  Perform a fresh independent READ-ONLY security/correctness review of the current uncommitted diff in /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/immutable-release-bundle. Do not edit, test, commit, land, or deploy.

  Review exactly these files plus referenced materializer/authority code essential to judge boundaries:
  - packaging/deploy-queue-launcher.sh
  - overdeck-deploy.service
  - deploy-local.sh
  - test-deploy-local.sh
  - release-bundle.mjs
  - validate-release-bundle.mjs
  - release-bundle.test.mjs

  Review specifically against all five frozen blockers:
  1. auth-before-parse and same-opened-object package validation
  2. post-receipt executable/config substitution and zero mutable workspace/DEPLOY install reads
  3. watchdog rollback identity retention
  4. authenticated queue envelope with descriptor-less immutable refusal and unchanged legacy mode
  5. receipt-gated preserve/bootstrap/rollback

  Verify five dedicated adversarial regressions truly exist and exercise each blocker rather than merely two queue cases. Treat protected creator modification and .real dirs as foreign, not review scope, but flag any dependency on them.

  Act as a senior application-security and correctness auditor doing an independent adversarial pre-ship pass. Treat prior safety claims as unverified. Every trust-boundary input is hostile. Fail closed where guards cannot be confirmed. Enumerate every relevant branch and sibling path. Check object identity, TOCTOU, auth-before-parse, immutable descriptor enforcement, authenticated envelopes, legacy-mode invariance, rollback identity, receipt gating, idempotency/atomicity, path/file substitution, unsafe parsing, information leaks, resource exhaustion, and malformed-input validation. For every candidate: state exact trigger, try to refute from code/callers, report only if it survives. Severity by real impact.

  Use /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/immutable-release-bundle/.security/attack-surface.md only if present and provably fresh. Because this is strictly read-only, do not create or update it; if absent/stale, enumerate in memory and note residual only if this prevents confirmation.

  Output only concrete reproducible blockers with absolute file:line and failure scenario, or CLEAN. Explicitly state whether all five blocker-specific adversarial tests exist and genuinely exercise their blocker. End with headline and residual/unverified. Do not run tests or modify files.


id: 019ffb3e-d640-7a53-8fbb-769f5182b96f
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/tmux-runtime-boundary-79d991acef71
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 7a2e478fc6472483758c5f970475d19bc6e95a8c
git_branch: wt/tmux-runtime-boundary
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/13/rollout-2026-08-13T13-10-27-019ffb3e-d640-7a53-8fbb-769f5182b96f.jsonl

title:
  Review candidate in /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/tmux-runtime-boundary: stable execution-client wrapper resolves global mutable active version per invocation, so a deploy between admission and runtime phases can load different broker/client protocol versions; no session pins version. Inspect all stable wrappers and the manifest plus essential cited symbols only. User asks: Return exactly CONFIRMED/PLAUSIBLE/REFUTED with current file:line and one realistic scenario. Act as independent adversarial pre-ship application-security and correctness auditor; treat trust-boundary inputs as hostile; fail closed; enumerate sibling wrapper branches; identify a concrete trigger; refute the candidate once against code/callers; report only if it survives. Output must be exactly one verdict word, then current absolute file:line, then one realistic scenario, with no extra findings.

first_user_message:
  Review candidate in /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/tmux-runtime-boundary: stable execution-client wrapper resolves global mutable active version per invocation, so a deploy between admission and runtime phases can load different broker/client protocol versions; no session pins version. Inspect all stable wrappers and the manifest plus essential cited symbols only. User asks: Return exactly CONFIRMED/PLAUSIBLE/REFUTED with current file:line and one realistic scenario. Act as independent adversarial pre-ship application-security and correctness auditor; treat trust-boundary inputs as hostile; fail closed; enumerate sibling wrapper branches; identify a concrete trigger; refute the candidate once against code/callers; report only if it survives. Output must be exactly one verdict word, then current absolute file:line, then one realistic scenario, with no extra findings.

preview:
  Review candidate in /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/tmux-runtime-boundary: stable execution-client wrapper resolves global mutable active version per invocation, so a deploy between admission and runtime phases can load different broker/client protocol versions; no session pins version. Inspect all stable wrappers and the manifest plus essential cited symbols only. User asks: Return exactly CONFIRMED/PLAUSIBLE/REFUTED with current file:line and one realistic scenario. Act as independent adversarial pre-ship application-security and correctness auditor; treat trust-boundary inputs as hostile; fail closed; enumerate sibling wrapper branches; identify a concrete trigger; refute the candidate once against code/callers; report only if it survives. Output must be exactly one verdict word, then current absolute file:line, then one realistic scenario, with no extra findings.


id: 019ffb60-a4e7-7003-b955-6444dbb295db
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/agent-a0e196bc8b551386b-1da471d6a8c8
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 3a365f2a437812d5c262a3228b744fef98bd3bd1
git_branch: worktree-agent-a0e196bc8b551386b
git_origin_url: git@github.com:avi-ezra/Press.Zone-Works.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/13/rollout-2026-08-13T13-47-22-019ffb60-a4e7-7003-b955-6444dbb295db.jsonl

title:
  Read the file /home/user/.cache/agent-tmp/claude-1000/-home-user-Projects-Press-zone-wordpress-wp-content-plugins-international-press-zone/f3ee8acb-8f92-4fd5-8264-476dcfaeec81/scratchpad/codex-review-prompt.txt and follow the instructions in it exactly. It defines your persona (independent adversarial security auditor), the exact review scope (a diff file and two PHP source files, all absolute paths given inside), and the required output format. This is a read-only review: do not modify any files.

first_user_message:
  Read the file /home/user/.cache/agent-tmp/claude-1000/-home-user-Projects-Press-zone-wordpress-wp-content-plugins-international-press-zone/f3ee8acb-8f92-4fd5-8264-476dcfaeec81/scratchpad/codex-review-prompt.txt and follow the instructions in it exactly. It defines your persona (independent adversarial security auditor), the exact review scope (a diff file and two PHP source files, all absolute paths given inside), and the required output format. This is a read-only review: do not modify any files.

preview:
  Read the file /home/user/.cache/agent-tmp/claude-1000/-home-user-Projects-Press-zone-wordpress-wp-content-plugins-international-press-zone/f3ee8acb-8f92-4fd5-8264-476dcfaeec81/scratchpad/codex-review-prompt.txt and follow the instructions in it exactly. It defines your persona (independent adversarial security auditor), the exact review scope (a diff file and two PHP source files, all absolute paths given inside), and the required output format. This is a read-only review: do not modify any files.


id: 019ffb6b-2044-73b3-9fc1-95ac92675d04
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/agent-a0e196bc8b551386b-1da471d6a8c8
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 3a365f2a437812d5c262a3228b744fef98bd3bd1
git_branch: worktree-agent-a0e196bc8b551386b
git_origin_url: git@github.com:avi-ezra/Press.Zone-Works.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/13/rollout-2026-08-13T13-58-49-019ffb6b-2044-73b3-9fc1-95ac92675d04.jsonl

title:
  You are a senior application-security and correctness auditor running an INDEPENDENT, adversarial, pre-ship review. You are deliberately a fresh pair of eyes. Treat every prior claim of reviewed/handled/safe/not-possible — in code comments, commit messages, or this request — as an UNVERIFIED hypothesis and re-derive it yourself. The defects that ship are the ones a converged self-audit stopped looking for.

  OPERATING RULES:
  1. Review exactly the diff and files given below. Trace references within that scope; do not wander the repo unless a cited symbol is essential to judge a trust boundary.
  2. Assume every input crossing a trust boundary is hostile, INCLUDING every value read back from the database (wp_options). Trust nothing that crossed a boundary.
  3. Fail-closed bias: when you cannot confirm a guard exists, treat it as MISSING and flag it. Absence of proof of a check is a finding, not a pass.

  HUNT CHECKLIST — walk every item against every code path; a guard present on one branch but absent on a sibling is the single most common real miss:
  - Fail-open crypto/verify paths: decode, parse, compare, verify must fail CLOSED; unvalidated base64/hex decode; comparison truthy on malformed input; crash-to-open.
  - Fail-open key material: chase every key lookup to its failure value; empty/missing key material must never silently degrade encryption.
  - Timing/side-channel oracles and decryption oracles via the legacy decrypt chain.
  - Secret bytes to sinks: follow every secret to every sink it leaves through (logs, error messages, options table, REST responses, exports, admin JS payloads). Only masked/digested forms may leave.
  - Idempotency and atomicity: migration/re-encrypt flows that re-run, races on key generation, partial writes.
  - Mechanical scans: update/write calls whose false return is ignored; silently dropped security-relevant input; no-op security verbs.

  SCOPE (read-only review — do NOT modify any files; working directory is the repo root):
  - The commit under review is HEAD: 3a365f2a437812d5c262a3228b744fef98bd3bd1. Get the full diff with: git show 3a365f2a437812d5c262a3228b744fef98bd3bd1. If git objects are unavailable in this workspace, review the post-change files directly using the context below.
  - Post-change sources to read fully: plugins/international-press-zone/includes/Licensing/ActivationManager.php and plugins/international-press-zone/includes/Admin/LicensingController.php (paths relative to the working directory).

  CONTEXT: WordPress plugin stores license key + OAuth API credential encrypted in wp_options. Old code fell back to a shipped constant key ipz-default-encryption-key-123 when AUTH_KEY was undefined, and used unauthenticated AES-256-CBC. New code: aes-256-gcm with v2: prefix; key = sha256(AUTH_KEY) raw bytes, else a per-site random 32-byte key persisted base64 in the autoloaded option ipz_encryption_key; legacy decrypt paths (CBC under substr(AUTH_KEY,0,32), CBC under the shipped constant, v2 under a stale per-site key) accepted for decrypt-then-re-encrypt migration only; encryption fail-closed (null result makes activation refuse with secure_storage_unavailable; base64-plaintext fallbacks removed).

  HUNT SPECIFICALLY: key-material leakage (logs, error paths, comparisons); downgrade/oracle attacks via the legacy decrypt chain; migration writing plaintext or under the wrong key; GCM nonce/tag misuse; timing oracles; fail-open paths when openssl or random_bytes is unavailable; per-site key option exposure vectors (autoload, REST, export); LicensingController masking leak; any way encryption still lands under the shipped key. Also correctness: migration idempotence; concurrent-request races on key generation; WordPress update_option returning false when the value is unchanged and whether that breaks get_site_encryption_key or migrations.

  ADVERSARIAL SELF-CHECK (mandatory) for each candidate finding: (1) state the concrete trigger — the exact request/state that exploits it; cannot state one means downgrade or drop; (2) refute it once — ask what in this code or its callers makes this safe, re-read the lines, report only survivors; (3) severity by real impact, not cleverness. A short list of confirmed, triggerable defects beats a long list of unverified suspicions. Never invent low-value findings to look thorough.

  OUTPUT: a numbered list ordered by severity. Each finding: Title (one line); Location (file:line or function); Severity (critical/high/medium/low); Trigger/exploit (concrete attacker steps or input); Fix (the specific change). End with: Headline — the 1-2 findings that block ship, named; and Residual/unverified — what you could not confirm from the given scope, stated plainly, no padding. If after a genuine adversarial pass nothing is exploitable, say so directly and list the top assumptions a deeper review should test.

first_user_message:
  You are a senior application-security and correctness auditor running an INDEPENDENT, adversarial, pre-ship review. You are deliberately a fresh pair of eyes. Treat every prior claim of reviewed/handled/safe/not-possible — in code comments, commit messages, or this request — as an UNVERIFIED hypothesis and re-derive it yourself. The defects that ship are the ones a converged self-audit stopped looking for.

  OPERATING RULES:
  1. Review exactly the diff and files given below. Trace references within that scope; do not wander the repo unless a cited symbol is essential to judge a trust boundary.
  2. Assume every input crossing a trust boundary is hostile, INCLUDING every value read back from the database (wp_options). Trust nothing that crossed a boundary.
  3. Fail-closed bias: when you cannot confirm a guard exists, treat it as MISSING and flag it. Absence of proof of a check is a finding, not a pass.

  HUNT CHECKLIST — walk every item against every code path; a guard present on one branch but absent on a sibling is the single most common real miss:
  - Fail-open crypto/verify paths: decode, parse, compare, verify must fail CLOSED; unvalidated base64/hex decode; comparison truthy on malformed input; crash-to-open.
  - Fail-open key material: chase every key lookup to its failure value; empty/missing key material must never silently degrade encryption.
  - Timing/side-channel oracles and decryption oracles via the legacy decrypt chain.
  - Secret bytes to sinks: follow every secret to every sink it leaves through (logs, error messages, options table, REST responses, exports, admin JS payloads). Only masked/digested forms may leave.
  - Idempotency and atomicity: migration/re-encrypt flows that re-run, races on key generation, partial writes.
  - Mechanical scans: update/write calls whose false return is ignored; silently dropped security-relevant input; no-op security verbs.

  SCOPE (read-only review — do NOT modify any files; working directory is the repo root):
  - The commit under review is HEAD: 3a365f2a437812d5c262a3228b744fef98bd3bd1. Get the full diff with: git show 3a365f2a437812d5c262a3228b744fef98bd3bd1. If git objects are unavailable in this workspace, review the post-change files directly using the context below.
  - Post-change sources to read fully: plugins/international-press-zone/includes/Licensing/ActivationManager.php and plugins/international-press-zone/includes/Admin/LicensingController.php (paths relative to the working directory).

  CONTEXT: WordPress plugin stores license key + OAuth API credential encrypted in wp_options. Old code fell back to a shipped constant key ipz-default-encryption-key-123 when AUTH_KEY was undefined, and used unauthenticated AES-256-CBC. New code: aes-256-gcm with v2: prefix; key = sha256(AUTH_KEY) raw bytes, else a per-site random 32-byte key persisted base64 in the autoloaded option ipz_encryption_key; legacy decrypt paths (CBC under substr(AUTH_KEY,0,32), CBC under the shipped constant, v2 under a stale per-site key) accepted for decrypt-then-re-encrypt migration only; encryption fail-closed (null result makes activation refuse with secure_storage_unavailable; base64-plaintext fallbacks removed).

  HUNT SPECIFICALLY: key-material leakage (logs, error paths, comparisons); downgrade/oracle attacks via the legacy decrypt chain; migration writing plaintext or under the wrong key; GCM nonce/tag misuse; timing oracles; fail-open paths when openssl or random_bytes is unavailable; per-site key option exposure vectors (autoload, REST, export); LicensingController masking leak; any way encryption still lands under the shipped key. Also correctness: migration idempotence; concurrent-request races on key generation; WordPress update_option returning false when the value is unchanged and whether that breaks get_site_encryption_key or migrations.

  ADVERSARIAL SELF-CHECK (mandatory) for each candidate finding: (1) state the concrete trigger — the exact request/state that exploits it; cannot state one means downgrade or drop; (2) refute it once — ask what in this code or its callers makes this safe, re-read the lines, report only survivors; (3) severity by real impact, not cleverness. A short list of confirmed, triggerable defects beats a long list of unverified suspicions. Never invent low-value findings to look thorough.

  OUTPUT: a numbered list ordered by severity. Each finding: Title (one line); Location (file:line or function); Severity (critical/high/medium/low); Trigger/exploit (concrete attacker steps or input); Fix (the specific change). End with: Headline — the 1-2 findings that block ship, named; and Residual/unverified — what you could not confirm from the given scope, stated plainly, no padding. If after a genuine adversarial pass nothing is exploitable, say so directly and list the top assumptions a deeper review should test.

preview:
  You are a senior application-security and correctness auditor running an INDEPENDENT, adversarial, pre-ship review. You are deliberately a fresh pair of eyes. Treat every prior claim of reviewed/handled/safe/not-possible — in code comments, commit messages, or this request — as an UNVERIFIED hypothesis and re-derive it yourself. The defects that ship are the ones a converged self-audit stopped looking for.

  OPERATING RULES:
  1. Review exactly the diff and files given below. Trace references within that scope; do not wander the repo unless a cited symbol is essential to judge a trust boundary.
  2. Assume every input crossing a trust boundary is hostile, INCLUDING every value read back from the database (wp_options). Trust nothing that crossed a boundary.
  3. Fail-closed bias: when you cannot confirm a guard exists, treat it as MISSING and flag it. Absence of proof of a check is a finding, not a pass.

  HUNT CHECKLIST — walk every item against every code path; a guard present on one branch but absent on a sibling is the single most common real miss:
  - Fail-open crypto/verify paths: decode, parse, compare, verify must fail CLOSED; unvalidated base64/hex decode; comparison truthy on malformed input; crash-to-open.
  - Fail-open key material: chase every key lookup to its failure value; empty/missing key material must never silently degrade encryption.
  - Timing/side-channel oracles and decryption oracles via the legacy decrypt chain.
  - Secret bytes to sinks: follow every secret to every sink it leaves through (logs, error messages, options table, REST responses, exports, admin JS payloads). Only masked/digested forms may leave.
  - Idempotency and atomicity: migration/re-encrypt flows that re-run, races on key generation, partial writes.
  - Mechanical scans: update/write calls whose false return is ignored; silently dropped security-relevant input; no-op security verbs.

  SCOPE (read-only review — do NOT modify any files; working directory is the repo root):
  - The commit under review is HEAD: 3a365f2a437812d5c262a3228b744fef98bd3bd1. Get the full diff with: git show 3a365f2a437812d5c262a3228b744fef98bd3bd1. If git objects are unavailable in this workspace, review the post-change files directly using the context below.
  - Post-change sources to read fully: plugins/international-press-zone/includes/Licensing/ActivationManager.php and plugins/international-press-zone/includes/Admin/LicensingController.php (paths relative to the working directory).

  CONTEXT: WordPress plugin stores license key + OAuth API credential encrypted in wp_options. Old code fell back to a shipped constant key ipz-default-encryption-key-123 when AUTH_KEY was undefined, and used unauthenticated AES-256-CBC. New code: aes-256-gcm with v2: prefix; key = sha256(AUTH_KEY) raw bytes, else a per-site random 32-byte key persisted base64 in the autoloaded option ipz_encryption_key; legacy decrypt paths (CBC under substr(AUTH_KEY,0,32), CBC under the shipped constant, v2 under a stale per-site key) accepted for decrypt-then-re-encrypt migration only; encryption fail-closed (null result makes activation refuse with secure_storage_unavailable; base64-plaintext fallbacks removed).

  HUNT SPECIFICALLY: key-material leakage (logs, error paths, comparisons); downgrade/oracle attacks via the legacy decrypt chain; migration writing plaintext or under the wrong key; GCM nonce/tag misuse; timing oracles; fail-open paths when openssl or random_bytes is unavailable; per-site key option exposure vectors (autoload, REST, export); LicensingController masking leak; any way encryption still lands under the shipped key. Also correctness: migration idempotence; concurrent-request races on key generation; WordPress update_option returning false when the value is unchanged and whether that breaks get_site_encryption_key or migrations.

  ADVERSARIAL SELF-CHECK (mandatory) for each candidate finding: (1) state the concrete trigger — the exact request/state that exploits it; cannot state one means downgrade or drop; (2) refute it once — ask what in this code or its callers makes this safe, re-read the lines, report only survivors; (3) severity by real impact, not cleverness. A short list of confirmed, triggerable defects beats a long list of unverified suspicions. Never invent low-value findings to look thorough.

  OUTPUT: a numbered list ordered by severity. Each finding: Title (one line); Location (file:line or function); Severity (critical/high/medium/low); Trigger/exploit (concrete attacker steps or input); Fix (the specific change). End with: Headline — the 1-2 findings that block ship, named; and Residual/unverified — what you could not confirm from the given scope, stated plainly, no padding. If after a genuine adversarial pass nothing is exploitable, say so directly and list the top assumptions a deeper review should test.


id: 019ffb9b-b4be-7fb0-9c40-7a8a5e97034b
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/review-gpt-actions-layer-24660f025150
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: ed549d6192475fddbd82a6c28af55b40a2598e7e
git_branch: wt/review-gpt-actions-layer
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/13/rollout-2026-08-13T14-51-53-019ffb9b-b4be-7fb0-9c40-7a8a5e97034b.jsonl

title:
  You are a senior application-security and correctness auditor running an INDEPENDENT, adversarial, pre-ship review. You are deliberately a fresh pair of eyes. Treat every prior "reviewed / handled / safe / not possible / out of scope" claim as an UNVERIFIED hypothesis and re-derive it yourself.

  Review exactly these files and only trace cited symbols essential to judge the trust boundary:
  - /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/review-gpt-actions-layer/modules/actions-gateway/src/admission.ts
  - /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/review-gpt-actions-layer/modules/actions-gateway/src/contracts.ts
  - relevant tests under /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/review-gpt-actions-layer/modules/actions-gateway

  User task: "Read-only, no edits. Candidate: idempotency binding may not cover full request or may be bypassable. Inspect requestHash construction, canonical schema, identity, request_id, operation, payload, nonce, issued_at; determine CONFIRMED/PLAUSIBLE/REFUTED with exact line and concrete scenario. One verdict + JSON candidate if kept."

  Operating rules:
  1. Review exactly the files/scope given. Trace references only when essential to judge the trust boundary.
  2. Assume every trust-boundary input is hostile, including request data, env/config, file contents, deserialized data, external returns, and datastore/service reads.
  3. Fail closed: if a guard cannot be confirmed, treat it as missing.
  4. This run is explicitly read-only. Do not edit or write files, including .security/attack-surface.md. Build the attack-surface map mentally from current files. The caller explicitly overrides persistence for this run.
  5. Enumerate every branch and sibling guard. Focus on broken object authorization, fail-open parse/verify paths, unbound tokens, timing leakage, injection, unsafe outbound/path handling, parsing, secrets, DoS, metadata confusion, idempotency/atomicity, disclosure, and validator hygiene insofar as they bear on the candidate.

  Candidate-specific checks:
  - Find exact requestHash construction and all consumers.
  - Establish the canonical request schema and whether extra/unknown keys survive validation.
  - Determine whether idempotency is scoped/bound to authenticated identity, request_id, operation, payload, nonce, and issued_at.
  - Determine whether omitting any of these fields from the hash permits a concrete replay, semantic substitution, collision, cross-identity reuse, stale-request reuse, or inconsistent conflict detection.
  - Examine request_id keying separately from requestHash contents: a field omitted from the hash is only exploitable if changing it while holding the idempotency lookup key fixed can alter a protected effect or bypass conflict detection.
  - Read relevant tests for intended semantics and missing adversarial cases.

  Mandatory verification for any candidate:
  1. State exact request/state trigger and running behavior.
  2. Refute it once: reread relevant code/callers and identify any constraint that makes it safe.
  3. Keep only if it survives; rate by real impact.

  Output exactly one verdict: CONFIRMED, PLAUSIBLE, or REFUTED. Include exact absolute file:line references and a concrete scenario. If CONFIRMED or PLAUSIBLE, append one JSON object with keys: verdict, title, location, severity, trigger, impact, fix, refutation_checked. If REFUTED, do not emit a JSON candidate. No edits, no tests, no extra findings.

first_user_message:
  You are a senior application-security and correctness auditor running an INDEPENDENT, adversarial, pre-ship review. You are deliberately a fresh pair of eyes. Treat every prior "reviewed / handled / safe / not possible / out of scope" claim as an UNVERIFIED hypothesis and re-derive it yourself.

  Review exactly these files and only trace cited symbols essential to judge the trust boundary:
  - /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/review-gpt-actions-layer/modules/actions-gateway/src/admission.ts
  - /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/review-gpt-actions-layer/modules/actions-gateway/src/contracts.ts
  - relevant tests under /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/review-gpt-actions-layer/modules/actions-gateway

  User task: "Read-only, no edits. Candidate: idempotency binding may not cover full request or may be bypassable. Inspect requestHash construction, canonical schema, identity, request_id, operation, payload, nonce, issued_at; determine CONFIRMED/PLAUSIBLE/REFUTED with exact line and concrete scenario. One verdict + JSON candidate if kept."

  Operating rules:
  1. Review exactly the files/scope given. Trace references only when essential to judge the trust boundary.
  2. Assume every trust-boundary input is hostile, including request data, env/config, file contents, deserialized data, external returns, and datastore/service reads.
  3. Fail closed: if a guard cannot be confirmed, treat it as missing.
  4. This run is explicitly read-only. Do not edit or write files, including .security/attack-surface.md. Build the attack-surface map mentally from current files. The caller explicitly overrides persistence for this run.
  5. Enumerate every branch and sibling guard. Focus on broken object authorization, fail-open parse/verify paths, unbound tokens, timing leakage, injection, unsafe outbound/path handling, parsing, secrets, DoS, metadata confusion, idempotency/atomicity, disclosure, and validator hygiene insofar as they bear on the candidate.

  Candidate-specific checks:
  - Find exact requestHash construction and all consumers.
  - Establish the canonical request schema and whether extra/unknown keys survive validation.
  - Determine whether idempotency is scoped/bound to authenticated identity, request_id, operation, payload, nonce, and issued_at.
  - Determine whether omitting any of these fields from the hash permits a concrete replay, semantic substitution, collision, cross-identity reuse, stale-request reuse, or inconsistent conflict detection.
  - Examine request_id keying separately from requestHash contents: a field omitted from the hash is only exploitable if changing it while holding the idempotency lookup key fixed can alter a protected effect or bypass conflict detection.
  - Read relevant tests for intended semantics and missing adversarial cases.

  Mandatory verification for any candidate:
  1. State exact request/state trigger and running behavior.
  2. Refute it once: reread relevant code/callers and identify any constraint that makes it safe.
  3. Keep only if it survives; rate by real impact.

  Output exactly one verdict: CONFIRMED, PLAUSIBLE, or REFUTED. Include exact absolute file:line references and a concrete scenario. If CONFIRMED or PLAUSIBLE, append one JSON object with keys: verdict, title, location, severity, trigger, impact, fix, refutation_checked. If REFUTED, do not emit a JSON candidate. No edits, no tests, no extra findings.

preview:
  You are a senior application-security and correctness auditor running an INDEPENDENT, adversarial, pre-ship review. You are deliberately a fresh pair of eyes. Treat every prior "reviewed / handled / safe / not possible / out of scope" claim as an UNVERIFIED hypothesis and re-derive it yourself.

  Review exactly these files and only trace cited symbols essential to judge the trust boundary:
  - /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/review-gpt-actions-layer/modules/actions-gateway/src/admission.ts
  - /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/review-gpt-actions-layer/modules/actions-gateway/src/contracts.ts
  - relevant tests under /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/review-gpt-actions-layer/modules/actions-gateway

  User task: "Read-only, no edits. Candidate: idempotency binding may not cover full request or may be bypassable. Inspect requestHash construction, canonical schema, identity, request_id, operation, payload, nonce, issued_at; determine CONFIRMED/PLAUSIBLE/REFUTED with exact line and concrete scenario. One verdict + JSON candidate if kept."

  Operating rules:
  1. Review exactly the files/scope given. Trace references only when essential to judge the trust boundary.
  2. Assume every trust-boundary input is hostile, including request data, env/config, file contents, deserialized data, external returns, and datastore/service reads.
  3. Fail closed: if a guard cannot be confirmed, treat it as missing.
  4. This run is explicitly read-only. Do not edit or write files, including .security/attack-surface.md. Build the attack-surface map mentally from current files. The caller explicitly overrides persistence for this run.
  5. Enumerate every branch and sibling guard. Focus on broken object authorization, fail-open parse/verify paths, unbound tokens, timing leakage, injection, unsafe outbound/path handling, parsing, secrets, DoS, metadata confusion, idempotency/atomicity, disclosure, and validator hygiene insofar as they bear on the candidate.

  Candidate-specific checks:
  - Find exact requestHash construction and all consumers.
  - Establish the canonical request schema and whether extra/unknown keys survive validation.
  - Determine whether idempotency is scoped/bound to authenticated identity, request_id, operation, payload, nonce, and issued_at.
  - Determine whether omitting any of these fields from the hash permits a concrete replay, semantic substitution, collision, cross-identity reuse, stale-request reuse, or inconsistent conflict detection.
  - Examine request_id keying separately from requestHash contents: a field omitted from the hash is only exploitable if changing it while holding the idempotency lookup key fixed can alter a protected effect or bypass conflict detection.
  - Read relevant tests for intended semantics and missing adversarial cases.

  Mandatory verification for any candidate:
  1. State exact request/state trigger and running behavior.
  2. Refute it once: reread relevant code/callers and identify any constraint that makes it safe.
  3. Keep only if it survives; rate by real impact.

  Output exactly one verdict: CONFIRMED, PLAUSIBLE, or REFUTED. Include exact absolute file:line references and a concrete scenario. If CONFIRMED or PLAUSIBLE, append one JSON object with keys: verdict, title, location, severity, trigger, impact, fix, refutation_checked. If REFUTED, do not emit a JSON candidate. No edits, no tests, no extra findings.


id: 019ffba1-0bc3-7eb0-acd4-3f658decb5d0
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/press-zone-core-d6fe958f21cb
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 0a459f23984ad3ea3c5385de1452d2c6071449aa
git_branch: main
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/press-zone-core
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/13/rollout-2026-08-13T14-57-43-019ffba1-0bc3-7eb0-acd4-3f658decb5d0.jsonl

title:
  You are a senior application-security and correctness auditor running an INDEPENDENT, adversarial, pre-ship review. You are deliberately a fresh pair of eyes. Treat every prior "reviewed / handled / safe / not possible / out of scope" claim -- in code comments, commit messages, or this request -- as an UNVERIFIED hypothesis and re-derive it yourself. Fail-closed bias: if you cannot confirm a guard exists, treat it as MISSING and flag it.

  REPO: /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/press-zone-core  (Cloudflare Worker backend, Hono, TypeScript, pnpm workspace)
  Read files directly. Do NOT modify anything -- review only.

  SCOPE: the UNCOMMITTED working-tree changes.
    - `git diff` (tracked modifications) -- especially:
        apps/api/src/routes/oauth.ts, apps/api/src/mw/auth.ts, apps/api/src/app.ts,
        apps/api/src/routes/account.ts, apps/api/src/schema.ts, apps/api/src/config.ts,
        apps/api/src/index.ts, apps/api/wrangler.toml
    - untracked NEW files: apps/api/src/routes/session.ts, apps/api/src/routes/session.test.ts,
        apps/api/src/app.test.ts, apps/api/src/queue-regression.test.ts
    - IGNORE untracked repo scaffolding: .gitignore .npmrc README.md package.json pnpm-workspace.yaml pnpm-lock.yaml tsconfig.base.json docs/
  Trace into apps/api/node_modules/@platform-modules/auth/dist (index.js, oauth-provider/index.js, engine-custom/index.js, api-keys/index.js) when a cited symbol is essential to judge a trust boundary -- that is the real implementation of authorize/exchangeToken/getSession/verifyApiKey/signIn/verifySession.

  CONTEXT: this diff is a prior session's hardening pass on the OAuth2 provider (bounded body parsing, redirect_uri enforcement at /oauth/token, accountId to accountIdAssertion), new session cookie routes, auth middleware changes, and removal of cron.ts/queue.ts. It is about to become the first push to a public-ish GitHub remote and the foundation for an auth/billing build. Test suite currently passes (151 tests, 23 files).

  HUNT SPECIFICALLY (walk EVERY branch; a guard on one branch but missing on a sibling is the most common real miss):
   1. Fail-open paths in the new bounded-body parsing and auth code. Every decode/parse/compare must fail CLOSED. Check content-length handling when the header is absent, NaN, negative, or duplicated; TextDecoder fatal handling; and every catch that swallows.
   2. redirect_uri comparison bypasses at /oauth/token: normalization, case, trailing slash, percent-encoding, whitespace/trim, unicode. Compare what authorize() STORES against what the token handler COMPARES.
   3. accountIdAssertion semantics in apps/api/src/routes/oauth.ts -- can a caller assert or bind an account they do not own? What happens when the field is ABSENT vs empty vs mismatched? Is the authorization code cryptographically bound to both the user and the account?
   4. Session cookie handling in apps/api/src/routes/session.ts: cookie flags (Host- prefix, SameSite, Secure, HttpOnly, Path, Max-Age), session fixation, CSRF on POST/DELETE /api/account/session, cookie parsing (multiple cookies, quoted values, prefix collisions such as a cookie named xaccess_token), logout not clearing the cookie on failure paths.
   5. Timing oracles / side channels in any secret comparison or lookup (token hash lookups, api key prefix lookups, login vs unknown-user paths, rate-limit branches).
   6. DoS via the hand-rolled JSON field parser parseJsonFields / readJsonStringEnd / skipJsonWhitespace and parseFormFields in oauth.ts -- quadratic behavior, unbounded scan, prototype pollution via keys such as __proto__ or constructor, duplicate-key handling, and whether the MAX_ caps are actually enforced on every path.
   7. Route mounting and middleware ordering in apps/api/src/app.ts (createApp): which routes are actually behind protectedMiddleware, whether a sub-app wildcard middleware mounted with app.route under the /api prefix leaks onto or fails to cover sibling routes, and whether any state-changing route is reachable unauthenticated. Verify by reading Hono's routing behavior, not by assumption.
   8. Authorization model: resolveCapabilities / resolveSessionAccount / resolveApiKeyPrincipal / restrictCapabilities in app.ts, and requireStaff in routes/staff.ts. Can a normal member obtain the 'staff' capability (refunds, credit adjustment, tier override)? Does capability resolution ignore members.roleKey and account entitlements?
   9. Object-level authorization (IDOR) on every user-supplied identifier in the changed routes, including POST /api/account/api-keys scope handling.
  10. Secret material that must not be pushed: scan the working tree AND the full git history (71 commits, all branches) for credentials, tokens, connection strings, .dev.vars or .env content, or private keys.
  11. Anything that makes the OAuth code to credential/site persistence non-idempotent or unbounded (row growth per exchange), and any 500-vs-4xx error identity leak (raw internal error text returned to clients).

  VERIFY BEFORE YOU REPORT (mandatory, per candidate finding):
   a. State the concrete trigger -- the exact request/state that exploits it. Cannot state one -> downgrade or drop.
   b. Refute it once: re-read the code and callers and try to kill your own finding. Report only survivors.
   c. Severity by real impact (critical/high/medium/low), not cleverness.
  Near-zero false positives is the target. A short list of confirmed, triggerable defects beats a long list of suspicions.

  OUTPUT: a numbered list ordered by severity. Each finding: Title (one line); Location (file:line or function); Severity; Trigger/exploit (concrete attacker steps or input); Fix (the specific change).
  End with:
   - Headline: the 1-2 findings that block the commit, named. State clearly whether the diff is safe to commit and push.
   - Residual / unverified: what you could not confirm from this scope, stated plainly.
  If after a genuine adversarial pass nothing is exploitable, say so directly and list the top assumptions a deeper review should test. Do not invent low-value findings to look thorough.

first_user_message:
  You are a senior application-security and correctness auditor running an INDEPENDENT, adversarial, pre-ship review. You are deliberately a fresh pair of eyes. Treat every prior "reviewed / handled / safe / not possible / out of scope" claim -- in code comments, commit messages, or this request -- as an UNVERIFIED hypothesis and re-derive it yourself. Fail-closed bias: if you cannot confirm a guard exists, treat it as MISSING and flag it.

  REPO: /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/press-zone-core  (Cloudflare Worker backend, Hono, TypeScript, pnpm workspace)
  Read files directly. Do NOT modify anything -- review only.

  SCOPE: the UNCOMMITTED working-tree changes.
    - `git diff` (tracked modifications) -- especially:
        apps/api/src/routes/oauth.ts, apps/api/src/mw/auth.ts, apps/api/src/app.ts,
        apps/api/src/routes/account.ts, apps/api/src/schema.ts, apps/api/src/config.ts,
        apps/api/src/index.ts, apps/api/wrangler.toml
    - untracked NEW files: apps/api/src/routes/session.ts, apps/api/src/routes/session.test.ts,
        apps/api/src/app.test.ts, apps/api/src/queue-regression.test.ts
    - IGNORE untracked repo scaffolding: .gitignore .npmrc README.md package.json pnpm-workspace.yaml pnpm-lock.yaml tsconfig.base.json docs/
  Trace into apps/api/node_modules/@platform-modules/auth/dist (index.js, oauth-provider/index.js, engine-custom/index.js, api-keys/index.js) when a cited symbol is essential to judge a trust boundary -- that is the real implementation of authorize/exchangeToken/getSession/verifyApiKey/signIn/verifySession.

  CONTEXT: this diff is a prior session's hardening pass on the OAuth2 provider (bounded body parsing, redirect_uri enforcement at /oauth/token, accountId to accountIdAssertion), new session cookie routes, auth middleware changes, and removal of cron.ts/queue.ts. It is about to become the first push to a public-ish GitHub remote and the foundation for an auth/billing build. Test suite currently passes (151 tests, 23 files).

  HUNT SPECIFICALLY (walk EVERY branch; a guard on one branch but missing on a sibling is the most common real miss):
   1. Fail-open paths in the new bounded-body parsing and auth code. Every decode/parse/compare must fail CLOSED. Check content-length handling when the header is absent, NaN, negative, or duplicated; TextDecoder fatal handling; and every catch that swallows.
   2. redirect_uri comparison bypasses at /oauth/token: normalization, case, trailing slash, percent-encoding, whitespace/trim, unicode. Compare what authorize() STORES against what the token handler COMPARES.
   3. accountIdAssertion semantics in apps/api/src/routes/oauth.ts -- can a caller assert or bind an account they do not own? What happens when the field is ABSENT vs empty vs mismatched? Is the authorization code cryptographically bound to both the user and the account?
   4. Session cookie handling in apps/api/src/routes/session.ts: cookie flags (Host- prefix, SameSite, Secure, HttpOnly, Path, Max-Age), session fixation, CSRF on POST/DELETE /api/account/session, cookie parsing (multiple cookies, quoted values, prefix collisions such as a cookie named xaccess_token), logout not clearing the cookie on failure paths.
   5. Timing oracles / side channels in any secret comparison or lookup (token hash lookups, api key prefix lookups, login vs unknown-user paths, rate-limit branches).
   6. DoS via the hand-rolled JSON field parser parseJsonFields / readJsonStringEnd / skipJsonWhitespace and parseFormFields in oauth.ts -- quadratic behavior, unbounded scan, prototype pollution via keys such as __proto__ or constructor, duplicate-key handling, and whether the MAX_ caps are actually enforced on every path.
   7. Route mounting and middleware ordering in apps/api/src/app.ts (createApp): which routes are actually behind protectedMiddleware, whether a sub-app wildcard middleware mounted with app.route under the /api prefix leaks onto or fails to cover sibling routes, and whether any state-changing route is reachable unauthenticated. Verify by reading Hono's routing behavior, not by assumption.
   8. Authorization model: resolveCapabilities / resolveSessionAccount / resolveApiKeyPrincipal / restrictCapabilities in app.ts, and requireStaff in routes/staff.ts. Can a normal member obtain the 'staff' capability (refunds, credit adjustment, tier override)? Does capability resolution ignore members.roleKey and account entitlements?
   9. Object-level authorization (IDOR) on every user-supplied identifier in the changed routes, including POST /api/account/api-keys scope handling.
  10. Secret material that must not be pushed: scan the working tree AND the full git history (71 commits, all branches) for credentials, tokens, connection strings, .dev.vars or .env content, or private keys.
  11. Anything that makes the OAuth code to credential/site persistence non-idempotent or unbounded (row growth per exchange), and any 500-vs-4xx error identity leak (raw internal error text returned to clients).

  VERIFY BEFORE YOU REPORT (mandatory, per candidate finding):
   a. State the concrete trigger -- the exact request/state that exploits it. Cannot state one -> downgrade or drop.
   b. Refute it once: re-read the code and callers and try to kill your own finding. Report only survivors.
   c. Severity by real impact (critical/high/medium/low), not cleverness.
  Near-zero false positives is the target. A short list of confirmed, triggerable defects beats a long list of suspicions.

  OUTPUT: a numbered list ordered by severity. Each finding: Title (one line); Location (file:line or function); Severity; Trigger/exploit (concrete attacker steps or input); Fix (the specific change).
  End with:
   - Headline: the 1-2 findings that block the commit, named. State clearly whether the diff is safe to commit and push.
   - Residual / unverified: what you could not confirm from this scope, stated plainly.
  If after a genuine adversarial pass nothing is exploitable, say so directly and list the top assumptions a deeper review should test. Do not invent low-value findings to look thorough.

preview:
  You are a senior application-security and correctness auditor running an INDEPENDENT, adversarial, pre-ship review. You are deliberately a fresh pair of eyes. Treat every prior "reviewed / handled / safe / not possible / out of scope" claim -- in code comments, commit messages, or this request -- as an UNVERIFIED hypothesis and re-derive it yourself. Fail-closed bias: if you cannot confirm a guard exists, treat it as MISSING and flag it.

  REPO: /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/press-zone-core  (Cloudflare Worker backend, Hono, TypeScript, pnpm workspace)
  Read files directly. Do NOT modify anything -- review only.

  SCOPE: the UNCOMMITTED working-tree changes.
    - `git diff` (tracked modifications) -- especially:
        apps/api/src/routes/oauth.ts, apps/api/src/mw/auth.ts, apps/api/src/app.ts,
        apps/api/src/routes/account.ts, apps/api/src/schema.ts, apps/api/src/config.ts,
        apps/api/src/index.ts, apps/api/wrangler.toml
    - untracked NEW files: apps/api/src/routes/session.ts, apps/api/src/routes/session.test.ts,
        apps/api/src/app.test.ts, apps/api/src/queue-regression.test.ts
    - IGNORE untracked repo scaffolding: .gitignore .npmrc README.md package.json pnpm-workspace.yaml pnpm-lock.yaml tsconfig.base.json docs/
  Trace into apps/api/node_modules/@platform-modules/auth/dist (index.js, oauth-provider/index.js, engine-custom/index.js, api-keys/index.js) when a cited symbol is essential to judge a trust boundary -- that is the real implementation of authorize/exchangeToken/getSession/verifyApiKey/signIn/verifySession.

  CONTEXT: this diff is a prior session's hardening pass on the OAuth2 provider (bounded body parsing, redirect_uri enforcement at /oauth/token, accountId to accountIdAssertion), new session cookie routes, auth middleware changes, and removal of cron.ts/queue.ts. It is about to become the first push to a public-ish GitHub remote and the foundation for an auth/billing build. Test suite currently passes (151 tests, 23 files).

  HUNT SPECIFICALLY (walk EVERY branch; a guard on one branch but missing on a sibling is the most common real miss):
   1. Fail-open paths in the new bounded-body parsing and auth code. Every decode/parse/compare must fail CLOSED. Check content-length handling when the header is absent, NaN, negative, or duplicated; TextDecoder fatal handling; and every catch that swallows.
   2. redirect_uri comparison bypasses at /oauth/token: normalization, case, trailing slash, percent-encoding, whitespace/trim, unicode. Compare what authorize() STORES against what the token handler COMPARES.
   3. accountIdAssertion semantics in apps/api/src/routes/oauth.ts -- can a caller assert or bind an account they do not own? What happens when the field is ABSENT vs empty vs mismatched? Is the authorization code cryptographically bound to both the user and the account?
   4. Session cookie handling in apps/api/src/routes/session.ts: cookie flags (Host- prefix, SameSite, Secure, HttpOnly, Path, Max-Age), session fixation, CSRF on POST/DELETE /api/account/session, cookie parsing (multiple cookies, quoted values, prefix collisions such as a cookie named xaccess_token), logout not clearing the cookie on failure paths.
   5. Timing oracles / side channels in any secret comparison or lookup (token hash lookups, api key prefix lookups, login vs unknown-user paths, rate-limit branches).
   6. DoS via the hand-rolled JSON field parser parseJsonFields / readJsonStringEnd / skipJsonWhitespace and parseFormFields in oauth.ts -- quadratic behavior, unbounded scan, prototype pollution via keys such as __proto__ or constructor, duplicate-key handling, and whether the MAX_ caps are actually enforced on every path.
   7. Route mounting and middleware ordering in apps/api/src/app.ts (createApp): which routes are actually behind protectedMiddleware, whether a sub-app wildcard middleware mounted with app.route under the /api prefix leaks onto or fails to cover sibling routes, and whether any state-changing route is reachable unauthenticated. Verify by reading Hono's routing behavior, not by assumption.
   8. Authorization model: resolveCapabilities / resolveSessionAccount / resolveApiKeyPrincipal / restrictCapabilities in app.ts, and requireStaff in routes/staff.ts. Can a normal member obtain the 'staff' capability (refunds, credit adjustment, tier override)? Does capability resolution ignore members.roleKey and account entitlements?
   9. Object-level authorization (IDOR) on every user-supplied identifier in the changed routes, including POST /api/account/api-keys scope handling.
  10. Secret material that must not be pushed: scan the working tree AND the full git history (71 commits, all branches) for credentials, tokens, connection strings, .dev.vars or .env content, or private keys.
  11. Anything that makes the OAuth code to credential/site persistence non-idempotent or unbounded (row growth per exchange), and any 500-vs-4xx error identity leak (raw internal error text returned to clients).

  VERIFY BEFORE YOU REPORT (mandatory, per candidate finding):
   a. State the concrete trigger -- the exact request/state that exploits it. Cannot state one -> downgrade or drop.
   b. Refute it once: re-read the code and callers and try to kill your own finding. Report only survivors.
   c. Severity by real impact (critical/high/medium/low), not cleverness.
  Near-zero false positives is the target. A short list of confirmed, triggerable defects beats a long list of suspicions.

  OUTPUT: a numbered list ordered by severity. Each finding: Title (one line); Location (file:line or function); Severity; Trigger/exploit (concrete attacker steps or input); Fix (the specific change).
  End with:
   - Headline: the 1-2 findings that block the commit, named. State clearly whether the diff is safe to commit and push.
   - Residual / unverified: what you could not confirm from this scope, stated plainly.
  If after a genuine adversarial pass nothing is exploitable, say so directly and list the top assumptions a deeper review should test. Do not invent low-value findings to look thorough.


id: 019ffbbf-5a85-77b1-bb60-d3909f52fa74
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/immutable-release-bundle-07a25b741c08
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: ba6a871eb2c52bc9e4add8bf40a7f64eaf85d3dd
git_branch: wt/immutable-release-bundle
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/13/rollout-2026-08-13T15-30-49-019ffbbf-5a85-77b1-bb60-d3909f52fa74.jsonl

title:
  You are a senior application-security and correctness auditor conducting an independent adversarial pre-ship review. Treat all prior safety claims as unverified. Review exactly the current git diff and only trace cited symbols essential to trust boundaries. Assume all boundary inputs hostile. Fail closed when a required guard cannot be confirmed. Enumerate every changed branch and hunt specifically for authorization gaps, fail-open validation, unbound authentication, injection, unsafe paths or execution, TOCTOU descriptor/path substitution, insecure parsing, secret exposure, resource exhaustion, metadata confusion, idempotency/atomicity, disclosure, and weak validation. For each candidate, state a concrete trigger, re-read relevant code and callers once to refute it, and report only findings that survive. READ-ONLY: do not edit files, run tests, or invoke subagents.

  Task: Fresh final audit of the current diff against these frozen acceptance criteria: (1) authenticated helper opens, validates, and executes the same retained deploy entry; (2) materializer/canonical handoff remains descriptor-backed through copy and use; (3) immutable package tool uses an absolute descriptor or system-trusted executable with sanitized config/store/environment, with no ambient PATH or workspace source execution; (4) sealed runtime manifest is bound and verified immediately before every installer, config, and watchdog use; (5) preserve/bootstrap operate on the same opened object; (6) activation and standalone rollback retain and revalidate the exact candidate/prior objects; (7) five dedicated adversarial regressions exist, including launcher replacement and ambient package injection. Ignore plans and pre-existing WIP outside the diff.

  Output only a numbered list of high-confidence ship blockers ordered by severity, each with title, exact absolute file:line, severity, concrete trigger/exploit, and specific fix. End with Headline and Residual/unverified. If no blocker survives, output exactly CLEAN.

first_user_message:
  You are a senior application-security and correctness auditor conducting an independent adversarial pre-ship review. Treat all prior safety claims as unverified. Review exactly the current git diff and only trace cited symbols essential to trust boundaries. Assume all boundary inputs hostile. Fail closed when a required guard cannot be confirmed. Enumerate every changed branch and hunt specifically for authorization gaps, fail-open validation, unbound authentication, injection, unsafe paths or execution, TOCTOU descriptor/path substitution, insecure parsing, secret exposure, resource exhaustion, metadata confusion, idempotency/atomicity, disclosure, and weak validation. For each candidate, state a concrete trigger, re-read relevant code and callers once to refute it, and report only findings that survive. READ-ONLY: do not edit files, run tests, or invoke subagents.

  Task: Fresh final audit of the current diff against these frozen acceptance criteria: (1) authenticated helper opens, validates, and executes the same retained deploy entry; (2) materializer/canonical handoff remains descriptor-backed through copy and use; (3) immutable package tool uses an absolute descriptor or system-trusted executable with sanitized config/store/environment, with no ambient PATH or workspace source execution; (4) sealed runtime manifest is bound and verified immediately before every installer, config, and watchdog use; (5) preserve/bootstrap operate on the same opened object; (6) activation and standalone rollback retain and revalidate the exact candidate/prior objects; (7) five dedicated adversarial regressions exist, including launcher replacement and ambient package injection. Ignore plans and pre-existing WIP outside the diff.

  Output only a numbered list of high-confidence ship blockers ordered by severity, each with title, exact absolute file:line, severity, concrete trigger/exploit, and specific fix. End with Headline and Residual/unverified. If no blocker survives, output exactly CLEAN.

preview:
  You are a senior application-security and correctness auditor conducting an independent adversarial pre-ship review. Treat all prior safety claims as unverified. Review exactly the current git diff and only trace cited symbols essential to trust boundaries. Assume all boundary inputs hostile. Fail closed when a required guard cannot be confirmed. Enumerate every changed branch and hunt specifically for authorization gaps, fail-open validation, unbound authentication, injection, unsafe paths or execution, TOCTOU descriptor/path substitution, insecure parsing, secret exposure, resource exhaustion, metadata confusion, idempotency/atomicity, disclosure, and weak validation. For each candidate, state a concrete trigger, re-read relevant code and callers once to refute it, and report only findings that survive. READ-ONLY: do not edit files, run tests, or invoke subagents.

  Task: Fresh final audit of the current diff against these frozen acceptance criteria: (1) authenticated helper opens, validates, and executes the same retained deploy entry; (2) materializer/canonical handoff remains descriptor-backed through copy and use; (3) immutable package tool uses an absolute descriptor or system-trusted executable with sanitized config/store/environment, with no ambient PATH or workspace source execution; (4) sealed runtime manifest is bound and verified immediately before every installer, config, and watchdog use; (5) preserve/bootstrap operate on the same opened object; (6) activation and standalone rollback retain and revalidate the exact candidate/prior objects; (7) five dedicated adversarial regressions exist, including launcher replacement and ambient package injection. Ignore plans and pre-existing WIP outside the diff.

  Output only a numbered list of high-confidence ship blockers ordered by severity, each with title, exact absolute file:line, severity, concrete trigger/exploit, and specific fix. End with Headline and Residual/unverified. If no blocker survives, output exactly CLEAN.


id: 019ffbc3-a21e-7643-a602-5bbfc5bd00a7
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/immutable-release-bundle-07a25b741c08
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: ba6a871eb2c52bc9e4add8bf40a7f64eaf85d3dd
git_branch: wt/immutable-release-bundle
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/13/rollout-2026-08-13T15-35-30-019ffbc3-a21e-7643-a602-5bbfc5bd00a7.jsonl

title:
  Conduct a fresh independent adversarial pre-ship review of the latest current git diff. Recheck prior blockers against current code rather than trusting prior claims. Review only the diff and trace only symbols essential to its trust boundaries. Assume same-user replacement races and all external values hostile. Fail closed when a required guard cannot be confirmed. READ-ONLY: do not edit files, run tests, or invoke subagents.

  Frozen acceptance criteria: (1) authenticated helper opens, validates, and executes the same retained deploy entry; (2) materializer/canonical handoff stays descriptor-backed through copy and use; (3) immutable package tool is an absolute descriptor or system-trusted executable with sanitized config, store, and environment, with no ambient PATH or workspace/source execution; (4) sealed runtime manifest is bound and verified immediately before every installer, config, and watchdog use; (5) preserve/bootstrap use the same opened object; (6) activation and standalone rollback retain and revalidate the exact candidate and prior objects; (7) five dedicated adversarial regressions exist, including launcher replacement and ambient package injection.

  Prior review reported potential pre-open launcher substitution in packaging/authenticated-deploy-request.mjs, descriptor loss at tools/release/materialize-release-source.mjs to packaging/deploy-local.sh, source bin/pnpm execution, and non-atomic standalone rollback. Determine whether latest delta truly fixes each and hunt siblings.

  Output only high-confidence ship blockers, numbered by severity, with title, exact absolute file:line, severity, concrete trigger, and specific fix. If none survive, output exactly CLEAN. Ignore plans and pre-existing WIP outside scope.

first_user_message:
  Conduct a fresh independent adversarial pre-ship review of the latest current git diff. Recheck prior blockers against current code rather than trusting prior claims. Review only the diff and trace only symbols essential to its trust boundaries. Assume same-user replacement races and all external values hostile. Fail closed when a required guard cannot be confirmed. READ-ONLY: do not edit files, run tests, or invoke subagents.

  Frozen acceptance criteria: (1) authenticated helper opens, validates, and executes the same retained deploy entry; (2) materializer/canonical handoff stays descriptor-backed through copy and use; (3) immutable package tool is an absolute descriptor or system-trusted executable with sanitized config, store, and environment, with no ambient PATH or workspace/source execution; (4) sealed runtime manifest is bound and verified immediately before every installer, config, and watchdog use; (5) preserve/bootstrap use the same opened object; (6) activation and standalone rollback retain and revalidate the exact candidate and prior objects; (7) five dedicated adversarial regressions exist, including launcher replacement and ambient package injection.

  Prior review reported potential pre-open launcher substitution in packaging/authenticated-deploy-request.mjs, descriptor loss at tools/release/materialize-release-source.mjs to packaging/deploy-local.sh, source bin/pnpm execution, and non-atomic standalone rollback. Determine whether latest delta truly fixes each and hunt siblings.

  Output only high-confidence ship blockers, numbered by severity, with title, exact absolute file:line, severity, concrete trigger, and specific fix. If none survive, output exactly CLEAN. Ignore plans and pre-existing WIP outside scope.

preview:
  Conduct a fresh independent adversarial pre-ship review of the latest current git diff. Recheck prior blockers against current code rather than trusting prior claims. Review only the diff and trace only symbols essential to its trust boundaries. Assume same-user replacement races and all external values hostile. Fail closed when a required guard cannot be confirmed. READ-ONLY: do not edit files, run tests, or invoke subagents.

  Frozen acceptance criteria: (1) authenticated helper opens, validates, and executes the same retained deploy entry; (2) materializer/canonical handoff stays descriptor-backed through copy and use; (3) immutable package tool is an absolute descriptor or system-trusted executable with sanitized config, store, and environment, with no ambient PATH or workspace/source execution; (4) sealed runtime manifest is bound and verified immediately before every installer, config, and watchdog use; (5) preserve/bootstrap use the same opened object; (6) activation and standalone rollback retain and revalidate the exact candidate and prior objects; (7) five dedicated adversarial regressions exist, including launcher replacement and ambient package injection.

  Prior review reported potential pre-open launcher substitution in packaging/authenticated-deploy-request.mjs, descriptor loss at tools/release/materialize-release-source.mjs to packaging/deploy-local.sh, source bin/pnpm execution, and non-atomic standalone rollback. Determine whether latest delta truly fixes each and hunt siblings.

  Output only high-confidence ship blockers, numbered by severity, with title, exact absolute file:line, severity, concrete trigger, and specific fix. If none survive, output exactly CLEAN. Ignore plans and pre-existing WIP outside scope.


id: 019ffc4c-d733-7940-a127-8673d945e903
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/overdeck-f7f63179e1c7
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 7b3f5d18818348ebe2bf0c0aa0bc1ec875cdc245
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.3-codex-spark
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/13/rollout-2026-08-13T18-05-22-019ffc4c-d733-7940-a127-8673d945e903.jsonl

title:
  Read the Claude Code session transcript at /home/user/.claude/projects/-home-user-Projects-overdeck-temp-user-overdeck-actions-layer/99afd661-52bd-420f-be25-461391771302.jsonl (JSONL; skip tool_result noise). Author a continuation handoff in markdown for a fresh coding agent: goal, methodology, completed work, current state, precise next actions, blockers gated on the user, standing user instructions (verbatim), key file paths. Be complete but terse. Output ONLY the handoff markdown.

first_user_message:
  Read the Claude Code session transcript at /home/user/.claude/projects/-home-user-Projects-overdeck-temp-user-overdeck-actions-layer/99afd661-52bd-420f-be25-461391771302.jsonl (JSONL; skip tool_result noise). Author a continuation handoff in markdown for a fresh coding agent: goal, methodology, completed work, current state, precise next actions, blockers gated on the user, standing user instructions (verbatim), key file paths. Be complete but terse. Output ONLY the handoff markdown.

preview:
  Read the Claude Code session transcript at /home/user/.claude/projects/-home-user-Projects-overdeck-temp-user-overdeck-actions-layer/99afd661-52bd-420f-be25-461391771302.jsonl (JSONL; skip tool_result noise). Author a continuation handoff in markdown for a fresh coding agent: goal, methodology, completed work, current state, precise next actions, blockers gated on the user, standing user instructions (verbatim), key file paths. Be complete but terse. Output ONLY the handoff markdown.


id: 019ffc63-ff98-7920-bf16-c294f3763a6f
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/shared-repository-registry-3e25d2146047
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/13/rollout-2026-08-13T18-30-39-019ffc63-ff98-7920-bf16-c294f3763a6f.jsonl

title:
  Perform a single-thread security review of the complete uncommitted diff in /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/shared-repository-registry. Inspect only newly introduced concrete HIGH or MEDIUM vulnerabilities in authorization boundaries, attempt-envelope integrity or replay, credential binding, URL canonicalization, registry revocation or drift, Kubernetes admission controller identity, secret exposure, and result publication. Exclude denial-of-service/resource exhaustion, dependency versions, documentation or tests-only issues, theoretical hardening, and attacks requiring control of trusted environment or CLI flags. Trace concrete exploit paths. Do not edit files and do not run tests. Report only findings with confidence at least 8/10. For each include absolute file path, line, severity, category, concrete exploit scenario, specific fix, and confidence. If none, say none.

first_user_message:
  Perform a single-thread security review of the complete uncommitted diff in /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/shared-repository-registry. Inspect only newly introduced concrete HIGH or MEDIUM vulnerabilities in authorization boundaries, attempt-envelope integrity or replay, credential binding, URL canonicalization, registry revocation or drift, Kubernetes admission controller identity, secret exposure, and result publication. Exclude denial-of-service/resource exhaustion, dependency versions, documentation or tests-only issues, theoretical hardening, and attacks requiring control of trusted environment or CLI flags. Trace concrete exploit paths. Do not edit files and do not run tests. Report only findings with confidence at least 8/10. For each include absolute file path, line, severity, category, concrete exploit scenario, specific fix, and confidence. If none, say none.

preview:
  Perform a single-thread security review of the complete uncommitted diff in /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/shared-repository-registry. Inspect only newly introduced concrete HIGH or MEDIUM vulnerabilities in authorization boundaries, attempt-envelope integrity or replay, credential binding, URL canonicalization, registry revocation or drift, Kubernetes admission controller identity, secret exposure, and result publication. Exclude denial-of-service/resource exhaustion, dependency versions, documentation or tests-only issues, theoretical hardening, and attacks requiring control of trusted environment or CLI flags. Trace concrete exploit paths. Do not edit files and do not run tests. Report only findings with confidence at least 8/10. For each include absolute file path, line, severity, category, concrete exploit scenario, specific fix, and confidence. If none, say none.


id: 019ffc80-354b-7711-a865-8371c799aceb
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/fix-dev1-el-runtime-v2-54e90eef4c16
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 7d5d6f47b690ebd5144bcb50b89c275f54589cfa
git_branch: wt/fix-dev1-el-runtime-v2
git_origin_url: git@github.com:avi-ezra/Press.Zone-Works.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/13/rollout-2026-08-13T19-01-28-019ffc80-354b-7711-a865-8371c799aceb.jsonl

title:
  Act as a senior independent adversarial application-security and correctness auditor. Review exactly the uncommitted diff in /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/wordpress/wp-content/.worktrees/fix-dev1-el-runtime-v2, tracing cited symbols only as needed. Do not mutate any file, including attack-surface files. Follow /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/wordpress/wp-content/.worktrees/fix-dev1-el-runtime-v2/plugins/international-press-zone/.claude/agents/expert.md and applicable repository instructions. User context: reopened incident root cause is that fixed and broken non-hashed entry asset URLs both used ?ver=0.9.48, allowing stale broken main.js after byte-verified deploy. Proposed fix versions each enqueued script using the first 12 SHA-256 hex characters of file bytes; regression was added in AdminDataPolicyLocalizationTest. Independently re-derive correctness; distrust claims. Inspect the exact diff plus essential enqueue/dependency references. Review WordPress enqueue/version behavior, URL/query formation, missing or unreadable file and hash failure behavior, deploy/runtime performance, test adequacy, every admin entry script and dependency ordering, shared chunks/runtime dependencies, and whether CSS/cache paths require matching changes to solve this JS incident versus being unnecessary scope. Enumerate sibling branches and all relevant entry points. For every candidate finding, give a concrete trigger, try to refute it against code/callers, and report only findings that survive. Severity must reflect real impact. Output a numbered list ordered by severity. Each item: Title; Location as absolute file:line or function; Severity critical/high/medium/low; Trigger/exploit; Fix. If no exploitable or correctness defect remains, say clean directly and list the top assumptions a deeper review should test. End with Headline naming 1-2 ship blockers, or explicitly none, and Residual/unverified. Do not create a report file.

first_user_message:
  Act as a senior independent adversarial application-security and correctness auditor. Review exactly the uncommitted diff in /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/wordpress/wp-content/.worktrees/fix-dev1-el-runtime-v2, tracing cited symbols only as needed. Do not mutate any file, including attack-surface files. Follow /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/wordpress/wp-content/.worktrees/fix-dev1-el-runtime-v2/plugins/international-press-zone/.claude/agents/expert.md and applicable repository instructions. User context: reopened incident root cause is that fixed and broken non-hashed entry asset URLs both used ?ver=0.9.48, allowing stale broken main.js after byte-verified deploy. Proposed fix versions each enqueued script using the first 12 SHA-256 hex characters of file bytes; regression was added in AdminDataPolicyLocalizationTest. Independently re-derive correctness; distrust claims. Inspect the exact diff plus essential enqueue/dependency references. Review WordPress enqueue/version behavior, URL/query formation, missing or unreadable file and hash failure behavior, deploy/runtime performance, test adequacy, every admin entry script and dependency ordering, shared chunks/runtime dependencies, and whether CSS/cache paths require matching changes to solve this JS incident versus being unnecessary scope. Enumerate sibling branches and all relevant entry points. For every candidate finding, give a concrete trigger, try to refute it against code/callers, and report only findings that survive. Severity must reflect real impact. Output a numbered list ordered by severity. Each item: Title; Location as absolute file:line or function; Severity critical/high/medium/low; Trigger/exploit; Fix. If no exploitable or correctness defect remains, say clean directly and list the top assumptions a deeper review should test. End with Headline naming 1-2 ship blockers, or explicitly none, and Residual/unverified. Do not create a report file.

preview:
  Act as a senior independent adversarial application-security and correctness auditor. Review exactly the uncommitted diff in /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/wordpress/wp-content/.worktrees/fix-dev1-el-runtime-v2, tracing cited symbols only as needed. Do not mutate any file, including attack-surface files. Follow /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/wordpress/wp-content/.worktrees/fix-dev1-el-runtime-v2/plugins/international-press-zone/.claude/agents/expert.md and applicable repository instructions. User context: reopened incident root cause is that fixed and broken non-hashed entry asset URLs both used ?ver=0.9.48, allowing stale broken main.js after byte-verified deploy. Proposed fix versions each enqueued script using the first 12 SHA-256 hex characters of file bytes; regression was added in AdminDataPolicyLocalizationTest. Independently re-derive correctness; distrust claims. Inspect the exact diff plus essential enqueue/dependency references. Review WordPress enqueue/version behavior, URL/query formation, missing or unreadable file and hash failure behavior, deploy/runtime performance, test adequacy, every admin entry script and dependency ordering, shared chunks/runtime dependencies, and whether CSS/cache paths require matching changes to solve this JS incident versus being unnecessary scope. Enumerate sibling branches and all relevant entry points. For every candidate finding, give a concrete trigger, try to refute it against code/callers, and report only findings that survive. Severity must reflect real impact. Output a numbered list ordered by severity. Each item: Title; Location as absolute file:line or function; Severity critical/high/medium/low; Trigger/exploit; Fix. If no exploitable or correctness defect remains, say clean directly and list the top assumptions a deeper review should test. End with Headline naming 1-2 ship blockers, or explicitly none, and Residual/unverified. Do not create a report file.


id: 019ffc89-9ad7-78f0-9932-8d16be12c357
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/fix-dev1-el-runtime-v2-54e90eef4c16
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 7d5d6f47b690ebd5144bcb50b89c275f54589cfa
git_branch: wt/fix-dev1-el-runtime-v2
git_origin_url: git@github.com:avi-ezra/Press.Zone-Works.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/13/rollout-2026-08-13T19-11-44-019ffc89-9ad7-78f0-9932-8d16be12c357.jsonl

title:
  Act as a senior independent application-security and correctness auditor. Review only the exact uncommitted diff versus HEAD in /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/wordpress/wp-content/.worktrees/fix-dev1-el-runtime-v2. First follow /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/wordpress/wp-content/.worktrees/fix-dev1-el-runtime-v2/plugins/international-press-zone/.claude/agents/expert.md and any skills it requires for this review. Do not mutate any source, test, config, plan, attack-surface map, or repository file; this is strictly read-only. Previous blockers were: MetaBox editor scripts versioned only by plugin version, a stable vendor.js production filename, and non-atomic hash failures. The revised change claims to add a shared AssetVersion SHA-256 verifier, precompute hashes, apply them to SPA and editor assets, content-hash the production vendor filename, rebuild runtime, and add admin/editor/vendor/failure regressions. Independently verify every prior blocker is actually fixed, then inspect all changed paths for concrete correctness, security, performance, autoload, distribution/package, and test defects. Treat all prior claims as unverified. Enumerate every relevant branch and hostile boundary. Check fail-closed hash behavior, malformed/unreadable/missing files, TOCTOU or partial application, cache/version consistency, dev-versus-production behavior, WordPress enqueue dependencies, manifest/runtime/chunk references, Composer/class autoloading and naming, build artifact inclusion, stale files, deterministic output, and whether tests truly exercise production behavior. For each candidate, state a concrete trigger, attempt to refute it by rereading the relevant code/callers, and report only findings that survive. Because this is a read-only review, inspect any existing .security/attack-surface.md and assess freshness, but do not create or update it; mention inability to update under Residual / unverified if relevant. Output a numbered list ordered by severity. Each finding must include Title, absolute Location with line or function, Severity (critical/high/medium/low), concrete Trigger / exploit, and specific Fix. End with Headline naming the one or two ship blockers, and Residual / unverified. If no exploitable or correctness defect remains after a genuine adversarial pass, say clean directly and list only the top assumptions a deeper review should test. Return findings only, no process narration.

first_user_message:
  Act as a senior independent application-security and correctness auditor. Review only the exact uncommitted diff versus HEAD in /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/wordpress/wp-content/.worktrees/fix-dev1-el-runtime-v2. First follow /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/wordpress/wp-content/.worktrees/fix-dev1-el-runtime-v2/plugins/international-press-zone/.claude/agents/expert.md and any skills it requires for this review. Do not mutate any source, test, config, plan, attack-surface map, or repository file; this is strictly read-only. Previous blockers were: MetaBox editor scripts versioned only by plugin version, a stable vendor.js production filename, and non-atomic hash failures. The revised change claims to add a shared AssetVersion SHA-256 verifier, precompute hashes, apply them to SPA and editor assets, content-hash the production vendor filename, rebuild runtime, and add admin/editor/vendor/failure regressions. Independently verify every prior blocker is actually fixed, then inspect all changed paths for concrete correctness, security, performance, autoload, distribution/package, and test defects. Treat all prior claims as unverified. Enumerate every relevant branch and hostile boundary. Check fail-closed hash behavior, malformed/unreadable/missing files, TOCTOU or partial application, cache/version consistency, dev-versus-production behavior, WordPress enqueue dependencies, manifest/runtime/chunk references, Composer/class autoloading and naming, build artifact inclusion, stale files, deterministic output, and whether tests truly exercise production behavior. For each candidate, state a concrete trigger, attempt to refute it by rereading the relevant code/callers, and report only findings that survive. Because this is a read-only review, inspect any existing .security/attack-surface.md and assess freshness, but do not create or update it; mention inability to update under Residual / unverified if relevant. Output a numbered list ordered by severity. Each finding must include Title, absolute Location with line or function, Severity (critical/high/medium/low), concrete Trigger / exploit, and specific Fix. End with Headline naming the one or two ship blockers, and Residual / unverified. If no exploitable or correctness defect remains after a genuine adversarial pass, say clean directly and list only the top assumptions a deeper review should test. Return findings only, no process narration.

preview:
  Act as a senior independent application-security and correctness auditor. Review only the exact uncommitted diff versus HEAD in /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/wordpress/wp-content/.worktrees/fix-dev1-el-runtime-v2. First follow /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/wordpress/wp-content/.worktrees/fix-dev1-el-runtime-v2/plugins/international-press-zone/.claude/agents/expert.md and any skills it requires for this review. Do not mutate any source, test, config, plan, attack-surface map, or repository file; this is strictly read-only. Previous blockers were: MetaBox editor scripts versioned only by plugin version, a stable vendor.js production filename, and non-atomic hash failures. The revised change claims to add a shared AssetVersion SHA-256 verifier, precompute hashes, apply them to SPA and editor assets, content-hash the production vendor filename, rebuild runtime, and add admin/editor/vendor/failure regressions. Independently verify every prior blocker is actually fixed, then inspect all changed paths for concrete correctness, security, performance, autoload, distribution/package, and test defects. Treat all prior claims as unverified. Enumerate every relevant branch and hostile boundary. Check fail-closed hash behavior, malformed/unreadable/missing files, TOCTOU or partial application, cache/version consistency, dev-versus-production behavior, WordPress enqueue dependencies, manifest/runtime/chunk references, Composer/class autoloading and naming, build artifact inclusion, stale files, deterministic output, and whether tests truly exercise production behavior. For each candidate, state a concrete trigger, attempt to refute it by rereading the relevant code/callers, and report only findings that survive. Because this is a read-only review, inspect any existing .security/attack-surface.md and assess freshness, but do not create or update it; mention inability to update under Residual / unverified if relevant. Output a numbered list ordered by severity. Each finding must include Title, absolute Location with line or function, Severity (critical/high/medium/low), concrete Trigger / exploit, and specific Fix. End with Headline naming the one or two ship blockers, and Residual / unverified. If no exploitable or correctness defect remains after a genuine adversarial pass, say clean directly and list only the top assumptions a deeper review should test. Return findings only, no process narration.


id: 019ffc91-c86e-7872-9fb0-671f3506f6a0
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/fix-dev1-el-runtime-v2-54e90eef4c16
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 7d5d6f47b690ebd5144bcb50b89c275f54589cfa
git_branch: wt/fix-dev1-el-runtime-v2
git_origin_url: git@github.com:avi-ezra/Press.Zone-Works.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/13/rollout-2026-08-13T19-20-40-019ffc91-c86e-7872-9fb0-671f3506f6a0.jsonl

title:
  Act as a senior application-security and correctness auditor performing an independent adversarial pre-ship review. Treat all prior safe/fixed claims as unverified. Review exactly the uncommitted diff in this worktree plus only essential cited symbols. Do not mutate files and do not write reports. First inspect and follow plugins/international-press-zone/.claude/agents/expert.md and applicable repo instructions. Build or refresh .security/attack-surface.md only if this can be done without mutation; because mutation is prohibited, inspect any existing map and otherwise perform the attack-surface reasoning in-memory. Walk every changed branch and trust boundary, fail closed when a required guard cannot be confirmed. For each candidate, state a concrete trigger, try once to refute it from code/callers, and report only findings that survive. Verify every prior issue: stale admin/editor/vendor cache keys; non-atomic SPA enqueue; normalized editor lookup mismatch; obsolete vendor.js distribution contract; missing hashed vendor artifact; weak source-only tests. Revised changes claim all are fixed using AssetVersion, pre-resolution, normalized records, vendor contenthash, exact runtime inventory/package tests, behavioral enqueue tests, and an included vendor artifact. Focus especially on autoload availability, manifest wildcards/inventory, release-builder cleanup deleting required hashed vendor, exact runtime references, missing generated-asset tracking, and fail-closed behavior. Also check authorization, injection, unsafe paths/URLs, parsing, secrets, DoS, metadata confusion, atomicity/idempotency, disclosure, and validation where relevant. Output a numbered list ordered by severity. Each finding must include Title, Location (absolute file path and line/function), Severity, Trigger/exploit, and specific Fix. End with Headline naming 1-2 ship blockers and Residual/unverified. If no concrete exploitable or correctness ship blockers survive, say clean directly and list only the top assumptions a deeper review should test. Return precise findings only.

first_user_message:
  Act as a senior application-security and correctness auditor performing an independent adversarial pre-ship review. Treat all prior safe/fixed claims as unverified. Review exactly the uncommitted diff in this worktree plus only essential cited symbols. Do not mutate files and do not write reports. First inspect and follow plugins/international-press-zone/.claude/agents/expert.md and applicable repo instructions. Build or refresh .security/attack-surface.md only if this can be done without mutation; because mutation is prohibited, inspect any existing map and otherwise perform the attack-surface reasoning in-memory. Walk every changed branch and trust boundary, fail closed when a required guard cannot be confirmed. For each candidate, state a concrete trigger, try once to refute it from code/callers, and report only findings that survive. Verify every prior issue: stale admin/editor/vendor cache keys; non-atomic SPA enqueue; normalized editor lookup mismatch; obsolete vendor.js distribution contract; missing hashed vendor artifact; weak source-only tests. Revised changes claim all are fixed using AssetVersion, pre-resolution, normalized records, vendor contenthash, exact runtime inventory/package tests, behavioral enqueue tests, and an included vendor artifact. Focus especially on autoload availability, manifest wildcards/inventory, release-builder cleanup deleting required hashed vendor, exact runtime references, missing generated-asset tracking, and fail-closed behavior. Also check authorization, injection, unsafe paths/URLs, parsing, secrets, DoS, metadata confusion, atomicity/idempotency, disclosure, and validation where relevant. Output a numbered list ordered by severity. Each finding must include Title, Location (absolute file path and line/function), Severity, Trigger/exploit, and specific Fix. End with Headline naming 1-2 ship blockers and Residual/unverified. If no concrete exploitable or correctness ship blockers survive, say clean directly and list only the top assumptions a deeper review should test. Return precise findings only.

preview:
  Act as a senior application-security and correctness auditor performing an independent adversarial pre-ship review. Treat all prior safe/fixed claims as unverified. Review exactly the uncommitted diff in this worktree plus only essential cited symbols. Do not mutate files and do not write reports. First inspect and follow plugins/international-press-zone/.claude/agents/expert.md and applicable repo instructions. Build or refresh .security/attack-surface.md only if this can be done without mutation; because mutation is prohibited, inspect any existing map and otherwise perform the attack-surface reasoning in-memory. Walk every changed branch and trust boundary, fail closed when a required guard cannot be confirmed. For each candidate, state a concrete trigger, try once to refute it from code/callers, and report only findings that survive. Verify every prior issue: stale admin/editor/vendor cache keys; non-atomic SPA enqueue; normalized editor lookup mismatch; obsolete vendor.js distribution contract; missing hashed vendor artifact; weak source-only tests. Revised changes claim all are fixed using AssetVersion, pre-resolution, normalized records, vendor contenthash, exact runtime inventory/package tests, behavioral enqueue tests, and an included vendor artifact. Focus especially on autoload availability, manifest wildcards/inventory, release-builder cleanup deleting required hashed vendor, exact runtime references, missing generated-asset tracking, and fail-closed behavior. Also check authorization, injection, unsafe paths/URLs, parsing, secrets, DoS, metadata confusion, atomicity/idempotency, disclosure, and validation where relevant. Output a numbered list ordered by severity. Each finding must include Title, Location (absolute file path and line/function), Severity, Trigger/exploit, and specific Fix. End with Headline naming 1-2 ship blockers and Residual/unverified. If no concrete exploitable or correctness ship blockers survive, say clean directly and list only the top assumptions a deeper review should test. Return precise findings only.


id: 019ffca7-c543-7fc0-85d6-23c6cb0b88f6
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/safe-receipt-reuse-aea111855846
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 9537ac72fb9e70d250ff7d0ce0d3f9a8ddd75552
git_branch: wt/safe-receipt-reuse
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/13/rollout-2026-08-13T19-44-41-019ffca7-c543-7fc0-85d6-23c6cb0b88f6.jsonl

title:
  Perform an independent adversarial security and correctness review of the current uncommitted diff in /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/safe-receipt-reuse. Scope strictly to controller gate receipt persistence and exact-match reuse. Focus on trust-boundary validation, immutable receipt behavior, malformed stored data, result validation, time/age behavior, and performance. Review only; do not modify any files and do not run tests. Treat all boundary-crossing data as hostile, fail closed, enumerate sibling branches, and verify each candidate with a concrete trigger plus one refutation pass. Return only confirmed ship-blocking defects, ordered by severity, with title, absolute file and line/function, severity, concrete trigger, and specific fix. If no confirmed blockers remain, state clean. End with a short headline and residual/unverified scope.

first_user_message:
  Perform an independent adversarial security and correctness review of the current uncommitted diff in /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/safe-receipt-reuse. Scope strictly to controller gate receipt persistence and exact-match reuse. Focus on trust-boundary validation, immutable receipt behavior, malformed stored data, result validation, time/age behavior, and performance. Review only; do not modify any files and do not run tests. Treat all boundary-crossing data as hostile, fail closed, enumerate sibling branches, and verify each candidate with a concrete trigger plus one refutation pass. Return only confirmed ship-blocking defects, ordered by severity, with title, absolute file and line/function, severity, concrete trigger, and specific fix. If no confirmed blockers remain, state clean. End with a short headline and residual/unverified scope.

preview:
  Perform an independent adversarial security and correctness review of the current uncommitted diff in /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/safe-receipt-reuse. Scope strictly to controller gate receipt persistence and exact-match reuse. Focus on trust-boundary validation, immutable receipt behavior, malformed stored data, result validation, time/age behavior, and performance. Review only; do not modify any files and do not run tests. Treat all boundary-crossing data as hostile, fail closed, enumerate sibling branches, and verify each candidate with a concrete trigger plus one refutation pass. Return only confirmed ship-blocking defects, ordered by severity, with title, absolute file and line/function, severity, concrete trigger, and specific fix. If no confirmed blockers remain, state clean. End with a short headline and residual/unverified scope.


id: 019ffcc4-af2b-7810-beeb-5194daf3b434
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/agent-ad23b4393d93615e5-804569aac8d7
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 688a4d3133e71b5ddf59259e0c7de392afea5003
git_branch: worktree-agent-ad23b4393d93615e5
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/13/rollout-2026-08-13T20-16-16-019ffcc4-af2b-7810-beeb-5194daf3b434.jsonl

title:
  Perform a fresh single-thread security review ONLY. Do not delegate, modify files, or run tests. Review commit 959280bbc against its parent. Recheck only prior blockers: exact NetworkPolicy targeting CoreDNS and Gitea only; controller-owned durable atomic attempt consumption before Job creation with worker validation. Find only concrete high-confidence exploitable defects. Inspect the diff and necessary referenced symbols in scope. Report either numbered findings with file:line, concrete exploit, and specific fix, or CLEAN. Do not review unrelated changes.

first_user_message:
  Perform a fresh single-thread security review ONLY. Do not delegate, modify files, or run tests. Review commit 959280bbc against its parent. Recheck only prior blockers: exact NetworkPolicy targeting CoreDNS and Gitea only; controller-owned durable atomic attempt consumption before Job creation with worker validation. Find only concrete high-confidence exploitable defects. Inspect the diff and necessary referenced symbols in scope. Report either numbered findings with file:line, concrete exploit, and specific fix, or CLEAN. Do not review unrelated changes.

preview:
  Perform a fresh single-thread security review ONLY. Do not delegate, modify files, or run tests. Review commit 959280bbc against its parent. Recheck only prior blockers: exact NetworkPolicy targeting CoreDNS and Gitea only; controller-owned durable atomic attempt consumption before Job creation with worker validation. Find only concrete high-confidence exploitable defects. Inspect the diff and necessary referenced symbols in scope. Report either numbered findings with file:line, concrete exploit, and specific fix, or CLEAN. Do not review unrelated changes.


id: 019ffcd6-c193-7950-a282-0bb190272bbd
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/agent-ae9ba2f49732adbcc-c89dbb0de8fc
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 47e327baacbbf542affb53809f2200d2fd15c02c
git_branch: worktree-agent-ae9ba2f49732adbcc
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/13/rollout-2026-08-13T20-36-00-019ffcd6-c193-7950-a282-0bb190272bbd.jsonl

title:
  You are conducting a fresh single-thread, adversarial pre-ship security review in /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.claude/worktrees/agent-ae9ba2f49732adbcc. Do not delegate, edit files, or run tests. Review commit f26acec4a against its first parent: inspect every changed file and all changed code with git diff --find-renames --find-copies f26acec4a^ f26acec4a, reading only essential cited context. Assess concrete exploitability in controller credential confinement; token/redemption issuance and validation; binding to Job/Pod identity; Gitea mirror identity; DNS/NetworkPolicy; admission; and GitHub result-ref publication. Report ONLY high-confidence HIGH or MEDIUM findings with absolute file path and line, severity, concrete exploit, and specific fix. If none, output CLEAN. Also name material uncertainty that cannot be resolved from the changed scope.

first_user_message:
  You are conducting a fresh single-thread, adversarial pre-ship security review in /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.claude/worktrees/agent-ae9ba2f49732adbcc. Do not delegate, edit files, or run tests. Review commit f26acec4a against its first parent: inspect every changed file and all changed code with git diff --find-renames --find-copies f26acec4a^ f26acec4a, reading only essential cited context. Assess concrete exploitability in controller credential confinement; token/redemption issuance and validation; binding to Job/Pod identity; Gitea mirror identity; DNS/NetworkPolicy; admission; and GitHub result-ref publication. Report ONLY high-confidence HIGH or MEDIUM findings with absolute file path and line, severity, concrete exploit, and specific fix. If none, output CLEAN. Also name material uncertainty that cannot be resolved from the changed scope.

preview:
  You are conducting a fresh single-thread, adversarial pre-ship security review in /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.claude/worktrees/agent-ae9ba2f49732adbcc. Do not delegate, edit files, or run tests. Review commit f26acec4a against its first parent: inspect every changed file and all changed code with git diff --find-renames --find-copies f26acec4a^ f26acec4a, reading only essential cited context. Assess concrete exploitability in controller credential confinement; token/redemption issuance and validation; binding to Job/Pod identity; Gitea mirror identity; DNS/NetworkPolicy; admission; and GitHub result-ref publication. Report ONLY high-confidence HIGH or MEDIUM findings with absolute file path and line, severity, concrete exploit, and specific fix. If none, output CLEAN. Also name material uncertainty that cannot be resolved from the changed scope.


id: 019ffce0-5bde-7002-9157-c2a319611d85
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/agent-a64bbeccc353af490-d2fa20364953
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 47e327baacbbf542affb53809f2200d2fd15c02c
git_branch: worktree-agent-a64bbeccc353af490
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/13/rollout-2026-08-13T20-46-29-019ffce0-5bde-7002-9157-c2a319611d85.jsonl

title:
  You are an independent adversarial application-security and correctness auditor. Review commit e9abdd259 against its parent in the repository at /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.claude/worktrees/agent-a64bbeccc353af490. This is a fresh SINGLE-THREAD review: do not delegate, edit files, write reports/maps, run tests, or make commits. Inspect only the exact commit diff and essential directly cited references needed to trace each claimed protection end-to-end. Treat all claimed protections as unverified. Assess and report ONLY concrete exploitable HIGH or MEDIUM defects, or CLEAN if none. Specifically trace: server-side signed envelope verification; trusted controller authentication with observed Job/Pod UID; atomic redemption; scoped token issuance; absence of static Gitea/GitHub job credentials; pinned HTTPS CA and host; actual runtime resource deployment; restricted DNS/egress. For every candidate state a concrete exploit trigger and refute it once; report only survivors. Output a numbered severity-ordered list. Each finding must have Title, exact absolute file:line (or function), Severity, Trigger/exploit, and specific Fix. End with Headline and Residual/unverified. If clean, say CLEAN directly and name only the top assumptions a deeper review should test. Do not report low/informational/style issues.

first_user_message:
  You are an independent adversarial application-security and correctness auditor. Review commit e9abdd259 against its parent in the repository at /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.claude/worktrees/agent-a64bbeccc353af490. This is a fresh SINGLE-THREAD review: do not delegate, edit files, write reports/maps, run tests, or make commits. Inspect only the exact commit diff and essential directly cited references needed to trace each claimed protection end-to-end. Treat all claimed protections as unverified. Assess and report ONLY concrete exploitable HIGH or MEDIUM defects, or CLEAN if none. Specifically trace: server-side signed envelope verification; trusted controller authentication with observed Job/Pod UID; atomic redemption; scoped token issuance; absence of static Gitea/GitHub job credentials; pinned HTTPS CA and host; actual runtime resource deployment; restricted DNS/egress. For every candidate state a concrete exploit trigger and refute it once; report only survivors. Output a numbered severity-ordered list. Each finding must have Title, exact absolute file:line (or function), Severity, Trigger/exploit, and specific Fix. End with Headline and Residual/unverified. If clean, say CLEAN directly and name only the top assumptions a deeper review should test. Do not report low/informational/style issues.

preview:
  You are an independent adversarial application-security and correctness auditor. Review commit e9abdd259 against its parent in the repository at /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.claude/worktrees/agent-a64bbeccc353af490. This is a fresh SINGLE-THREAD review: do not delegate, edit files, write reports/maps, run tests, or make commits. Inspect only the exact commit diff and essential directly cited references needed to trace each claimed protection end-to-end. Treat all claimed protections as unverified. Assess and report ONLY concrete exploitable HIGH or MEDIUM defects, or CLEAN if none. Specifically trace: server-side signed envelope verification; trusted controller authentication with observed Job/Pod UID; atomic redemption; scoped token issuance; absence of static Gitea/GitHub job credentials; pinned HTTPS CA and host; actual runtime resource deployment; restricted DNS/egress. For every candidate state a concrete exploit trigger and refute it once; report only survivors. Output a numbered severity-ordered list. Each finding must have Title, exact absolute file:line (or function), Severity, Trigger/exploit, and specific Fix. End with Headline and Residual/unverified. If clean, say CLEAN directly and name only the top assumptions a deeper review should test. Do not report low/informational/style issues.


id: 019ffcea-8816-7dc0-9c69-d522e1a0c502
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/agent-ad72e0af03f2a95af-bdb9f07801c7
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: a20d6573b0f1fae9961e7dcad453706b3a8e70f2
git_branch: worktree-agent-ad72e0af03f2a95af
git_origin_url: git@github.com:avi-ezra/Press.Zone-Works.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/13/rollout-2026-08-13T20-57-36-019ffcea-8816-7dc0-9c69-d522e1a0c502.jsonl

title:
  You are an independent senior application-security and correctness auditor. Review only the uncommitted E2E safety repair in /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/wordpress/wp-content/.claude/worktrees/agent-ad72e0af03f2a95af. Do not modify files, do not delegate, and do not broaden scope beyond symbols essential to judge the target-safety boundary. Inspect the actual uncommitted diff and the focused test evidence independently. Intended boundary: global setup must use the production target-safety module, reject unsafe remote targets before browser authentication, and must not weaken existing safety checks. Treat all prior claims as unverified. Assess concrete execution order and whether any unsafe remote target can reach browser authentication. Report only confirmed blocking defects; otherwise issue explicit approval. Include commands run and concise results. For every finding give title, absolute file:line/function, severity, concrete trigger, and specific fix. End with Headline and Residual/unverified. Do not create files or change code.

first_user_message:
  You are an independent senior application-security and correctness auditor. Review only the uncommitted E2E safety repair in /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/wordpress/wp-content/.claude/worktrees/agent-ad72e0af03f2a95af. Do not modify files, do not delegate, and do not broaden scope beyond symbols essential to judge the target-safety boundary. Inspect the actual uncommitted diff and the focused test evidence independently. Intended boundary: global setup must use the production target-safety module, reject unsafe remote targets before browser authentication, and must not weaken existing safety checks. Treat all prior claims as unverified. Assess concrete execution order and whether any unsafe remote target can reach browser authentication. Report only confirmed blocking defects; otherwise issue explicit approval. Include commands run and concise results. For every finding give title, absolute file:line/function, severity, concrete trigger, and specific fix. End with Headline and Residual/unverified. Do not create files or change code.

preview:
  You are an independent senior application-security and correctness auditor. Review only the uncommitted E2E safety repair in /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/wordpress/wp-content/.claude/worktrees/agent-ad72e0af03f2a95af. Do not modify files, do not delegate, and do not broaden scope beyond symbols essential to judge the target-safety boundary. Inspect the actual uncommitted diff and the focused test evidence independently. Intended boundary: global setup must use the production target-safety module, reject unsafe remote targets before browser authentication, and must not weaken existing safety checks. Treat all prior claims as unverified. Assess concrete execution order and whether any unsafe remote target can reach browser authentication. Report only confirmed blocking defects; otherwise issue explicit approval. Include commands run and concise results. For every finding give title, absolute file:line/function, severity, concrete trigger, and specific fix. End with Headline and Residual/unverified. Do not create files or change code.


id: 019ffd15-c8b4-7e93-b391-c2d86488788b
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/delivery-crash-reconcile-37bad40d185d
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 62b80dc67f9c2420913896b47f3386ba8ec95f65
git_branch: wt/delivery-crash-reconcile
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/13/rollout-2026-08-13T21-44-51-019ffd15-c8b4-7e93-b391-c2d86488788b.jsonl

title:
  You are a senior application-security and correctness auditor performing an independent adversarial pre-ship review. Review exactly the current uncommitted git diff in /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/delivery-crash-reconcile for S7 crash/lost-response reconciliation. Do not modify any files, including the attack-surface map. Focus on correctness, output compatibility, security, and whether the regression truly proves the controller can durably acknowledge a normal seat launch after a lost response. Treat all prior safety claims as unverified. Inspect every changed branch and essential cited symbols only. Assume boundary inputs and persisted/external values are hostile. Fail closed where guards cannot be confirmed. Check authorization, fail-open parsing/verification, injection, unsafe paths, secrets, resource exhaustion, idempotency/atomicity, information disclosure, validation, state transitions, crash windows, replay behavior, durable write ordering, and response/output compatibility. If an existing .security/attack-surface.md is available, verify freshness without changing it and use it only if provably fresh; otherwise enumerate the changed scope in memory. For every candidate: state a concrete trigger, then re-read relevant code/callers and attempt to refute it; report only findings that survive. Severity must reflect real impact. Output ONLY either CLEAN or a numbered list of confirmed blockers, each with title, absolute file:line, severity, concrete trigger/exploit, and specific fix. No tests, no file changes, no speculative or cosmetic findings.

first_user_message:
  You are a senior application-security and correctness auditor performing an independent adversarial pre-ship review. Review exactly the current uncommitted git diff in /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/delivery-crash-reconcile for S7 crash/lost-response reconciliation. Do not modify any files, including the attack-surface map. Focus on correctness, output compatibility, security, and whether the regression truly proves the controller can durably acknowledge a normal seat launch after a lost response. Treat all prior safety claims as unverified. Inspect every changed branch and essential cited symbols only. Assume boundary inputs and persisted/external values are hostile. Fail closed where guards cannot be confirmed. Check authorization, fail-open parsing/verification, injection, unsafe paths, secrets, resource exhaustion, idempotency/atomicity, information disclosure, validation, state transitions, crash windows, replay behavior, durable write ordering, and response/output compatibility. If an existing .security/attack-surface.md is available, verify freshness without changing it and use it only if provably fresh; otherwise enumerate the changed scope in memory. For every candidate: state a concrete trigger, then re-read relevant code/callers and attempt to refute it; report only findings that survive. Severity must reflect real impact. Output ONLY either CLEAN or a numbered list of confirmed blockers, each with title, absolute file:line, severity, concrete trigger/exploit, and specific fix. No tests, no file changes, no speculative or cosmetic findings.

preview:
  You are a senior application-security and correctness auditor performing an independent adversarial pre-ship review. Review exactly the current uncommitted git diff in /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/delivery-crash-reconcile for S7 crash/lost-response reconciliation. Do not modify any files, including the attack-surface map. Focus on correctness, output compatibility, security, and whether the regression truly proves the controller can durably acknowledge a normal seat launch after a lost response. Treat all prior safety claims as unverified. Inspect every changed branch and essential cited symbols only. Assume boundary inputs and persisted/external values are hostile. Fail closed where guards cannot be confirmed. Check authorization, fail-open parsing/verification, injection, unsafe paths, secrets, resource exhaustion, idempotency/atomicity, information disclosure, validation, state transitions, crash windows, replay behavior, durable write ordering, and response/output compatibility. If an existing .security/attack-surface.md is available, verify freshness without changing it and use it only if provably fresh; otherwise enumerate the changed scope in memory. For every candidate: state a concrete trigger, then re-read relevant code/callers and attempt to refute it; report only findings that survive. Severity must reflect real impact. Output ONLY either CLEAN or a numbered list of confirmed blockers, each with title, absolute file:line, severity, concrete trigger/exploit, and specific fix. No tests, no file changes, no speculative or cosmetic findings.


id: 019ffd52-0876-78b1-9309-64a95dba3955
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/inert-feature-42a6b8245b41
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 018ce55815c2baad00b17e34e7effae38df2d029
git_branch: wt/inert-feature
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/13/rollout-2026-08-13T22-50-39-019ffd52-0876-78b1-9309-64a95dba3955.jsonl

title:
  Independently audit the current uncommitted diff for security and correctness. Scope: S10 connects one real incomplete /delivery/preview capability to existing controller-owned feature state. OFF must retain the exact prior 404 behavior; OFF must make no writes, enqueue no jobs, make no external calls, and cause no UI change. Unavailable definition, identity, or readiness must fail closed. Review exactly the uncommitted diff and only essential cited references. Treat boundary inputs as hostile. Enumerate sibling branches and verify fail-closed behavior. For each candidate, give a concrete trigger and refute it once against code/callers. Report only confirmed ship-blocking defects, ordered by severity, with absolute file path, line/function, trigger, and fix; otherwise output CLEAN. Do not modify files or run tests.

first_user_message:
  Independently audit the current uncommitted diff for security and correctness. Scope: S10 connects one real incomplete /delivery/preview capability to existing controller-owned feature state. OFF must retain the exact prior 404 behavior; OFF must make no writes, enqueue no jobs, make no external calls, and cause no UI change. Unavailable definition, identity, or readiness must fail closed. Review exactly the uncommitted diff and only essential cited references. Treat boundary inputs as hostile. Enumerate sibling branches and verify fail-closed behavior. For each candidate, give a concrete trigger and refute it once against code/callers. Report only confirmed ship-blocking defects, ordered by severity, with absolute file path, line/function, trigger, and fix; otherwise output CLEAN. Do not modify files or run tests.

preview:
  Independently audit the current uncommitted diff for security and correctness. Scope: S10 connects one real incomplete /delivery/preview capability to existing controller-owned feature state. OFF must retain the exact prior 404 behavior; OFF must make no writes, enqueue no jobs, make no external calls, and cause no UI change. Unavailable definition, identity, or readiness must fail closed. Review exactly the uncommitted diff and only essential cited references. Treat boundary inputs as hostile. Enumerate sibling branches and verify fail-closed behavior. For each candidate, give a concrete trigger and refute it once against code/callers. Report only confirmed ship-blocking defects, ordered by severity, with absolute file path, line/function, trigger, and fix; otherwise output CLEAN. Do not modify files or run tests.


id: 019ffd5b-8cf6-7e11-b773-d1a374fc0bb6
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/overdeck-f7f63179e1c7
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 7b3f5d18818348ebe2bf0c0aa0bc1ec875cdc245
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/13/rollout-2026-08-13T23-01-03-019ffd5b-8cf6-7e11-b773-d1a374fc0bb6.jsonl

title:
  Review commit 24dbc2924 as the corrected S10 change for security and correctness. Inspect its diff against its first parent and essential cited references only. Production /delivery/preview derives readiness from exact active deployment identity plus persisted acceptance/smoke receipt references; enabled-path regression added. OFF must preserve exact prior 404 and cause no writes, jobs, external calls, or UI change. Unavailable definition, identity, or readiness must fail closed. Treat boundary and persisted values as hostile. For each candidate state a concrete trigger and refute it once. Report confirmed ship blockers with absolute repository paths, location, severity, trigger, and fix; otherwise output CLEAN. Do not modify files or run tests.

first_user_message:
  Review commit 24dbc2924 as the corrected S10 change for security and correctness. Inspect its diff against its first parent and essential cited references only. Production /delivery/preview derives readiness from exact active deployment identity plus persisted acceptance/smoke receipt references; enabled-path regression added. OFF must preserve exact prior 404 and cause no writes, jobs, external calls, or UI change. Unavailable definition, identity, or readiness must fail closed. Treat boundary and persisted values as hostile. For each candidate state a concrete trigger and refute it once. Report confirmed ship blockers with absolute repository paths, location, severity, trigger, and fix; otherwise output CLEAN. Do not modify files or run tests.

preview:
  Review commit 24dbc2924 as the corrected S10 change for security and correctness. Inspect its diff against its first parent and essential cited references only. Production /delivery/preview derives readiness from exact active deployment identity plus persisted acceptance/smoke receipt references; enabled-path regression added. OFF must preserve exact prior 404 and cause no writes, jobs, external calls, or UI change. Unavailable definition, identity, or readiness must fail closed. Treat boundary and persisted values as hostile. For each candidate state a concrete trigger and refute it once. Report confirmed ship blockers with absolute repository paths, location, severity, trigger, and fix; otherwise output CLEAN. Do not modify files or run tests.


id: 019ffd63-9773-7661-97f9-ced6621b3098
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/inert-readiness-fix-223462041d33
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: d1c446a8f3e1f5fa48748c140ba2fa08446df3f5
git_branch: wt/inert-readiness-fix
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/13/rollout-2026-08-13T23-09-50-019ffd63-9773-7661-97f9-ced6621b3098.jsonl

title:
  Act as an independent, adversarial senior application-security and correctness auditor. Review exactly the uncommitted diff in /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/inert-readiness-fix; trace only essential cited symbols. Do not modify files and do not run tests. Treat all boundary inputs as hostile and fail closed when guards cannot be confirmed. Build or freshness-check the required attack-surface map at <repo-root>/.security/attack-surface.md only if this can be done without modifying files; because this task forbids modifications, inspect any existing map but do not create or update it, and state this limitation under residual uncertainty. Walk every changed branch for object-level authorization, fail-open verification/parsing, token/resource binding, injection, SSRF, path traversal, unsafe parsing, secret exposure, DoS, metadata confusion, idempotency/atomicity, info disclosure, and validation. Focus especially on confirming two prior blockers are fixed: (1) exact receipt load and binding, meaning the implementation loads the intended receipt and proves it belongs to the relevant request/resource rather than accepting a nearby/latest/general receipt; (2) controller target requirement, meaning controller operations require and validate the intended target rather than proceeding with a missing, inferred, or unrelated target. For each candidate, give a concrete trigger, attempt to refute it from code/callers, and report only findings that survive. Output a numbered severity-ordered list. Each finding must include Title, Location (absolute file path and line/function), Severity, Trigger/exploit, and Fix. End with Headline naming ship blockers and Residual/unverified. If no exploitable or correctness blocker remains, output CLEAN directly and list only meaningful assumptions. Explicitly state whether each of the two prior blockers is fixed. No tests, no edits.

first_user_message:
  Act as an independent, adversarial senior application-security and correctness auditor. Review exactly the uncommitted diff in /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/inert-readiness-fix; trace only essential cited symbols. Do not modify files and do not run tests. Treat all boundary inputs as hostile and fail closed when guards cannot be confirmed. Build or freshness-check the required attack-surface map at <repo-root>/.security/attack-surface.md only if this can be done without modifying files; because this task forbids modifications, inspect any existing map but do not create or update it, and state this limitation under residual uncertainty. Walk every changed branch for object-level authorization, fail-open verification/parsing, token/resource binding, injection, SSRF, path traversal, unsafe parsing, secret exposure, DoS, metadata confusion, idempotency/atomicity, info disclosure, and validation. Focus especially on confirming two prior blockers are fixed: (1) exact receipt load and binding, meaning the implementation loads the intended receipt and proves it belongs to the relevant request/resource rather than accepting a nearby/latest/general receipt; (2) controller target requirement, meaning controller operations require and validate the intended target rather than proceeding with a missing, inferred, or unrelated target. For each candidate, give a concrete trigger, attempt to refute it from code/callers, and report only findings that survive. Output a numbered severity-ordered list. Each finding must include Title, Location (absolute file path and line/function), Severity, Trigger/exploit, and Fix. End with Headline naming ship blockers and Residual/unverified. If no exploitable or correctness blocker remains, output CLEAN directly and list only meaningful assumptions. Explicitly state whether each of the two prior blockers is fixed. No tests, no edits.

preview:
  Act as an independent, adversarial senior application-security and correctness auditor. Review exactly the uncommitted diff in /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/inert-readiness-fix; trace only essential cited symbols. Do not modify files and do not run tests. Treat all boundary inputs as hostile and fail closed when guards cannot be confirmed. Build or freshness-check the required attack-surface map at <repo-root>/.security/attack-surface.md only if this can be done without modifying files; because this task forbids modifications, inspect any existing map but do not create or update it, and state this limitation under residual uncertainty. Walk every changed branch for object-level authorization, fail-open verification/parsing, token/resource binding, injection, SSRF, path traversal, unsafe parsing, secret exposure, DoS, metadata confusion, idempotency/atomicity, info disclosure, and validation. Focus especially on confirming two prior blockers are fixed: (1) exact receipt load and binding, meaning the implementation loads the intended receipt and proves it belongs to the relevant request/resource rather than accepting a nearby/latest/general receipt; (2) controller target requirement, meaning controller operations require and validate the intended target rather than proceeding with a missing, inferred, or unrelated target. For each candidate, give a concrete trigger, attempt to refute it from code/callers, and report only findings that survive. Output a numbered severity-ordered list. Each finding must include Title, Location (absolute file path and line/function), Severity, Trigger/exploit, and Fix. End with Headline naming ship blockers and Residual/unverified. If no exploitable or correctness blocker remains, output CLEAN directly and list only meaningful assumptions. Explicitly state whether each of the two prior blockers is fixed. No tests, no edits.


id: 019ffd79-bacd-7a30-9937-d486cc0cc3e4
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/delivery-lifecycle-proofs-209366703ede
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 7aa4aae3d48b7c60704b0afb263df6ed09f56d8d
git_branch: wt/delivery-lifecycle-proofs
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/13/rollout-2026-08-13T23-34-01-019ffd79-bacd-7a30-9937-d486cc0cc3e4.jsonl

title:
  Act as a senior independent application-security and correctness auditor. Review only the uncommitted diff in /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/delivery-lifecycle-proofs plus cited symbols essential to judge it. Determine whether the changes truthfully prove additive compatibility with the old schema without relying on any destructive database contract. Verify that plan claims align with existing activation-retirement tests. Treat all prior safety claims as unverified; enumerate branches and fail closed where guards cannot be confirmed. Do not modify files and do not run tests. For each candidate defect, state a concrete trigger, attempt to refute it from code/callers, and report only confirmed exploitable/correctness defects. Output a numbered list ordered by severity with title, absolute file:line, severity, trigger/exploit, and specific fix. End with Headline naming ship blockers and Residual/unverified. If no confirmed blocker exists, say CLEAN and list assumptions a deeper review should test.

first_user_message:
  Act as a senior independent application-security and correctness auditor. Review only the uncommitted diff in /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/delivery-lifecycle-proofs plus cited symbols essential to judge it. Determine whether the changes truthfully prove additive compatibility with the old schema without relying on any destructive database contract. Verify that plan claims align with existing activation-retirement tests. Treat all prior safety claims as unverified; enumerate branches and fail closed where guards cannot be confirmed. Do not modify files and do not run tests. For each candidate defect, state a concrete trigger, attempt to refute it from code/callers, and report only confirmed exploitable/correctness defects. Output a numbered list ordered by severity with title, absolute file:line, severity, trigger/exploit, and specific fix. End with Headline naming ship blockers and Residual/unverified. If no confirmed blocker exists, say CLEAN and list assumptions a deeper review should test.

preview:
  Act as a senior independent application-security and correctness auditor. Review only the uncommitted diff in /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/delivery-lifecycle-proofs plus cited symbols essential to judge it. Determine whether the changes truthfully prove additive compatibility with the old schema without relying on any destructive database contract. Verify that plan claims align with existing activation-retirement tests. Treat all prior safety claims as unverified; enumerate branches and fail closed where guards cannot be confirmed. Do not modify files and do not run tests. For each candidate defect, state a concrete trigger, attempt to refute it from code/callers, and report only confirmed exploitable/correctness defects. Output a numbered list ordered by severity with title, absolute file:line, severity, trigger/exploit, and specific fix. End with Headline naming ship blockers and Residual/unverified. If no confirmed blocker exists, say CLEAN and list assumptions a deeper review should test.


id: 019ffd7e-dc04-7d82-995a-099f2b709811
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/delivery-lifecycle-proofs-209366703ede
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 7aa4aae3d48b7c60704b0afb263df6ed09f56d8d
git_branch: wt/delivery-lifecycle-proofs
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/13/rollout-2026-08-13T23-39-37-019ffd7e-dc04-7d82-995a-099f2b709811.jsonl

title:
  Independently re-review only the corrected uncommitted diff. Prior blockers were: incomplete legacy row/schema preservation assertion; plan falsely claiming retirement/removal crash replay; plan overbroadly claiming all store initialization is additive. Confirm whether corrected test now asserts the complete legacy row, original PRAGMA metadata, and exact added column definitions, and whether the plan accurately narrows claims to normal retirement/removal, jobs-only additive columns, and activation-only crash replay. Inspect cited existing activation tests as needed. Do not modify files. Do not run tests. Report only concrete correctness/security blockers that survive refutation, or CLEAN. Include absolute file:line and fix for any blocker; end with residual unverified assumptions.

first_user_message:
  Independently re-review only the corrected uncommitted diff. Prior blockers were: incomplete legacy row/schema preservation assertion; plan falsely claiming retirement/removal crash replay; plan overbroadly claiming all store initialization is additive. Confirm whether corrected test now asserts the complete legacy row, original PRAGMA metadata, and exact added column definitions, and whether the plan accurately narrows claims to normal retirement/removal, jobs-only additive columns, and activation-only crash replay. Inspect cited existing activation tests as needed. Do not modify files. Do not run tests. Report only concrete correctness/security blockers that survive refutation, or CLEAN. Include absolute file:line and fix for any blocker; end with residual unverified assumptions.

preview:
  Independently re-review only the corrected uncommitted diff. Prior blockers were: incomplete legacy row/schema preservation assertion; plan falsely claiming retirement/removal crash replay; plan overbroadly claiming all store initialization is additive. Confirm whether corrected test now asserts the complete legacy row, original PRAGMA metadata, and exact added column definitions, and whether the plan accurately narrows claims to normal retirement/removal, jobs-only additive columns, and activation-only crash replay. Inspect cited existing activation tests as needed. Do not modify files. Do not run tests. Report only concrete correctness/security blockers that survive refutation, or CLEAN. Include absolute file:line and fix for any blocker; end with residual unverified assumptions.


id: 019ffe17-5383-7821-a5fc-ab83b26dc3d0
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/wp-content-10b66c7a0e8b
title: Reply with the single word OK.
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: b1a83f8c7ba93d9b17b85876890e12fdeef35cd9
git_branch: fix/content-generate-all
git_origin_url: git@github.com:avi-ezra/Press.Zone-Works.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
first_user_message: Reply with the single word OK.
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.3-codex-spark
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
preview: Reply with the single word OK.
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/14/rollout-2026-08-14T02-26-09-019ffe17-5383-7821-a5fc-ab83b26dc3d0.jsonl


id: 019ffe4b-682b-7e31-b80c-dddfc44a085f
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/agent-a56fafa919ed739ae-1eb41686cab7
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/14/rollout-2026-08-14T03-23-02-019ffe4b-682b-7e31-b80c-dddfc44a085f.jsonl

title:
  Perform a fresh, independent, single-threaded adversarial pre-ship review of commit c82e25d30 against its first parent in the Overdeck repository. Review every changed file and the runtime contracts needed to judge the changed production flows; do not edit files and do not run tests. Recheck the five previously identified defects if visible in the diff/history and specifically audit added repository model credential isolation. Trace actual production paths, not test helpers. Report ONLY concrete, triggerable HIGH or MEDIUM security exploits or deterministic deployment failures. For every finding give exact absolute file path and line, severity, concrete trigger/exploit, and specific fix. If none, say CLEAN and state only key assumptions that remain unverified. Do not delegate.

first_user_message:
  Perform a fresh, independent, single-threaded adversarial pre-ship review of commit c82e25d30 against its first parent in the Overdeck repository. Review every changed file and the runtime contracts needed to judge the changed production flows; do not edit files and do not run tests. Recheck the five previously identified defects if visible in the diff/history and specifically audit added repository model credential isolation. Trace actual production paths, not test helpers. Report ONLY concrete, triggerable HIGH or MEDIUM security exploits or deterministic deployment failures. For every finding give exact absolute file path and line, severity, concrete trigger/exploit, and specific fix. If none, say CLEAN and state only key assumptions that remain unverified. Do not delegate.

preview:
  Perform a fresh, independent, single-threaded adversarial pre-ship review of commit c82e25d30 against its first parent in the Overdeck repository. Review every changed file and the runtime contracts needed to judge the changed production flows; do not edit files and do not run tests. Recheck the five previously identified defects if visible in the diff/history and specifically audit added repository model credential isolation. Trace actual production paths, not test helpers. Report ONLY concrete, triggerable HIGH or MEDIUM security exploits or deterministic deployment failures. For every finding give exact absolute file path and line, severity, concrete trigger/exploit, and specific fix. If none, say CLEAN and state only key assumptions that remain unverified. Do not delegate.


id: 019ffe5f-c9cf-7483-a3b1-495de380abe1
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/worktree-salvage-gc-c484afe2b9e5
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 37700a9d89b705494d0a9245e2290cfba595ad2b
git_branch: wt/worktree-salvage-gc
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/14/rollout-2026-08-14T03-45-18-019ffe5f-c9cf-7483-a3b1-495de380abe1.jsonl

title:
  You are a critical design reviewer. Review the design spec at docs/specs/2026-08-14-worktree-salvage-gc-design.md in this repo. It extends the existing fail-closed worktree GC at modules/monitor/lib/worktree_gc.py (read that file too, plus its tests at modules/monitor/tests/test_worktree_gc.py and the caller modules/monitor/slices/bin/disk-maintain) with a salvage path: worktrees idle 3 days or more get secret files moved to a vault under ~/.local/state/overdeck/worktree-vault, remaining work auto-committed and pushed to origin under wip/BRANCH-DATE, verified via ls-remote, then the worktree is removed; merged trees keep a 1-day grace; plus local branch cleanup, git worktree prune, 60-day vault expiry, and an edge-triggered notify line. Find: (1) design flaws or unsafe deletion paths, any way work or secrets can be lost; (2) missed edge cases such as git states, submodules, LFS, detached HEAD, concurrent sessions, symlinks, cross-device moves, push races; (3) places the spec contradicts the existing code behavior or seams; (4) simpler or more robust alternatives. Do NOT modify any files. Output a numbered list of findings, each labeled BLOCKER or IMPROVEMENT or QUESTION-FOR-OWNER with a one-line rationale, then a short overall verdict.

first_user_message:
  You are a critical design reviewer. Review the design spec at docs/specs/2026-08-14-worktree-salvage-gc-design.md in this repo. It extends the existing fail-closed worktree GC at modules/monitor/lib/worktree_gc.py (read that file too, plus its tests at modules/monitor/tests/test_worktree_gc.py and the caller modules/monitor/slices/bin/disk-maintain) with a salvage path: worktrees idle 3 days or more get secret files moved to a vault under ~/.local/state/overdeck/worktree-vault, remaining work auto-committed and pushed to origin under wip/BRANCH-DATE, verified via ls-remote, then the worktree is removed; merged trees keep a 1-day grace; plus local branch cleanup, git worktree prune, 60-day vault expiry, and an edge-triggered notify line. Find: (1) design flaws or unsafe deletion paths, any way work or secrets can be lost; (2) missed edge cases such as git states, submodules, LFS, detached HEAD, concurrent sessions, symlinks, cross-device moves, push races; (3) places the spec contradicts the existing code behavior or seams; (4) simpler or more robust alternatives. Do NOT modify any files. Output a numbered list of findings, each labeled BLOCKER or IMPROVEMENT or QUESTION-FOR-OWNER with a one-line rationale, then a short overall verdict.

preview:
  You are a critical design reviewer. Review the design spec at docs/specs/2026-08-14-worktree-salvage-gc-design.md in this repo. It extends the existing fail-closed worktree GC at modules/monitor/lib/worktree_gc.py (read that file too, plus its tests at modules/monitor/tests/test_worktree_gc.py and the caller modules/monitor/slices/bin/disk-maintain) with a salvage path: worktrees idle 3 days or more get secret files moved to a vault under ~/.local/state/overdeck/worktree-vault, remaining work auto-committed and pushed to origin under wip/BRANCH-DATE, verified via ls-remote, then the worktree is removed; merged trees keep a 1-day grace; plus local branch cleanup, git worktree prune, 60-day vault expiry, and an edge-triggered notify line. Find: (1) design flaws or unsafe deletion paths, any way work or secrets can be lost; (2) missed edge cases such as git states, submodules, LFS, detached HEAD, concurrent sessions, symlinks, cross-device moves, push races; (3) places the spec contradicts the existing code behavior or seams; (4) simpler or more robust alternatives. Do NOT modify any files. Output a numbered list of findings, each labeled BLOCKER or IMPROVEMENT or QUESTION-FOR-OWNER with a one-line rationale, then a short overall verdict.


id: 019ffe66-3d15-74d1-8f9b-2a2b2c5c7974
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/agent-a27ab8f09565c6407-d9196f8efff0
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 37700a9d89b705494d0a9245e2290cfba595ad2b
git_branch: worktree-agent-a27ab8f09565c6407
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/14/rollout-2026-08-14T03-52-21-019ffe66-3d15-74d1-8f9b-2a2b2c5c7974.jsonl

title:
  You are an independent adversarial security and operability reviewer. Review exactly commit 001f5eb33 against its first parent in the repository at /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.claude/worktrees/agent-a27ab8f09565c6407. Do not edit files, do not run tests, do not delegate. Inspect the exact diff, changed production code, and changed manifests. Trace only essential referenced symbols. Report ONLY concrete HIGH or MEDIUM severity exploitable security defects or deterministic operational failures, with exact absolute file:line, concrete trigger, and specific fix. If none, output exactly CLEAN plus the brief evidence/assumptions.

  Required adversarial checks: verify dedicated model-secret mapping; one-active-attempt mirror lock and revocation before publication; OpenSSH client presence; bounded controller protocol; HTTPS with CA validation; token/envelope/workload binding; absence of job GitHub/admin credentials; actual resource requests/limits and readiness checks. Treat every trust-boundary input and datastore/service return as hostile. Enumerate all changed conditional branches and compare sibling guards. Require fail-closed behavior for parsing, auth, crypto, configuration, and outbound connections. Candidate findings must have a concrete trigger and survive one refutation pass.

  Output format: numbered findings ordered by severity, each with Title, Location, Severity, Trigger/exploit, Fix. End Headline and Residual/unverified. Do not report low severity, style, speculation, or tests you did not run.

first_user_message:
  You are an independent adversarial security and operability reviewer. Review exactly commit 001f5eb33 against its first parent in the repository at /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.claude/worktrees/agent-a27ab8f09565c6407. Do not edit files, do not run tests, do not delegate. Inspect the exact diff, changed production code, and changed manifests. Trace only essential referenced symbols. Report ONLY concrete HIGH or MEDIUM severity exploitable security defects or deterministic operational failures, with exact absolute file:line, concrete trigger, and specific fix. If none, output exactly CLEAN plus the brief evidence/assumptions.

  Required adversarial checks: verify dedicated model-secret mapping; one-active-attempt mirror lock and revocation before publication; OpenSSH client presence; bounded controller protocol; HTTPS with CA validation; token/envelope/workload binding; absence of job GitHub/admin credentials; actual resource requests/limits and readiness checks. Treat every trust-boundary input and datastore/service return as hostile. Enumerate all changed conditional branches and compare sibling guards. Require fail-closed behavior for parsing, auth, crypto, configuration, and outbound connections. Candidate findings must have a concrete trigger and survive one refutation pass.

  Output format: numbered findings ordered by severity, each with Title, Location, Severity, Trigger/exploit, Fix. End Headline and Residual/unverified. Do not report low severity, style, speculation, or tests you did not run.

preview:
  You are an independent adversarial security and operability reviewer. Review exactly commit 001f5eb33 against its first parent in the repository at /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.claude/worktrees/agent-a27ab8f09565c6407. Do not edit files, do not run tests, do not delegate. Inspect the exact diff, changed production code, and changed manifests. Trace only essential referenced symbols. Report ONLY concrete HIGH or MEDIUM severity exploitable security defects or deterministic operational failures, with exact absolute file:line, concrete trigger, and specific fix. If none, output exactly CLEAN plus the brief evidence/assumptions.

  Required adversarial checks: verify dedicated model-secret mapping; one-active-attempt mirror lock and revocation before publication; OpenSSH client presence; bounded controller protocol; HTTPS with CA validation; token/envelope/workload binding; absence of job GitHub/admin credentials; actual resource requests/limits and readiness checks. Treat every trust-boundary input and datastore/service return as hostile. Enumerate all changed conditional branches and compare sibling guards. Require fail-closed behavior for parsing, auth, crypto, configuration, and outbound connections. Candidate findings must have a concrete trigger and survive one refutation pass.

  Output format: numbered findings ordered by severity, each with Title, Location, Severity, Trigger/exploit, Fix. End Headline and Residual/unverified. Do not report low severity, style, speculation, or tests you did not run.


id: 019ffe7d-2af3-7131-97c5-e2601379ee9b
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/agent-a657e79cfc4d2f370-9422c4cf4c4b
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 37700a9d89b705494d0a9245e2290cfba595ad2b
git_branch: worktree-agent-a657e79cfc4d2f370
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/14/rollout-2026-08-14T04-17-23-019ffe7d-2af3-7131-97c5-e2601379ee9b.jsonl

title:
  Perform a fresh independent, single-threaded security and operability review only. Do not edit files or run tests. Review commit b1e4347a8 against its first parent in this repository. Inspect the exact diff and trace only essential referenced symbols to assess the full trusted-Gitea execution chain: secure deploy-key lifecycle; controller/key/worker authentication; envelope/model-secret binding; sole-GitHub-publisher enforcement; TLS identities and mounts; DNS/egress; Pod Security Standards; resource/handler/database lifecycle; and installer behavior. Verify the three most recent corrections in the diff. Treat all inputs and datastore reads as hostile. Report only concrete HIGH or MEDIUM security vulnerabilities, or deterministic deployment/runtime failures. For each: title, absolute file path and line, severity, concrete trigger, and specific fix. If none, state CLEAN, followed only by material assumptions that need deeper confirmation. Do not produce low-confidence concerns, code changes, tests, or a plan. Base conclusions on running behavior, and refute each candidate once before reporting.

first_user_message:
  Perform a fresh independent, single-threaded security and operability review only. Do not edit files or run tests. Review commit b1e4347a8 against its first parent in this repository. Inspect the exact diff and trace only essential referenced symbols to assess the full trusted-Gitea execution chain: secure deploy-key lifecycle; controller/key/worker authentication; envelope/model-secret binding; sole-GitHub-publisher enforcement; TLS identities and mounts; DNS/egress; Pod Security Standards; resource/handler/database lifecycle; and installer behavior. Verify the three most recent corrections in the diff. Treat all inputs and datastore reads as hostile. Report only concrete HIGH or MEDIUM security vulnerabilities, or deterministic deployment/runtime failures. For each: title, absolute file path and line, severity, concrete trigger, and specific fix. If none, state CLEAN, followed only by material assumptions that need deeper confirmation. Do not produce low-confidence concerns, code changes, tests, or a plan. Base conclusions on running behavior, and refute each candidate once before reporting.

preview:
  Perform a fresh independent, single-threaded security and operability review only. Do not edit files or run tests. Review commit b1e4347a8 against its first parent in this repository. Inspect the exact diff and trace only essential referenced symbols to assess the full trusted-Gitea execution chain: secure deploy-key lifecycle; controller/key/worker authentication; envelope/model-secret binding; sole-GitHub-publisher enforcement; TLS identities and mounts; DNS/egress; Pod Security Standards; resource/handler/database lifecycle; and installer behavior. Verify the three most recent corrections in the diff. Treat all inputs and datastore reads as hostile. Report only concrete HIGH or MEDIUM security vulnerabilities, or deterministic deployment/runtime failures. For each: title, absolute file path and line, severity, concrete trigger, and specific fix. If none, state CLEAN, followed only by material assumptions that need deeper confirmation. Do not produce low-confidence concerns, code changes, tests, or a plan. Base conclusions on running behavior, and refute each candidate once before reporting.


id: 019fff32-8127-74b0-a74d-d4d54e25aadd
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/ipz-stubs-b827c3daa938/plugins/international-press-zone
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/14/rollout-2026-08-14T07-35-27-019fff32-8127-74b0-a74d-d4d54e25aadd.jsonl

title:
  Replace nine placeholder/stub implementations with real, working implementations in the WordPress plugin at /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/wordpress/wp-content/.worktrees/ipz-stubs/plugins/international-press-zone. All paths below are relative to that directory. Work ONLY inside that worktree.

  Load and follow .claude/agents/expert.md and the repo CLAUDE.md conventions (strict_types, namespace InternationalPressZone, ABSPATH guard, text domain 'international-press-zone', escaping/sanitization rules, no inline CSS).

  The nine sites, each currently a stub marked by a 'for now'/'placeholder'/'simplified' comment:

  1. includes/Database/IndexOptimizer.php:479 — '// For now, return empty array'. Implement the real query.
  2. includes/API/DashboardController.php:85 — '// Placeholder implementation until validation logger is ready'. Implement it against whatever validation/logging facility actually exists in includes/ (search for it); if none exists, derive the data from the real tables rather than returning fabricated values.
  3. includes/Workflow/EmailTemplates/TemplateEngine.php:97 — '// For now, convert HTML to text'. Implement proper plain-text alternative generation.
  4. includes/Workflow/ProgressReporter.php:73 and :105 — simplified completion percentage, and 'Apply filters (dates, languages, etc) - simplified for now'. Implement real per-state weighted progress and real filter application (date_from/date_to, language, state).
  5. includes/CLI/CacheCommand.php:114 — '// For now, we will assume we can get it from Plugin or construct it.' Resolve the CacheWarmer dependency properly through the plugin's real container/bootstrap.
  6. includes/Team/PerformanceMetrics.php:92, :119, :152 (and the related :122 and :177 comments) — engagement score hardcoded to 100, the 'simplified' assigned/completed query that admits it is querying the wrong table, and the ':152 Placeholder for now'. Implement these against the real schema: read the actual table definitions from includes/Core/Database.php (ipz_workflow_states, ipz_time_entries, translations, and any activity/history tables) and write correct SQL with $wpdb->prepare.

  HARD REQUIREMENTS:
  - NO stubs, NO placeholders, NO 'for now' comments, NO fabricated/hardcoded metric values. Every one of these sites must do real work against the real schema or be removed entirely if the feature is genuinely dead.
  - Do not add explanatory comments about your reasoning. Comments only where the code cannot be made self-evident.
  - Read includes/Core/Database.php for the authoritative table names and columns before writing any SQL. Never invent a column.
  - All SQL through $wpdb->prepare. All output escaped. All input sanitized.
  - Touch ONLY the six files listed above plus any test files you add. Do not refactor adjacent code.

  ACCEPTANCE — run these from the plugin directory and report their REAL output:
    bash tools/factory-gate.sh php-syntax
    bash tools/factory-gate.sh test
    bash tools/factory-gate.sh phpstan
  All three must exit 0. If phpstan reports new errors caused by your change, fix the code — do NOT add baseline entries.

  Do NOT commit. Leave the changes in the working tree. Report: which files you changed, what each stub became, and the verbatim output of the three acceptance commands.

first_user_message:
  Replace nine placeholder/stub implementations with real, working implementations in the WordPress plugin at /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/wordpress/wp-content/.worktrees/ipz-stubs/plugins/international-press-zone. All paths below are relative to that directory. Work ONLY inside that worktree.

  Load and follow .claude/agents/expert.md and the repo CLAUDE.md conventions (strict_types, namespace InternationalPressZone, ABSPATH guard, text domain 'international-press-zone', escaping/sanitization rules, no inline CSS).

  The nine sites, each currently a stub marked by a 'for now'/'placeholder'/'simplified' comment:

  1. includes/Database/IndexOptimizer.php:479 — '// For now, return empty array'. Implement the real query.
  2. includes/API/DashboardController.php:85 — '// Placeholder implementation until validation logger is ready'. Implement it against whatever validation/logging facility actually exists in includes/ (search for it); if none exists, derive the data from the real tables rather than returning fabricated values.
  3. includes/Workflow/EmailTemplates/TemplateEngine.php:97 — '// For now, convert HTML to text'. Implement proper plain-text alternative generation.
  4. includes/Workflow/ProgressReporter.php:73 and :105 — simplified completion percentage, and 'Apply filters (dates, languages, etc) - simplified for now'. Implement real per-state weighted progress and real filter application (date_from/date_to, language, state).
  5. includes/CLI/CacheCommand.php:114 — '// For now, we will assume we can get it from Plugin or construct it.' Resolve the CacheWarmer dependency properly through the plugin's real container/bootstrap.
  6. includes/Team/PerformanceMetrics.php:92, :119, :152 (and the related :122 and :177 comments) — engagement score hardcoded to 100, the 'simplified' assigned/completed query that admits it is querying the wrong table, and the ':152 Placeholder for now'. Implement these against the real schema: read the actual table definitions from includes/Core/Database.php (ipz_workflow_states, ipz_time_entries, translations, and any activity/history tables) and write correct SQL with $wpdb->prepare.

  HARD REQUIREMENTS:
  - NO stubs, NO placeholders, NO 'for now' comments, NO fabricated/hardcoded metric values. Every one of these sites must do real work against the real schema or be removed entirely if the feature is genuinely dead.
  - Do not add explanatory comments about your reasoning. Comments only where the code cannot be made self-evident.
  - Read includes/Core/Database.php for the authoritative table names and columns before writing any SQL. Never invent a column.
  - All SQL through $wpdb->prepare. All output escaped. All input sanitized.
  - Touch ONLY the six files listed above plus any test files you add. Do not refactor adjacent code.

  ACCEPTANCE — run these from the plugin directory and report their REAL output:
    bash tools/factory-gate.sh php-syntax
    bash tools/factory-gate.sh test
    bash tools/factory-gate.sh phpstan
  All three must exit 0. If phpstan reports new errors caused by your change, fix the code — do NOT add baseline entries.

  Do NOT commit. Leave the changes in the working tree. Report: which files you changed, what each stub became, and the verbatim output of the three acceptance commands.

preview:
  Replace nine placeholder/stub implementations with real, working implementations in the WordPress plugin at /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/wordpress/wp-content/.worktrees/ipz-stubs/plugins/international-press-zone. All paths below are relative to that directory. Work ONLY inside that worktree.

  Load and follow .claude/agents/expert.md and the repo CLAUDE.md conventions (strict_types, namespace InternationalPressZone, ABSPATH guard, text domain 'international-press-zone', escaping/sanitization rules, no inline CSS).

  The nine sites, each currently a stub marked by a 'for now'/'placeholder'/'simplified' comment:

  1. includes/Database/IndexOptimizer.php:479 — '// For now, return empty array'. Implement the real query.
  2. includes/API/DashboardController.php:85 — '// Placeholder implementation until validation logger is ready'. Implement it against whatever validation/logging facility actually exists in includes/ (search for it); if none exists, derive the data from the real tables rather than returning fabricated values.
  3. includes/Workflow/EmailTemplates/TemplateEngine.php:97 — '// For now, convert HTML to text'. Implement proper plain-text alternative generation.
  4. includes/Workflow/ProgressReporter.php:73 and :105 — simplified completion percentage, and 'Apply filters (dates, languages, etc) - simplified for now'. Implement real per-state weighted progress and real filter application (date_from/date_to, language, state).
  5. includes/CLI/CacheCommand.php:114 — '// For now, we will assume we can get it from Plugin or construct it.' Resolve the CacheWarmer dependency properly through the plugin's real container/bootstrap.
  6. includes/Team/PerformanceMetrics.php:92, :119, :152 (and the related :122 and :177 comments) — engagement score hardcoded to 100, the 'simplified' assigned/completed query that admits it is querying the wrong table, and the ':152 Placeholder for now'. Implement these against the real schema: read the actual table definitions from includes/Core/Database.php (ipz_workflow_states, ipz_time_entries, translations, and any activity/history tables) and write correct SQL with $wpdb->prepare.

  HARD REQUIREMENTS:
  - NO stubs, NO placeholders, NO 'for now' comments, NO fabricated/hardcoded metric values. Every one of these sites must do real work against the real schema or be removed entirely if the feature is genuinely dead.
  - Do not add explanatory comments about your reasoning. Comments only where the code cannot be made self-evident.
  - Read includes/Core/Database.php for the authoritative table names and columns before writing any SQL. Never invent a column.
  - All SQL through $wpdb->prepare. All output escaped. All input sanitized.
  - Touch ONLY the six files listed above plus any test files you add. Do not refactor adjacent code.

  ACCEPTANCE — run these from the plugin directory and report their REAL output:
    bash tools/factory-gate.sh php-syntax
    bash tools/factory-gate.sh test
    bash tools/factory-gate.sh phpstan
  All three must exit 0. If phpstan reports new errors caused by your change, fix the code — do NOT add baseline entries.

  Do NOT commit. Leave the changes in the working tree. Report: which files you changed, what each stub became, and the verbatim output of the three acceptance commands.


id: 019fff41-9258-78c1-bbbc-d4c0c897562e
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/plans-sidebar-removal-69f791643970
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 08d60987312f5d0296fbcd5294df1e26cfc54671
git_branch: wt/plans-sidebar-removal
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-terra
reasoning_effort: medium
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/14/rollout-2026-08-14T07-51-55-019fff41-9258-78c1-bbbc-d4c0c897562e.jsonl

title:
  Task: remove the retired /plans route from the Overdeck web sidebar navigation. Owner ruling
  (docs/plans/2026-08-14-requests-board-astryx.md, "Route rulings"): "/plans is RETIRED... remove
  /plans from the sidebar/nav. The route may keep serving deep links until the board replaces it,
  but it stops being advertised."

  Scope is EXACTLY ONE FILE: apps/web/src/lib/sidebar-nav.ts
  Remove this array entry from the "Operations" section of SIDEBAR_SECTIONS:
    { label: 'Plans', href: '/plans', badge: '1▶ 1⛔' },

  Do NOT touch any other file. Do NOT delete the /plans route, pages, or components
  (apps/web/src/pages/plans*, apps/web/src/components/plans/*, PlansCard.tsx on the overview page
  stay exactly as-is — they are out of scope). Do NOT change any other sidebar entry, label, or
  badge. Do NOT add comments explaining the removal. This is a one-line deletion from a data array.

  Report back only the diff.

first_user_message:
  Task: remove the retired /plans route from the Overdeck web sidebar navigation. Owner ruling
  (docs/plans/2026-08-14-requests-board-astryx.md, "Route rulings"): "/plans is RETIRED... remove
  /plans from the sidebar/nav. The route may keep serving deep links until the board replaces it,
  but it stops being advertised."

  Scope is EXACTLY ONE FILE: apps/web/src/lib/sidebar-nav.ts
  Remove this array entry from the "Operations" section of SIDEBAR_SECTIONS:
    { label: 'Plans', href: '/plans', badge: '1▶ 1⛔' },

  Do NOT touch any other file. Do NOT delete the /plans route, pages, or components
  (apps/web/src/pages/plans*, apps/web/src/components/plans/*, PlansCard.tsx on the overview page
  stay exactly as-is — they are out of scope). Do NOT change any other sidebar entry, label, or
  badge. Do NOT add comments explaining the removal. This is a one-line deletion from a data array.

  Report back only the diff.

preview:
  Task: remove the retired /plans route from the Overdeck web sidebar navigation. Owner ruling
  (docs/plans/2026-08-14-requests-board-astryx.md, "Route rulings"): "/plans is RETIRED... remove
  /plans from the sidebar/nav. The route may keep serving deep links until the board replaces it,
  but it stops being advertised."

  Scope is EXACTLY ONE FILE: apps/web/src/lib/sidebar-nav.ts
  Remove this array entry from the "Operations" section of SIDEBAR_SECTIONS:
    { label: 'Plans', href: '/plans', badge: '1▶ 1⛔' },

  Do NOT touch any other file. Do NOT delete the /plans route, pages, or components
  (apps/web/src/pages/plans*, apps/web/src/components/plans/*, PlansCard.tsx on the overview page
  stay exactly as-is — they are out of scope). Do NOT change any other sidebar entry, label, or
  badge. Do NOT add comments explaining the removal. This is a one-line deletion from a data array.

  Report back only the diff.


id: 019fffc2-07bf-76c0-8e13-65dfe693a33e
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/deploy-docs-shortcircuit-e7e4fd3c6633
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/14/rollout-2026-08-14T10-12-13-019fffc2-07bf-76c0-8e13-65dfe693a33e.jsonl

title:
  REVIEW ONLY — do not edit any files, report findings as text.

  Context: this is CRITICAL INFRA. File packaging/deploy-local.sh in the overdeck repo (worktree at /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/deploy-docs-shortcircuit) deploys local services after every landed git commit, taking ~6 minutes even for a one-line docs change. I implemented a docs-only short-circuit per this binding contract:

  - After the detached checkout of origin/main, before pnpm install: read a stamp file at $DEPLOY/.git/harness-deployed-sha (the full 40-hex sha of the last FULLY successful deploy, written only at the very end of a successful run, immediately before the final deployed JSON line).
  - Skip condition (fail-closed in every direction): stamp file readable AND matches ^[0-9a-f]{40}$ AND `git cat-file -e <sha>^{commit}` succeeds AND `git diff --no-renames --name-only <sha> HEAD` succeeds AND every changed path is documentation (docs/* at any depth, or a repo-root *.md with no slash in the path). ANY other path, unreadable/malformed stamp, unknown commit, or diff failure -> full deploy. Empty diff also skips.
  - On skip: drain the existing queue_snapshot array exactly like the script's own tail (rm -f "${queue_snapshot[@]}" with the same fail handling), print exactly one JSON line {"stage":"deploy-local","status":"deployed-docs-only","sha":"<short>","base":"<stamp short>"}, exit 0. No installers/builds/restarts run on this path.
  - Stamp write: immediately before the final 'deployed' JSON printf, after the queue drain and od-live-report-refresh — full 40-hex $deployment_sha, atomic via .tmp + mv, fail() on write error, NEVER written on any failure path.
  - No new env bypass flag (that would be fail-open). Force-full-deploy override is: delete $DEPLOY/.git/harness-deployed-sha (documented as a one-line note in the script's top header comment).

  Please review the actual diff below for: (1) any fail-open hole — a case where docs-only status would wrongly fire on a non-docs or ambiguous change, (2) shell correctness bugs (quoting, word-splitting, exit-code propagation through the 'if var=$(cmd); then' idiom, the case-pattern path classification, the here-string empty-diff edge case), (3) anything that could write a bad/short/malformed stamp, (4) anything that skips the queue drain or leaks a side effect on the skip path, (5) style/idiom mismatches with the rest of the script (it uses a fail() helper with stage/status/detail, set -uo pipefail, no local declarations, no functions besides established ones).

  Read these two files directly for full context before answering:
  - /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/deploy-docs-shortcircuit/packaging/deploy-local.sh
  - /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/deploy-docs-shortcircuit/packaging/test-deploy-local.sh

  Full diff also at: /home/user/.cache/agent-tmp/claude-1000/-home-user-Projects-overdeck/f7206ccd-6b70-4951-aca7-740f2f4cab41/scratchpad/review-diff.patch

  Report findings as a numbered list: BLOCKING (must fix before landing) vs NIT (optional). Be concrete with line references.

first_user_message:
  REVIEW ONLY — do not edit any files, report findings as text.

  Context: this is CRITICAL INFRA. File packaging/deploy-local.sh in the overdeck repo (worktree at /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/deploy-docs-shortcircuit) deploys local services after every landed git commit, taking ~6 minutes even for a one-line docs change. I implemented a docs-only short-circuit per this binding contract:

  - After the detached checkout of origin/main, before pnpm install: read a stamp file at $DEPLOY/.git/harness-deployed-sha (the full 40-hex sha of the last FULLY successful deploy, written only at the very end of a successful run, immediately before the final deployed JSON line).
  - Skip condition (fail-closed in every direction): stamp file readable AND matches ^[0-9a-f]{40}$ AND `git cat-file -e <sha>^{commit}` succeeds AND `git diff --no-renames --name-only <sha> HEAD` succeeds AND every changed path is documentation (docs/* at any depth, or a repo-root *.md with no slash in the path). ANY other path, unreadable/malformed stamp, unknown commit, or diff failure -> full deploy. Empty diff also skips.
  - On skip: drain the existing queue_snapshot array exactly like the script's own tail (rm -f "${queue_snapshot[@]}" with the same fail handling), print exactly one JSON line {"stage":"deploy-local","status":"deployed-docs-only","sha":"<short>","base":"<stamp short>"}, exit 0. No installers/builds/restarts run on this path.
  - Stamp write: immediately before the final 'deployed' JSON printf, after the queue drain and od-live-report-refresh — full 40-hex $deployment_sha, atomic via .tmp + mv, fail() on write error, NEVER written on any failure path.
  - No new env bypass flag (that would be fail-open). Force-full-deploy override is: delete $DEPLOY/.git/harness-deployed-sha (documented as a one-line note in the script's top header comment).

  Please review the actual diff below for: (1) any fail-open hole — a case where docs-only status would wrongly fire on a non-docs or ambiguous change, (2) shell correctness bugs (quoting, word-splitting, exit-code propagation through the 'if var=$(cmd); then' idiom, the case-pattern path classification, the here-string empty-diff edge case), (3) anything that could write a bad/short/malformed stamp, (4) anything that skips the queue drain or leaks a side effect on the skip path, (5) style/idiom mismatches with the rest of the script (it uses a fail() helper with stage/status/detail, set -uo pipefail, no local declarations, no functions besides established ones).

  Read these two files directly for full context before answering:
  - /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/deploy-docs-shortcircuit/packaging/deploy-local.sh
  - /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/deploy-docs-shortcircuit/packaging/test-deploy-local.sh

  Full diff also at: /home/user/.cache/agent-tmp/claude-1000/-home-user-Projects-overdeck/f7206ccd-6b70-4951-aca7-740f2f4cab41/scratchpad/review-diff.patch

  Report findings as a numbered list: BLOCKING (must fix before landing) vs NIT (optional). Be concrete with line references.

preview:
  REVIEW ONLY — do not edit any files, report findings as text.

  Context: this is CRITICAL INFRA. File packaging/deploy-local.sh in the overdeck repo (worktree at /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/deploy-docs-shortcircuit) deploys local services after every landed git commit, taking ~6 minutes even for a one-line docs change. I implemented a docs-only short-circuit per this binding contract:

  - After the detached checkout of origin/main, before pnpm install: read a stamp file at $DEPLOY/.git/harness-deployed-sha (the full 40-hex sha of the last FULLY successful deploy, written only at the very end of a successful run, immediately before the final deployed JSON line).
  - Skip condition (fail-closed in every direction): stamp file readable AND matches ^[0-9a-f]{40}$ AND `git cat-file -e <sha>^{commit}` succeeds AND `git diff --no-renames --name-only <sha> HEAD` succeeds AND every changed path is documentation (docs/* at any depth, or a repo-root *.md with no slash in the path). ANY other path, unreadable/malformed stamp, unknown commit, or diff failure -> full deploy. Empty diff also skips.
  - On skip: drain the existing queue_snapshot array exactly like the script's own tail (rm -f "${queue_snapshot[@]}" with the same fail handling), print exactly one JSON line {"stage":"deploy-local","status":"deployed-docs-only","sha":"<short>","base":"<stamp short>"}, exit 0. No installers/builds/restarts run on this path.
  - Stamp write: immediately before the final 'deployed' JSON printf, after the queue drain and od-live-report-refresh — full 40-hex $deployment_sha, atomic via .tmp + mv, fail() on write error, NEVER written on any failure path.
  - No new env bypass flag (that would be fail-open). Force-full-deploy override is: delete $DEPLOY/.git/harness-deployed-sha (documented as a one-line note in the script's top header comment).

  Please review the actual diff below for: (1) any fail-open hole — a case where docs-only status would wrongly fire on a non-docs or ambiguous change, (2) shell correctness bugs (quoting, word-splitting, exit-code propagation through the 'if var=$(cmd); then' idiom, the case-pattern path classification, the here-string empty-diff edge case), (3) anything that could write a bad/short/malformed stamp, (4) anything that skips the queue drain or leaks a side effect on the skip path, (5) style/idiom mismatches with the rest of the script (it uses a fail() helper with stage/status/detail, set -uo pipefail, no local declarations, no functions besides established ones).

  Read these two files directly for full context before answering:
  - /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/deploy-docs-shortcircuit/packaging/deploy-local.sh
  - /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/deploy-docs-shortcircuit/packaging/test-deploy-local.sh

  Full diff also at: /home/user/.cache/agent-tmp/claude-1000/-home-user-Projects-overdeck/f7206ccd-6b70-4951-aca7-740f2f4cab41/scratchpad/review-diff.patch

  Report findings as a numbered list: BLOCKING (must fix before landing) vs NIT (optional). Be concrete with line references.


id: 019fffc3-a14a-7db2-ad91-b600ddbdcec7
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/auth-stripe-4cb21aa4e2b8
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: cf6284c887ff29b29b5286b2e8b88ee471469804
git_branch: wt/auth-stripe
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/press-zone-core
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/14/rollout-2026-08-14T10-13-58-019fffc3-a14a-7db2-ad91-b600ddbdcec7.jsonl

title:
  Implement slice 3 of the ecosystem auth work in this repository.

  REPO ROOT (absolute): /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/press-zone-core/.worktrees/auth-stripe
  Branch: wt/auth-stripe (already checked out, based on origin/main). Every path below is relative to the repo root.

  READ FIRST, in this order:
  1. AGENTS.md — repo rules, binding.
  2. docs/plans/2026-08-14-ecosystem-auth-3-stripe.md — THE REQUEST. This is authoritative; implement exactly it.
  3. docs/specs/2026-08-13-ecosystem-auth-design.md §4.5 and §6 — the pinned contracts (routes, request/response shapes, webhook event table, error codes). Follow them VERBATIM; do not paraphrase or invent shapes.
  4. Slices 1 and 2 are ALREADY LANDED in this tree. Read and reuse them rather than reinventing:
     - apps/api/src/routes/connect.ts (+ its tests) — the site connect handshake
     - apps/api/src/routes/social.ts, apps/api/src/lib/social-session.ts, apps/api/src/lib/social-identity.ts — social sign-in
     - apps/api/src/config.ts — the fail-closed `requireBinding` config pattern you must match for the Stripe bindings
     - the existing `ingestWebhook` / `webhook_events` dedup path and the existing subscribe transaction and refund-reservation flow — REUSE them, do not fork them.

  HARD CONSTRAINTS:
  - NO STUBS. A hardcoded return, a `not implemented` throw, a `TODO` body, or an empty function body is a defect, not progress. `slopgate` runs in the pre-commit hook and rejects them.
  - NEVER weaken or evade a check to make it pass. Do not obfuscate identifiers (e.g. string concatenation of a property name) to dodge a grep. Do not use `as unknown as X` or `any` to silence a type error — fix the type honestly.
  - Do not touch PayPal or Morning code paths, plugin-side code, the customer web dashboard, or any §6 seam shape.
  - Webhook signature verification happens BEFORE the payload is trusted at all. Activation is exclusively webhook-driven — a browser-reported success never grants entitlement.
  - Config must fail closed at load when STRIPE_SECRET_KEY / STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET / STRIPE_PUBLISHABLE_KEY is absent, matching the existing loadConfig pattern. If you add required bindings, you MUST also update every existing test that builds an env object for the worker (e.g. apps/api/src/index.test.ts) so the whole suite still passes.
  - New integration suites go in apps/api/tests/integration/ alongside connect.test.ts, subscribe.test.ts, webhook-idempotency.test.ts.

  ACCEPTANCE (the only acceptance command):
    pnpm run verify        # from the repo root — must PASS (exit 0)
  It runs api:typecheck && api:test && api:integration && web:test && api:build && web:build && api:wrangler:dry-run.
  If your sandbox cannot install this repo's private dependencies (@platform-modules/* come from npm.pkg.github.com and may 401), DO NOT fake a pass and DO NOT invent output. Say plainly in your final report that you could not run verify and why; the reviewer will run it locally.

  REPORT AT THE END:
  - Every file you created or modified.
  - Whether you ran `pnpm run verify`, and if so its REAL exit code and the tail of its output. Never claim a pass you did not observe.
  - Anything you deliberately left out and why.

  Do NOT commit. Leave the work uncommitted in the working tree.

first_user_message:
  Implement slice 3 of the ecosystem auth work in this repository.

  REPO ROOT (absolute): /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/press-zone-core/.worktrees/auth-stripe
  Branch: wt/auth-stripe (already checked out, based on origin/main). Every path below is relative to the repo root.

  READ FIRST, in this order:
  1. AGENTS.md — repo rules, binding.
  2. docs/plans/2026-08-14-ecosystem-auth-3-stripe.md — THE REQUEST. This is authoritative; implement exactly it.
  3. docs/specs/2026-08-13-ecosystem-auth-design.md §4.5 and §6 — the pinned contracts (routes, request/response shapes, webhook event table, error codes). Follow them VERBATIM; do not paraphrase or invent shapes.
  4. Slices 1 and 2 are ALREADY LANDED in this tree. Read and reuse them rather than reinventing:
     - apps/api/src/routes/connect.ts (+ its tests) — the site connect handshake
     - apps/api/src/routes/social.ts, apps/api/src/lib/social-session.ts, apps/api/src/lib/social-identity.ts — social sign-in
     - apps/api/src/config.ts — the fail-closed `requireBinding` config pattern you must match for the Stripe bindings
     - the existing `ingestWebhook` / `webhook_events` dedup path and the existing subscribe transaction and refund-reservation flow — REUSE them, do not fork them.

  HARD CONSTRAINTS:
  - NO STUBS. A hardcoded return, a `not implemented` throw, a `TODO` body, or an empty function body is a defect, not progress. `slopgate` runs in the pre-commit hook and rejects them.
  - NEVER weaken or evade a check to make it pass. Do not obfuscate identifiers (e.g. string concatenation of a property name) to dodge a grep. Do not use `as unknown as X` or `any` to silence a type error — fix the type honestly.
  - Do not touch PayPal or Morning code paths, plugin-side code, the customer web dashboard, or any §6 seam shape.
  - Webhook signature verification happens BEFORE the payload is trusted at all. Activation is exclusively webhook-driven — a browser-reported success never grants entitlement.
  - Config must fail closed at load when STRIPE_SECRET_KEY / STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET / STRIPE_PUBLISHABLE_KEY is absent, matching the existing loadConfig pattern. If you add required bindings, you MUST also update every existing test that builds an env object for the worker (e.g. apps/api/src/index.test.ts) so the whole suite still passes.
  - New integration suites go in apps/api/tests/integration/ alongside connect.test.ts, subscribe.test.ts, webhook-idempotency.test.ts.

  ACCEPTANCE (the only acceptance command):
    pnpm run verify        # from the repo root — must PASS (exit 0)
  It runs api:typecheck && api:test && api:integration && web:test && api:build && web:build && api:wrangler:dry-run.
  If your sandbox cannot install this repo's private dependencies (@platform-modules/* come from npm.pkg.github.com and may 401), DO NOT fake a pass and DO NOT invent output. Say plainly in your final report that you could not run verify and why; the reviewer will run it locally.

  REPORT AT THE END:
  - Every file you created or modified.
  - Whether you ran `pnpm run verify`, and if so its REAL exit code and the tail of its output. Never claim a pass you did not observe.
  - Anything you deliberately left out and why.

  Do NOT commit. Leave the work uncommitted in the working tree.

preview:
  Implement slice 3 of the ecosystem auth work in this repository.

  REPO ROOT (absolute): /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/press-zone-core/.worktrees/auth-stripe
  Branch: wt/auth-stripe (already checked out, based on origin/main). Every path below is relative to the repo root.

  READ FIRST, in this order:
  1. AGENTS.md — repo rules, binding.
  2. docs/plans/2026-08-14-ecosystem-auth-3-stripe.md — THE REQUEST. This is authoritative; implement exactly it.
  3. docs/specs/2026-08-13-ecosystem-auth-design.md §4.5 and §6 — the pinned contracts (routes, request/response shapes, webhook event table, error codes). Follow them VERBATIM; do not paraphrase or invent shapes.
  4. Slices 1 and 2 are ALREADY LANDED in this tree. Read and reuse them rather than reinventing:
     - apps/api/src/routes/connect.ts (+ its tests) — the site connect handshake
     - apps/api/src/routes/social.ts, apps/api/src/lib/social-session.ts, apps/api/src/lib/social-identity.ts — social sign-in
     - apps/api/src/config.ts — the fail-closed `requireBinding` config pattern you must match for the Stripe bindings
     - the existing `ingestWebhook` / `webhook_events` dedup path and the existing subscribe transaction and refund-reservation flow — REUSE them, do not fork them.

  HARD CONSTRAINTS:
  - NO STUBS. A hardcoded return, a `not implemented` throw, a `TODO` body, or an empty function body is a defect, not progress. `slopgate` runs in the pre-commit hook and rejects them.
  - NEVER weaken or evade a check to make it pass. Do not obfuscate identifiers (e.g. string concatenation of a property name) to dodge a grep. Do not use `as unknown as X` or `any` to silence a type error — fix the type honestly.
  - Do not touch PayPal or Morning code paths, plugin-side code, the customer web dashboard, or any §6 seam shape.
  - Webhook signature verification happens BEFORE the payload is trusted at all. Activation is exclusively webhook-driven — a browser-reported success never grants entitlement.
  - Config must fail closed at load when STRIPE_SECRET_KEY / STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET / STRIPE_PUBLISHABLE_KEY is absent, matching the existing loadConfig pattern. If you add required bindings, you MUST also update every existing test that builds an env object for the worker (e.g. apps/api/src/index.test.ts) so the whole suite still passes.
  - New integration suites go in apps/api/tests/integration/ alongside connect.test.ts, subscribe.test.ts, webhook-idempotency.test.ts.

  ACCEPTANCE (the only acceptance command):
    pnpm run verify        # from the repo root — must PASS (exit 0)
  It runs api:typecheck && api:test && api:integration && web:test && api:build && web:build && api:wrangler:dry-run.
  If your sandbox cannot install this repo's private dependencies (@platform-modules/* come from npm.pkg.github.com and may 401), DO NOT fake a pass and DO NOT invent output. Say plainly in your final report that you could not run verify and why; the reviewer will run it locally.

  REPORT AT THE END:
  - Every file you created or modified.
  - Whether you ran `pnpm run verify`, and if so its REAL exit code and the tail of its output. Never claim a pass you did not observe.
  - Anything you deliberately left out and why.

  Do NOT commit. Leave the work uncommitted in the working tree.


id: 019fffe8-3ded-7501-b50d-6f80bca9f37a
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/multilingual-all-slices-b3360b8c24b7
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 94a8b405f427c7ef753887547671ddba7ae881fa
git_branch: worktree-multilingual-all-slices
git_origin_url: git@github.com:avi-ezra/Press.Zone-Works.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-terra
reasoning_effort: medium
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/14/rollout-2026-08-14T10-53-58-019fffe8-3ded-7501-b50d-6f80bca9f37a.jsonl

title:
  Work directly in this repository; do not delegate. Complete the currently active dormant Site Content repository unit. The owner asked you to do the implementation; Claude will review and merge it. Read and follow the repository CLAUDE.md, plugins/international-press-zone/CLAUDE.md, plugins/international-press-zone/.claude/agents/expert.md, and the durable plan plugins/international-press-zone/docs/plans/2026-08-14-site-content-repository.md. Current changed files include includes/SiteContent/class-sitecontentrepository.php, tests/Unit/SiteContent/SiteContentRepositoryTest.php, and plan/index records. Focused PHPUnit currently passes 13 tests/34 assertions, PHPStan and syntax pass, but project PHPCS reports 50 source findings (mostly missing method/property docblocks and three exception-output false positives) and 44 test-fixture style findings. Finish the repository robustly and surgically: remediate all applicable project PHPCS findings without broad suppression or baseline growth; use only narrow established test-fixture suppressions where unavoidable and consistent with existing Site Content tests; preserve WordPress 6.0 support, trusted table prefix validation, prepared values, compare-and-swap revisions, generic DB errors, compiled-cache invalidation, bounded theme lifecycle, dormant/unregistered state, and frozen plan scope. Review for correctness and security, fix defects you find, and run focused PHPUnit, PHPStan, PHP syntax, project PHPCS, git diff --check, and a no-consumer/registration search. Do not commit, merge, push, deploy, alter unrelated files, reset, stash, clean, invoke other agents/models, or ask questions. Leave the verified working-tree changes ready for Claude's review. At the end report exact files changed, gate results, and any remaining signal.

first_user_message:
  Work directly in this repository; do not delegate. Complete the currently active dormant Site Content repository unit. The owner asked you to do the implementation; Claude will review and merge it. Read and follow the repository CLAUDE.md, plugins/international-press-zone/CLAUDE.md, plugins/international-press-zone/.claude/agents/expert.md, and the durable plan plugins/international-press-zone/docs/plans/2026-08-14-site-content-repository.md. Current changed files include includes/SiteContent/class-sitecontentrepository.php, tests/Unit/SiteContent/SiteContentRepositoryTest.php, and plan/index records. Focused PHPUnit currently passes 13 tests/34 assertions, PHPStan and syntax pass, but project PHPCS reports 50 source findings (mostly missing method/property docblocks and three exception-output false positives) and 44 test-fixture style findings. Finish the repository robustly and surgically: remediate all applicable project PHPCS findings without broad suppression or baseline growth; use only narrow established test-fixture suppressions where unavoidable and consistent with existing Site Content tests; preserve WordPress 6.0 support, trusted table prefix validation, prepared values, compare-and-swap revisions, generic DB errors, compiled-cache invalidation, bounded theme lifecycle, dormant/unregistered state, and frozen plan scope. Review for correctness and security, fix defects you find, and run focused PHPUnit, PHPStan, PHP syntax, project PHPCS, git diff --check, and a no-consumer/registration search. Do not commit, merge, push, deploy, alter unrelated files, reset, stash, clean, invoke other agents/models, or ask questions. Leave the verified working-tree changes ready for Claude's review. At the end report exact files changed, gate results, and any remaining signal.

preview:
  Work directly in this repository; do not delegate. Complete the currently active dormant Site Content repository unit. The owner asked you to do the implementation; Claude will review and merge it. Read and follow the repository CLAUDE.md, plugins/international-press-zone/CLAUDE.md, plugins/international-press-zone/.claude/agents/expert.md, and the durable plan plugins/international-press-zone/docs/plans/2026-08-14-site-content-repository.md. Current changed files include includes/SiteContent/class-sitecontentrepository.php, tests/Unit/SiteContent/SiteContentRepositoryTest.php, and plan/index records. Focused PHPUnit currently passes 13 tests/34 assertions, PHPStan and syntax pass, but project PHPCS reports 50 source findings (mostly missing method/property docblocks and three exception-output false positives) and 44 test-fixture style findings. Finish the repository robustly and surgically: remediate all applicable project PHPCS findings without broad suppression or baseline growth; use only narrow established test-fixture suppressions where unavoidable and consistent with existing Site Content tests; preserve WordPress 6.0 support, trusted table prefix validation, prepared values, compare-and-swap revisions, generic DB errors, compiled-cache invalidation, bounded theme lifecycle, dormant/unregistered state, and frozen plan scope. Review for correctness and security, fix defects you find, and run focused PHPUnit, PHPStan, PHP syntax, project PHPCS, git diff --check, and a no-consumer/registration search. Do not commit, merge, push, deploy, alter unrelated files, reset, stash, clean, invoke other agents/models, or ask questions. Leave the verified working-tree changes ready for Claude's review. At the end report exact files changed, gate results, and any remaining signal.


id: 01a00007-bd1d-7b30-8de0-0c55485bd706
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/wp-content-10b66c7a0e8b
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: b1a83f8c7ba93d9b17b85876890e12fdeef35cd9
git_branch: fix/content-generate-all
git_origin_url: git@github.com:avi-ezra/Press.Zone-Works.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.3-codex-spark
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/14/rollout-2026-08-14T11-28-22-01a00007-bd1d-7b30-8de0-0c55485bd706.jsonl

title:
  Read the Claude Code session transcript at /home/user/.claude/projects/-home-user-Projects-Press-zone-wordpress-wp-content-plugins-international-press-zone/44f3236d-ba94-47c4-9d68-64adc03dff9b.jsonl (JSONL; skip tool_result noise). Author a continuation handoff in markdown for a fresh coding agent: goal, methodology, completed work, current state, precise next actions, blockers gated on the user, standing user instructions (verbatim), key file paths. Be complete but terse. Output ONLY the handoff markdown.

first_user_message:
  Read the Claude Code session transcript at /home/user/.claude/projects/-home-user-Projects-Press-zone-wordpress-wp-content-plugins-international-press-zone/44f3236d-ba94-47c4-9d68-64adc03dff9b.jsonl (JSONL; skip tool_result noise). Author a continuation handoff in markdown for a fresh coding agent: goal, methodology, completed work, current state, precise next actions, blockers gated on the user, standing user instructions (verbatim), key file paths. Be complete but terse. Output ONLY the handoff markdown.

preview:
  Read the Claude Code session transcript at /home/user/.claude/projects/-home-user-Projects-Press-zone-wordpress-wp-content-plugins-international-press-zone/44f3236d-ba94-47c4-9d68-64adc03dff9b.jsonl (JSONL; skip tool_result noise). Author a continuation handoff in markdown for a fresh coding agent: goal, methodology, completed work, current state, precise next actions, blockers gated on the user, standing user instructions (verbatim), key file paths. Be complete but terse. Output ONLY the handoff markdown.


id: 01a00061-0fde-7b30-9367-b1ea08a5f450
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/factory-pi-remote-9b291304a43a
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-terra
reasoning_effort: medium
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/14/rollout-2026-08-14T13-05-56-01a00061-0fde-7b30-9367-b1ea08a5f450.jsonl

title:
  Repo: /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/factory-pi-remote (git worktree, branch wt/factory-pi-remote).
  Read /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/factory-pi-remote/docs/plans/2026-08-14-factory-pi-remote.md FIRST — it is the authoritative spec with all verified facts and resolved design decisions. Implement exactly what it describes. Do not re-derive facts it already states; trust them.

  Summary of what to build (full detail is in the plan file — read it, this is just an index):

  1. `modules/workstation/bin/pi-remote` — a bash CLI wrapper that runs the `pi` coding-agent binary on a buildbox over ssh instead of locally, reusing `modules/systray/remote_dispatch.py`'s public Python functions (host selection, registry, mirroring machinery) by shelling out to a small Python helper module (e.g. `modules/workstation/bin/pi_remote_dispatch.py` or extend remote_dispatch's own call sites — your call, keep remote_dispatch.py's existing contract intact, do not break command_router.py/cdx.py callers). It must:
     - Target a bare `agent-seat` role host (NOT the podman sandbox container — see plan for why).
     - Forward all argv to `pi` unchanged, except: detect info-only pi invocations (`--list-models`, `--version`, `--help`, or no `-p`/`--session-id` present) and exec local `pi` directly for those — never round-trip those to a buildbox.
     - For a real agent turn, mirror the git repo tree (cwd) via remote_dispatch's existing open_session/push/pull machinery, AND additionally mirror the `--session-dir` argument's directory (raw_output_path stays local — VERIFY this by reading agent_pi.py's run() function before implementing; do not assume, read the actual code to confirm raw_output_path is written by the LOCAL Popen's stdout consumer thread, not by the remote pi process).
     - Push `--session-dir`'s directory to the remote host before running pi there, pull it back after, every invocation (correctness over speed, no caching).
     - Preserve real-time line-by-line stdout streaming (pi flushes per-line; do not buffer).
     - Propagate SIGTERM/SIGKILL sent to the local pi-remote process to the remote pi process (use ssh -tt or a remote trap+wait pattern; verify empirically that killing pi-remote's local process also kills the remote pi process, e.g. via a follow-up ssh pgrep check in the test).
     - Record a containment entry in ~/.overdeck/containment.jsonl on success/failure/abort, reusing command_router.py's `_append_containment_record` pattern (tool label "pi" or "factory-pi", runtime "pi") — do not duplicate its logic if it can be imported/reused cleanly; if not cleanly importable (it's currently a private function in command_router.py), extract a small shared helper into remote_dispatch.py or a new tiny module and have both command_router.py and pi-remote use it — keep this change minimal, do not refactor unrelated command_router.py code.
     - Fail CLOSED on: registry unreadable, no reachable host, mirror push/pull failure — clear nonzero exit (reuse remote_dispatch.EXIT_* codes), detail to stderr, NEVER fall back to local pi silently.

  2. Factory config: add a `defaults` key to `modules/harness/factory/adw_modules/data_types.py`'s `ConfigDefaults` (e.g. `pi_spawn: Literal["local", "remote"] = "local"`) and wire it through `modules/harness/factory/adw_modules/agents.py` so when `"remote"`, the agent_pi.run() spawn path uses the installed `pi-remote` binary's absolute path instead of the bare `PI_PATH`/"pi" default — WITHOUT modifying agent_pi.py's protocol/tracer/gate logic; the only touch to agent_pi.py, if any, should be widening how PI_PATH is resolved (e.g. read an additional env var or accept an explicit path parameter threaded from agents.py) — keep this diff minimal and follow the existing PI_PATH env-var precedence (explicit env var override still wins). Follow the config layering idiom shown in `modules/harness/factory/tests/test_config_layering.py`. Default stays "local" — zero behavior change unless a project opts in.

  3. Register `pi` as a new `vendor` entry in `modules/buildbox/devtools.json` so `buildbox bootstrap` installs it fleet-wide (pi ships as npm package `@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent`; the workstation already has it in `~/.npm-global`; check what "kind" values devtools.json already supports for npm-based installs — study the `codex` vendor entry (kind: mise, tool: npm:@openai/codex) as the closest pattern and adapt).

  4. Auth: extend `modules/systray/pi_auth_sync.py` (or a thin new remote counterpart) so an authenticated `~/.pi/agent/auth.json` reaches the buildboxes via the existing claude-parity/buildbox-parity convergence path (study `modules/buildbox/lib/claude-parity.sh` and `modules/workstation/claude/bin/buildbox-parity.sh` for the convergence pattern this should follow) — codex's own `~/.codex/auth.json` is already present on the boxes (verified this session on debian1), so pi_auth_sync.py's existing `_derive_credential` logic (which already derives pi creds FROM codex's auth.json) can plausibly run box-side too, or push its derived output — your design call, follow the plan file's "next executable action" section, keep the change narrowly scoped to landing an authenticated pi on the boxes via the established mechanism, not hand-rolling a new one.

  5. Tests:
     - `pi-remote` / its Python helper: unit tests for fail-closed branches (registry absent, host down, mirror failure) near `modules/systray/tests/test_remote_dispatch*` patterns (FT_FROM_HOOK=1 FT_HINTS=1 ft find and follow that file's exact test structure/fixtures).
     - One factory test proving the `pi_spawn: remote` config key changes the resolved spawn path passed into agent_pi.run — mock the wrapper entirely, no real ssh/dispatch. Add near the existing agent_pi/agents tests in `modules/harness/factory/tests/`.
     - `python3 -m pytest modules/harness/factory/tests/ -q` MUST stay green (189/189 baseline recorded in the plan file — re-verify exact count before you start and report the delta).
     - devtools.json / claude-parity changes: follow whatever existing test pattern covers devtools.json vendor entries (check `modules/buildbox/test/vendor.test.sh` and `modules/buildbox/test/claude-parity.test.sh`) and extend if a new vendor entry needs coverage.

  Constraints (from repo CLAUDE.md, non-negotiable):
  - No hand-scp of unmanaged binaries — pi reaches the boxes only through devtools.json + buildbox bootstrap.
  - Never touch agent_pi.py's protocol handling / tracer / gate logic / runner commit flow beyond the minimal PI_PATH-resolution widening described in step 2.
  - No stubs/placeholders — everything must actually work end to end for the parts you can verify locally (wrapper logic, config wiring, unit tests). Live ssh-to-buildbox proof will be run by the reviewer separately once pi is actually installed+authenticated on a box — you do not need to wait for that to land this code, but the code must be genuinely correct, not aspirational.
  - Comments: WHAT only, never reasoning/why, per repo CLAUDE.md; keep them minimal.
  - Do not create any new documentation/README files.
  - Do not run `git commit`/push — leave the worktree with the changes staged/unstaged for the reviewer (me) to inspect, test, and commit myself.

  When done, report: files changed/created, test counts before/after for both `modules/harness/factory/tests/` and any new test files you added, any design decisions you made that the plan file left open, and anything you could NOT verify (e.g. real ssh dispatch, since pi is not yet installed on any box).

first_user_message:
  Repo: /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/factory-pi-remote (git worktree, branch wt/factory-pi-remote).
  Read /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/factory-pi-remote/docs/plans/2026-08-14-factory-pi-remote.md FIRST — it is the authoritative spec with all verified facts and resolved design decisions. Implement exactly what it describes. Do not re-derive facts it already states; trust them.

  Summary of what to build (full detail is in the plan file — read it, this is just an index):

  1. `modules/workstation/bin/pi-remote` — a bash CLI wrapper that runs the `pi` coding-agent binary on a buildbox over ssh instead of locally, reusing `modules/systray/remote_dispatch.py`'s public Python functions (host selection, registry, mirroring machinery) by shelling out to a small Python helper module (e.g. `modules/workstation/bin/pi_remote_dispatch.py` or extend remote_dispatch's own call sites — your call, keep remote_dispatch.py's existing contract intact, do not break command_router.py/cdx.py callers). It must:
     - Target a bare `agent-seat` role host (NOT the podman sandbox container — see plan for why).
     - Forward all argv to `pi` unchanged, except: detect info-only pi invocations (`--list-models`, `--version`, `--help`, or no `-p`/`--session-id` present) and exec local `pi` directly for those — never round-trip those to a buildbox.
     - For a real agent turn, mirror the git repo tree (cwd) via remote_dispatch's existing open_session/push/pull machinery, AND additionally mirror the `--session-dir` argument's directory (raw_output_path stays local — VERIFY this by reading agent_pi.py's run() function before implementing; do not assume, read the actual code to confirm raw_output_path is written by the LOCAL Popen's stdout consumer thread, not by the remote pi process).
     - Push `--session-dir`'s directory to the remote host before running pi there, pull it back after, every invocation (correctness over speed, no caching).
     - Preserve real-time line-by-line stdout streaming (pi flushes per-line; do not buffer).
     - Propagate SIGTERM/SIGKILL sent to the local pi-remote process to the remote pi process (use ssh -tt or a remote trap+wait pattern; verify empirically that killing pi-remote's local process also kills the remote pi process, e.g. via a follow-up ssh pgrep check in the test).
     - Record a containment entry in ~/.overdeck/containment.jsonl on success/failure/abort, reusing command_router.py's `_append_containment_record` pattern (tool label "pi" or "factory-pi", runtime "pi") — do not duplicate its logic if it can be imported/reused cleanly; if not cleanly importable (it's currently a private function in command_router.py), extract a small shared helper into remote_dispatch.py or a new tiny module and have both command_router.py and pi-remote use it — keep this change minimal, do not refactor unrelated command_router.py code.
     - Fail CLOSED on: registry unreadable, no reachable host, mirror push/pull failure — clear nonzero exit (reuse remote_dispatch.EXIT_* codes), detail to stderr, NEVER fall back to local pi silently.

  2. Factory config: add a `defaults` key to `modules/harness/factory/adw_modules/data_types.py`'s `ConfigDefaults` (e.g. `pi_spawn: Literal["local", "remote"] = "local"`) and wire it through `modules/harness/factory/adw_modules/agents.py` so when `"remote"`, the agent_pi.run() spawn path uses the installed `pi-remote` binary's absolute path instead of the bare `PI_PATH`/"pi" default — WITHOUT modifying agent_pi.py's protocol/tracer/gate logic; the only touch to agent_pi.py, if any, should be widening how PI_PATH is resolved (e.g. read an additional env var or accept an explicit path parameter threaded from agents.py) — keep this diff minimal and follow the existing PI_PATH env-var precedence (explicit env var override still wins). Follow the config layering idiom shown in `modules/harness/factory/tests/test_config_layering.py`. Default stays "local" — zero behavior change unless a project opts in.

  3. Register `pi` as a new `vendor` entry in `modules/buildbox/devtools.json` so `buildbox bootstrap` installs it fleet-wide (pi ships as npm package `@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent`; the workstation already has it in `~/.npm-global`; check what "kind" values devtools.json already supports for npm-based installs — study the `codex` vendor entry (kind: mise, tool: npm:@openai/codex) as the closest pattern and adapt).

  4. Auth: extend `modules/systray/pi_auth_sync.py` (or a thin new remote counterpart) so an authenticated `~/.pi/agent/auth.json` reaches the buildboxes via the existing claude-parity/buildbox-parity convergence path (study `modules/buildbox/lib/claude-parity.sh` and `modules/workstation/claude/bin/buildbox-parity.sh` for the convergence pattern this should follow) — codex's own `~/.codex/auth.json` is already present on the boxes (verified this session on debian1), so pi_auth_sync.py's existing `_derive_credential` logic (which already derives pi creds FROM codex's auth.json) can plausibly run box-side too, or push its derived output — your design call, follow the plan file's "next executable action" section, keep the change narrowly scoped to landing an authenticated pi on the boxes via the established mechanism, not hand-rolling a new one.

  5. Tests:
     - `pi-remote` / its Python helper: unit tests for fail-closed branches (registry absent, host down, mirror failure) near `modules/systray/tests/test_remote_dispatch*` patterns (FT_FROM_HOOK=1 FT_HINTS=1 ft find and follow that file's exact test structure/fixtures).
     - One factory test proving the `pi_spawn: remote` config key changes the resolved spawn path passed into agent_pi.run — mock the wrapper entirely, no real ssh/dispatch. Add near the existing agent_pi/agents tests in `modules/harness/factory/tests/`.
     - `python3 -m pytest modules/harness/factory/tests/ -q` MUST stay green (189/189 baseline recorded in the plan file — re-verify exact count before you start and report the delta).
     - devtools.json / claude-parity changes: follow whatever existing test pattern covers devtools.json vendor entries (check `modules/buildbox/test/vendor.test.sh` and `modules/buildbox/test/claude-parity.test.sh`) and extend if a new vendor entry needs coverage.

  Constraints (from repo CLAUDE.md, non-negotiable):
  - No hand-scp of unmanaged binaries — pi reaches the boxes only through devtools.json + buildbox bootstrap.
  - Never touch agent_pi.py's protocol handling / tracer / gate logic / runner commit flow beyond the minimal PI_PATH-resolution widening described in step 2.
  - No stubs/placeholders — everything must actually work end to end for the parts you can verify locally (wrapper logic, config wiring, unit tests). Live ssh-to-buildbox proof will be run by the reviewer separately once pi is actually installed+authenticated on a box — you do not need to wait for that to land this code, but the code must be genuinely correct, not aspirational.
  - Comments: WHAT only, never reasoning/why, per repo CLAUDE.md; keep them minimal.
  - Do not create any new documentation/README files.
  - Do not run `git commit`/push — leave the worktree with the changes staged/unstaged for the reviewer (me) to inspect, test, and commit myself.

  When done, report: files changed/created, test counts before/after for both `modules/harness/factory/tests/` and any new test files you added, any design decisions you made that the plan file left open, and anything you could NOT verify (e.g. real ssh dispatch, since pi is not yet installed on any box).

preview:
  Repo: /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/factory-pi-remote (git worktree, branch wt/factory-pi-remote).
  Read /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/factory-pi-remote/docs/plans/2026-08-14-factory-pi-remote.md FIRST — it is the authoritative spec with all verified facts and resolved design decisions. Implement exactly what it describes. Do not re-derive facts it already states; trust them.

  Summary of what to build (full detail is in the plan file — read it, this is just an index):

  1. `modules/workstation/bin/pi-remote` — a bash CLI wrapper that runs the `pi` coding-agent binary on a buildbox over ssh instead of locally, reusing `modules/systray/remote_dispatch.py`'s public Python functions (host selection, registry, mirroring machinery) by shelling out to a small Python helper module (e.g. `modules/workstation/bin/pi_remote_dispatch.py` or extend remote_dispatch's own call sites — your call, keep remote_dispatch.py's existing contract intact, do not break command_router.py/cdx.py callers). It must:
     - Target a bare `agent-seat` role host (NOT the podman sandbox container — see plan for why).
     - Forward all argv to `pi` unchanged, except: detect info-only pi invocations (`--list-models`, `--version`, `--help`, or no `-p`/`--session-id` present) and exec local `pi` directly for those — never round-trip those to a buildbox.
     - For a real agent turn, mirror the git repo tree (cwd) via remote_dispatch's existing open_session/push/pull machinery, AND additionally mirror the `--session-dir` argument's directory (raw_output_path stays local — VERIFY this by reading agent_pi.py's run() function before implementing; do not assume, read the actual code to confirm raw_output_path is written by the LOCAL Popen's stdout consumer thread, not by the remote pi process).
     - Push `--session-dir`'s directory to the remote host before running pi there, pull it back after, every invocation (correctness over speed, no caching).
     - Preserve real-time line-by-line stdout streaming (pi flushes per-line; do not buffer).
     - Propagate SIGTERM/SIGKILL sent to the local pi-remote process to the remote pi process (use ssh -tt or a remote trap+wait pattern; verify empirically that killing pi-remote's local process also kills the remote pi process, e.g. via a follow-up ssh pgrep check in the test).
     - Record a containment entry in ~/.overdeck/containment.jsonl on success/failure/abort, reusing command_router.py's `_append_containment_record` pattern (tool label "pi" or "factory-pi", runtime "pi") — do not duplicate its logic if it can be imported/reused cleanly; if not cleanly importable (it's currently a private function in command_router.py), extract a small shared helper into remote_dispatch.py or a new tiny module and have both command_router.py and pi-remote use it — keep this change minimal, do not refactor unrelated command_router.py code.
     - Fail CLOSED on: registry unreadable, no reachable host, mirror push/pull failure — clear nonzero exit (reuse remote_dispatch.EXIT_* codes), detail to stderr, NEVER fall back to local pi silently.

  2. Factory config: add a `defaults` key to `modules/harness/factory/adw_modules/data_types.py`'s `ConfigDefaults` (e.g. `pi_spawn: Literal["local", "remote"] = "local"`) and wire it through `modules/harness/factory/adw_modules/agents.py` so when `"remote"`, the agent_pi.run() spawn path uses the installed `pi-remote` binary's absolute path instead of the bare `PI_PATH`/"pi" default — WITHOUT modifying agent_pi.py's protocol/tracer/gate logic; the only touch to agent_pi.py, if any, should be widening how PI_PATH is resolved (e.g. read an additional env var or accept an explicit path parameter threaded from agents.py) — keep this diff minimal and follow the existing PI_PATH env-var precedence (explicit env var override still wins). Follow the config layering idiom shown in `modules/harness/factory/tests/test_config_layering.py`. Default stays "local" — zero behavior change unless a project opts in.

  3. Register `pi` as a new `vendor` entry in `modules/buildbox/devtools.json` so `buildbox bootstrap` installs it fleet-wide (pi ships as npm package `@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent`; the workstation already has it in `~/.npm-global`; check what "kind" values devtools.json already supports for npm-based installs — study the `codex` vendor entry (kind: mise, tool: npm:@openai/codex) as the closest pattern and adapt).

  4. Auth: extend `modules/systray/pi_auth_sync.py` (or a thin new remote counterpart) so an authenticated `~/.pi/agent/auth.json` reaches the buildboxes via the existing claude-parity/buildbox-parity convergence path (study `modules/buildbox/lib/claude-parity.sh` and `modules/workstation/claude/bin/buildbox-parity.sh` for the convergence pattern this should follow) — codex's own `~/.codex/auth.json` is already present on the boxes (verified this session on debian1), so pi_auth_sync.py's existing `_derive_credential` logic (which already derives pi creds FROM codex's auth.json) can plausibly run box-side too, or push its derived output — your design call, follow the plan file's "next executable action" section, keep the change narrowly scoped to landing an authenticated pi on the boxes via the established mechanism, not hand-rolling a new one.

  5. Tests:
     - `pi-remote` / its Python helper: unit tests for fail-closed branches (registry absent, host down, mirror failure) near `modules/systray/tests/test_remote_dispatch*` patterns (FT_FROM_HOOK=1 FT_HINTS=1 ft find and follow that file's exact test structure/fixtures).
     - One factory test proving the `pi_spawn: remote` config key changes the resolved spawn path passed into agent_pi.run — mock the wrapper entirely, no real ssh/dispatch. Add near the existing agent_pi/agents tests in `modules/harness/factory/tests/`.
     - `python3 -m pytest modules/harness/factory/tests/ -q` MUST stay green (189/189 baseline recorded in the plan file — re-verify exact count before you start and report the delta).
     - devtools.json / claude-parity changes: follow whatever existing test pattern covers devtools.json vendor entries (check `modules/buildbox/test/vendor.test.sh` and `modules/buildbox/test/claude-parity.test.sh`) and extend if a new vendor entry needs coverage.

  Constraints (from repo CLAUDE.md, non-negotiable):
  - No hand-scp of unmanaged binaries — pi reaches the boxes only through devtools.json + buildbox bootstrap.
  - Never touch agent_pi.py's protocol handling / tracer / gate logic / runner commit flow beyond the minimal PI_PATH-resolution widening described in step 2.
  - No stubs/placeholders — everything must actually work end to end for the parts you can verify locally (wrapper logic, config wiring, unit tests). Live ssh-to-buildbox proof will be run by the reviewer separately once pi is actually installed+authenticated on a box — you do not need to wait for that to land this code, but the code must be genuinely correct, not aspirational.
  - Comments: WHAT only, never reasoning/why, per repo CLAUDE.md; keep them minimal.
  - Do not create any new documentation/README files.
  - Do not run `git commit`/push — leave the worktree with the changes staged/unstaged for the reviewer (me) to inspect, test, and commit myself.

  When done, report: files changed/created, test counts before/after for both `modules/harness/factory/tests/` and any new test files you added, any design decisions you made that the plan file left open, and anything you could NOT verify (e.g. real ssh dispatch, since pi is not yet installed on any box).


id: 01a00083-24d1-70d3-b565-235c74a2ba23
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/consult-0a58d612892e
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: medium
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/14/rollout-2026-08-14T13-43-09-01a00083-24d1-70d3-b565-235c74a2ba23.jsonl

title:
  OPEN DESIGN QUESTION — text answer only, no file edits, no repo access needed. There is no preferred solution; do not critique anyone's proposal. Design the best answer, including options nobody has proposed.

  CONTEXT (measured facts from a single-developer AI-agent platform repo):
  - Many parallel LLM coding-agent sessions (Claude Code, codex CLI) work on this repo daily.
  - It ships 322 distinct executables (152 under modules/+bin/, 117 installed onto PATH): od-worktree, list-sessions, e2e-remote, deck-sudo, agent-reaper, ft, local-gate, ship.sh, factory, model-test-fixture, etc.
  - The auto-loaded instruction file (AGENTS.md, symlinked as CLAUDE.md) names almost none of them.
  - The only machine-readable registry is a DENY registry (tools.json) read by a PreToolUse hook: it blocks a naive-wrong command and names the correct wrapper. It never advertises capability.
  - Observed repeatedly: agents rebuild tools that already exist; agents hand-roll fragile raw commands instead of tested wrappers; agents cannot find prior work. Sessions compact mid-task, so anything read at session start may be gone when needed.
  - Constraints: one owner with poor recall; tokens for anything auto-loaded are paid by EVERY session; hand-maintained docs have repeatedly rotted here and caused real incidents. Platform already has: PreToolUse/PostToolUse hooks, a skills mechanism with description-based triggering, an MCP plugin for sandboxed execution and indexed search, a local collector service (SQLite + web UI), and remote build offload.

  QUESTION: what is the BEST way to make an LLM agent reliably discover and use the right existing tool at the moment it needs it? Consider mechanisms beyond documentation and beyond a CLI — e.g. intercepting intent at the hook layer with just-in-time suggestions; semantic/embedding search over tool descriptions; self-describing machine-queryable tools; exposing tools as MCP tools in the agent's native tool list; runtime telemetry that learns which tools solve which tasks; failure-triggered discovery; making the wrong path impossible rather than the right path documented.

  Give: (a) recommended architecture and why it beats alternatives for LLM agents specifically, (b) top 2-3 alternatives with honest trade-offs, (c) failure modes of your own recommendation, (d) minimum viable first slice, (e) what NOT to build. Be concrete about mechanisms.

first_user_message:
  OPEN DESIGN QUESTION — text answer only, no file edits, no repo access needed. There is no preferred solution; do not critique anyone's proposal. Design the best answer, including options nobody has proposed.

  CONTEXT (measured facts from a single-developer AI-agent platform repo):
  - Many parallel LLM coding-agent sessions (Claude Code, codex CLI) work on this repo daily.
  - It ships 322 distinct executables (152 under modules/+bin/, 117 installed onto PATH): od-worktree, list-sessions, e2e-remote, deck-sudo, agent-reaper, ft, local-gate, ship.sh, factory, model-test-fixture, etc.
  - The auto-loaded instruction file (AGENTS.md, symlinked as CLAUDE.md) names almost none of them.
  - The only machine-readable registry is a DENY registry (tools.json) read by a PreToolUse hook: it blocks a naive-wrong command and names the correct wrapper. It never advertises capability.
  - Observed repeatedly: agents rebuild tools that already exist; agents hand-roll fragile raw commands instead of tested wrappers; agents cannot find prior work. Sessions compact mid-task, so anything read at session start may be gone when needed.
  - Constraints: one owner with poor recall; tokens for anything auto-loaded are paid by EVERY session; hand-maintained docs have repeatedly rotted here and caused real incidents. Platform already has: PreToolUse/PostToolUse hooks, a skills mechanism with description-based triggering, an MCP plugin for sandboxed execution and indexed search, a local collector service (SQLite + web UI), and remote build offload.

  QUESTION: what is the BEST way to make an LLM agent reliably discover and use the right existing tool at the moment it needs it? Consider mechanisms beyond documentation and beyond a CLI — e.g. intercepting intent at the hook layer with just-in-time suggestions; semantic/embedding search over tool descriptions; self-describing machine-queryable tools; exposing tools as MCP tools in the agent's native tool list; runtime telemetry that learns which tools solve which tasks; failure-triggered discovery; making the wrong path impossible rather than the right path documented.

  Give: (a) recommended architecture and why it beats alternatives for LLM agents specifically, (b) top 2-3 alternatives with honest trade-offs, (c) failure modes of your own recommendation, (d) minimum viable first slice, (e) what NOT to build. Be concrete about mechanisms.

preview:
  OPEN DESIGN QUESTION — text answer only, no file edits, no repo access needed. There is no preferred solution; do not critique anyone's proposal. Design the best answer, including options nobody has proposed.

  CONTEXT (measured facts from a single-developer AI-agent platform repo):
  - Many parallel LLM coding-agent sessions (Claude Code, codex CLI) work on this repo daily.
  - It ships 322 distinct executables (152 under modules/+bin/, 117 installed onto PATH): od-worktree, list-sessions, e2e-remote, deck-sudo, agent-reaper, ft, local-gate, ship.sh, factory, model-test-fixture, etc.
  - The auto-loaded instruction file (AGENTS.md, symlinked as CLAUDE.md) names almost none of them.
  - The only machine-readable registry is a DENY registry (tools.json) read by a PreToolUse hook: it blocks a naive-wrong command and names the correct wrapper. It never advertises capability.
  - Observed repeatedly: agents rebuild tools that already exist; agents hand-roll fragile raw commands instead of tested wrappers; agents cannot find prior work. Sessions compact mid-task, so anything read at session start may be gone when needed.
  - Constraints: one owner with poor recall; tokens for anything auto-loaded are paid by EVERY session; hand-maintained docs have repeatedly rotted here and caused real incidents. Platform already has: PreToolUse/PostToolUse hooks, a skills mechanism with description-based triggering, an MCP plugin for sandboxed execution and indexed search, a local collector service (SQLite + web UI), and remote build offload.

  QUESTION: what is the BEST way to make an LLM agent reliably discover and use the right existing tool at the moment it needs it? Consider mechanisms beyond documentation and beyond a CLI — e.g. intercepting intent at the hook layer with just-in-time suggestions; semantic/embedding search over tool descriptions; self-describing machine-queryable tools; exposing tools as MCP tools in the agent's native tool list; runtime telemetry that learns which tools solve which tasks; failure-triggered discovery; making the wrong path impossible rather than the right path documented.

  Give: (a) recommended architecture and why it beats alternatives for LLM agents specifically, (b) top 2-3 alternatives with honest trade-offs, (c) failure modes of your own recommendation, (d) minimum viable first slice, (e) what NOT to build. Be concrete about mechanisms.


id: 01a0008b-ded5-7553-b16a-745267daad5d
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/gateway-check-scope-d2386b0602db
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: d86783962d06c7275d8e5d8111bc978659362106
git_branch: wt/gateway-check-scope
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/14/rollout-2026-08-14T13-52-41-01a0008b-ded5-7553-b16a-745267daad5d.jsonl

title:
  Work in /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/landq-controller-conduct (a git worktree; edit files only here). Repo: overdeck controller (Bun/TypeScript, sqlite3 store, zod schemas). Implement ONLY step 1 below. Do not touch the lander shell script's gate/verdict/ticket-format logic, do not add a `submit` verb, do not touch UI.

  GOAL: the live controller must proactively drive the land queue conductor (`bash modules/workstation/claude/workflows/lib/finish-branch.sh landq-conduct <root>`) on its existing periodic reconcile loop, for every configured repository root, instead of only when a receipt happens to be accepted.

  Files to read first for context (do not change their existing behavior beyond what's asked):
  - controller/src/land-retirement.ts (LandRetirementService; conductor spawn logic; trustedRepositoryRoot/trustedDirectory helpers already validate paths against an allowlist)
  - controller/src/admission-loop.ts (existing 60s interval loop; `reconcileDeliveryLifecycle` callback runs inside a `running` guard so it never overlaps itself)
  - controller/src/index.ts (wires `reconcileDeliveryLifecycle: () => { runtime.deliveryActivator.reconcileExpired(); runtime.landRetirement.reconcile(); }` into `startAdmissionReconcileLoop`)
  - controller/src/config.ts (`landRepositoryRoots: z.array(z.string()).default([])` already exists in ControllerConfig; reuse it, do not add new config keys)
  - controller/src/store.ts (ControllerStore: sqlite-backed; see the `hosts` table + `listHosts()` for the established pattern of a per-entity table exposed as a list of typed records — model the new health table the same way)
  - controller/src/status.ts (`buildControllerStatus` composes `ControllerStatus` — a strict zod-validated object — from store data; `hosts` field is built from `store.listHosts()`)
  - controller/src/land-retirement.test.ts and controller/src/admission-loop.test.ts (existing test idioms: temp dir per test via something like `mkdtempSync`, fixture git repos, `ControllerStore` per test, injected `now`/`spawn`/`conductor` for determinism — follow the same idioms, no new test framework)

  REQUIRED CHANGES:

  1. controller/src/store.ts
     - Add a new sqlite table `land_conduct_health` (created in `initSchema`, same style as the `hosts` table) with columns: `root TEXT PRIMARY KEY`, `last_pass_at TEXT`, `last_ok INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 1`, `last_detail TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT ''`, `consecutive_failures INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0`.
     - Add an exported interface `LandConductHealthRecord { root: string; lastPassAt: string | null; lastOk: boolean; lastDetail: string; consecutiveFailures: number }`.
     - Add method `recordLandConductResult(root: string, at: string, ok: boolean, detail: string): void` — upserts the row (INSERT ... ON CONFLICT(root) DO UPDATE). On `ok`, set `consecutive_failures = 0`; on failure, set `consecutive_failures = consecutive_failures + 1` (use SQL `excluded`/increment, not a read-then-write race). Always set `last_pass_at`, `last_ok`, `last_detail`. Wrap in the existing `mutate()` helper like other write methods.
     - Add method `listLandConductHealth(): LandConductHealthRecord[]` returning all rows ordered by `root`, mapped to the interface (root ascending, `lastOk: row.last_ok === 1`).

  2. controller/src/land-retirement.ts
     - Keep `LandRetirementOptions.repositoryRoots?: string[]` as-is; reuse it. Add a new optional test-injection hook `conductRoot?: (root: string) => { ok: boolean; detail: string }` for direct unit testing without spawning a real process (mirrors the existing `conductor`/`dispatch` injection pattern).
     - Add a new public method on `LandRetirementService`: `conductConfiguredRoots(log: (line: string) => void = (line) => process.stderr.write(`${line}\n`)): void`.
       - Iterates the service's configured `repositoryRoots` (store the raw list passed via options on the instance; do not resolve/validate them at construction time — validate per-root at call time so a root that later becomes available/unavailable is re-checked every pass).
       - For each root, in order, one pass, never concurrent (this method itself must not be re-entered while a previous call is still running — guard with a simple `running` boolean field on the instance that no-ops a re-entrant call).
       - For each root: if `conductRoot` option was injected, call it directly. Otherwise: validate the root exists and is a readable directory (reuse the existing `trustedDirectory`/`trustedRepositoryRoot` validation already used by the receipt path, checked against the same `allowedRoots` — a root not in `repositoryRoots`/`allowedRoots` is impossible here since we iterate that exact list, so this step is really "does it still exist as a real directory, no symlink games"); if validation throws, catch it, log `land-conduct: skipping <root>: <reason>`, call `this.store.recordLandConductResult(root, new Date(this.now()).toISOString(), false, "<reason>")`, and continue to the next root — never throw, never crash the loop.
       - If validation passes, spawn the conductor script exactly like the existing receipt-driven path does (`bash <conductorScript> landq-conduct <root>`) but this time CAPTURE the exit status (do not use `stdio: "ignore"` blindly — capture status, ignore stdout/stderr content but observe `status`/`error`). Exit code 0 = ok (queue drained or was empty or lock was held by someone else — all legitimate no-ops per the script's own contract). Non-zero or spawn error = failure; log `land-conduct: <root> conduct pass failed (rc=<n>)` and do not throw.
       - After each root's attempt (success or failure), call `this.store.recordLandConductResult(root, <iso-now>, ok, detail)` where `detail` is empty string on success and a short reason on failure.
       - A per-root failure must not stop the loop from continuing to the next root.
     - Do not change `accept()`, `reconcile()`, the conductor lock protocol, or the ticket/verdict format. Do not change what `configureLandConductor`'s existing `start`/`resolve` closures do for the receipt-driven path — add new code alongside it, reusing its trusted-path helpers where sensible rather than duplicating validation logic if you can factor cleanly, but do NOT change its existing exported behavior or signatures.

  3. controller/src/index.ts
     - In `startController`, the `reconcileDeliveryLifecycle` callback passed to `startAdmissionReconcileLoop` currently reads:
       `() => { runtime.deliveryActivator.reconcileExpired(); runtime.landRetirement.reconcile(); }`
     - Add a call to `runtime.landRetirement.conductConfiguredRoots()` in that same callback (after the existing `reconcile()` call). This makes queue-conducting a standing duty of the existing 60s loop for every configured root — no new timer, no new loop.

  4. controller/src/status.ts
     - Add a new field to `ControllerStatusSchema`: `landConduct: z.record(z.object({ lastPassAt: z.string().nullable(), lastOk: z.boolean(), lastDetail: z.string(), consecutiveFailures: z.number().int().nonnegative() }).strict())`.
     - In `emptyControllerStatus()`, default it to `{}`.
     - In `buildControllerStatus()`, populate it from `store.listLandConductHealth()`, keyed by `root` (same style as the existing `hosts` map built from `store.listHosts()`).

  TESTS TO ADD (bun test, same file/idiom conventions as the existing `*.test.ts` files in controller/src):
  - store.test.ts (or a focused addition): `recordLandConductResult` upserts, increments `consecutiveFailures` across repeated failures, resets it to 0 on a success after failures, and `listLandConductHealth` returns rows ordered by root.
  - land-retirement.test.ts: add tests using the new `conductRoot` injection hook covering:
    - conducting multiple configured roots in one call, one pass each, recording success health per root
    - a root whose directory does not exist is skipped (no throw), logged, and recorded as a failure in health — remaining configured roots still get conducted
    - a real conducted root that returns non-zero is recorded as a failure without throwing
    - calling `conductConfiguredRoots()` re-entrantly while a call is still in flight is a no-op for the second call (you can test this by making `conductRoot` synchronous but asserting a manual re-entrancy guard — if the guard can't be black-box tested without an async injection point, add the minimum necessary async-friendly seam ONLY if adding one is clearly needed, and explain why in your summary; do not overbuild this)
  - admission-loop.test.ts or index.test.ts: confirm `reconcileDeliveryLifecycle` (or the wiring in index.ts) invokes `conductConfiguredRoots` — follow whichever existing test already asserts `landRetirement.reconcile()` gets called from the loop, if one exists, and add a parallel assertion for the new call. If no such existing test hook exists, add the smallest test that proves it (e.g. inject a stub `landRetirement` object into the loop wiring and assert both `reconcile` and `conductConfiguredRoots` were called on a tick).
  - status.test.ts: `buildControllerStatus` surfaces `landConduct` health from the store correctly (present roots mapped, absent-from-store roots simply absent from the map — do not fabricate zeroed entries for roots that have never been conducted, unless the existing `hosts` pattern does that, in which case follow it exactly for consistency).

  CONSTRAINTS (do not violate):
  - Do NOT change the lander's ticket format, gates, verdict semantics, or the conductor lock protocol (finish-branch.sh) — no edits to that file at all.
  - Do NOT add a `submit` verb, refusal message, or brief rewrite — out of scope for this slice.
  - Do NOT invent a new controller API/HTTP endpoint for this health data — `/status` (buildControllerStatus) already exists and is the right place.
  - No new npm/bun dependencies.
  - Keep TypeScript strict-mode clean (this repo's tsconfig is strict); no `any`.
  - Follow the file's existing code style exactly (no reformatting unrelated lines).

  WHEN DONE: run `bun test` inside controller/ and report the pass/fail counts before/after your change (baseline before your change was 278 pass / 1 fail, the 1 pre-existing failure is `ControllerStore > expands an old jobs schema without changing legacy rows` in store.test.ts — unrelated, must still be exactly that same 1 failure after your change, no new failures). Also run `bunx tsc --noEmit` (or the project's existing typecheck script if there is one — check package.json) and report clean or report every remaining error verbatim. Report a short summary of exactly what you changed, file by file, and the final health field names you used.

first_user_message:
  Work in /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/landq-controller-conduct (a git worktree; edit files only here). Repo: overdeck controller (Bun/TypeScript, sqlite3 store, zod schemas). Implement ONLY step 1 below. Do not touch the lander shell script's gate/verdict/ticket-format logic, do not add a `submit` verb, do not touch UI.

  GOAL: the live controller must proactively drive the land queue conductor (`bash modules/workstation/claude/workflows/lib/finish-branch.sh landq-conduct <root>`) on its existing periodic reconcile loop, for every configured repository root, instead of only when a receipt happens to be accepted.

  Files to read first for context (do not change their existing behavior beyond what's asked):
  - controller/src/land-retirement.ts (LandRetirementService; conductor spawn logic; trustedRepositoryRoot/trustedDirectory helpers already validate paths against an allowlist)
  - controller/src/admission-loop.ts (existing 60s interval loop; `reconcileDeliveryLifecycle` callback runs inside a `running` guard so it never overlaps itself)
  - controller/src/index.ts (wires `reconcileDeliveryLifecycle: () => { runtime.deliveryActivator.reconcileExpired(); runtime.landRetirement.reconcile(); }` into `startAdmissionReconcileLoop`)
  - controller/src/config.ts (`landRepositoryRoots: z.array(z.string()).default([])` already exists in ControllerConfig; reuse it, do not add new config keys)
  - controller/src/store.ts (ControllerStore: sqlite-backed; see the `hosts` table + `listHosts()` for the established pattern of a per-entity table exposed as a list of typed records — model the new health table the same way)
  - controller/src/status.ts (`buildControllerStatus` composes `ControllerStatus` — a strict zod-validated object — from store data; `hosts` field is built from `store.listHosts()`)
  - controller/src/land-retirement.test.ts and controller/src/admission-loop.test.ts (existing test idioms: temp dir per test via something like `mkdtempSync`, fixture git repos, `ControllerStore` per test, injected `now`/`spawn`/`conductor` for determinism — follow the same idioms, no new test framework)

  REQUIRED CHANGES:

  1. controller/src/store.ts
     - Add a new sqlite table `land_conduct_health` (created in `initSchema`, same style as the `hosts` table) with columns: `root TEXT PRIMARY KEY`, `last_pass_at TEXT`, `last_ok INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 1`, `last_detail TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT ''`, `consecutive_failures INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0`.
     - Add an exported interface `LandConductHealthRecord { root: string; lastPassAt: string | null; lastOk: boolean; lastDetail: string; consecutiveFailures: number }`.
     - Add method `recordLandConductResult(root: string, at: string, ok: boolean, detail: string): void` — upserts the row (INSERT ... ON CONFLICT(root) DO UPDATE). On `ok`, set `consecutive_failures = 0`; on failure, set `consecutive_failures = consecutive_failures + 1` (use SQL `excluded`/increment, not a read-then-write race). Always set `last_pass_at`, `last_ok`, `last_detail`. Wrap in the existing `mutate()` helper like other write methods.
     - Add method `listLandConductHealth(): LandConductHealthRecord[]` returning all rows ordered by `root`, mapped to the interface (root ascending, `lastOk: row.last_ok === 1`).

  2. controller/src/land-retirement.ts
     - Keep `LandRetirementOptions.repositoryRoots?: string[]` as-is; reuse it. Add a new optional test-injection hook `conductRoot?: (root: string) => { ok: boolean; detail: string }` for direct unit testing without spawning a real process (mirrors the existing `conductor`/`dispatch` injection pattern).
     - Add a new public method on `LandRetirementService`: `conductConfiguredRoots(log: (line: string) => void = (line) => process.stderr.write(`${line}\n`)): void`.
       - Iterates the service's configured `repositoryRoots` (store the raw list passed via options on the instance; do not resolve/validate them at construction time — validate per-root at call time so a root that later becomes available/unavailable is re-checked every pass).
       - For each root, in order, one pass, never concurrent (this method itself must not be re-entered while a previous call is still running — guard with a simple `running` boolean field on the instance that no-ops a re-entrant call).
       - For each root: if `conductRoot` option was injected, call it directly. Otherwise: validate the root exists and is a readable directory (reuse the existing `trustedDirectory`/`trustedRepositoryRoot` validation already used by the receipt path, checked against the same `allowedRoots` — a root not in `repositoryRoots`/`allowedRoots` is impossible here since we iterate that exact list, so this step is really "does it still exist as a real directory, no symlink games"); if validation throws, catch it, log `land-conduct: skipping <root>: <reason>`, call `this.store.recordLandConductResult(root, new Date(this.now()).toISOString(), false, "<reason>")`, and continue to the next root — never throw, never crash the loop.
       - If validation passes, spawn the conductor script exactly like the existing receipt-driven path does (`bash <conductorScript> landq-conduct <root>`) but this time CAPTURE the exit status (do not use `stdio: "ignore"` blindly — capture status, ignore stdout/stderr content but observe `status`/`error`). Exit code 0 = ok (queue drained or was empty or lock was held by someone else — all legitimate no-ops per the script's own contract). Non-zero or spawn error = failure; log `land-conduct: <root> conduct pass failed (rc=<n>)` and do not throw.
       - After each root's attempt (success or failure), call `this.store.recordLandConductResult(root, <iso-now>, ok, detail)` where `detail` is empty string on success and a short reason on failure.
       - A per-root failure must not stop the loop from continuing to the next root.
     - Do not change `accept()`, `reconcile()`, the conductor lock protocol, or the ticket/verdict format. Do not change what `configureLandConductor`'s existing `start`/`resolve` closures do for the receipt-driven path — add new code alongside it, reusing its trusted-path helpers where sensible rather than duplicating validation logic if you can factor cleanly, but do NOT change its existing exported behavior or signatures.

  3. controller/src/index.ts
     - In `startController`, the `reconcileDeliveryLifecycle` callback passed to `startAdmissionReconcileLoop` currently reads:
       `() => { runtime.deliveryActivator.reconcileExpired(); runtime.landRetirement.reconcile(); }`
     - Add a call to `runtime.landRetirement.conductConfiguredRoots()` in that same callback (after the existing `reconcile()` call). This makes queue-conducting a standing duty of the existing 60s loop for every configured root — no new timer, no new loop.

  4. controller/src/status.ts
     - Add a new field to `ControllerStatusSchema`: `landConduct: z.record(z.object({ lastPassAt: z.string().nullable(), lastOk: z.boolean(), lastDetail: z.string(), consecutiveFailures: z.number().int().nonnegative() }).strict())`.
     - In `emptyControllerStatus()`, default it to `{}`.
     - In `buildControllerStatus()`, populate it from `store.listLandConductHealth()`, keyed by `root` (same style as the existing `hosts` map built from `store.listHosts()`).

  TESTS TO ADD (bun test, same file/idiom conventions as the existing `*.test.ts` files in controller/src):
  - store.test.ts (or a focused addition): `recordLandConductResult` upserts, increments `consecutiveFailures` across repeated failures, resets it to 0 on a success after failures, and `listLandConductHealth` returns rows ordered by root.
  - land-retirement.test.ts: add tests using the new `conductRoot` injection hook covering:
    - conducting multiple configured roots in one call, one pass each, recording success health per root
    - a root whose directory does not exist is skipped (no throw), logged, and recorded as a failure in health — remaining configured roots still get conducted
    - a real conducted root that returns non-zero is recorded as a failure without throwing
    - calling `conductConfiguredRoots()` re-entrantly while a call is still in flight is a no-op for the second call (you can test this by making `conductRoot` synchronous but asserting a manual re-entrancy guard — if the guard can't be black-box tested without an async injection point, add the minimum necessary async-friendly seam ONLY if adding one is clearly needed, and explain why in your summary; do not overbuild this)
  - admission-loop.test.ts or index.test.ts: confirm `reconcileDeliveryLifecycle` (or the wiring in index.ts) invokes `conductConfiguredRoots` — follow whichever existing test already asserts `landRetirement.reconcile()` gets called from the loop, if one exists, and add a parallel assertion for the new call. If no such existing test hook exists, add the smallest test that proves it (e.g. inject a stub `landRetirement` object into the loop wiring and assert both `reconcile` and `conductConfiguredRoots` were called on a tick).
  - status.test.ts: `buildControllerStatus` surfaces `landConduct` health from the store correctly (present roots mapped, absent-from-store roots simply absent from the map — do not fabricate zeroed entries for roots that have never been conducted, unless the existing `hosts` pattern does that, in which case follow it exactly for consistency).

  CONSTRAINTS (do not violate):
  - Do NOT change the lander's ticket format, gates, verdict semantics, or the conductor lock protocol (finish-branch.sh) — no edits to that file at all.
  - Do NOT add a `submit` verb, refusal message, or brief rewrite — out of scope for this slice.
  - Do NOT invent a new controller API/HTTP endpoint for this health data — `/status` (buildControllerStatus) already exists and is the right place.
  - No new npm/bun dependencies.
  - Keep TypeScript strict-mode clean (this repo's tsconfig is strict); no `any`.
  - Follow the file's existing code style exactly (no reformatting unrelated lines).

  WHEN DONE: run `bun test` inside controller/ and report the pass/fail counts before/after your change (baseline before your change was 278 pass / 1 fail, the 1 pre-existing failure is `ControllerStore > expands an old jobs schema without changing legacy rows` in store.test.ts — unrelated, must still be exactly that same 1 failure after your change, no new failures). Also run `bunx tsc --noEmit` (or the project's existing typecheck script if there is one — check package.json) and report clean or report every remaining error verbatim. Report a short summary of exactly what you changed, file by file, and the final health field names you used.

preview:
  Work in /home/user/Projects/overdeck/.worktrees/landq-controller-conduct (a git worktree; edit files only here). Repo: overdeck controller (Bun/TypeScript, sqlite3 store, zod schemas). Implement ONLY step 1 below. Do not touch the lander shell script's gate/verdict/ticket-format logic, do not add a `submit` verb, do not touch UI.

  GOAL: the live controller must proactively drive the land queue conductor (`bash modules/workstation/claude/workflows/lib/finish-branch.sh landq-conduct <root>`) on its existing periodic reconcile loop, for every configured repository root, instead of only when a receipt happens to be accepted.

  Files to read first for context (do not change their existing behavior beyond what's asked):
  - controller/src/land-retirement.ts (LandRetirementService; conductor spawn logic; trustedRepositoryRoot/trustedDirectory helpers already validate paths against an allowlist)
  - controller/src/admission-loop.ts (existing 60s interval loop; `reconcileDeliveryLifecycle` callback runs inside a `running` guard so it never overlaps itself)
  - controller/src/index.ts (wires `reconcileDeliveryLifecycle: () => { runtime.deliveryActivator.reconcileExpired(); runtime.landRetirement.reconcile(); }` into `startAdmissionReconcileLoop`)
  - controller/src/config.ts (`landRepositoryRoots: z.array(z.string()).default([])` already exists in ControllerConfig; reuse it, do not add new config keys)
  - controller/src/store.ts (ControllerStore: sqlite-backed; see the `hosts` table + `listHosts()` for the established pattern of a per-entity table exposed as a list of typed records — model the new health table the same way)
  - controller/src/status.ts (`buildControllerStatus` composes `ControllerStatus` — a strict zod-validated object — from store data; `hosts` field is built from `store.listHosts()`)
  - controller/src/land-retirement.test.ts and controller/src/admission-loop.test.ts (existing test idioms: temp dir per test via something like `mkdtempSync`, fixture git repos, `ControllerStore` per test, injected `now`/`spawn`/`conductor` for determinism — follow the same idioms, no new test framework)

  REQUIRED CHANGES:

  1. controller/src/store.ts
     - Add a new sqlite table `land_conduct_health` (created in `initSchema`, same style as the `hosts` table) with columns: `root TEXT PRIMARY KEY`, `last_pass_at TEXT`, `last_ok INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 1`, `last_detail TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT ''`, `consecutive_failures INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0`.
     - Add an exported interface `LandConductHealthRecord { root: string; lastPassAt: string | null; lastOk: boolean; lastDetail: string; consecutiveFailures: number }`.
     - Add method `recordLandConductResult(root: string, at: string, ok: boolean, detail: string): void` — upserts the row (INSERT ... ON CONFLICT(root) DO UPDATE). On `ok`, set `consecutive_failures = 0`; on failure, set `consecutive_failures = consecutive_failures + 1` (use SQL `excluded`/increment, not a read-then-write race). Always set `last_pass_at`, `last_ok`, `last_detail`. Wrap in the existing `mutate()` helper like other write methods.
     - Add method `listLandConductHealth(): LandConductHealthRecord[]` returning all rows ordered by `root`, mapped to the interface (root ascending, `lastOk: row.last_ok === 1`).

  2. controller/src/land-retirement.ts
     - Keep `LandRetirementOptions.repositoryRoots?: string[]` as-is; reuse it. Add a new optional test-injection hook `conductRoot?: (root: string) => { ok: boolean; detail: string }` for direct unit testing without spawning a real process (mirrors the existing `conductor`/`dispatch` injection pattern).
     - Add a new public method on `LandRetirementService`: `conductConfiguredRoots(log: (line: string) => void = (line) => process.stderr.write(`${line}\n`)): void`.
       - Iterates the service's configured `repositoryRoots` (store the raw list passed via options on the instance; do not resolve/validate them at construction time — validate per-root at call time so a root that later becomes available/unavailable is re-checked every pass).
       - For each root, in order, one pass, never concurrent (this method itself must not be re-entered while a previous call is still running — guard with a simple `running` boolean field on the instance that no-ops a re-entrant call).
       - For each root: if `conductRoot` option was injected, call it directly. Otherwise: validate the root exists and is a readable directory (reuse the existing `trustedDirectory`/`trustedRepositoryRoot` validation already used by the receipt path, checked against the same `allowedRoots` — a root not in `repositoryRoots`/`allowedRoots` is impossible here since we iterate that exact list, so this step is really "does it still exist as a real directory, no symlink games"); if validation throws, catch it, log `land-conduct: skipping <root>: <reason>`, call `this.store.recordLandConductResult(root, new Date(this.now()).toISOString(), false, "<reason>")`, and continue to the next root — never throw, never crash the loop.
       - If validation passes, spawn the conductor script exactly like the existing receipt-driven path does (`bash <conductorScript> landq-conduct <root>`) but this time CAPTURE the exit status (do not use `stdio: "ignore"` blindly — capture status, ignore stdout/stderr content but observe `status`/`error`). Exit code 0 = ok (queue drained or was empty or lock was held by someone else — all legitimate no-ops per the script's own contract). Non-zero or spawn error = failure; log `land-conduct: <root> conduct pass failed (rc=<n>)` and do not throw.
       - After each root's attempt (success or failure), call `this.store.recordLandConductResult(root, <iso-now>, ok, detail)` where `detail` is empty string on success and a short reason on failure.
       - A per-root failure must not stop the loop from continuing to the next root.
     - Do not change `accept()`, `reconcile()`, the conductor lock protocol, or the ticket/verdict format. Do not change what `configureLandConductor`'s existing `start`/`resolve` closures do for the receipt-driven path — add new code alongside it, reusing its trusted-path helpers where sensible rather than duplicating validation logic if you can factor cleanly, but do NOT change its existing exported behavior or signatures.

  3. controller/src/index.ts
     - In `startController`, the `reconcileDeliveryLifecycle` callback passed to `startAdmissionReconcileLoop` currently reads:
       `() => { runtime.deliveryActivator.reconcileExpired(); runtime.landRetirement.reconcile(); }`
     - Add a call to `runtime.landRetirement.conductConfiguredRoots()` in that same callback (after the existing `reconcile()` call). This makes queue-conducting a standing duty of the existing 60s loop for every configured root — no new timer, no new loop.

  4. controller/src/status.ts
     - Add a new field to `ControllerStatusSchema`: `landConduct: z.record(z.object({ lastPassAt: z.string().nullable(), lastOk: z.boolean(), lastDetail: z.string(), consecutiveFailures: z.number().int().nonnegative() }).strict())`.
     - In `emptyControllerStatus()`, default it to `{}`.
     - In `buildControllerStatus()`, populate it from `store.listLandConductHealth()`, keyed by `root` (same style as the existing `hosts` map built from `store.listHosts()`).

  TESTS TO ADD (bun test, same file/idiom conventions as the existing `*.test.ts` files in controller/src):
  - store.test.ts (or a focused addition): `recordLandConductResult` upserts, increments `consecutiveFailures` across repeated failures, resets it to 0 on a success after failures, and `listLandConductHealth` returns rows ordered by root.
  - land-retirement.test.ts: add tests using the new `conductRoot` injection hook covering:
    - conducting multiple configured roots in one call, one pass each, recording success health per root
    - a root whose directory does not exist is skipped (no throw), logged, and recorded as a failure in health — remaining configured roots still get conducted
    - a real conducted root that returns non-zero is recorded as a failure without throwing
    - calling `conductConfiguredRoots()` re-entrantly while a call is still in flight is a no-op for the second call (you can test this by making `conductRoot` synchronous but asserting a manual re-entrancy guard — if the guard can't be black-box tested without an async injection point, add the minimum necessary async-friendly seam ONLY if adding one is clearly needed, and explain why in your summary; do not overbuild this)
  - admission-loop.test.ts or index.test.ts: confirm `reconcileDeliveryLifecycle` (or the wiring in index.ts) invokes `conductConfiguredRoots` — follow whichever existing test already asserts `landRetirement.reconcile()` gets called from the loop, if one exists, and add a parallel assertion for the new call. If no such existing test hook exists, add the smallest test that proves it (e.g. inject a stub `landRetirement` object into the loop wiring and assert both `reconcile` and `conductConfiguredRoots` were called on a tick).
  - status.test.ts: `buildControllerStatus` surfaces `landConduct` health from the store correctly (present roots mapped, absent-from-store roots simply absent from the map — do not fabricate zeroed entries for roots that have never been conducted, unless the existing `hosts` pattern does that, in which case follow it exactly for consistency).

  CONSTRAINTS (do not violate):
  - Do NOT change the lander's ticket format, gates, verdict semantics, or the conductor lock protocol (finish-branch.sh) — no edits to that file at all.
  - Do NOT add a `submit` verb, refusal message, or brief rewrite — out of scope for this slice.
  - Do NOT invent a new controller API/HTTP endpoint for this health data — `/status` (buildControllerStatus) already exists and is the right place.
  - No new npm/bun dependencies.
  - Keep TypeScript strict-mode clean (this repo's tsconfig is strict); no `any`.
  - Follow the file's existing code style exactly (no reformatting unrelated lines).

  WHEN DONE: run `bun test` inside controller/ and report the pass/fail counts before/after your change (baseline before your change was 278 pass / 1 fail, the 1 pre-existing failure is `ControllerStore > expands an old jobs schema without changing legacy rows` in store.test.ts — unrelated, must still be exactly that same 1 failure after your change, no new failures). Also run `bunx tsc --noEmit` (or the project's existing typecheck script if there is one — check package.json) and report clean or report every remaining error verbatim. Report a short summary of exactly what you changed, file by file, and the final health field names you used.


id: 01a0008e-db98-7bc3-b7c1-f213a2b9c6c5
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/gateway-check-scope-d2386b0602db
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: d86783962d06c7275d8e5d8111bc978659362106
git_branch: wt/gateway-check-scope
git_origin_url: https://github.com/alexcodeplace/overdeck.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/14/rollout-2026-08-14T13-55-57-01a0008e-db98-7bc3-b7c1-f213a2b9c6c5.jsonl

title:
  [ft: output identical to same command 5min ago (10655 bytes, unchanged). Full copy: /home/user/.fewtok/cache/spill/39cc4755a12b0b0f3debcbbad13473d48f332146ec928cfe40f076c46ab659aa.txt — or rerun with FT_FULL=1]

first_user_message:
  [ft: output identical to same command 5min ago (10655 bytes, unchanged). Full copy: /home/user/.fewtok/cache/spill/39cc4755a12b0b0f3debcbbad13473d48f332146ec928cfe40f076c46ab659aa.txt — or rerun with FT_FULL=1]

preview:
  [ft: output identical to same command 5min ago (10655 bytes, unchanged). Full copy: /home/user/.fewtok/cache/spill/39cc4755a12b0b0f3debcbbad13473d48f332146ec928cfe40f076c46ab659aa.txt — or rerun with FT_FULL=1]


id: 01a00101-3484-79b0-959c-946969b47c69
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/intake-writes-4ac6b1ad05ea
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: ae2c9284c91e0d23a1639b90c3c96d368fbc886e
git_origin_url: /home/user/cdx-offload/repos/overdeck-73dd7c243420.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-terra
reasoning_effort: medium
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/14/rollout-2026-08-14T16-00-51-01a00101-3484-79b0-959c-946969b47c69.jsonl

title:
  [showing first 100 of 210 lines]
  Implement ONE new Claude Code hook and its test, in the current git worktree
  (overdeck monorepo). Follow the contract below exactly. Do not touch any file
  outside the ones named. Do not run `git commit` — leave changes unstaged for
  the caller to review.

  ## File 1 — create `modules/workstation/claude/hooks/intake-request-writer.mjs`

  Bun ESM script, mirrors the header/idiom of the sibling file
  `modules/workstation/claude/hooks/subagent-journal.mjs` (read it first) and
  reuses `fingerprint` and `isSidechain` from
  `modules/workstation/claude/hooks/lib/task-store.mjs` (read that file too —
  do not reimplement either function).

  Purpose: a `UserPromptSubmit` hook. On every owner prompt it decides,
  cheaply and deterministically (no LLM, no subprocess spawn), whether the
  prompt is an actionable request, and if so POSTs a row to the Overdeck
  collector's `/requests` endpoint with `state: "asked"`. Must never block,
  delay past a small budget, or print anything that becomes injected prompt
  context — it is silent infrastructure.

  ### Exported pure functions (unit-testable, no I/O)

  ```js
  export function classify(promptRaw) -> boolean
  export function deriveProject(cwd) -> string
  export function titleOf(prompt) -> string
  export function requestId(project, prompt) -> string
  ```

  `classify(promptRaw)`:
  - Normalize: trim, collapse internal whitespace runs to single spaces.
  - Empty after normalize -> `false`.
  - Lowercase, strip one or more trailing `.`/`!`/`?`, exact-match against this
    closed skip set (conversational, never a request) -> `false`:
    `thanks, thank you, thanks!, ty, tysm, ok, okay, k, kk, continue, go, go ahead, proceed, yes, yep, yup, no, nope, sure, cool, nice, great, awesome, perfect, done, got it, sounds good, np, no problem, status, good, fine, alright, yeah, lgtm, approved`
  - Length of normalized text < 8 chars -> `false`.
  - Token count (split on whitespace) < 3 -> `false`.
  - Strip a leading `please` token (if followed by more tokens) before checking
    the lead word.
  - Lead word (first remaining token, stripped of any char outside `[a-z']`)
    in this set -> `true`:
    `add, fix, build, make, create, implement, write, update, remove, delete, refactor, investigate, debug, deploy, land, ship, install, configure, enable, disable, migrate, rewrite, optimize, reduce, clean, cleanup, review, test, document, rename, move, merge, restart, stop, start, kill, reset, upgrade, downgrade, wire, hook, connect, integrate, check, run`
  - Else, if the lowercased normalized text (pre-strip, full original,
    including "please") CONTAINS any of these phrases as a substring -> `true`:
    `can you, could you, would you, will you, i need, i want, we need, please can, please could, let's, lets, i'd like, i would like, make sure, need you to, want you to`
  - Else -> `false`.
  - Precision over recall by design: a prompt that is neither an exact
    skip-list match NOR an imperative/request shape returns `false` (default
    is NOT actionable — the inverse of a fail-closed classifier).

  `deriveProject(cwd)`:
  - Walk upward from `cwd` (fall back to `process.cwd()` if `cwd` is falsy),
    using `fs.existsSync(path.join(dir, '.git'))` at each level (a `.git`
    entry may be a directory OR a file — a git worktree's root has a `.git`
    FILE, `existsSync` covers both), stopping at the first directory where it
    is true, or at filesystem root if never found (in which case fall back to
    the original `cwd`).
  - If that resolved root's absolute path contains the segment
    `/.worktrees/`, take everything before that segment instead (this is the
    real repo root; a worktree's own `.git` file would otherwise stop the walk
    one level too early and yield the worktree's slug, not the repo name).
  - Return `path.basename()` of the final root, or `'unknown'` if that is
    empty.
  - No subprocess/`git` CLI calls — pure `fs`/`path`.

  `titleOf(prompt)`:
  - First line of the (already normalized) prompt, trimmed.
  - If longer than 200 chars, truncate to 197 chars + `'...'`.
  - Never paraphrase — this must be the owner's own words, verbatim except for
    the length truncation.

  `requestId(project, prompt)`:
  - Return `` `intake-${fingerprint(`${project}\n${prompt}`)}` `` (import
    `fingerprint` from `./lib/task-store.mjs`).

  ### Side-effecting behavior (only inside a guarded `main()`, see CLI guard below)

  1. Read stdin as JSON (hook input). On parse failure, or if
     `typeof inp.prompt !== 'string'`, return silently (no I/O, no log, no
     HTTP).
  2. If `isSidechain(inp.transcript_path)` is true, return silently — a
     subagent's dispatch/response text is not the owner's own words and must
     never become a board row. (Verified empirically: without this guard,
     the sibling `todo-autocapture.mjs` hook's local ledger shows entries
     whose subject is literally `<agent-message from="...">` — subagent
     turns DO fire this hook class.)
  3. Run `classify()` on `inp.prompt`. If `false`, return silently.
  4. Compute `project = deriveProject(inp.cwd)`, `id = requestId(project, normalizedPrompt)`,
     `title = titleOf(normalizedPrompt)`, `now = new Date().toISOString()`.
  5. Build the request body:
     ```js
     { id, title, project, state: "asked", priority: "NORMAL", asked_at: now, updated_at: now, detail: null }
     ```
  6. Resolve the collector base URL:
     - If `process.env.COLLECTOR_URL` is set, use it verbatim.
     - Else read `${OVERDECK_CONFIG_DIR or ~/.config/overdeck}/config.toml`,
       regex `/^\s*port\s*=\s*(\d+)/m` for the port, use `http://127.0.0.1:<port>`.
     - Else fall back to `http://127.0.0.1:4980`.
     - Any read/parse error in the config.toml step falls through to the next
       rule (try/catch), never throws.
  [truncated]

first_user_message:
  [showing first 100 of 210 lines]
  Implement ONE new Claude Code hook and its test, in the current git worktree
  (overdeck monorepo). Follow the contract below exactly. Do not touch any file
  outside the ones named. Do not run `git commit` — leave changes unstaged for
  the caller to review.

  ## File 1 — create `modules/workstation/claude/hooks/intake-request-writer.mjs`

  Bun ESM script, mirrors the header/idiom of the sibling file
  `modules/workstation/claude/hooks/subagent-journal.mjs` (read it first) and
  reuses `fingerprint` and `isSidechain` from
  `modules/workstation/claude/hooks/lib/task-store.mjs` (read that file too —
  do not reimplement either function).

  Purpose: a `UserPromptSubmit` hook. On every owner prompt it decides,
  cheaply and deterministically (no LLM, no subprocess spawn), whether the
  prompt is an actionable request, and if so POSTs a row to the Overdeck
  collector's `/requests` endpoint with `state: "asked"`. Must never block,
  delay past a small budget, or print anything that becomes injected prompt
  context — it is silent infrastructure.

  ### Exported pure functions (unit-testable, no I/O)

  ```js
  export function classify(promptRaw) -> boolean
  export function deriveProject(cwd) -> string
  export function titleOf(prompt) -> string
  export function requestId(project, prompt) -> string
  ```

  `classify(promptRaw)`:
  - Normalize: trim, collapse internal whitespace runs to single spaces.
  - Empty after normalize -> `false`.
  - Lowercase, strip one or more trailing `.`/`!`/`?`, exact-match against this
    closed skip set (conversational, never a request) -> `false`:
    `thanks, thank you, thanks!, ty, tysm, ok, okay, k, kk, continue, go, go ahead, proceed, yes, yep, yup, no, nope, sure, cool, nice, great, awesome, perfect, done, got it, sounds good, np, no problem, status, good, fine, alright, yeah, lgtm, approved`
  - Length of normalized text < 8 chars -> `false`.
  - Token count (split on whitespace) < 3 -> `false`.
  - Strip a leading `please` token (if followed by more tokens) before checking
    the lead word.
  - Lead word (first remaining token, stripped of any char outside `[a-z']`)
    in this set -> `true`:
    `add, fix, build, make, create, implement, write, update, remove, delete, refactor, investigate, debug, deploy, land, ship, install, configure, enable, disable, migrate, rewrite, optimize, reduce, clean, cleanup, review, test, document, rename, move, merge, restart, stop, start, kill, reset, upgrade, downgrade, wire, hook, connect, integrate, check, run`
  - Else, if the lowercased normalized text (pre-strip, full original,
    including "please") CONTAINS any of these phrases as a substring -> `true`:
    `can you, could you, would you, will you, i need, i want, we need, please can, please could, let's, lets, i'd like, i would like, make sure, need you to, want you to`
  - Else -> `false`.
  - Precision over recall by design: a prompt that is neither an exact
    skip-list match NOR an imperative/request shape returns `false` (default
    is NOT actionable — the inverse of a fail-closed classifier).

  `deriveProject(cwd)`:
  - Walk upward from `cwd` (fall back to `process.cwd()` if `cwd` is falsy),
    using `fs.existsSync(path.join(dir, '.git'))` at each level (a `.git`
    entry may be a directory OR a file — a git worktree's root has a `.git`
    FILE, `existsSync` covers both), stopping at the first directory where it
    is true, or at filesystem root if never found (in which case fall back to
    the original `cwd`).
  - If that resolved root's absolute path contains the segment
    `/.worktrees/`, take everything before that segment instead (this is the
    real repo root; a worktree's own `.git` file would otherwise stop the walk
    one level too early and yield the worktree's slug, not the repo name).
  - Return `path.basename()` of the final root, or `'unknown'` if that is
    empty.
  - No subprocess/`git` CLI calls — pure `fs`/`path`.

  `titleOf(prompt)`:
  - First line of the (already normalized) prompt, trimmed.
  - If longer than 200 chars, truncate to 197 chars + `'...'`.
  - Never paraphrase — this must be the owner's own words, verbatim except for
    the length truncation.

  `requestId(project, prompt)`:
  - Return `` `intake-${fingerprint(`${project}\n${prompt}`)}` `` (import
    `fingerprint` from `./lib/task-store.mjs`).

  ### Side-effecting behavior (only inside a guarded `main()`, see CLI guard below)

  1. Read stdin as JSON (hook input). On parse failure, or if
     `typeof inp.prompt !== 'string'`, return silently (no I/O, no log, no
     HTTP).
  2. If `isSidechain(inp.transcript_path)` is true, return silently — a
     subagent's dispatch/response text is not the owner's own words and must
     never become a board row. (Verified empirically: without this guard,
     the sibling `todo-autocapture.mjs` hook's local ledger shows entries
     whose subject is literally `<agent-message from="...">` — subagent
     turns DO fire this hook class.)
  3. Run `classify()` on `inp.prompt`. If `false`, return silently.
  4. Compute `project = deriveProject(inp.cwd)`, `id = requestId(project, normalizedPrompt)`,
     `title = titleOf(normalizedPrompt)`, `now = new Date().toISOString()`.
  5. Build the request body:
     ```js
     { id, title, project, state: "asked", priority: "NORMAL", asked_at: now, updated_at: now, detail: null }
     ```
  6. Resolve the collector base URL:
     - If `process.env.COLLECTOR_URL` is set, use it verbatim.
     - Else read `${OVERDECK_CONFIG_DIR or ~/.config/overdeck}/config.toml`,
       regex `/^\s*port\s*=\s*(\d+)/m` for the port, use `http://127.0.0.1:<port>`.
     - Else fall back to `http://127.0.0.1:4980`.
     - Any read/parse error in the config.toml step falls through to the next
       rule (try/catch), never throws.
  [truncated]

preview:
  [showing first 100 of 210 lines]
  Implement ONE new Claude Code hook and its test, in the current git worktree
  (overdeck monorepo). Follow the contract below exactly. Do not touch any file
  outside the ones named. Do not run `git commit` — leave changes unstaged for
  the caller to review.

  ## File 1 — create `modules/workstation/claude/hooks/intake-request-writer.mjs`

  Bun ESM script, mirrors the header/idiom of the sibling file
  `modules/workstation/claude/hooks/subagent-journal.mjs` (read it first) and
  reuses `fingerprint` and `isSidechain` from
  `modules/workstation/claude/hooks/lib/task-store.mjs` (read that file too —
  do not reimplement either function).

  Purpose: a `UserPromptSubmit` hook. On every owner prompt it decides,
  cheaply and deterministically (no LLM, no subprocess spawn), whether the
  prompt is an actionable request, and if so POSTs a row to the Overdeck
  collector's `/requests` endpoint with `state: "asked"`. Must never block,
  delay past a small budget, or print anything that becomes injected prompt
  context — it is silent infrastructure.

  ### Exported pure functions (unit-testable, no I/O)

  ```js
  export function classify(promptRaw) -> boolean
  export function deriveProject(cwd) -> string
  export function titleOf(prompt) -> string
  export function requestId(project, prompt) -> string
  ```

  `classify(promptRaw)`:
  - Normalize: trim, collapse internal whitespace runs to single spaces.
  - Empty after normalize -> `false`.
  - Lowercase, strip one or more trailing `.`/`!`/`?`, exact-match against this
    closed skip set (conversational, never a request) -> `false`:
    `thanks, thank you, thanks!, ty, tysm, ok, okay, k, kk, continue, go, go ahead, proceed, yes, yep, yup, no, nope, sure, cool, nice, great, awesome, perfect, done, got it, sounds good, np, no problem, status, good, fine, alright, yeah, lgtm, approved`
  - Length of normalized text < 8 chars -> `false`.
  - Token count (split on whitespace) < 3 -> `false`.
  - Strip a leading `please` token (if followed by more tokens) before checking
    the lead word.
  - Lead word (first remaining token, stripped of any char outside `[a-z']`)
    in this set -> `true`:
    `add, fix, build, make, create, implement, write, update, remove, delete, refactor, investigate, debug, deploy, land, ship, install, configure, enable, disable, migrate, rewrite, optimize, reduce, clean, cleanup, review, test, document, rename, move, merge, restart, stop, start, kill, reset, upgrade, downgrade, wire, hook, connect, integrate, check, run`
  - Else, if the lowercased normalized text (pre-strip, full original,
    including "please") CONTAINS any of these phrases as a substring -> `true`:
    `can you, could you, would you, will you, i need, i want, we need, please can, please could, let's, lets, i'd like, i would like, make sure, need you to, want you to`
  - Else -> `false`.
  - Precision over recall by design: a prompt that is neither an exact
    skip-list match NOR an imperative/request shape returns `false` (default
    is NOT actionable — the inverse of a fail-closed classifier).

  `deriveProject(cwd)`:
  - Walk upward from `cwd` (fall back to `process.cwd()` if `cwd` is falsy),
    using `fs.existsSync(path.join(dir, '.git'))` at each level (a `.git`
    entry may be a directory OR a file — a git worktree's root has a `.git`
    FILE, `existsSync` covers both), stopping at the first directory where it
    is true, or at filesystem root if never found (in which case fall back to
    the original `cwd`).
  - If that resolved root's absolute path contains the segment
    `/.worktrees/`, take everything before that segment instead (this is the
    real repo root; a worktree's own `.git` file would otherwise stop the walk
    one level too early and yield the worktree's slug, not the repo name).
  - Return `path.basename()` of the final root, or `'unknown'` if that is
    empty.
  - No subprocess/`git` CLI calls — pure `fs`/`path`.

  `titleOf(prompt)`:
  - First line of the (already normalized) prompt, trimmed.
  - If longer than 200 chars, truncate to 197 chars + `'...'`.
  - Never paraphrase — this must be the owner's own words, verbatim except for
    the length truncation.

  `requestId(project, prompt)`:
  - Return `` `intake-${fingerprint(`${project}\n${prompt}`)}` `` (import
    `fingerprint` from `./lib/task-store.mjs`).

  ### Side-effecting behavior (only inside a guarded `main()`, see CLI guard below)

  1. Read stdin as JSON (hook input). On parse failure, or if
     `typeof inp.prompt !== 'string'`, return silently (no I/O, no log, no
     HTTP).
  2. If `isSidechain(inp.transcript_path)` is true, return silently — a
     subagent's dispatch/response text is not the owner's own words and must
     never become a board row. (Verified empirically: without this guard,
     the sibling `todo-autocapture.mjs` hook's local ledger shows entries
     whose subject is literally `<agent-message from="...">` — subagent
     turns DO fire this hook class.)
  3. Run `classify()` on `inp.prompt`. If `false`, return silently.
  4. Compute `project = deriveProject(inp.cwd)`, `id = requestId(project, normalizedPrompt)`,
     `title = titleOf(normalizedPrompt)`, `now = new Date().toISOString()`.
  5. Build the request body:
     ```js
     { id, title, project, state: "asked", priority: "NORMAL", asked_at: now, updated_at: now, detail: null }
     ```
  6. Resolve the collector base URL:
     - If `process.env.COLLECTOR_URL` is set, use it verbatim.
     - Else read `${OVERDECK_CONFIG_DIR or ~/.config/overdeck}/config.toml`,
       regex `/^\s*port\s*=\s*(\d+)/m` for the port, use `http://127.0.0.1:<port>`.
     - Else fall back to `http://127.0.0.1:4980`.
     - Any read/parse error in the config.toml step falls through to the next
       rule (try/catch), never throws.
  [truncated]


id: 01a00103-568c-7af0-a756-412432c6cb60
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/intake-writes-4ac6b1ad05ea
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 5152cccdda2b4e905f9f684d6608db52094d2162
git_origin_url: /home/user/cdx-offload/repos/overdeck-73dd7c243420.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-terra
reasoning_effort: medium
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/14/rollout-2026-08-14T16-03-11-01a00103-568c-7af0-a756-412432c6cb60.jsonl

title:
  Read the file .cdx-contract.md at the repo root of this worktree and implement it exactly as specified — it is a full contract for two new files. After implementing, run the test command it names and report the pass/fail output. Do not modify .cdx-contract.md. Do not commit anything.

first_user_message:
  Read the file .cdx-contract.md at the repo root of this worktree and implement it exactly as specified — it is a full contract for two new files. After implementing, run the test command it names and report the pass/fail output. Do not modify .cdx-contract.md. Do not commit anything.

preview:
  Read the file .cdx-contract.md at the repo root of this worktree and implement it exactly as specified — it is a full contract for two new files. After implementing, run the test command it names and report the pass/fail output. Do not modify .cdx-contract.md. Do not commit anything.


id: 01a00124-111b-73a0-8dcc-7f97efb7bd34
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/overdeck-f7f63179e1c7-scratch
title: reply OK
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
cli_version: 0.146.0
first_user_message: reply OK
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
preview: reply OK
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/14/rollout-2026-08-14T16-38-56-01a00124-111b-73a0-8dcc-7f97efb7bd34.jsonl


id: 01a00138-1395-7830-84e7-794ce2c4582d
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/overdeck-f7f63179e1c7
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 8a45f5517bdc3f443b1659a094ebd2da9fef0bde
git_origin_url: /home/user/cdx-offload/repos/overdeck-73dd7c243420.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.4-mini
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/14/rollout-2026-08-14T17-00-47-01a00138-1395-7830-84e7-794ce2c4582d.jsonl

title:
  Read the Claude Code session transcript at /home/user/.claude/projects/-home-user-Projects-overdeck/bb00887a-f6b4-4073-9e58-3e72d7350f1d.jsonl (JSONL; skip tool_result noise). Author a continuation handoff in markdown for a fresh coding agent: goal, methodology, completed work, current state, precise next actions, blockers gated on the user, standing user instructions (verbatim), key file paths. Be complete but terse. Output ONLY the handoff markdown.

first_user_message:
  Read the Claude Code session transcript at /home/user/.claude/projects/-home-user-Projects-overdeck/bb00887a-f6b4-4073-9e58-3e72d7350f1d.jsonl (JSONL; skip tool_result noise). Author a continuation handoff in markdown for a fresh coding agent: goal, methodology, completed work, current state, precise next actions, blockers gated on the user, standing user instructions (verbatim), key file paths. Be complete but terse. Output ONLY the handoff markdown.

preview:
  Read the Claude Code session transcript at /home/user/.claude/projects/-home-user-Projects-overdeck/bb00887a-f6b4-4073-9e58-3e72d7350f1d.jsonl (JSONL; skip tool_result noise). Author a continuation handoff in markdown for a fresh coding agent: goal, methodology, completed work, current state, precise next actions, blockers gated on the user, standing user instructions (verbatim), key file paths. Be complete but terse. Output ONLY the handoff markdown.


id: 01a0013d-312d-7921-b1e3-59725a0c984e
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/ipz-connect-36534f6b888b
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: d31c2b602006dc1bc0ecc0be1ca23f7eca684a80
git_origin_url: /home/user/cdx-offload/repos/wp-content-898fc4388a24.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-terra
reasoning_effort: medium
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/14/rollout-2026-08-14T17-06-22-01a0013d-312d-7921-b1e3-59725a0c984e.jsonl

title:
  Implement the request spec at docs/plans/2026-08-13-ecosystem-auth-plugin.md in the repo /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/wordpress/wp-content/.worktrees/ipz-connect/plugins/international-press-zone (all paths in the spec are relative to that directory).

  Edit ONLY the three files its Files section names. Honor its 'Out of scope' section exactly — in particular do NOT change the authorize URL, do NOT touch CredentialStore.php, do NOT touch admin/src, and do NOT add PHPUnit infrastructure.

  The wire contract table in the spec is authoritative and was read directly from the backend source; do not re-derive it or 'correct' it.

  Run every command in the Acceptance section and report their REAL output verbatim, including failures. Never claim a pass you did not observe. Do not commit.

first_user_message:
  Implement the request spec at docs/plans/2026-08-13-ecosystem-auth-plugin.md in the repo /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/wordpress/wp-content/.worktrees/ipz-connect/plugins/international-press-zone (all paths in the spec are relative to that directory).

  Edit ONLY the three files its Files section names. Honor its 'Out of scope' section exactly — in particular do NOT change the authorize URL, do NOT touch CredentialStore.php, do NOT touch admin/src, and do NOT add PHPUnit infrastructure.

  The wire contract table in the spec is authoritative and was read directly from the backend source; do not re-derive it or 'correct' it.

  Run every command in the Acceptance section and report their REAL output verbatim, including failures. Never claim a pass you did not observe. Do not commit.

preview:
  Implement the request spec at docs/plans/2026-08-13-ecosystem-auth-plugin.md in the repo /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/wordpress/wp-content/.worktrees/ipz-connect/plugins/international-press-zone (all paths in the spec are relative to that directory).

  Edit ONLY the three files its Files section names. Honor its 'Out of scope' section exactly — in particular do NOT change the authorize URL, do NOT touch CredentialStore.php, do NOT touch admin/src, and do NOT add PHPUnit infrastructure.

  The wire contract table in the spec is authoritative and was read directly from the backend source; do not re-derive it or 'correct' it.

  Run every command in the Acceptance section and report their REAL output verbatim, including failures. Never claim a pass you did not observe. Do not commit.


id: 01a00194-0748-74b3-80a4-422abe39cd9f
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/multilingual-navigation-adapter-2ddb95e1b73b/plugins/international-press-zone
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 6058cf95f5ba0c3581ea76cf0a79657da7731767
git_origin_url: /home/user/cdx-offload/repos/wp-content-898fc4388a24.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-terra
reasoning_effort: medium
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/14/rollout-2026-08-14T18-41-13-01a00194-0748-74b3-80a4-422abe39cd9f.jsonl

title:
  Follow .claude/agents/expert.md. Implement the next single dependency-correct multilingual Site Content slice: the dormant NavigationTranslationAdapter for wp_navigation, according to docs/specs/2026-08-09-multilingual-site-entry-and-layout-design.md and docs/plans/2026-08-09-multilingual-site-entry-and-layout.md. Work directly; do not delegate, invoke other agents/models, or publish. First create/update the durable task plan and indexes. Inspect current origin/master patterns, especially BlockTemplateTranslationAdapter, SiteContentCatalog, SiteContentRepository, SiteContentRequestContext, and BlockSegmentCodec. Implement only the navigation runtime adapter and focused deterministic tests. Requirements: official WordPress navigation retrieval/render seams; translated labels and internal-link mapping; public-frontend or explicit plugin-preview contexts only; no effects in source Site Editor, generic REST, admin, cron, CLI, management AJAX, or canonical caches; current source structure remains authoritative; stale/missing/malformed translations fail closed to source; bounded diagnostics; WordPress 6.0 and PHP 8.0 compatibility; no bootstrap registration or visible runtime activation in this dormant slice. Preserve existing behavior and unrelated files. Run focused PHPUnit, direct and candidate-aware PHPCS, focused PHPStan, PHP syntax, git diff --check, and a dormancy search. Do not commit. Return a concise implementation and verification receipt for Claude review.

first_user_message:
  Follow .claude/agents/expert.md. Implement the next single dependency-correct multilingual Site Content slice: the dormant NavigationTranslationAdapter for wp_navigation, according to docs/specs/2026-08-09-multilingual-site-entry-and-layout-design.md and docs/plans/2026-08-09-multilingual-site-entry-and-layout.md. Work directly; do not delegate, invoke other agents/models, or publish. First create/update the durable task plan and indexes. Inspect current origin/master patterns, especially BlockTemplateTranslationAdapter, SiteContentCatalog, SiteContentRepository, SiteContentRequestContext, and BlockSegmentCodec. Implement only the navigation runtime adapter and focused deterministic tests. Requirements: official WordPress navigation retrieval/render seams; translated labels and internal-link mapping; public-frontend or explicit plugin-preview contexts only; no effects in source Site Editor, generic REST, admin, cron, CLI, management AJAX, or canonical caches; current source structure remains authoritative; stale/missing/malformed translations fail closed to source; bounded diagnostics; WordPress 6.0 and PHP 8.0 compatibility; no bootstrap registration or visible runtime activation in this dormant slice. Preserve existing behavior and unrelated files. Run focused PHPUnit, direct and candidate-aware PHPCS, focused PHPStan, PHP syntax, git diff --check, and a dormancy search. Do not commit. Return a concise implementation and verification receipt for Claude review.

preview:
  Follow .claude/agents/expert.md. Implement the next single dependency-correct multilingual Site Content slice: the dormant NavigationTranslationAdapter for wp_navigation, according to docs/specs/2026-08-09-multilingual-site-entry-and-layout-design.md and docs/plans/2026-08-09-multilingual-site-entry-and-layout.md. Work directly; do not delegate, invoke other agents/models, or publish. First create/update the durable task plan and indexes. Inspect current origin/master patterns, especially BlockTemplateTranslationAdapter, SiteContentCatalog, SiteContentRepository, SiteContentRequestContext, and BlockSegmentCodec. Implement only the navigation runtime adapter and focused deterministic tests. Requirements: official WordPress navigation retrieval/render seams; translated labels and internal-link mapping; public-frontend or explicit plugin-preview contexts only; no effects in source Site Editor, generic REST, admin, cron, CLI, management AJAX, or canonical caches; current source structure remains authoritative; stale/missing/malformed translations fail closed to source; bounded diagnostics; WordPress 6.0 and PHP 8.0 compatibility; no bootstrap registration or visible runtime activation in this dormant slice. Preserve existing behavior and unrelated files. Run focused PHPUnit, direct and candidate-aware PHPCS, focused PHPStan, PHP syntax, git diff --check, and a dormancy search. Do not commit. Return a concise implementation and verification receipt for Claude review.


id: 01a0030c-8f06-74c1-9e33-b72e308c0357
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/wp-content-10b66c7a0e8b
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: a84827d647e665b801cf51d75b621dce0e8e91a7
git_origin_url: /home/user/cdx-offload/repos/wp-content-898fc4388a24.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.3-codex-spark
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/15/rollout-2026-08-15T01-32-29-01a0030c-8f06-74c1-9e33-b72e308c0357.jsonl

title:
  Read the Claude Code session transcript at /home/user/.claude/projects/-home-user-Projects-Press-zone-wordpress-wp-content-plugins-international-press-zone/ac8aef9a-4f6a-483e-844c-762bcc604395.jsonl (JSONL; skip tool_result noise). Author a continuation handoff in markdown for a fresh coding agent: goal, methodology, completed work, current state, precise next actions, blockers gated on the user, standing user instructions (verbatim), key file paths. Be complete but terse. Output ONLY the handoff markdown.

first_user_message:
  Read the Claude Code session transcript at /home/user/.claude/projects/-home-user-Projects-Press-zone-wordpress-wp-content-plugins-international-press-zone/ac8aef9a-4f6a-483e-844c-762bcc604395.jsonl (JSONL; skip tool_result noise). Author a continuation handoff in markdown for a fresh coding agent: goal, methodology, completed work, current state, precise next actions, blockers gated on the user, standing user instructions (verbatim), key file paths. Be complete but terse. Output ONLY the handoff markdown.

preview:
  Read the Claude Code session transcript at /home/user/.claude/projects/-home-user-Projects-Press-zone-wordpress-wp-content-plugins-international-press-zone/ac8aef9a-4f6a-483e-844c-762bcc604395.jsonl (JSONL; skip tool_result noise). Author a continuation handoff in markdown for a fresh coding agent: goal, methodology, completed work, current state, precise next actions, blockers gated on the user, standing user instructions (verbatim), key file paths. Be complete but terse. Output ONLY the handoff markdown.


id: 01a00393-7e34-74a1-8e04-17e4e723afad
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/ledger-bulk2-43236ded3267
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 529879cecd4172dccfca28d2a2d1c5d520cf94d3
git_origin_url: /home/user/cdx-offload/repos/overdeck-73dd7c243420.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.3-codex-spark
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/15/rollout-2026-08-15T03-59-52-01a00393-7e34-74a1-8e04-17e4e723afad.jsonl

title:
  Read the Claude Code session transcript at /home/user/.claude/projects/-home-user-Projects-overdeck/f7206ccd-6b70-4951-aca7-740f2f4cab41.jsonl (JSONL; skip tool_result noise). Author a continuation handoff in markdown for a fresh coding agent: goal, methodology, completed work, current state, precise next actions, blockers gated on the user, standing user instructions (verbatim), key file paths. Be complete but terse. Output ONLY the handoff markdown.

first_user_message:
  Read the Claude Code session transcript at /home/user/.claude/projects/-home-user-Projects-overdeck/f7206ccd-6b70-4951-aca7-740f2f4cab41.jsonl (JSONL; skip tool_result noise). Author a continuation handoff in markdown for a fresh coding agent: goal, methodology, completed work, current state, precise next actions, blockers gated on the user, standing user instructions (verbatim), key file paths. Be complete but terse. Output ONLY the handoff markdown.

preview:
  Read the Claude Code session transcript at /home/user/.claude/projects/-home-user-Projects-overdeck/f7206ccd-6b70-4951-aca7-740f2f4cab41.jsonl (JSONL; skip tool_result noise). Author a continuation handoff in markdown for a fresh coding agent: goal, methodology, completed work, current state, precise next actions, blockers gated on the user, standing user instructions (verbatim), key file paths. Be complete but terse. Output ONLY the handoff markdown.


id: 01a004df-d5cf-79a1-a19b-bf877c39aa98
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/cf-deploy-e2e863c378a4
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 1fbaf02fe824d55b45222a7e3d3d10b2b228c8ac
git_origin_url: /home/user/cdx-offload/repos/press-zone-core-6216e86359a3.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-terra
reasoning_effort: medium
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/15/rollout-2026-08-15T10-02-53-01a004df-d5cf-79a1-a19b-bf877c39aa98.jsonl

title:
  Repo root: /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/press-zone-core/.worktrees/cf-deploy — every plan path is relative to it. Read docs/plans/2026-08-15-product-plane-1-translate.md and implement ONLY Task A. The plan owns the contract — follow it exactly; do not invent names or shapes it does not specify. Edit ONLY the files Task A's Files list names (apps/api/src/routes/plugin.ts, apps/api/src/routes/plugin.test.ts). Another agent owns every other file RIGHT NOW. Touching a file outside your list corrupts their work. /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/wordpress/wp-content/press-zone-backend is READ-ONLY. Read it to port behavior; never edit it. Do not edit apps/api/src/queue-regression.test.ts and do not add any queue, scheduled or cron surface anywhere. That test is a landed requirement. No stubs, no placeholders, no TODOs. Full working implementation. Run your task's Acceptance command (FT_FROM_HOOK=1 FT_HINTS=1 ft pnpm --filter @press-zone/api test src/routes/plugin.test.ts) and report its REAL output. Never claim a pass you did not observe. Commit only your own task's files, with a short imperative one-line message. Never use --no-verify or --force. Report the sha of the commit carrying YOUR files — never another task's commit. A repo-wide tooling or dependency warning outside your Files list is the owner's to fix, not yours. Report it and judge your task on its own Files list.

first_user_message:
  Repo root: /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/press-zone-core/.worktrees/cf-deploy — every plan path is relative to it. Read docs/plans/2026-08-15-product-plane-1-translate.md and implement ONLY Task A. The plan owns the contract — follow it exactly; do not invent names or shapes it does not specify. Edit ONLY the files Task A's Files list names (apps/api/src/routes/plugin.ts, apps/api/src/routes/plugin.test.ts). Another agent owns every other file RIGHT NOW. Touching a file outside your list corrupts their work. /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/wordpress/wp-content/press-zone-backend is READ-ONLY. Read it to port behavior; never edit it. Do not edit apps/api/src/queue-regression.test.ts and do not add any queue, scheduled or cron surface anywhere. That test is a landed requirement. No stubs, no placeholders, no TODOs. Full working implementation. Run your task's Acceptance command (FT_FROM_HOOK=1 FT_HINTS=1 ft pnpm --filter @press-zone/api test src/routes/plugin.test.ts) and report its REAL output. Never claim a pass you did not observe. Commit only your own task's files, with a short imperative one-line message. Never use --no-verify or --force. Report the sha of the commit carrying YOUR files — never another task's commit. A repo-wide tooling or dependency warning outside your Files list is the owner's to fix, not yours. Report it and judge your task on its own Files list.

preview:
  Repo root: /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/press-zone-core/.worktrees/cf-deploy — every plan path is relative to it. Read docs/plans/2026-08-15-product-plane-1-translate.md and implement ONLY Task A. The plan owns the contract — follow it exactly; do not invent names or shapes it does not specify. Edit ONLY the files Task A's Files list names (apps/api/src/routes/plugin.ts, apps/api/src/routes/plugin.test.ts). Another agent owns every other file RIGHT NOW. Touching a file outside your list corrupts their work. /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/wordpress/wp-content/press-zone-backend is READ-ONLY. Read it to port behavior; never edit it. Do not edit apps/api/src/queue-regression.test.ts and do not add any queue, scheduled or cron surface anywhere. That test is a landed requirement. No stubs, no placeholders, no TODOs. Full working implementation. Run your task's Acceptance command (FT_FROM_HOOK=1 FT_HINTS=1 ft pnpm --filter @press-zone/api test src/routes/plugin.test.ts) and report its REAL output. Never claim a pass you did not observe. Commit only your own task's files, with a short imperative one-line message. Never use --no-verify or --force. Report the sha of the commit carrying YOUR files — never another task's commit. A repo-wide tooling or dependency warning outside your Files list is the owner's to fix, not yours. Report it and judge your task on its own Files list.


id: 01a004e2-811c-7b13-98ba-3f89875ff89d
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/cf-deploy-e2e863c378a4
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: fe8553bbbe67a421c4b407955e88f977541cfc56
git_origin_url: /home/user/cdx-offload/repos/press-zone-core-6216e86359a3.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-terra
reasoning_effort: medium
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/15/rollout-2026-08-15T10-05-48-01a004e2-811c-7b13-98ba-3f89875ff89d.jsonl

title:
  Repo root: /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/press-zone-core/.worktrees/cf-deploy — every plan path is relative to it. Read docs/plans/2026-08-15-product-plane-1-translate.md and implement ONLY Task B. The plan owns the contract — follow it exactly; do not invent names or shapes it does not specify. Edit ONLY the files Task B's Files list names (apps/api/src/lib/gemini.ts, apps/api/src/lib/gemini.test.ts, apps/api/src/config.ts, apps/api/src/config.test.ts, apps/api/wrangler.toml). Another agent owns every other file RIGHT NOW. Touching a file outside your list corrupts their work. /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/wordpress/wp-content/press-zone-backend is READ-ONLY. Read it (specifically api/src/services/geminiClient.ts) to port behavior; never edit it. Do not edit apps/api/src/queue-regression.test.ts and do not add any queue, scheduled or cron surface anywhere. That test is a landed requirement. No stubs, no placeholders, no TODOs. Full working implementation. Run your task's Acceptance command (FT_FROM_HOOK=1 FT_HINTS=1 ft pnpm --filter @press-zone/api test src/lib/gemini.test.ts src/config.test.ts) and report its REAL output. Never claim a pass you did not observe. Commit only your own task's files, with a short imperative one-line message. Never use --no-verify or --force. Report the sha of the commit carrying YOUR files — never another task's commit. A repo-wide tooling or dependency warning outside your Files list is the owner's to fix, not yours. Report it and judge your task on its own Files list.

first_user_message:
  Repo root: /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/press-zone-core/.worktrees/cf-deploy — every plan path is relative to it. Read docs/plans/2026-08-15-product-plane-1-translate.md and implement ONLY Task B. The plan owns the contract — follow it exactly; do not invent names or shapes it does not specify. Edit ONLY the files Task B's Files list names (apps/api/src/lib/gemini.ts, apps/api/src/lib/gemini.test.ts, apps/api/src/config.ts, apps/api/src/config.test.ts, apps/api/wrangler.toml). Another agent owns every other file RIGHT NOW. Touching a file outside your list corrupts their work. /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/wordpress/wp-content/press-zone-backend is READ-ONLY. Read it (specifically api/src/services/geminiClient.ts) to port behavior; never edit it. Do not edit apps/api/src/queue-regression.test.ts and do not add any queue, scheduled or cron surface anywhere. That test is a landed requirement. No stubs, no placeholders, no TODOs. Full working implementation. Run your task's Acceptance command (FT_FROM_HOOK=1 FT_HINTS=1 ft pnpm --filter @press-zone/api test src/lib/gemini.test.ts src/config.test.ts) and report its REAL output. Never claim a pass you did not observe. Commit only your own task's files, with a short imperative one-line message. Never use --no-verify or --force. Report the sha of the commit carrying YOUR files — never another task's commit. A repo-wide tooling or dependency warning outside your Files list is the owner's to fix, not yours. Report it and judge your task on its own Files list.

preview:
  Repo root: /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/press-zone-core/.worktrees/cf-deploy — every plan path is relative to it. Read docs/plans/2026-08-15-product-plane-1-translate.md and implement ONLY Task B. The plan owns the contract — follow it exactly; do not invent names or shapes it does not specify. Edit ONLY the files Task B's Files list names (apps/api/src/lib/gemini.ts, apps/api/src/lib/gemini.test.ts, apps/api/src/config.ts, apps/api/src/config.test.ts, apps/api/wrangler.toml). Another agent owns every other file RIGHT NOW. Touching a file outside your list corrupts their work. /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/wordpress/wp-content/press-zone-backend is READ-ONLY. Read it (specifically api/src/services/geminiClient.ts) to port behavior; never edit it. Do not edit apps/api/src/queue-regression.test.ts and do not add any queue, scheduled or cron surface anywhere. That test is a landed requirement. No stubs, no placeholders, no TODOs. Full working implementation. Run your task's Acceptance command (FT_FROM_HOOK=1 FT_HINTS=1 ft pnpm --filter @press-zone/api test src/lib/gemini.test.ts src/config.test.ts) and report its REAL output. Never claim a pass you did not observe. Commit only your own task's files, with a short imperative one-line message. Never use --no-verify or --force. Report the sha of the commit carrying YOUR files — never another task's commit. A repo-wide tooling or dependency warning outside your Files list is the owner's to fix, not yours. Report it and judge your task on its own Files list.


id: 01a00556-bc6f-7d42-bb8d-6b51d3cc42e2
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/cf-deploy-e2e863c378a4
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: c3c9931cefbb9e9590a305dfacede32e0fc7e070
git_origin_url: /home/user/cdx-offload/repos/press-zone-core-6216e86359a3.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-terra
reasoning_effort: medium
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/15/rollout-2026-08-15T12-12-45-01a00556-bc6f-7d42-bb8d-6b51d3cc42e2.jsonl

title:
  Repo root: /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/press-zone-core — every path below is relative to it. You are authorized to edit exactly ONE file: apps/api/src/lib/gemini.test.ts (this is Task B's own test file, defined in docs/plans/2026-08-15-product-plane-1-translate.md). Do not touch any other file, especially not apps/api/src/schema.ts, apps/api/src/schema.test.ts, apps/api/src/routes/sites.ts, apps/api/src/routes/sites.test.ts, apps/api/src/routes/exceptions.ts, apps/api/src/routes/exceptions.test.ts (another lane owns those with uncommitted work), and not apps/api/src/lib/gemini.ts, apps/api/src/config.ts, apps/api/src/index.test.ts, apps/api/src/http.test.ts, press-zone-backend/ (read-only).

  Fix a real TypeScript typecheck error: running cd apps/api && FT_FROM_HOOK=1 FT_HINTS=1 ft pnpm typecheck (FT_FROM_HOOK=1 FT_HINTS=1 ft tsc --noEmit) fails with:

  src/lib/gemini.test.ts(25,11): error TS2488: Type '[input: string | Request | URL, init?: RequestInit | undefined] | undefined' must have a '[Symbol.iterator]()' method that returns an iterator.

  That is this line in the test 'translates all supplied fields in one structured Gemini request':

      expect(fetchImpl).toHaveBeenCalledOnce()
      const [url, init] = fetchImpl.mock.calls[0]

  Because the tsconfig has strict indexed-access checking, fetchImpl.mock.calls[0] types as possibly undefined even though the test already asserted toHaveBeenCalledOnce() on the line above, so TS cannot narrow it. Fix this in a type-safe, non-hacky way — do not use 'as any' or a blanket '@ts-ignore' or '@ts-expect-error'. The idiomatic fix is a non-null assertion since correctness is already guaranteed by the preceding assertion: const [url, init] = fetchImpl.mock.calls[0]! — or equivalently, assign to a local const first and non-null-assert that. Pick whichever reads cleanest but keep it minimal (one line changed).

  Verify: cd apps/api && FT_FROM_HOOK=1 FT_HINTS=1 ft pnpm typecheck if your sandbox can run tsc (it should not require node_modules network install if already present; if tsc itself is missing, say so plainly rather than claim a pass).

  Commit ONLY by explicit path: git add apps/api/src/lib/gemini.test.ts && git commit -m '<message>'. Never use git add -A, git add ., git commit -a, git stash, git checkout -- ., or git reset --hard. Report the exact commit sha and confirm via git diff --stat that only gemini.test.ts changed.

first_user_message:
  Repo root: /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/press-zone-core — every path below is relative to it. You are authorized to edit exactly ONE file: apps/api/src/lib/gemini.test.ts (this is Task B's own test file, defined in docs/plans/2026-08-15-product-plane-1-translate.md). Do not touch any other file, especially not apps/api/src/schema.ts, apps/api/src/schema.test.ts, apps/api/src/routes/sites.ts, apps/api/src/routes/sites.test.ts, apps/api/src/routes/exceptions.ts, apps/api/src/routes/exceptions.test.ts (another lane owns those with uncommitted work), and not apps/api/src/lib/gemini.ts, apps/api/src/config.ts, apps/api/src/index.test.ts, apps/api/src/http.test.ts, press-zone-backend/ (read-only).

  Fix a real TypeScript typecheck error: running cd apps/api && FT_FROM_HOOK=1 FT_HINTS=1 ft pnpm typecheck (FT_FROM_HOOK=1 FT_HINTS=1 ft tsc --noEmit) fails with:

  src/lib/gemini.test.ts(25,11): error TS2488: Type '[input: string | Request | URL, init?: RequestInit | undefined] | undefined' must have a '[Symbol.iterator]()' method that returns an iterator.

  That is this line in the test 'translates all supplied fields in one structured Gemini request':

      expect(fetchImpl).toHaveBeenCalledOnce()
      const [url, init] = fetchImpl.mock.calls[0]

  Because the tsconfig has strict indexed-access checking, fetchImpl.mock.calls[0] types as possibly undefined even though the test already asserted toHaveBeenCalledOnce() on the line above, so TS cannot narrow it. Fix this in a type-safe, non-hacky way — do not use 'as any' or a blanket '@ts-ignore' or '@ts-expect-error'. The idiomatic fix is a non-null assertion since correctness is already guaranteed by the preceding assertion: const [url, init] = fetchImpl.mock.calls[0]! — or equivalently, assign to a local const first and non-null-assert that. Pick whichever reads cleanest but keep it minimal (one line changed).

  Verify: cd apps/api && FT_FROM_HOOK=1 FT_HINTS=1 ft pnpm typecheck if your sandbox can run tsc (it should not require node_modules network install if already present; if tsc itself is missing, say so plainly rather than claim a pass).

  Commit ONLY by explicit path: git add apps/api/src/lib/gemini.test.ts && git commit -m '<message>'. Never use git add -A, git add ., git commit -a, git stash, git checkout -- ., or git reset --hard. Report the exact commit sha and confirm via git diff --stat that only gemini.test.ts changed.

preview:
  Repo root: /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/press-zone-core — every path below is relative to it. You are authorized to edit exactly ONE file: apps/api/src/lib/gemini.test.ts (this is Task B's own test file, defined in docs/plans/2026-08-15-product-plane-1-translate.md). Do not touch any other file, especially not apps/api/src/schema.ts, apps/api/src/schema.test.ts, apps/api/src/routes/sites.ts, apps/api/src/routes/sites.test.ts, apps/api/src/routes/exceptions.ts, apps/api/src/routes/exceptions.test.ts (another lane owns those with uncommitted work), and not apps/api/src/lib/gemini.ts, apps/api/src/config.ts, apps/api/src/index.test.ts, apps/api/src/http.test.ts, press-zone-backend/ (read-only).

  Fix a real TypeScript typecheck error: running cd apps/api && FT_FROM_HOOK=1 FT_HINTS=1 ft pnpm typecheck (FT_FROM_HOOK=1 FT_HINTS=1 ft tsc --noEmit) fails with:

  src/lib/gemini.test.ts(25,11): error TS2488: Type '[input: string | Request | URL, init?: RequestInit | undefined] | undefined' must have a '[Symbol.iterator]()' method that returns an iterator.

  That is this line in the test 'translates all supplied fields in one structured Gemini request':

      expect(fetchImpl).toHaveBeenCalledOnce()
      const [url, init] = fetchImpl.mock.calls[0]

  Because the tsconfig has strict indexed-access checking, fetchImpl.mock.calls[0] types as possibly undefined even though the test already asserted toHaveBeenCalledOnce() on the line above, so TS cannot narrow it. Fix this in a type-safe, non-hacky way — do not use 'as any' or a blanket '@ts-ignore' or '@ts-expect-error'. The idiomatic fix is a non-null assertion since correctness is already guaranteed by the preceding assertion: const [url, init] = fetchImpl.mock.calls[0]! — or equivalently, assign to a local const first and non-null-assert that. Pick whichever reads cleanest but keep it minimal (one line changed).

  Verify: cd apps/api && FT_FROM_HOOK=1 FT_HINTS=1 ft pnpm typecheck if your sandbox can run tsc (it should not require node_modules network install if already present; if tsc itself is missing, say so plainly rather than claim a pass).

  Commit ONLY by explicit path: git add apps/api/src/lib/gemini.test.ts && git commit -m '<message>'. Never use git add -A, git add ., git commit -a, git stash, git checkout -- ., or git reset --hard. Report the exact commit sha and confirm via git diff --stat that only gemini.test.ts changed.


id: 01a00564-8a7e-7aa1-8f6e-f09b99f5d469
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/cf-deploy-e2e863c378a4
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 515bf394187abacefc0d30ab3f2a0590afc84d0d
git_origin_url: /home/user/cdx-offload/repos/press-zone-core-6216e86359a3.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/15/rollout-2026-08-15T12-27-50-01a00564-8a7e-7aa1-8f6e-f09b99f5d469.jsonl

title:
  Repo root: /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/press-zone-core — every path below is relative to it. Read docs/plans/2026-08-15-product-plane-1-translate.md, Task B only (Gemini client: apps/api/src/lib/gemini.ts, apps/api/src/lib/gemini.test.ts, apps/api/src/config.ts, apps/api/src/config.test.ts, apps/api/wrangler.toml).

  Do an adversarial review of Task B as already implemented and committed on the current branch (wt/cf-deploy). Report findings only — never edit any file. This is report-only. Your sandbox likely cannot run pnpm install (a private @platform-modules/db GitHub Packages dependency 401s) and the 'ft' tool is not available here — if you cannot run the acceptance command yourself, say so plainly and do not fabricate output; the orchestrator has already run it locally and will report the real result separately.

  Checklist:
  1. Contract check — exact shapes:
  export type TranslateFields = { title?: string; excerpt?: string; content: string }
  export type TranslateRequest = { sourceLang: string; targetLang: string; fields: TranslateFields; tone?: string; format?: 'html' | 'text'; preserveTags?: string[] }
  export type TranslateResponse = { title?: string; excerpt?: string; content: string }
  export function createGeminiClient(apiKey: string, fetchImpl?: typeof fetch): { translate(request: TranslateRequest): Promise<TranslateResponse> }

  2. Behavior check: one structured JSON prompt returning one JSON object keyed by field name — never one call per field. Model must be exactly 'gemini-3-flash-preview'. preserveTags names HTML tags whose markup must survive verbatim (check HOW this is achieved — flag if it uses a placeholder-substitution scheme that can throw a spurious error on a benign upstream reformat; prompt-only instruction to the model is acceptable and preferred). A non-2xx upstream response, a response that is not JSON, or a response missing content must throw (verify the caller — apps/api/src/routes/plugin.ts or wherever this gets wired in Task D — is expected to map that to 502; Task D isn't built yet, just confirm gemini.ts itself throws in all three cases). Never log the API key or the request body anywhere in gemini.ts (FT_FROM_HOOK=1 FT_HINTS=1 ft grep for console.log, console.error, logger calls).

  3. loadConfig in config.ts must have gained a required GEMINI_API_KEY binding, failing closed with exactly 'Missing required binding: GEMINI_API_KEY' in the same style/mechanism as AUTH_SESSION_SECRET. wrangler.toml must have '# GEMINI_API_KEY' added to the secret inventory comment block (originally around lines 40-62).

  4. File scope: only apps/api/src/lib/gemini.ts, apps/api/src/lib/gemini.test.ts, apps/api/src/config.ts, apps/api/src/config.test.ts, apps/api/wrangler.toml should be touched by Task B's commits. Use git log --oneline -20 and git show --stat on the relevant commits (0979a23, f22c47f, c3c9931, 4a780d7) to confirm. Flag anything unexpected.

  5. Stubs/placeholders/TODOs/hacky workarounds — none allowed.

  6. Out of scope check: Task B must not add metering, routing, or exception-dictionary logic (that's Task D's job).

  Report your findings as: PASS (no blocking findings) or FAIL (list every blocking finding as precise, actionable text: file, line if known, what's wrong, why it violates the contract/behavior/acceptance). Do not fix anything yourself.

first_user_message:
  Repo root: /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/press-zone-core — every path below is relative to it. Read docs/plans/2026-08-15-product-plane-1-translate.md, Task B only (Gemini client: apps/api/src/lib/gemini.ts, apps/api/src/lib/gemini.test.ts, apps/api/src/config.ts, apps/api/src/config.test.ts, apps/api/wrangler.toml).

  Do an adversarial review of Task B as already implemented and committed on the current branch (wt/cf-deploy). Report findings only — never edit any file. This is report-only. Your sandbox likely cannot run pnpm install (a private @platform-modules/db GitHub Packages dependency 401s) and the 'ft' tool is not available here — if you cannot run the acceptance command yourself, say so plainly and do not fabricate output; the orchestrator has already run it locally and will report the real result separately.

  Checklist:
  1. Contract check — exact shapes:
  export type TranslateFields = { title?: string; excerpt?: string; content: string }
  export type TranslateRequest = { sourceLang: string; targetLang: string; fields: TranslateFields; tone?: string; format?: 'html' | 'text'; preserveTags?: string[] }
  export type TranslateResponse = { title?: string; excerpt?: string; content: string }
  export function createGeminiClient(apiKey: string, fetchImpl?: typeof fetch): { translate(request: TranslateRequest): Promise<TranslateResponse> }

  2. Behavior check: one structured JSON prompt returning one JSON object keyed by field name — never one call per field. Model must be exactly 'gemini-3-flash-preview'. preserveTags names HTML tags whose markup must survive verbatim (check HOW this is achieved — flag if it uses a placeholder-substitution scheme that can throw a spurious error on a benign upstream reformat; prompt-only instruction to the model is acceptable and preferred). A non-2xx upstream response, a response that is not JSON, or a response missing content must throw (verify the caller — apps/api/src/routes/plugin.ts or wherever this gets wired in Task D — is expected to map that to 502; Task D isn't built yet, just confirm gemini.ts itself throws in all three cases). Never log the API key or the request body anywhere in gemini.ts (FT_FROM_HOOK=1 FT_HINTS=1 ft grep for console.log, console.error, logger calls).

  3. loadConfig in config.ts must have gained a required GEMINI_API_KEY binding, failing closed with exactly 'Missing required binding: GEMINI_API_KEY' in the same style/mechanism as AUTH_SESSION_SECRET. wrangler.toml must have '# GEMINI_API_KEY' added to the secret inventory comment block (originally around lines 40-62).

  4. File scope: only apps/api/src/lib/gemini.ts, apps/api/src/lib/gemini.test.ts, apps/api/src/config.ts, apps/api/src/config.test.ts, apps/api/wrangler.toml should be touched by Task B's commits. Use git log --oneline -20 and git show --stat on the relevant commits (0979a23, f22c47f, c3c9931, 4a780d7) to confirm. Flag anything unexpected.

  5. Stubs/placeholders/TODOs/hacky workarounds — none allowed.

  6. Out of scope check: Task B must not add metering, routing, or exception-dictionary logic (that's Task D's job).

  Report your findings as: PASS (no blocking findings) or FAIL (list every blocking finding as precise, actionable text: file, line if known, what's wrong, why it violates the contract/behavior/acceptance). Do not fix anything yourself.

preview:
  Repo root: /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/press-zone-core — every path below is relative to it. Read docs/plans/2026-08-15-product-plane-1-translate.md, Task B only (Gemini client: apps/api/src/lib/gemini.ts, apps/api/src/lib/gemini.test.ts, apps/api/src/config.ts, apps/api/src/config.test.ts, apps/api/wrangler.toml).

  Do an adversarial review of Task B as already implemented and committed on the current branch (wt/cf-deploy). Report findings only — never edit any file. This is report-only. Your sandbox likely cannot run pnpm install (a private @platform-modules/db GitHub Packages dependency 401s) and the 'ft' tool is not available here — if you cannot run the acceptance command yourself, say so plainly and do not fabricate output; the orchestrator has already run it locally and will report the real result separately.

  Checklist:
  1. Contract check — exact shapes:
  export type TranslateFields = { title?: string; excerpt?: string; content: string }
  export type TranslateRequest = { sourceLang: string; targetLang: string; fields: TranslateFields; tone?: string; format?: 'html' | 'text'; preserveTags?: string[] }
  export type TranslateResponse = { title?: string; excerpt?: string; content: string }
  export function createGeminiClient(apiKey: string, fetchImpl?: typeof fetch): { translate(request: TranslateRequest): Promise<TranslateResponse> }

  2. Behavior check: one structured JSON prompt returning one JSON object keyed by field name — never one call per field. Model must be exactly 'gemini-3-flash-preview'. preserveTags names HTML tags whose markup must survive verbatim (check HOW this is achieved — flag if it uses a placeholder-substitution scheme that can throw a spurious error on a benign upstream reformat; prompt-only instruction to the model is acceptable and preferred). A non-2xx upstream response, a response that is not JSON, or a response missing content must throw (verify the caller — apps/api/src/routes/plugin.ts or wherever this gets wired in Task D — is expected to map that to 502; Task D isn't built yet, just confirm gemini.ts itself throws in all three cases). Never log the API key or the request body anywhere in gemini.ts (FT_FROM_HOOK=1 FT_HINTS=1 ft grep for console.log, console.error, logger calls).

  3. loadConfig in config.ts must have gained a required GEMINI_API_KEY binding, failing closed with exactly 'Missing required binding: GEMINI_API_KEY' in the same style/mechanism as AUTH_SESSION_SECRET. wrangler.toml must have '# GEMINI_API_KEY' added to the secret inventory comment block (originally around lines 40-62).

  4. File scope: only apps/api/src/lib/gemini.ts, apps/api/src/lib/gemini.test.ts, apps/api/src/config.ts, apps/api/src/config.test.ts, apps/api/wrangler.toml should be touched by Task B's commits. Use git log --oneline -20 and git show --stat on the relevant commits (0979a23, f22c47f, c3c9931, 4a780d7) to confirm. Flag anything unexpected.

  5. Stubs/placeholders/TODOs/hacky workarounds — none allowed.

  6. Out of scope check: Task B must not add metering, routing, or exception-dictionary logic (that's Task D's job).

  Report your findings as: PASS (no blocking findings) or FAIL (list every blocking finding as precise, actionable text: file, line if known, what's wrong, why it violates the contract/behavior/acceptance). Do not fix anything yourself.


id: 01a00566-f8b6-7283-913c-51bb9bf636a6
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/cf-deploy-e2e863c378a4
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 515bf394187abacefc0d30ab3f2a0590afc84d0d
git_origin_url: /home/user/cdx-offload/repos/press-zone-core-6216e86359a3.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/15/rollout-2026-08-15T12-30-29-01a00566-f8b6-7283-913c-51bb9bf636a6.jsonl

title:
  Repo root: /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/press-zone-core — every path below is relative to it. Read docs/plans/2026-08-15-product-plane-1-translate.md, Task C only (character counter: apps/api/src/lib/characters.ts, apps/api/src/lib/characters.test.ts).

  Do an adversarial review of Task C as already implemented and committed (commit 392cc3c on branch wt/cf-deploy). Report findings only — never edit any file. This is report-only. Your sandbox likely cannot run pnpm install (a private @platform-modules/db GitHub Packages dependency 401s) and 'ft' is unavailable — if you cannot run the acceptance command yourself, say so plainly, do not fabricate output; the orchestrator has already run it locally and will report separately.

  Checklist:
  1. Contract: export function countCharacters(fields: { title?: string; excerpt?: string; content?: string }): bigint
  2. Behavior: must equal mb_strlen(title) + mb_strlen(strip_tags(excerpt)) + mb_strlen(strip_tags(content)). Title counted as-is (no tag-stripping). Excerpt and content counted with HTML tags stripped. Count Unicode code points (not UTF-16 units) — verify the implementation uses something equivalent to [...value].length, not value.length, so astral characters/emoji count once, not two. Absent fields count zero.
  3. Adversarial edge cases to check by reading the implementation logic carefully (do not just trust the test file — verify the code is actually correct, not merely that its own tests happen to pass): tag-stripping regex correctness on malformed/nested/self-closing tags, HTML entities (should NOT be decoded — mb_strlen on stripped HTML in PHP does not decode entities, so '&amp;' should count as 5 characters, not 1 — check whether the implementation matches this), strings containing '<' or '>' that aren't real tags, empty string vs undefined distinction.
  4. File scope: only apps/api/src/lib/characters.ts and apps/api/src/lib/characters.test.ts should be touched by commit 392cc3c — verify with git show --stat 392cc3c.
  5. Stubs/placeholders/TODOs/hacky workarounds — none allowed.
  6. Test coverage check: plain ASCII, Hebrew, an astral-plane character counting 1, '<p>hi</p>' in content counting 2, and a nested-tag excerpt — confirm these exact cases are pinned in characters.test.ts and are not weakened.

  Report your findings as: PASS (no blocking findings) or FAIL (list every blocking finding as precise, actionable text: file, line if known, what's wrong, why it violates the contract/behavior/acceptance). Do not fix anything yourself.

first_user_message:
  Repo root: /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/press-zone-core — every path below is relative to it. Read docs/plans/2026-08-15-product-plane-1-translate.md, Task C only (character counter: apps/api/src/lib/characters.ts, apps/api/src/lib/characters.test.ts).

  Do an adversarial review of Task C as already implemented and committed (commit 392cc3c on branch wt/cf-deploy). Report findings only — never edit any file. This is report-only. Your sandbox likely cannot run pnpm install (a private @platform-modules/db GitHub Packages dependency 401s) and 'ft' is unavailable — if you cannot run the acceptance command yourself, say so plainly, do not fabricate output; the orchestrator has already run it locally and will report separately.

  Checklist:
  1. Contract: export function countCharacters(fields: { title?: string; excerpt?: string; content?: string }): bigint
  2. Behavior: must equal mb_strlen(title) + mb_strlen(strip_tags(excerpt)) + mb_strlen(strip_tags(content)). Title counted as-is (no tag-stripping). Excerpt and content counted with HTML tags stripped. Count Unicode code points (not UTF-16 units) — verify the implementation uses something equivalent to [...value].length, not value.length, so astral characters/emoji count once, not two. Absent fields count zero.
  3. Adversarial edge cases to check by reading the implementation logic carefully (do not just trust the test file — verify the code is actually correct, not merely that its own tests happen to pass): tag-stripping regex correctness on malformed/nested/self-closing tags, HTML entities (should NOT be decoded — mb_strlen on stripped HTML in PHP does not decode entities, so '&amp;' should count as 5 characters, not 1 — check whether the implementation matches this), strings containing '<' or '>' that aren't real tags, empty string vs undefined distinction.
  4. File scope: only apps/api/src/lib/characters.ts and apps/api/src/lib/characters.test.ts should be touched by commit 392cc3c — verify with git show --stat 392cc3c.
  5. Stubs/placeholders/TODOs/hacky workarounds — none allowed.
  6. Test coverage check: plain ASCII, Hebrew, an astral-plane character counting 1, '<p>hi</p>' in content counting 2, and a nested-tag excerpt — confirm these exact cases are pinned in characters.test.ts and are not weakened.

  Report your findings as: PASS (no blocking findings) or FAIL (list every blocking finding as precise, actionable text: file, line if known, what's wrong, why it violates the contract/behavior/acceptance). Do not fix anything yourself.

preview:
  Repo root: /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/press-zone-core — every path below is relative to it. Read docs/plans/2026-08-15-product-plane-1-translate.md, Task C only (character counter: apps/api/src/lib/characters.ts, apps/api/src/lib/characters.test.ts).

  Do an adversarial review of Task C as already implemented and committed (commit 392cc3c on branch wt/cf-deploy). Report findings only — never edit any file. This is report-only. Your sandbox likely cannot run pnpm install (a private @platform-modules/db GitHub Packages dependency 401s) and 'ft' is unavailable — if you cannot run the acceptance command yourself, say so plainly, do not fabricate output; the orchestrator has already run it locally and will report separately.

  Checklist:
  1. Contract: export function countCharacters(fields: { title?: string; excerpt?: string; content?: string }): bigint
  2. Behavior: must equal mb_strlen(title) + mb_strlen(strip_tags(excerpt)) + mb_strlen(strip_tags(content)). Title counted as-is (no tag-stripping). Excerpt and content counted with HTML tags stripped. Count Unicode code points (not UTF-16 units) — verify the implementation uses something equivalent to [...value].length, not value.length, so astral characters/emoji count once, not two. Absent fields count zero.
  3. Adversarial edge cases to check by reading the implementation logic carefully (do not just trust the test file — verify the code is actually correct, not merely that its own tests happen to pass): tag-stripping regex correctness on malformed/nested/self-closing tags, HTML entities (should NOT be decoded — mb_strlen on stripped HTML in PHP does not decode entities, so '&amp;' should count as 5 characters, not 1 — check whether the implementation matches this), strings containing '<' or '>' that aren't real tags, empty string vs undefined distinction.
  4. File scope: only apps/api/src/lib/characters.ts and apps/api/src/lib/characters.test.ts should be touched by commit 392cc3c — verify with git show --stat 392cc3c.
  5. Stubs/placeholders/TODOs/hacky workarounds — none allowed.
  6. Test coverage check: plain ASCII, Hebrew, an astral-plane character counting 1, '<p>hi</p>' in content counting 2, and a nested-tag excerpt — confirm these exact cases are pinned in characters.test.ts and are not weakened.

  Report your findings as: PASS (no blocking findings) or FAIL (list every blocking finding as precise, actionable text: file, line if known, what's wrong, why it violates the contract/behavior/acceptance). Do not fix anything yourself.


id: 01a0056a-2e11-72a2-91e0-5ea302f65efe
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/cf-deploy-e2e863c378a4
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 515bf394187abacefc0d30ab3f2a0590afc84d0d
git_origin_url: /home/user/cdx-offload/repos/press-zone-core-6216e86359a3.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-terra
reasoning_effort: medium
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/15/rollout-2026-08-15T12-33-59-01a0056a-2e11-72a2-91e0-5ea302f65efe.jsonl

title:
  Repo root: /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/press-zone-core — every path below is relative to it. You are authorized to edit exactly these two files: apps/api/src/lib/characters.ts and apps/api/src/lib/characters.test.ts. Do not touch any other file.

  A blocking finding from an adversarial reviewer, empirically confirmed against real PHP by the orchestrator (running php -r against actual strip_tags()): the current tag-stripping regex /<[^>]*>/g in apps/api/src/lib/characters.ts does not match PHP strip_tags() semantics in two real cases:

  1. A '<' NOT immediately followed by a tag-name-like character (a letter, '/', '!', or '?') is literal text in PHP, not a tag start. Example verified against real PHP: strip_tags('1 < 2 and 3 > 1') === '1 < 2 and 3 > 1' (unchanged, mb_strlen 15) — because '< ' (less-than followed by a space) is not a tag opener. The current regex wrongly matches '< 2 and 3 >' as a tag and strips it down to '1  1'.

  2. An unclosed tag (a '<' that starts a tag-like sequence but has no matching '>' before the string ends) causes PHP to drop everything from that '<' to the end of the string. Example verified against real PHP: strip_tags('x <not closed') === 'x ' (mb_strlen 2). The current regex leaves the whole unclosed fragment as literal text ('x <not closed' unchanged) because it requires a '>' to match at all.

  Verified-correct cases that the current regex already gets right and must NOT regress (these came from the same php -r verification):
  - strip_tags('a <> b') === 'a  b' (mb_strlen 4)
  - strip_tags('a <b/c> d') === 'a  d' (mb_strlen 4)
  - strip_tags('a <br/> b') === 'a  b' (mb_strlen 4)
  - strip_tags('a <div><em>x</div></em> b') === 'a x b' (mb_strlen 5)
  - strip_tags('&amp;') === '&amp;' (entities are never decoded, mb_strlen 5)
  - strip_tags('<p>hi</p>') === 'hi' (mb_strlen 2)

  Fix required: replace the naive stripHtmlTags regex/logic with a small state-machine tag stripper that matches this PHP semantic: a '<' begins a tag ONLY when the very next character is an ASCII letter (a-z, A-Z), '/', '!', or '?'; once a tag begins, everything up to and including the next '>' is removed; if no '>' is found before the string ends, everything from that '<' to the end of the string is removed (dropped, not kept). A '<' NOT followed by one of those characters is literal text and is kept as-is, and is not itself treated as starting tag-scanning again for subsequent characters (i.e. do not falsely re-trigger on a '<' that appeared as literal text). Entities (like &amp;) are never decoded — leave them as literal text (this already works, do not change it). Count Unicode code points via [...value].length after stripping (this already works, do not change it — only fix the tag-stripping step itself).

  Add test cases in characters.test.ts pinning the two newly-fixed behaviors (case 1 and case 2 above, applied inside an excerpt or content field going through countCharacters — pick whichever field naming best fits an existing test's style) plus at least the six already-verified-correct regression cases above (adapt as needed to fit through countCharacters rather than calling a private helper directly, since stripHtmlTags is presumably not exported). Do not weaken or remove the plan's originally required cases (plain ASCII, Hebrew, an astral-plane character counting 1, '<p>hi</p>' in content counting 2, nested-tag excerpt).

  No stubs, no placeholders, no TODOs, no hacky workaround — implement a real, correct, minimal state machine.

  Verify: cd apps/api && FT_FROM_HOOK=1 FT_HINTS=1 ft pnpm test src/lib/characters.test.ts if your sandbox has node_modules (say so plainly if missing, do not fabricate a pass).

  Commit ONLY by explicit path: git add apps/api/src/lib/characters.ts apps/api/src/lib/characters.test.ts && git commit -m '<message>'. Never use git add -A, git add ., git commit -a, git stash, git checkout -- ., or git reset --hard. Report the exact commit sha and confirm via git diff --stat that only these two files changed.

first_user_message:
  Repo root: /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/press-zone-core — every path below is relative to it. You are authorized to edit exactly these two files: apps/api/src/lib/characters.ts and apps/api/src/lib/characters.test.ts. Do not touch any other file.

  A blocking finding from an adversarial reviewer, empirically confirmed against real PHP by the orchestrator (running php -r against actual strip_tags()): the current tag-stripping regex /<[^>]*>/g in apps/api/src/lib/characters.ts does not match PHP strip_tags() semantics in two real cases:

  1. A '<' NOT immediately followed by a tag-name-like character (a letter, '/', '!', or '?') is literal text in PHP, not a tag start. Example verified against real PHP: strip_tags('1 < 2 and 3 > 1') === '1 < 2 and 3 > 1' (unchanged, mb_strlen 15) — because '< ' (less-than followed by a space) is not a tag opener. The current regex wrongly matches '< 2 and 3 >' as a tag and strips it down to '1  1'.

  2. An unclosed tag (a '<' that starts a tag-like sequence but has no matching '>' before the string ends) causes PHP to drop everything from that '<' to the end of the string. Example verified against real PHP: strip_tags('x <not closed') === 'x ' (mb_strlen 2). The current regex leaves the whole unclosed fragment as literal text ('x <not closed' unchanged) because it requires a '>' to match at all.

  Verified-correct cases that the current regex already gets right and must NOT regress (these came from the same php -r verification):
  - strip_tags('a <> b') === 'a  b' (mb_strlen 4)
  - strip_tags('a <b/c> d') === 'a  d' (mb_strlen 4)
  - strip_tags('a <br/> b') === 'a  b' (mb_strlen 4)
  - strip_tags('a <div><em>x</div></em> b') === 'a x b' (mb_strlen 5)
  - strip_tags('&amp;') === '&amp;' (entities are never decoded, mb_strlen 5)
  - strip_tags('<p>hi</p>') === 'hi' (mb_strlen 2)

  Fix required: replace the naive stripHtmlTags regex/logic with a small state-machine tag stripper that matches this PHP semantic: a '<' begins a tag ONLY when the very next character is an ASCII letter (a-z, A-Z), '/', '!', or '?'; once a tag begins, everything up to and including the next '>' is removed; if no '>' is found before the string ends, everything from that '<' to the end of the string is removed (dropped, not kept). A '<' NOT followed by one of those characters is literal text and is kept as-is, and is not itself treated as starting tag-scanning again for subsequent characters (i.e. do not falsely re-trigger on a '<' that appeared as literal text). Entities (like &amp;) are never decoded — leave them as literal text (this already works, do not change it). Count Unicode code points via [...value].length after stripping (this already works, do not change it — only fix the tag-stripping step itself).

  Add test cases in characters.test.ts pinning the two newly-fixed behaviors (case 1 and case 2 above, applied inside an excerpt or content field going through countCharacters — pick whichever field naming best fits an existing test's style) plus at least the six already-verified-correct regression cases above (adapt as needed to fit through countCharacters rather than calling a private helper directly, since stripHtmlTags is presumably not exported). Do not weaken or remove the plan's originally required cases (plain ASCII, Hebrew, an astral-plane character counting 1, '<p>hi</p>' in content counting 2, nested-tag excerpt).

  No stubs, no placeholders, no TODOs, no hacky workaround — implement a real, correct, minimal state machine.

  Verify: cd apps/api && FT_FROM_HOOK=1 FT_HINTS=1 ft pnpm test src/lib/characters.test.ts if your sandbox has node_modules (say so plainly if missing, do not fabricate a pass).

  Commit ONLY by explicit path: git add apps/api/src/lib/characters.ts apps/api/src/lib/characters.test.ts && git commit -m '<message>'. Never use git add -A, git add ., git commit -a, git stash, git checkout -- ., or git reset --hard. Report the exact commit sha and confirm via git diff --stat that only these two files changed.

preview:
  Repo root: /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/press-zone-core — every path below is relative to it. You are authorized to edit exactly these two files: apps/api/src/lib/characters.ts and apps/api/src/lib/characters.test.ts. Do not touch any other file.

  A blocking finding from an adversarial reviewer, empirically confirmed against real PHP by the orchestrator (running php -r against actual strip_tags()): the current tag-stripping regex /<[^>]*>/g in apps/api/src/lib/characters.ts does not match PHP strip_tags() semantics in two real cases:

  1. A '<' NOT immediately followed by a tag-name-like character (a letter, '/', '!', or '?') is literal text in PHP, not a tag start. Example verified against real PHP: strip_tags('1 < 2 and 3 > 1') === '1 < 2 and 3 > 1' (unchanged, mb_strlen 15) — because '< ' (less-than followed by a space) is not a tag opener. The current regex wrongly matches '< 2 and 3 >' as a tag and strips it down to '1  1'.

  2. An unclosed tag (a '<' that starts a tag-like sequence but has no matching '>' before the string ends) causes PHP to drop everything from that '<' to the end of the string. Example verified against real PHP: strip_tags('x <not closed') === 'x ' (mb_strlen 2). The current regex leaves the whole unclosed fragment as literal text ('x <not closed' unchanged) because it requires a '>' to match at all.

  Verified-correct cases that the current regex already gets right and must NOT regress (these came from the same php -r verification):
  - strip_tags('a <> b') === 'a  b' (mb_strlen 4)
  - strip_tags('a <b/c> d') === 'a  d' (mb_strlen 4)
  - strip_tags('a <br/> b') === 'a  b' (mb_strlen 4)
  - strip_tags('a <div><em>x</div></em> b') === 'a x b' (mb_strlen 5)
  - strip_tags('&amp;') === '&amp;' (entities are never decoded, mb_strlen 5)
  - strip_tags('<p>hi</p>') === 'hi' (mb_strlen 2)

  Fix required: replace the naive stripHtmlTags regex/logic with a small state-machine tag stripper that matches this PHP semantic: a '<' begins a tag ONLY when the very next character is an ASCII letter (a-z, A-Z), '/', '!', or '?'; once a tag begins, everything up to and including the next '>' is removed; if no '>' is found before the string ends, everything from that '<' to the end of the string is removed (dropped, not kept). A '<' NOT followed by one of those characters is literal text and is kept as-is, and is not itself treated as starting tag-scanning again for subsequent characters (i.e. do not falsely re-trigger on a '<' that appeared as literal text). Entities (like &amp;) are never decoded — leave them as literal text (this already works, do not change it). Count Unicode code points via [...value].length after stripping (this already works, do not change it — only fix the tag-stripping step itself).

  Add test cases in characters.test.ts pinning the two newly-fixed behaviors (case 1 and case 2 above, applied inside an excerpt or content field going through countCharacters — pick whichever field naming best fits an existing test's style) plus at least the six already-verified-correct regression cases above (adapt as needed to fit through countCharacters rather than calling a private helper directly, since stripHtmlTags is presumably not exported). Do not weaken or remove the plan's originally required cases (plain ASCII, Hebrew, an astral-plane character counting 1, '<p>hi</p>' in content counting 2, nested-tag excerpt).

  No stubs, no placeholders, no TODOs, no hacky workaround — implement a real, correct, minimal state machine.

  Verify: cd apps/api && FT_FROM_HOOK=1 FT_HINTS=1 ft pnpm test src/lib/characters.test.ts if your sandbox has node_modules (say so plainly if missing, do not fabricate a pass).

  Commit ONLY by explicit path: git add apps/api/src/lib/characters.ts apps/api/src/lib/characters.test.ts && git commit -m '<message>'. Never use git add -A, git add ., git commit -a, git stash, git checkout -- ., or git reset --hard. Report the exact commit sha and confirm via git diff --stat that only these two files changed.


id: 01a00576-a10b-70f2-8d57-354c1740f027
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/cf-deploy-e2e863c378a4
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 60176f51a81646d29fdedc18db4615778a6b6d14
git_origin_url: /home/user/cdx-offload/repos/press-zone-core-6216e86359a3.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/15/rollout-2026-08-15T12-47-35-01a00576-a10b-70f2-8d57-354c1740f027.jsonl

title:
  Repo root: /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/press-zone-core/.worktrees/cf-deploy (all paths below are relative to this root). This is a RE-REVIEW after fixes, not a first review.

  Two files were changed after your (or a prior reviewer's) earlier pass, in response to blocking findings:

  1. apps/api/src/routes/plugin.ts and apps/api/src/routes/plugin.test.ts (commit 515bf39) — fix: the handler now ALWAYS attempts to parse the raw request body once, for BOTH literal-bigint costs and resolver costs. For resolver (function) costs: a JSON parse failure OR a resolver throw now returns fail('INVALID_REQUEST', ..., 400) with no intent created and no debit. For literal bigint costs: a parse failure does NOT reject the request — body stays undefined and execution proceeds exactly as before the fix (backward compatible). The parsed body (when parsing succeeded) is now passed to execute() for both cost forms.

  2. apps/api/src/lib/characters.ts and apps/api/src/lib/characters.test.ts (commit 60176f5) — fix: stripHtmlTags() was rewritten from a regex (/<[^>]*>/g) to a character-by-character state machine, because the regex diverged from PHP's real strip_tags() on two verified cases: (a) '<' not followed by a tag-starting character (letter, '/', '!', '?', or '>') is literal text, not a tag opener — e.g. '1 < 2 and 3 > 1' strips to '1 < 2 and 3 > 1' unchanged (15 chars); (b) an unclosed tag (no following '>') causes PHP to drop everything from the '<' to end-of-string. Both behaviors were empirically verified against real PHP 8 strip_tags() in a live WordPress container before being specified to the fixer.

  Task: adversarially re-review ONLY these two fixes (not the rest of the codebase). Specifically:
  - For plugin.ts: confirm the new unconditional-parse-before-intent ordering does not create any new way to double-parse the body stream, does not create a TOCTOU or a way to bypass the request-hash dedupe/idempotency logic, and that literal-cost routes truly preserve prior undefined-body behavior on unparseable JSON. Re-run apps/api's test suite yourself (FT_FROM_HOOK=1 FT_HINTS=1 ft pnpm --filter @press-zone/core-api test) and report the real pass/fail counts you observe.
  - For characters.ts: this is the important one. The state machine strips a tag by scanning for the NEXT '>' via value.indexOf('>', index + 1) once it sees a tag-opening '<'. HTML/WordPress content routinely contains comments like <!-- more --> and Gutenberg block comments <!-- wp:paragraph -->. Real PHP strip_tags() treats '<!--' as entering a distinct comment state that is only closed by the literal sequence '-->', NOT by the next bare '>'. Determine by reading the code (you do not have php available in your sandbox, reason about it directly) whether stripHtmlTags as currently written would mishandle a case like 'a <!-- x > y --> b' by stopping the tag-strip at the '>' inside 'x > y' and leaking ' y --> b' into the output, when real PHP strip_tags would strip the whole comment down to '-->' and leave 'a  b'. State explicitly whether this is a real divergence or not, and if real, whether it is BLOCKING (this path is used to compute billing character counts for a metered translation endpoint, so an undercount or overcount is a billing-correctness bug, not cosmetic).

  Report format: PASS or FAIL per file, with the real test suite output you observed, and for characters.ts an explicit yes/no on the HTML-comment divergence with your reasoning. Do not edit any files — this is review only, report findings as text.

first_user_message:
  Repo root: /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/press-zone-core/.worktrees/cf-deploy (all paths below are relative to this root). This is a RE-REVIEW after fixes, not a first review.

  Two files were changed after your (or a prior reviewer's) earlier pass, in response to blocking findings:

  1. apps/api/src/routes/plugin.ts and apps/api/src/routes/plugin.test.ts (commit 515bf39) — fix: the handler now ALWAYS attempts to parse the raw request body once, for BOTH literal-bigint costs and resolver costs. For resolver (function) costs: a JSON parse failure OR a resolver throw now returns fail('INVALID_REQUEST', ..., 400) with no intent created and no debit. For literal bigint costs: a parse failure does NOT reject the request — body stays undefined and execution proceeds exactly as before the fix (backward compatible). The parsed body (when parsing succeeded) is now passed to execute() for both cost forms.

  2. apps/api/src/lib/characters.ts and apps/api/src/lib/characters.test.ts (commit 60176f5) — fix: stripHtmlTags() was rewritten from a regex (/<[^>]*>/g) to a character-by-character state machine, because the regex diverged from PHP's real strip_tags() on two verified cases: (a) '<' not followed by a tag-starting character (letter, '/', '!', '?', or '>') is literal text, not a tag opener — e.g. '1 < 2 and 3 > 1' strips to '1 < 2 and 3 > 1' unchanged (15 chars); (b) an unclosed tag (no following '>') causes PHP to drop everything from the '<' to end-of-string. Both behaviors were empirically verified against real PHP 8 strip_tags() in a live WordPress container before being specified to the fixer.

  Task: adversarially re-review ONLY these two fixes (not the rest of the codebase). Specifically:
  - For plugin.ts: confirm the new unconditional-parse-before-intent ordering does not create any new way to double-parse the body stream, does not create a TOCTOU or a way to bypass the request-hash dedupe/idempotency logic, and that literal-cost routes truly preserve prior undefined-body behavior on unparseable JSON. Re-run apps/api's test suite yourself (FT_FROM_HOOK=1 FT_HINTS=1 ft pnpm --filter @press-zone/core-api test) and report the real pass/fail counts you observe.
  - For characters.ts: this is the important one. The state machine strips a tag by scanning for the NEXT '>' via value.indexOf('>', index + 1) once it sees a tag-opening '<'. HTML/WordPress content routinely contains comments like <!-- more --> and Gutenberg block comments <!-- wp:paragraph -->. Real PHP strip_tags() treats '<!--' as entering a distinct comment state that is only closed by the literal sequence '-->', NOT by the next bare '>'. Determine by reading the code (you do not have php available in your sandbox, reason about it directly) whether stripHtmlTags as currently written would mishandle a case like 'a <!-- x > y --> b' by stopping the tag-strip at the '>' inside 'x > y' and leaking ' y --> b' into the output, when real PHP strip_tags would strip the whole comment down to '-->' and leave 'a  b'. State explicitly whether this is a real divergence or not, and if real, whether it is BLOCKING (this path is used to compute billing character counts for a metered translation endpoint, so an undercount or overcount is a billing-correctness bug, not cosmetic).

  Report format: PASS or FAIL per file, with the real test suite output you observed, and for characters.ts an explicit yes/no on the HTML-comment divergence with your reasoning. Do not edit any files — this is review only, report findings as text.

preview:
  Repo root: /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/press-zone-core/.worktrees/cf-deploy (all paths below are relative to this root). This is a RE-REVIEW after fixes, not a first review.

  Two files were changed after your (or a prior reviewer's) earlier pass, in response to blocking findings:

  1. apps/api/src/routes/plugin.ts and apps/api/src/routes/plugin.test.ts (commit 515bf39) — fix: the handler now ALWAYS attempts to parse the raw request body once, for BOTH literal-bigint costs and resolver costs. For resolver (function) costs: a JSON parse failure OR a resolver throw now returns fail('INVALID_REQUEST', ..., 400) with no intent created and no debit. For literal bigint costs: a parse failure does NOT reject the request — body stays undefined and execution proceeds exactly as before the fix (backward compatible). The parsed body (when parsing succeeded) is now passed to execute() for both cost forms.

  2. apps/api/src/lib/characters.ts and apps/api/src/lib/characters.test.ts (commit 60176f5) — fix: stripHtmlTags() was rewritten from a regex (/<[^>]*>/g) to a character-by-character state machine, because the regex diverged from PHP's real strip_tags() on two verified cases: (a) '<' not followed by a tag-starting character (letter, '/', '!', '?', or '>') is literal text, not a tag opener — e.g. '1 < 2 and 3 > 1' strips to '1 < 2 and 3 > 1' unchanged (15 chars); (b) an unclosed tag (no following '>') causes PHP to drop everything from the '<' to end-of-string. Both behaviors were empirically verified against real PHP 8 strip_tags() in a live WordPress container before being specified to the fixer.

  Task: adversarially re-review ONLY these two fixes (not the rest of the codebase). Specifically:
  - For plugin.ts: confirm the new unconditional-parse-before-intent ordering does not create any new way to double-parse the body stream, does not create a TOCTOU or a way to bypass the request-hash dedupe/idempotency logic, and that literal-cost routes truly preserve prior undefined-body behavior on unparseable JSON. Re-run apps/api's test suite yourself (FT_FROM_HOOK=1 FT_HINTS=1 ft pnpm --filter @press-zone/core-api test) and report the real pass/fail counts you observe.
  - For characters.ts: this is the important one. The state machine strips a tag by scanning for the NEXT '>' via value.indexOf('>', index + 1) once it sees a tag-opening '<'. HTML/WordPress content routinely contains comments like <!-- more --> and Gutenberg block comments <!-- wp:paragraph -->. Real PHP strip_tags() treats '<!--' as entering a distinct comment state that is only closed by the literal sequence '-->', NOT by the next bare '>'. Determine by reading the code (you do not have php available in your sandbox, reason about it directly) whether stripHtmlTags as currently written would mishandle a case like 'a <!-- x > y --> b' by stopping the tag-strip at the '>' inside 'x > y' and leaking ' y --> b' into the output, when real PHP strip_tags would strip the whole comment down to '-->' and leave 'a  b'. State explicitly whether this is a real divergence or not, and if real, whether it is BLOCKING (this path is used to compute billing character counts for a metered translation endpoint, so an undercount or overcount is a billing-correctness bug, not cosmetic).

  Report format: PASS or FAIL per file, with the real test suite output you observed, and for characters.ts an explicit yes/no on the HTML-comment divergence with your reasoning. Do not edit any files — this is review only, report findings as text.


id: 01a00578-f580-7f71-bea3-d5814413eda9
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/cf-deploy-e2e863c378a4
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 60176f51a81646d29fdedc18db4615778a6b6d14
git_origin_url: /home/user/cdx-offload/repos/press-zone-core-6216e86359a3.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-terra
reasoning_effort: medium
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/15/rollout-2026-08-15T12-50-08-01a00578-f580-7f71-bea3-d5814413eda9.jsonl

title:
  Repo root: /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/press-zone-core/.worktrees/cf-deploy (all paths below are relative to this root). This is a fix-round dispatch for Task C of docs/plans/2026-08-15-product-plane-1-translate.md.

  Edit ONLY these two files: apps/api/src/lib/characters.ts and apps/api/src/lib/characters.test.ts. Touching any other file corrupts other work in this shared tree — in particular NEVER touch apps/api/src/schema.ts, apps/api/src/schema.test.ts, apps/api/src/routes/sites.ts, apps/api/src/routes/sites.test.ts, apps/api/src/routes/exceptions.ts, apps/api/src/routes/exceptions.test.ts (another lane owns those).

  /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/wordpress/wp-content/press-zone-backend is READ-ONLY reference — never edit it. Do not add any queue, scheduled or cron surface anywhere. No stubs, no placeholders, no TODOs. Full working implementation.

  REVIEWER FINDING (verbatim, confirmed real and BLOCKING — this function computes billing character counts for a metered translation endpoint, so this is a billing-correctness bug):

  'HTML-comment divergence: Yes. For input "a <!-- x > y --> b", the current stripHtmlTags implementation recognizes <!-- as tag-like but uses the first subsequent bare ">" as its terminator, so it strips only "<!-- x >" and emits "a  y --> b". Real PHP strip_tags() instead treats <!-- as entering a distinct comment state that stays active until the literal sequence "-->", producing "a  b". Gutenberg block comments (<!-- wp:paragraph -->) and ordinary HTML comments (<!--more-->) make this operationally common in WordPress content.'

  Required fix: in the stripHtmlTags state machine in apps/api/src/lib/characters.ts, when a '<' is encountered and the following characters are exactly '!--' (i.e. the tag begins with '<!--'), enter a distinct COMMENT state that consumes characters until it finds the literal closing sequence '-->' (three characters: '-', '-', '>'), then resumes normal scanning immediately after that sequence. If no closing '-->' is found before the end of the string, the entire remainder from '<!--' to end-of-string is dropped (same end-of-string-drop behavior as an unclosed regular tag) — do NOT emit any of the unterminated comment content. This must NOT change behavior for any non-comment tag ('<div>', '<br/>', '<>', '<b/c>', etc.) which continue to use the existing first-'>' termination logic already in place.

  Verify your fix against these exact cases (values -> expected mb_strlen-equivalent stripped-and-counted length via countCharacters({content: value})):
  - 'a <!-- x > y --> b' -> 'a  b' (4 characters)
  - '<!--c-->d' -> 'd' (1 character)
  - '<!-- wp:paragraph -->hi<!-- /wp:paragraph -->' -> 'hi' (2 characters)
  - 'a<!--more-->b' -> 'ab' (2 characters)
  - 'a <!-- unterminated comment b' -> 'a ' (2 characters, everything from <!-- to end-of-string dropped, matching PHP's unclosed-tag behavior)

  Also re-verify these existing passing cases still pass unchanged after your fix (do not regress them): '1 < 2 and 3 > 1' -> unchanged 15 chars; 'x <not closed' -> 'x ' 2 chars; 'a <> b' -> 4 chars; 'a <b/c> d' -> 4 chars; 'a <br/> b' -> 4 chars; 'a <div><em>x</div></em> b' -> 5 chars; '&amp;' -> 5 chars unchanged (not HTML-decoded).

  Add all 5 new comment test cases above (plus at least one negative/regression case already in the file) to apps/api/src/lib/characters.test.ts using the file's existing test style/conventions.

  Your sandbox likely cannot run pnpm install (private @platform-modules/db GitHub Packages dependency 401s) and 'ft' is not available — do not rely on running the test suite yourself if it fails for that reason; instead hand-trace your implementation against every case above in your own report and show the trace. Report your literal reasoning trace for at least the two new comment cases and the two adjacent already-passing cases, so the trace can be independently checked.

  Commit ONLY by explicit path: git add apps/api/src/lib/characters.ts apps/api/src/lib/characters.test.ts && git commit -m '<message>'. Never git add -A, never git add ., never git commit -a, never git stash, never git checkout -- ., never git reset --hard. Report the commit sha your sandbox produces.

first_user_message:
  Repo root: /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/press-zone-core/.worktrees/cf-deploy (all paths below are relative to this root). This is a fix-round dispatch for Task C of docs/plans/2026-08-15-product-plane-1-translate.md.

  Edit ONLY these two files: apps/api/src/lib/characters.ts and apps/api/src/lib/characters.test.ts. Touching any other file corrupts other work in this shared tree — in particular NEVER touch apps/api/src/schema.ts, apps/api/src/schema.test.ts, apps/api/src/routes/sites.ts, apps/api/src/routes/sites.test.ts, apps/api/src/routes/exceptions.ts, apps/api/src/routes/exceptions.test.ts (another lane owns those).

  /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/wordpress/wp-content/press-zone-backend is READ-ONLY reference — never edit it. Do not add any queue, scheduled or cron surface anywhere. No stubs, no placeholders, no TODOs. Full working implementation.

  REVIEWER FINDING (verbatim, confirmed real and BLOCKING — this function computes billing character counts for a metered translation endpoint, so this is a billing-correctness bug):

  'HTML-comment divergence: Yes. For input "a <!-- x > y --> b", the current stripHtmlTags implementation recognizes <!-- as tag-like but uses the first subsequent bare ">" as its terminator, so it strips only "<!-- x >" and emits "a  y --> b". Real PHP strip_tags() instead treats <!-- as entering a distinct comment state that stays active until the literal sequence "-->", producing "a  b". Gutenberg block comments (<!-- wp:paragraph -->) and ordinary HTML comments (<!--more-->) make this operationally common in WordPress content.'

  Required fix: in the stripHtmlTags state machine in apps/api/src/lib/characters.ts, when a '<' is encountered and the following characters are exactly '!--' (i.e. the tag begins with '<!--'), enter a distinct COMMENT state that consumes characters until it finds the literal closing sequence '-->' (three characters: '-', '-', '>'), then resumes normal scanning immediately after that sequence. If no closing '-->' is found before the end of the string, the entire remainder from '<!--' to end-of-string is dropped (same end-of-string-drop behavior as an unclosed regular tag) — do NOT emit any of the unterminated comment content. This must NOT change behavior for any non-comment tag ('<div>', '<br/>', '<>', '<b/c>', etc.) which continue to use the existing first-'>' termination logic already in place.

  Verify your fix against these exact cases (values -> expected mb_strlen-equivalent stripped-and-counted length via countCharacters({content: value})):
  - 'a <!-- x > y --> b' -> 'a  b' (4 characters)
  - '<!--c-->d' -> 'd' (1 character)
  - '<!-- wp:paragraph -->hi<!-- /wp:paragraph -->' -> 'hi' (2 characters)
  - 'a<!--more-->b' -> 'ab' (2 characters)
  - 'a <!-- unterminated comment b' -> 'a ' (2 characters, everything from <!-- to end-of-string dropped, matching PHP's unclosed-tag behavior)

  Also re-verify these existing passing cases still pass unchanged after your fix (do not regress them): '1 < 2 and 3 > 1' -> unchanged 15 chars; 'x <not closed' -> 'x ' 2 chars; 'a <> b' -> 4 chars; 'a <b/c> d' -> 4 chars; 'a <br/> b' -> 4 chars; 'a <div><em>x</div></em> b' -> 5 chars; '&amp;' -> 5 chars unchanged (not HTML-decoded).

  Add all 5 new comment test cases above (plus at least one negative/regression case already in the file) to apps/api/src/lib/characters.test.ts using the file's existing test style/conventions.

  Your sandbox likely cannot run pnpm install (private @platform-modules/db GitHub Packages dependency 401s) and 'ft' is not available — do not rely on running the test suite yourself if it fails for that reason; instead hand-trace your implementation against every case above in your own report and show the trace. Report your literal reasoning trace for at least the two new comment cases and the two adjacent already-passing cases, so the trace can be independently checked.

  Commit ONLY by explicit path: git add apps/api/src/lib/characters.ts apps/api/src/lib/characters.test.ts && git commit -m '<message>'. Never git add -A, never git add ., never git commit -a, never git stash, never git checkout -- ., never git reset --hard. Report the commit sha your sandbox produces.

preview:
  Repo root: /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/press-zone-core/.worktrees/cf-deploy (all paths below are relative to this root). This is a fix-round dispatch for Task C of docs/plans/2026-08-15-product-plane-1-translate.md.

  Edit ONLY these two files: apps/api/src/lib/characters.ts and apps/api/src/lib/characters.test.ts. Touching any other file corrupts other work in this shared tree — in particular NEVER touch apps/api/src/schema.ts, apps/api/src/schema.test.ts, apps/api/src/routes/sites.ts, apps/api/src/routes/sites.test.ts, apps/api/src/routes/exceptions.ts, apps/api/src/routes/exceptions.test.ts (another lane owns those).

  /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/wordpress/wp-content/press-zone-backend is READ-ONLY reference — never edit it. Do not add any queue, scheduled or cron surface anywhere. No stubs, no placeholders, no TODOs. Full working implementation.

  REVIEWER FINDING (verbatim, confirmed real and BLOCKING — this function computes billing character counts for a metered translation endpoint, so this is a billing-correctness bug):

  'HTML-comment divergence: Yes. For input "a <!-- x > y --> b", the current stripHtmlTags implementation recognizes <!-- as tag-like but uses the first subsequent bare ">" as its terminator, so it strips only "<!-- x >" and emits "a  y --> b". Real PHP strip_tags() instead treats <!-- as entering a distinct comment state that stays active until the literal sequence "-->", producing "a  b". Gutenberg block comments (<!-- wp:paragraph -->) and ordinary HTML comments (<!--more-->) make this operationally common in WordPress content.'

  Required fix: in the stripHtmlTags state machine in apps/api/src/lib/characters.ts, when a '<' is encountered and the following characters are exactly '!--' (i.e. the tag begins with '<!--'), enter a distinct COMMENT state that consumes characters until it finds the literal closing sequence '-->' (three characters: '-', '-', '>'), then resumes normal scanning immediately after that sequence. If no closing '-->' is found before the end of the string, the entire remainder from '<!--' to end-of-string is dropped (same end-of-string-drop behavior as an unclosed regular tag) — do NOT emit any of the unterminated comment content. This must NOT change behavior for any non-comment tag ('<div>', '<br/>', '<>', '<b/c>', etc.) which continue to use the existing first-'>' termination logic already in place.

  Verify your fix against these exact cases (values -> expected mb_strlen-equivalent stripped-and-counted length via countCharacters({content: value})):
  - 'a <!-- x > y --> b' -> 'a  b' (4 characters)
  - '<!--c-->d' -> 'd' (1 character)
  - '<!-- wp:paragraph -->hi<!-- /wp:paragraph -->' -> 'hi' (2 characters)
  - 'a<!--more-->b' -> 'ab' (2 characters)
  - 'a <!-- unterminated comment b' -> 'a ' (2 characters, everything from <!-- to end-of-string dropped, matching PHP's unclosed-tag behavior)

  Also re-verify these existing passing cases still pass unchanged after your fix (do not regress them): '1 < 2 and 3 > 1' -> unchanged 15 chars; 'x <not closed' -> 'x ' 2 chars; 'a <> b' -> 4 chars; 'a <b/c> d' -> 4 chars; 'a <br/> b' -> 4 chars; 'a <div><em>x</div></em> b' -> 5 chars; '&amp;' -> 5 chars unchanged (not HTML-decoded).

  Add all 5 new comment test cases above (plus at least one negative/regression case already in the file) to apps/api/src/lib/characters.test.ts using the file's existing test style/conventions.

  Your sandbox likely cannot run pnpm install (private @platform-modules/db GitHub Packages dependency 401s) and 'ft' is not available — do not rely on running the test suite yourself if it fails for that reason; instead hand-trace your implementation against every case above in your own report and show the trace. Report your literal reasoning trace for at least the two new comment cases and the two adjacent already-passing cases, so the trace can be independently checked.

  Commit ONLY by explicit path: git add apps/api/src/lib/characters.ts apps/api/src/lib/characters.test.ts && git commit -m '<message>'. Never git add -A, never git add ., never git commit -a, never git stash, never git checkout -- ., never git reset --hard. Report the commit sha your sandbox produces.


id: 01a005d9-5ea7-7081-8c71-9139275a69cf
source: exec
model_provider: openai
cwd: /sandbox/workspaces/cf-deploy-e2e863c378a4
sandbox_policy: {"type":"disabled"}
approval_mode: never
git_sha: 0105def1831f3f201f590fc4539d9955bcc63d47
git_origin_url: /home/user/cdx-offload/repos/press-zone-core-6216e86359a3.git
cli_version: 0.146.0
memory_mode: enabled
model: gpt-5.6-sol
reasoning_effort: low
thread_source: user
history_mode: legacy
rollout_path:
  /sandbox/home/.codex/sessions/2026/08/15/rollout-2026-08-15T14-35-26-01a005d9-5ea7-7081-8c71-9139275a69cf.jsonl

title:
  Repo root (absolute): /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/press-zone-core/.worktrees/cf-deploy
  Adversarial, report-only review. Do NOT fix anything, only report findings. Do NOT stage/commit/touch any file.

  Review commits b1a77be "Add translation_exceptions table and site metadata columns" and cfe8bb8 "Fix TypeScript typing for pglite client close in schema tests" against "## Task A — schema" in docs/plans/2026-08-15-product-plane-2-sites-exceptions.md (paths in the plan are relative to the repo root).

  Do NOT run `pnpm install` or any install/fetch command — dependencies are already installed.
  IMPORTANT: run all `vitest`/`tsc` commands as plain raw shell commands, not through any wrapper. If your shell blocks a raw command as "heavy" and suggests a wrapper, re-run the exact same command with a trailing "# raw-ok" comment instead of using the suggested wrapper — the suggested wrapper imposes a 64 GiB virtual-memory ulimit that makes pglite-backed tests fail with spurious WebAssembly OOM errors unrelated to this code.

  Check:
  1. `git show --stat b1a77be` and `git show --stat cfe8bb8` together touch ONLY apps/api/src/schema.ts and apps/api/src/schema.test.ts — nothing else.
  2. `translationExceptions` pgTable matches the plan's contract block exactly: table `translation_exceptions`, columns id/accountId/pluginKey/text/matchType(default 'exact')/createdAt, unique index `translation_exceptions_account_plugin_text_uq` on (accountId, pluginKey, text).
  3. New nullable `sites` columns present: siteName, wpVersion, pluginVersion, phpVersion, activeTheme, locale, timezone (all text), isDevelopment (boolean), lastSeenAt (timestamptz) — all nullable, none breaking existing rows.
  4. `pressZoneInitSql` extension uses `CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS` / `CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS` / `ALTER TABLE ... ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS` idempotent style matching the rest of the file — no dropped/renamed existing column, no destructive statement.
  5. Re-run acceptance yourself (raw, per the note above): `cd apps/api && npx vitest run src/schema.test.ts` — run it TWICE, report both real outputs verbatim. It must pass both times.
  6. Run `cd apps/api && npx tsc --noEmit -p tsconfig.json` (raw) and confirm it is clean (no errors referencing schema.ts or schema.test.ts). Report the real output.
  7. Read `apps/api/src/schema.test.ts` and confirm the new assertions genuinely check the new table and each new column exactly once (not accidentally matching substrings of unrelated existing tables/columns), and that the `ClosablePgliteDatabase` cast added in cfe8bb8 is a reasonable, narrowly-scoped fix (not something that silently hides a real bug).

  Report PASS/FAIL per point with the real command outputs. List any blocking findings explicitly and clearly labeled "BLOCKING" vs "non-blocking observation".

first_user_message:
  Repo root (absolute): /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/press-zone-core/.worktrees/cf-deploy
  Adversarial, report-only review. Do NOT fix anything, only report findings. Do NOT stage/commit/touch any file.

  Review commits b1a77be "Add translation_exceptions table and site metadata columns" and cfe8bb8 "Fix TypeScript typing for pglite client close in schema tests" against "## Task A — schema" in docs/plans/2026-08-15-product-plane-2-sites-exceptions.md (paths in the plan are relative to the repo root).

  Do NOT run `pnpm install` or any install/fetch command — dependencies are already installed.
  IMPORTANT: run all `vitest`/`tsc` commands as plain raw shell commands, not through any wrapper. If your shell blocks a raw command as "heavy" and suggests a wrapper, re-run the exact same command with a trailing "# raw-ok" comment instead of using the suggested wrapper — the suggested wrapper imposes a 64 GiB virtual-memory ulimit that makes pglite-backed tests fail with spurious WebAssembly OOM errors unrelated to this code.

  Check:
  1. `git show --stat b1a77be` and `git show --stat cfe8bb8` together touch ONLY apps/api/src/schema.ts and apps/api/src/schema.test.ts — nothing else.
  2. `translationExceptions` pgTable matches the plan's contract block exactly: table `translation_exceptions`, columns id/accountId/pluginKey/text/matchType(default 'exact')/createdAt, unique index `translation_exceptions_account_plugin_text_uq` on (accountId, pluginKey, text).
  3. New nullable `sites` columns present: siteName, wpVersion, pluginVersion, phpVersion, activeTheme, locale, timezone (all text), isDevelopment (boolean), lastSeenAt (timestamptz) — all nullable, none breaking existing rows.
  4. `pressZoneInitSql` extension uses `CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS` / `CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS` / `ALTER TABLE ... ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS` idempotent style matching the rest of the file — no dropped/renamed existing column, no destructive statement.
  5. Re-run acceptance yourself (raw, per the note above): `cd apps/api && npx vitest run src/schema.test.ts` — run it TWICE, report both real outputs verbatim. It must pass both times.
  6. Run `cd apps/api && npx tsc --noEmit -p tsconfig.json` (raw) and confirm it is clean (no errors referencing schema.ts or schema.test.ts). Report the real output.
  7. Read `apps/api/src/schema.test.ts` and confirm the new assertions genuinely check the new table and each new column exactly once (not accidentally matching substrings of unrelated existing tables/columns), and that the `ClosablePgliteDatabase` cast added in cfe8bb8 is a reasonable, narrowly-scoped fix (not something that silently hides a real bug).

  Report PASS/FAIL per point with the real command outputs. List any blocking findings explicitly and clearly labeled "BLOCKING" vs "non-blocking observation".

preview:
  Repo root (absolute): /home/user/Projects/Press.zone/press-zone-core/.worktrees/cf-deploy
  Adversarial, report-only review. Do NOT fix anything, only report findings. Do NOT stage/commit/touch any file.

  Review commits b1a77be "Add translation_exceptions table and site metadata columns" and cfe8bb8 "Fix TypeScript typing for pglite client close in schema tests" against "## Task A — schema" in docs/plans/2026-08-15-product-plane-2-sites-exceptions.md (paths in the plan are relative to the repo root).

  Do NOT run `pnpm install` or any install/fetch command — dependencies are already installed.
  IMPORTANT: run all `vitest`/`tsc` commands as plain raw shell commands, not through any wrapper. If your shell blocks a raw command as "heavy" and suggests a wrapper, re-run the exact same command with a trailing "# raw-ok" comment instead of using the suggested wrapper — the suggested wrapper imposes a 64 GiB virtual-memory ulimit that makes pglite-backed tests fail with spurious WebAssembly OOM errors unrelated to this code.

  Check:
  1. `git show --stat b1a77be` and `git show --stat cfe8bb8` together touch ONLY apps/api/src/schema.ts and apps/api/src/schema.test.ts — nothing else.
  2. `translationExceptions` pgTable matches the plan's contract block exactly: table `translation_exceptions`, columns id/accountId/pluginKey/text/matchType(default 'exact')/createdAt, unique index `translation_exceptions_account_plugin_text_uq` on (accountId, pluginKey, text).
  3. New nullable `sites` columns present: siteName, wpVersion, pluginVersion, phpVersion, activeTheme, locale, timezone (all text), isDevelopment (boolean), lastSeenAt (timestamptz) — all nullable, none breaking existing rows.
  4. `pressZoneInitSql` extension uses `CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS` / `CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS` / `ALTER TABLE ... ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS` idempotent style matching the rest of the file — no dropped/renamed existing column, no destructive statement.
  5. Re-run acceptance yourself (raw, per the note above): `cd apps/api && npx vitest run src/schema.test.ts` — run it TWICE, report both real outputs verbatim. It must pass both times.
  6. Run `cd apps/api && npx tsc --noEmit -p tsconfig.json` (raw) and confirm it is clean (no errors referencing schema.ts or schema.test.ts). Report the real output.
  7. Read `apps/api/src/schema.test.ts` and confirm the new assertions genuinely check the new table and each new column exactly once (not accidentally matching substrings of unrelated existing tables/columns), and that the `ClosablePgliteDatabase` cast added in cfe8bb8 is a reasonable, narrowly-scoped fix (not something that silently hides a real bug).

  Report PASS/FAIL per point with the real command outputs. List any blocking findings explicitly and clearly labeled "BLOCKING" vs "non-blocking observation".


